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DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE LATIN-AMERICAN NATIONS

DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

CONCERNING

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE LATIN-AMERICAN NATIONS

SELECTED AND ARRANGED BY

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VOLUME I

CONTAINING PARTS I AND II
DOCUMENTS 1-320

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INTRODUCTION

The proposal for the publication of the *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations* was made to the Director of the Division of International Law by Dr. Alejandro Alvarez, then and now a distinguished publicist of Chile, in a memorandum under date of May 12, 1916. He thus explained the need for a publication of this kind, suggesting both its content and the service which it would render to the Americas:

> One of the necessities most strongly felt by all students of the international law and diplomatic history of our continent is the knowledge of the documents relative to the glorious period of the emancipation of the Latin-American nations. Among those documents, the foreign papers or papers of a diplomatic character in the files of the Department of State of the United States, as well as the correspondence of the statesmen who then had the honor of conducting the foreign relations of said country, occupy a preferent place. The importance of those precedents arises from the active and efficient part which the United States took in the movement of emancipation of the Latin-American states and from the careful reports which, upon the political, economical and social situation of these states were sent to the Department at Washington by the agents which the former credited to the latter.
>
> This of course is equivalent to saying that in the files of the Department of State of the United States there is a considerable quantity of material for the diplomatic, political and economic history of Latin America.
>
> While many of these documents had been published in "American State Papers, Foreign Relations" a great portion of them remain still unpublished and therefore are unknown to historians.
>
> In our estimation the Carnegie Endowment would accomplish something of far-reaching effect, of scientific results and Pan-American approximation, if it should decide to pay the expenses which the printing of all such documents should demand, and if it should solicit the acquiescence of the Government of the United States of America for the purpose.
>
> The documents hereinbefore referred to are all those between 1810, in which the emancipation movement of the old Spanish colonies was initiated, and 1830, the date of the dissolution of Great Colombia; and in which the very recent Pan-Americanism began to die away in order to revive with greater momentum and energy during the latter part of the last century.
>
> In order that the work in respect to which the patronage of the Carnegie Endowment is requested, will fully meet the high aims which will be pursued by it, it will be necessary to proceed previously to a proper and methodic selection, arrangement and classification of the documents which are to be published.

> Several members of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union to whose consideration we have submitted the idea herein stated by us, not only have welcomed it with enthusiasm and with manifestations of approval, but they believe that in carrying it into effect, the Carnegie Endowment will once more win the gratitude of Latin America.
>
> While the work in question must comprise several volumes, we do not hesitate to assert that the benefits which it will render will greatly compensate the expenditure which its arrangement and printing may demand.

The proposal was approved by the Executive Committee within the course of that year, and the Director was authorized "to arrange with William R. Manning, professor of Latin-American history in the University of Texas, for the collection and preparation for publication of the official correspondence and documents of the United States concerning the emancipation of the Latin-American countries."

Professor Manning agreed to select and arrange these documents for publication and came to Washington for this purpose in the fall of 1917. On April 6, 1917, when the United States entered the World War the Department of State, as a consequence thereof, closed its archives to the public. Professor Manning was therefore obliged to limit himself for some time to the designation for republication of pertinent documents already published by the United States. However, in 1922, the archives of the Department were opened to the enterprise and he was enabled to continue his investigations in the Department, where he had since 1918 been employed, and bring the undertaking to a close.

It is the earnest hope of the authorities of the Carnegie Endowment that these three volumes containing documents of priceless value, which enable as they do the Latin-American countries to trace the painful steps of their emancipation, will be accepted by them as an evidence of the friendly feeling of the people of the United States of North America; and that in carrying the project into effect the Endowment has accomplished, to quote Dr. Alvarez, "something of far-reaching effect, of scientific results and Pan-American approximation"—something for which it really will, as prophesied by members of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, "win the gratitude of Latin America."

JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
May 13, 1925.

PREFACE

An effort has been made to include in this collection all of the more important diplomatic correspondence of the United States regarding the independence of the Latin-American countries. Very few documents earlier than 1810 and none later than 1830, with a single exception which reviews events of the latter year, have been selected. Geographically the compilation will be found to include correspondence not only with the Latin-American countries whose independence was an accomplished fact before the latter date and with which frequent communication had been established but also with certain European countries where the Latin-American emancipation movement elicited especial interest.

The documents which have not previously been published, comprising by far the largest portion, have been copied from the original manuscripts preserved in the archives of the Department of State of the United States. In the selection of the pertinent documents and the pertinent portions of documents only partially devoted to the subject about four hundred and thirty bound volumes of manuscripts have been carefully examined. For various reasons, chiefly because of inevitable human limitations, it is probable that some important documents have been overlooked. In a few instances series of papers which there is good reason to believe should have reached the Department have not been found. Some such gaps are said to be possibly attributable to the destruction of portions of the archives in connection with the brief occupation of Washington by British troops during the second war with Great Britain, although in this connection it should be stated, concerning the most important missing series, that, in accordance with instructions of President Monroe, Daniel Brent, the Chief Clerk, on September 26, 1818,[1] forwarded to Joel Roberts Poinsett, his manuscript Journal No. 1, together with all the letters received from him which were then in the files of the Department of State.

To prosecute this exploration of the archives a fortuitous circumstance made it possible for the editor to avail himself of the services of Mr. T. John Newton, who had for forty-eight years been connected with the Bureau of Indexes and Archives of the Department of State and is more familiar than any other person with the older portion of the archives. He had, in accord with the Civil Service pension rules, retired from the Departmental service less than a month before this work was begun. For eleven months he de-

[1] See letter of this date from Daniel Brent to Joel Roberts Poinsett, MS. Domestic Letters, XVII, p. 212.

voted his time to it; and much of the credit for its thoroughness is due to him. In cases of doubt whether a particular paper or portion of a paper should or should not be included, and when he could not conveniently consult the editor, it was his practice to err, if at all, on the side of inclusion. In reviewing and arranging the transcripts for publication the editor found textual reference to many other papers and had them added. And although he has rejected a considerable number of documents and portions of documents believed not to be sufficiently apropos, there are still to be found some documents and many brief portions of documents whose pertinency will be questioned. This is due to the fact that the editor also has striven to err, when he might err in this regard, on the side of inclusion. In some cases wholly unrelated sentences or brief paragraphs have been permitted to stand merely because it was considered unnecessary or undesirable to break the continuity of the papers by such small omissions. A few entire documents which are only remotely relevant have been allowed to remain because of their inherent interest.

The editor has permitted most of the idiosyncrasies of the writers of these documents to stand, making correction only in case of manifest and inadvertent error, where the correction could in nowise affect the sense. Strict stylists will be able to discover not only blunders but inconsistencies in spelling, grammatical construction, punctuation, and capitalization throughout the volumes. A casual examination will reveal the fact that to have dressed all of the documents in comely State Department style would have required a practical rewriting of many of them, especially those coming from consular appointees, who at this early period were frequently selected from the few available, usually not highly educated, practical merchants already resident in the communities to which they were accredited. Some of the special agents and even of the regular diplomatic appointees will also be seen to have been far from perfect in matters of grammar and spelling.

Neither has an attempt been made to eliminate all indiscreet or undiplomatic language, which if published contemporaneously might have given just offense to foreign governments or officials or have proved embarrassing to the writers, although some obviously improper statements have been deleted where their deletion could not materially alter the sense of the documents. The latest of the papers being nearly a hundred years old, it is believed that none of the governments mentioned or the living relatives of their officials or of the writers will take offense at the publication now of indiscretions due to the passions or prejudices of a century ago. Their retention enables the reader of the present better to get into the atmosphere of the past and therefore enhances the historical value of the publication.

The documents printed in the old *American State Papers, Foreign Relations* which are pertinent to the present collection have been reprinted not only because of the desire to have the collection complete in itself, or as nearly so

as it has been feasible to make it, but also because the former publication, being out of print, is rather inaccessible to the public at large. Some of the documents will also be found in other publications, especially contemporary periodicals, in Congressional documents, and the printed correspondence of officials who drafted the papers, and a few have been quoted in diplomatic and historical treatises. Few citations have been made, however, except to *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, and to the volumes of manuscripts in the archives of the Department of State. Since the documents contained in the publication named were also copied from the archives of the Department of State, especially since they were officially prepared and printed, much labor in preparing the manuscript for the present publication, and some space in the publication, could have been saved by omitting all citations of sources except this prefatory explanation; but in order to facilitate the use of the present publication as a work of reference it has been considered worth while to incur the additional expense involved in citing individually the source of each document.

In some of the footnotes will be found brief reviews of the diplomatic careers of the more important writers or recipients of the documents to which they are appended. These reviews are taken from the *Register of the Department of State* printed in March 1874 of which Part II, entitled "Historical Register," contains the records, from 1789 to that date, of the Department's officials, its more important diplomatic agents to foreign countries, and the heads of foreign missions in the United States. The intention has been to append the record to the document where the name of the individual concerned first appears.

It will be observed that the documents have been arranged in fourteen parts, each designated by the name of the country in which the papers included therein originated. Part I, entitled "Communications from the United States," contains not only the Department of State's *instructions to* its representatives in foreign countries but also its *notes to* the representatives in Washington from those countries; and in addition to these, which alone are ordinarily understood to be included in the designation "diplomatic communications from the United States", there have also been included the more significant messages or portions thereof from the President of the United States to Congress, commenting upon the Latin-American struggle for independence, and a few such papers originating in Congress. The communications from foreign countries are arranged in alphabetical order, according to the countries of origin, and the Part designated by the name of each contains not only *despatches from* the representatives of the United States in that country and correspondence between them and the officials of that country, but also the *notes from* that country's representatives in Washington to the Department of State.

For access to the archives, and for the provision of space and other con-

veniences for carrying on the work, acknowledgments are due to the late Mr. Alvey A. Adee, Second Assistant Secretary of the Department, to the late Dr. Gaillard Hunt, Chief of the Division of Publications, and to Mr. David A. Salmon, Chief of the Bureau of Indexes and Archives. For permission to supervise the work while continuing his regular departmental duties the editor's personal acknowledgments are due to Mr. Francis White, Chief of the Division of Latin-American Affairs, and to the former Second Assistant Secretary.

WILLIAM R. MANNING.

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155	President John Quincy Adams	Same	March 30, 1826	269
156	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	José María Salazar, Colombian Minister to the U. S.	April 11, 1826	270
157	Same	Alexander H. Everett, U. S. Minister to Spain	April 13, 1826	271
158	Same	Henry Middleton, U. S. Minister to Russia	April 21, 1826	273
159	Same	Baron de Maltitz, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in the U. S.	May 26, 1826	274
160	Same	José María Salazar, Colombian Minister to the U. S.	Oct. 25, 1826	275
161	Same	Same	Oct. 31, 1826	276
162	Same	James Cooley, appointed U. S. Chargé d'Affaires in Peru	Nov. 6, 1826	277
163	Same	Baron de Maltitz, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in the U. S.	Dec. 23, 1826	278
164	Same	José María Salazar, Colombian Minister to the U. S.	Jan. 9, 1827	279
165	Same	Same	Jan. 15, 1827	280
166	Same	Francisco Dionisio Vives, Governor and Captain General of Cuba	Feb. 12, 1827	281
167	Same	Daniel P. Cook, U. S. Confidential Agent to Cuba	March 12, 1827	282

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170	Same	Pablo Obregon, Mexican Minister to the U. S.	May 21, 1827	285
171	Same	Hilario de Rivas y Salmon, Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in the U. S.	June 9, 1827	286
172	Same	Chevalier Francisco Tacon, Spanish Minister Resident to the U. S.	Oct. 31, 1827	289
173	Same	John M. Forbes, U. S. Chargé d'Affaires at Buenos Aires	Jan. 3, 1828	292
174	Same	J. Rafael Revenga, Colombian Secretary of State for Foreign Relations	Jan. 30, 1828	294
175	Same	Francisco Tacon, Spanish Minister Resident to the U. S.	April 11, 1828	295
176	Same	Pablo Obregon, Mexican Minister to the U. S.	May 1, 1828	296
177	Daniel Brent, Chief Clerk of the Dept. of State	Francisco Tacon, Spanish Minister Resident to the U. S.	Aug. 2, 1828	298
178	Same	Same	Sept. 20, 1828	298
179	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	Alejandro Valez, Colombian Chargé d'Affaires in the U. S.	Oct. 14, 1828	299
180	Same	F. I. Mariategui, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru	Dec. 30, 1828	300
181	Same	Samuel Larned, U. S. Chargé d'Affaires in Peru	Jan. 1, 1829	300
182	Same	Xavier de Medina, Colombian Consul General at New York	Feb. 9, 1829	302
183	Martin Van Buren, Sec. of State	Same	May 6, 1829	303
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191	Cornelio de Saavedra, President of the Governing Junta of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, Domingo Matheu and 11 others	Same	June 6, 1811	321
192	Cornelio de Saavedra, President of the Governing Junta of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata	Same	June 26, 1811	322
193	W. G. Miller, U. S. Consul at Buenos Aires	James Monroe, Sec. of State	April 30, 1812	322
194	Same	Same	July 16, 1812	326
195	Same	Same	Aug. 10, 1812	330
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197	Constituted Assembly of United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata	President James Madison	July 21, 1813	332
198	W. G. Miller, U. S. Consul at Buenos Aires	James Monroe, Sec. of State	Aug. 1, 1813	333
199	Gervasio Antonio de Posadas, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata	President James Madison	March 9, 1814	334
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201	Joel Roberts Poinsett, U. S. Consul General at Buenos Aires	James Monroe, Sec. of State	June 14, 1814	335
202	Thomas Lloyd Halsey, U. S. Consul at Buenos Aires	Same	Feb. 11, 1815	336
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204	Ignacio Alvarez, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata	Thomas Lloyd Halsey, Consul of the U. S. at Buenos Aires	May 10, 1815	339
205	Thomas Lloyd Halsey, U. S. Consul at Buenos Aires	James Monroe, Sec. of State	July 17, 1815	340
206	Ignacio Alvarez, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata	President James Madison	Jan. 16, 1816	341
207	Thomas Lloyd Halsey, U. S. Consul at Buenos Aires	James Monroe, Sec. of State	April 20, 1816	342
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212	Thomas Lloyd Halsey, U. S. Consul at Buenos Aires	James Monroe, Sec. of State	Jan. 30, 1817	347
213	Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America	President James Madison	Jan. 31, 1817	349
214	Thomas Lloyd Halsey, U. S. Consul at Buenos Aires	James Monroe, Sec. of State	March 3, 1817	349
215	Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America	President James Monroe	March 5, 1817	350
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218	Don José Francisco de San Martín, General of the Army of the Andes	President James Monroe	April 1, 1817	352
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221	Same	Same	Oct. 4, 1817	355
222	Same	Gregorio Tagle, Sec. of State of the United Provinces of South America	Oct. 6, 1817	356
223	Manuel H. de Aguirre, Agent of the United Provinces of South America	President James Monroe	Oct. 29, 1817	357
224	W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the U. S. to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru	Gregorio Tagle, Sec. of State of the United Provinces of South America	Oct. 30, 1817	358
225	Manuel H. de Aguirre, Agent of the United Provinces of South America to the U. S.	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	Dec. 16, 1817	361
226	Same	Same	Dec. 26, 1817	363
227	Same	Same	Dec. 29, 1817	366
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229	W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the U. S. to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru	Same	Jan. 10, 1818	368
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234	Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America	President James Monroe	Jan. 31, 1818	374
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236	Same	Same	April 5, 1818	376
237	Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America	President James Monroe	May —, 1818	377
238	W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru	Statement [to Dept. of State?]	July 1, 1818	378
239	Thomas Lloyd Halsey, ex-Consul of the U. S. at Buenos Aires	John Graham, Special Commissioner of the U. S. to South America	Aug. 21, 1818	379
240	Same	Same	Aug. 26, 1818	381
241	Theodorick Bland, Special Commissioner of the U. S. to South America	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	Nov. 2, 1818	382
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246	David C. de Forest, Agent of the United Provinces of South America at Georgetown	Same	Dec. 9, 1818	515
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249	W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the U. S. to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru	Same	March 7, 1819	519
250	John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the U. S. to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru	Same	Dec. 12, 1819	537
251	Same	Same	Feb. 14, 1820	540
252	Same	Same	March 9, 1820	541
253	W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the U. S. to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru	Same	March 10, 1820	544
254	John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the U. S. to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru	Same	March 20, 1820	545
255	W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the U. S. to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru	Same	April 8, 1820	548
256	John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the U. S. to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru	Same	April 30, 1820	549
257	Same	Same	May 24, 1820	551
258	Same	Same	June 8, 1820	552
259	Same	Same	Sept. 28, 1820	555
260	John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the U. S. at Buenos Aires	Same	Dec. 4, 1820	557
261	Same	Same	March 10, 1821	569

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263	Same	Same	July 3, 1821	576
264	Same [Minute of conference with Bernardo Rivadavia]	Same	Aug. 5, 1821	577
265	Same	Same	Sept. 2, 1821	579
266	Same	Same	Sept. 11, 1821	582
267	Same	Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Relations of the United Provinces of South America	Sept. 14, 1821	583
268	Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Relations of the United Provinces of South America	John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the U. S. at Buenos Aires	Sept. 15, 1821	584
269	John M. Forbes [Minute of a conference with Bernardo Rivadavia]	[Sec. of State]	Sept. 17, 1821	585
270	Same	Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Affairs of the United Provinces of South America	Sept. 22, 1821	587
271	Same	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	Sept. 28, 1821	587
272	Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Relations of the United Provinces of South America	John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the U. S. at Buenos Aires	Oct. 6, 1821	590
273	John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the U. S. at Buenos Aires	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	Oct. 8, 1821	591
274	Same	Same	Oct. 26, 1821	592
275	Same	Same	Nov. 8, 1821	593
276	Same	Same	Nov. 13, 1821	596
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278	Same	Same	Dec. 12, 1821	598

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280	Same	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	June 5, 1822	603
281	Same	Same	July 10, 1822	604
282	Same	Same	July 18, 1822	606
283	Same	Same	Aug. 21, 1822	609
284	Same	Same	Aug. 23, 1822	611
285	Same	Same	Aug. 24, 1822	612
286	Same	Same	Sept. 2, 1822	614
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288	John M. Forbes, Sec. of the U. S. Legation at Buenos Aires	Same	March 2, 1823	616
289	Same	Same	April 30, 1823	620
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292	Same	Same	July 5, 1823	623
293	Same	Same	Sept. 12, 1823	625
294	Same	Same	Nov. 5, 1823	627
295	Same	Same	Jan. 3, 1824	630
296	Same	Same	Jan. 24, 1824	632
297	Same	Same	Feb. 12, 1824	634
298	Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Relations of the United Provinces of South America	Caesar A. Rodney, U. S. Minister at Buenos Aires	Feb. 12, 1824	635
299	John M. Forbes, Sec. of the U. S. Legation at Buenos Aires	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	Feb. 22, 1824	636
300	John M. Forbes, Acting Chargé d'Affaires of the U. S. at Buenos Aires	Same	July 5, 1824	638
301	Same	Same	Aug. 13, 1824	639

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303	Same	John Quincy Adams, Sec. of State	Dec. 17, 1824	644
304	Same	Same	Jan. 23, 1825	645
305	John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the U. S. Legation at Buenos Aires	Henry Clay, Sec. of State	May 2, 1825	647
306	Same	Same	Sept. 18, 1825	650
307	Same	Same	Nov. 29, 1825	651
308	Same	Same	Feb. 9, 1826	653
309	Same	Same	June 17, 1826	653
310	Same	Same	July 15, 1826	655
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313	Same	Same	Oct. 25, 1826	658
314	Same	Same	March 8, 1827	660
315	Same	Same	April 12, 1827	660
316	Same	Same	July 18, 1827	661
317	Same	Same	May 2, 1828	662
318	Same	Same	Sept. 13, 1828	663
319	Same	Martin Van Buren, Sec. of State	Feb. 13, 1830	664
320	Same	Same	Dec. 25, 1830	665

NOTE

The idiosyncrasies of spelling, punctuation, capitalization and grammar of the original manuscript stand uncorrected in this print, except in case of manifest and inadvertent error, where the correction could in nowise affect the sense.

PART I

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES

1

Robert Smith, Secretary of State, to General John Armstrong, United States Minister to France[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 27, 1809.*

The policy or the pride of the new Spanish Monarch[2] or of the Emperor influencing him, may, in the event of a resistance to his authority, in South America, insist, as was done in the case of St Domingo,[3] on our prohibiting all trade therewith from the United States. It will be of much importance that such a demand be averted, as the right to make it cannot be admitted and the attempt may endanger the peace of the two Countries.

2

Robert Smith, Secretary of State, to General John Armstrong, United States Minister to France[4]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *May 1, 1809.*

SIR: I herewith send to you copies of letters that have recently passed between Genl Turreau and myself. The one from him indicates what he knows or presumes to be the sensibility of his Government as to the relations of the United States to the Spanish Colonies. My answer will enable you to meet its suggestions with an assurance that the conduct of this Government will be regulated in that respect, as it invariably has been, by the principles of good faith and by the rules prescribed by its neutral character. It is, however, not to be understood, that the United States will be restrained

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VII, 42. Robert Smith, of Maryland, was commissioned Secretary of State by President Madison March 6, 1809; was asked by President Madison to resign; resigned April 1, 1811. John Armstrong, of New York, had been commissioned minister plenipotentiary to France June 30, 1804. He left Paris September 14, 1810. Mr. Armstrong and James Bowdoin, of Massachusetts, who was then minister plenipotentiary at Madrid, were commissioned commissioners plenipotentiary and extraordinary, March 17, 1806, to treat jointly and severally with Spain concerning territories, wrongful captures, condemnations, and other injuries. Armstrong did not go to Madrid, but conducted negotiations at Paris. The negotiations were unsuccessful.

[2] Joseph Bonaparte, who had about a year earlier been placed on the Spanish throne by his brother Napoleon, the French Emperor, after the forced abdications of the Spanish Bourbons.

[3] When that former French colony revolted against France.

[4] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VII, 43.

from interposing in any manner that may be necessary to prevent the Territory claimed under the Convention from being reduced under the possession of another belligerent power.

There is reason to apprehend that the suspicions of Genl Turreau have been particularly incited by the incidental circumstance of Genl Wilkinson having touched at the Havana in his passage to New Orleans. The candid explanation is, that altho' no formal instructions were given to Genl Wilkinson, it was intended that he should avail himself of every proper occasion to remove the impressions, made by our Embargo laws, that the United States were in hostile cooperation against the Spanish Colonies; to obviate moreover, attempts that might be made to draw them into a hostile collision with the United States; and generally, to cultivate such dispositions towards the United States as become our existing pacific and legitimate relations. Neither Genl Wilkinson, nor any other person has been instructed or authorized to take any step or hold any communication that could intermeddle in the remotest degree with the internal affairs of the Spanish Empire, or that could tend to a violation of the strict neutrality professed by the United States.

From the policy and pretensions which had led to the demand heretofore made on the United States to interdict our commerce with St Domingo, it is not impossible, should Spanish America refuse to acknowledge the new dynasty, that a like demand may be meditated. Altho' it may not be proper to anticipate such a demand, yet if a purpose of the kind should be clearly manifested, it is desirable to obviate it by frank and friendly explanations. . . . And it is only necessary to add, that it would, at this time, be as difficult to effectuate such a prohibitory regulation, as it would be unreasonable to require it, and that the measure is regarded by the President in such a light as that no countenance is to be given to any hope of attaining it, even by an offer of arrangements otherwise satisfactory, with respect to the Floridas and the Western boundary of Louisiana.

I have the honor [etc.].

3

Robert Smith, Secretary of State, to Thomas Sumter, Jr., United States Minister to the Portuguese Court in Brazil[1, 2]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *August 1, 1809.*

You will not fail to communicate the earliest information of all the material occurrences in Spanish America, which may have been produced by the present contest in Spain. And whatever may ultimately be the form of Government there established it is our policy to be in harmony with it. You will however at the same time keep in mind that in any conflicts that may arise we will faithfully preserve our neutral character.

4

Robert Smith, Secretary of State, to William Pinkney, United States Minister to Great Britain[3]

WASHINGTON, *June 13, 1810.*

SIR: According to present appearances a crisis is approaching which cannot fail to dissolve the Colonial relation of Spanish America to their parent Country. It is the duty therefore of the United States to turn their attention particularly to the case of the two Floridas in whose destiny they have so near an interest. Besides that which results from Geographical position the United States consider themselves as holding a legal title to the greater part of West Florida under the purchase made by the Convention with France in the year 1803. And they have a fair claim of another kind, which would certainly not be more than satisfied by the acquisition of the residue of the West and the whole of East Florida. Under these circumstances it may be proper not to conceal from the British Government (which may otherwise form views towards these territories inconsistent with the eventual ones entertained by the United States) that any steps on the part

[1] In 1807 the Portuguese Court, in order to escape from Napoleon, fled from Lisbon and took refuge in Brazil, where it remained until 1821.

[2] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VII, 53. Thomas Sumter, Jr., of South Carolina, was commissioned minister plenipotentiary to Portugal, March 7, 1809, but accredited to the Portuguese court, residing in Brazil. He took leave July 24, 1819.

[3] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VII, 98. James Monroe, of Virginia, and William Pinkney, of Maryland, were jointly and severally commissioned, May 12, 1806, as commissioners for the settlement of differences with Great Britain and establishing commerce. Mr. Monroe took leave of the British court, October 7, 1807, and Mr. Pinkney May 7, 1811. The latter was also minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain from May 12, 1806, until May 7, 1811.

of Great Britain interfering with these will necessarily be regarded as unjust and unfriendly, and as leading to collisions, which it must be the interest of both nations to avoid.

This instruction from the President is given to you on the supposition that the connection of Great Britain with Spain will have been terminated by events in Europe. You will of course forbear to execute it in a different state of things. And in executing it you will be careful to authorize no inference with respect to the intentions of this Government inconsistent with the principles of justice and neutrality on which the policy of the United States is founded.

With great respect [etc.].

5

Robert Smith, Secretary of State, to Joel Robert Poinsett of South Carolina, appointed Special Agent of the United States to South America[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *June 28, 1810.*

SIR: As a crisis is approaching which must produce great changes in the situation of Spanish America, and may dissolve altogether its colonial relations to Europe, and as the geographical position of the United States, and other obvious considerations, give them an intimate interest in whatever may effect the destiny of that part of the American continent, it is our duty to turn our attention to this important subject, and to take such steps, not incompatible with the neutral character and honest policy of the United States, as the occasion renders proper. With this view, you have been selected to proceed, without delay, to Buenos Ayres. You will make it your object, wherever it may be proper, to diffuse the impression that the United States cherish the sincerest good will towards the people of Spanish America as neighbors, as belonging to the same portion of the globe, and as having a mutual interest in cultivating friendly intercourse: that this disposition will exist, whatever may be their internal system or European relation, with respect to which no interference of any sort is pretended: and that, in the event of a political separation from the parent country, and of the

[1] House Report No. 72, 20th Congress, 2d session, p. 7. The original of this document was not located in the archives of the Department of State. In the printed source from which it has been taken the heading reads "Extract of a letter from Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, to, etc."—an obvious error since Monroe was not Secretary of State until April 2, 1811, and Robert Smith held the post until April 1, 1811.

Joel R. Poinsett, of South Carolina: In addition to this special mission to South America was commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico, March 8, 1825. He was also commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Congress of Panama, which was to reassemble at Tacubaya, February 12, 1827. Took leave of Mexican government, December 25, 1829.

establishment of an independent system of National Government, it will coincide with the sentiments and policy of the United States to promote the most friendly relations, and the most liberal intercourse, between the inhabitants of this hemisphere, as having all a common interest, and as lying under a common obligation to maintain that system of peace, justice, and good will, which is the only source of happiness for nations.

Whilst you inculcate these as the principles and dispositions of the United States, it will be no less proper to ascertain those on the other side, not only towards the United States, but in reference to the great nations of Europe, and to the commercial and other connexions with them, respectively: and, generally, to inquire into the state, the characteristics, and the proportions, as to numbers, intelligence, and wealth, of the several parties, the amount of population, the extent and organization of the military force, and the pecuniary resources of the country.

The real as well as ostensible object of your mission is to explain the mutual advantages of commerce with the United States, to promote liberal and stable regulations, and to transmit seasonable information on the subject. In order that you may render the more service in this respect, and that you may, at the same time, enjoy the greater protection and respectability, you will be furnished with a credential letter, such as is held by sundry agents of the United States in the West Indies, and as was lately held by one at the Havana, and under the sanction of which you will give the requisite attention to commercial objects.

6

Robert Smith, Secretary of State, to General John Armstrong, United States Minister to France[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *November 1, 1810.*

SIR: You will avail yourself of the first proper opportunity to bring to the view of the French Government the trade with Spanish and Portuguese America which the British Government is at this time pushing thro' every avenue which its power and policy can penetrate. This monopoly not only affords to Great Britain the means of furnishing the people of that Country altogether with British manufactures, but it moreover enables her to maintain a controuling political ascendency over them which has already shewn itself, against the neutral commerce of the United States in the late Commercial arrangement of her Agent at Caraccas, to be seen in the newspapers

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VII, 121.

now sent you. To counteract the tendency of such an exclusive trade, nothing could at this time be more effectual than the opening of all the channels of a free commercial communication between the United States and France and her allies. By such freedom of admission and the abolition of all vexatious restrictions, France and the Nations connected with her would, thro' the medium of American enterprize and navigation, obtain a vent for a large portion of their produce and manufactures which in no other way can find a market in the ports of Spanish and Portuguese America.

7

Robert Smith, Secretary of State, to General John Armstrong, United States Minister to France[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *November 2, 1810.*

The recent transactions in Spain having produced in her American Colonies a sensation tending to a change of the old established polity, the Government of the United States could not remain an unconcerned spectator of the occurrence of such important events in our own immediate neighborhood. So long, however, as the fluctuation of opinions and policy did not actually interfere with the jurisdiction of the United States, or place in jeopardy the security of any of their territorial rights, the President confined within the limits of a necessary vigilance his attention to the incidents that had become public. But the late proceedings of the inhabitants of West Florida having indicated in form and in fact a total overthrow there of the Spanish authorities and a great uncertainty prevailing with respect to the shape which affairs in that quarter might assume if left to the uncontrouled current of a revolutionary impulse, the President has been compelled for the maintenance of the just rights of the Union to take the necessary measures for occupying the Country of West Florida as far as the River Perdido. From the enclosed copy of the President's proclamation you will perceive his determination to take possession of this Territory, and the considerations which have constrained him to resort to this measure. In this posture of affairs the Government of the United States will be ready to meet and discuss the question of the right of Sovereignty to the Territory thus occupied. This act of occupancy, which is merely a change of possession and not a change of right, will, it is hoped, be viewed only as the natural consequence of a state of things, which the American Government could neither foresee nor prevent.

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VII, 123.

8

Robert Smith, Secretary of State, to William Shaler, United States Agent for Seamen and Commerce, Habana[1,2]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *November 6, 1810.*

SIR: Your Letters of the 5, 9, 18, 22, 25, 29, June & 2 July have been duly received.

[The second paragraph of this is identical with the above from Smith to Armstrong, November 2, 1810.]

Under the varying aspect of the affairs of Spain, it has been the anxious endeavor of the President to regulate his conduct by the rules of the most exact neutrality. This disposition has been manifested in the prompt suppression of unlawful enterprizes carried on by certain Privateers bearing the French flag clandestinely fitted out in the Ports of the United States, and calculated to annoy the Trade of the subjects of Spain in the Gulph of Mexico and elsewhere and in the remonstrance against these illegal Equipments made to the Government of France, through the American Minister at Paris, a Copy of whose Letter to the Duke of Cadore is herewith sent to you.

These representations will enable you to give at Cuba and elsewhere any explanations that may be necessary.

In the enclosed Gazette you will perceive an official Declaration of the British Government respecting Spanish America which is transmitted to you as an evidence of the policy and views of the British Government, in relation as well to old Spain as to Spanish America. This in your hands may be useful.

I am [etc.].

9

Robert Smith, Secretary of State, to William Pinkney, United States Minister to Great Britain[3]

WASHINGTON, *January 22, 1811.*

SIR: You will herewith receive copies of two acts of Congress, which have been passed with closed doors and which have not yet been made public. You will thence perceive that the United States are not disposed to acquiesce in the occupation on the part of any foreign power of any part of East or West Florida, and that Congress have provided under certain contingencies for the temporary occupation of the said Territory.

[1] The same, *mutatis mutandis*, with the exception of the first paragraph, to William K. Loury, Caracas, and to Joel Robert Poinsett, Buenos Aires. See doc. 115 below addressed to Robert K. Lowry commissioning him consul at La Guayra in 1823. It is possible that they are the same. The records of the Division of the Department of State do not include special agents.

[2] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, I, 352.

[3] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VII, 140.

This proceeding is, on the part of the United States justified by national interest and by national policy; an interest founded upon a recognized though unliquidated claim on Spain for indemnities; and a policy imperatively prescribed by a legitimate principle of self preservation.

At a period prior to the purchase of Louisiana the attention of this Government had been directed to the peaceable acquisition of the Floridas from Spain. That purchase, whilst it diminished the geographical extent of West Florida, and lessened the value of the Spanish possessions in that quarter, has increased the solicitude of the United States for the Sovereignty of a tract of Country, whose contiguity rendered it vitally important in a military, naval and commercial point of view. Mingled with considerations of this nature, are claims which this Government has justly maintained against Spain, the final adjustment of which, it was believed, might be facilitated by a purchase for a fair price, of all the Territory of Florida East of the River Perdido. The fate of a proposition to this effect had not been decided when the present revolution commenced in Spain, the fury of which has extended to and convulsed her American Colonies, has weakened in them the authority of the parent kingdom, and in some instances has produced a dissolution of the old form of Government and the institution of independent States. In this condition of the Spanish Empire, with the antient system of Government expiring, new systems of Rule growing up in her provinces and exposed to events which the vicissitudes of a political and military revolution render incalculable, what more natural, what more conformable to justice, than for the United States in a spirit of friendly moderation to seek security for those indemnities not disowned by Spain herself, but the payment of which has been so long delayed? Should a new Government be established in Spain under any auspices whatsoever and declare itself absolved from the payment of the debts of the old Monarchy, to what source, except a pledge in possession, could the United States recur for remuneration for so many losses which their Citizens have suffered from the effects of the laws and the policy of Spain?

This motive of national interest is supported and strengthened by the obvious policy of the measure. Altho' this Government does not wantonly seek an extension of Territory, it frankly avows the pursuit of an object essential to its future peace and safety upon honorable and reasonable terms. The United States cannot see with indifference a foreign power, under any pretext whatever possess itself of the Floridas. The prospect of danger to the Union from such a step would be too imminent, the real object too apparent for them either to disguise their sentiments or to hesitate a moment as to the conduct which they would be inevitably compelled to pursue. This explicit declaration, uttered with sincerity and friendliness ought to admonish the British Government (should it unhappily yield itself up to such improper desires) to check all inclination of gaining a footing in the Floridas.

The Government of France will also be immediately apprized of this declaration on the part of the United States.

These observations, which at an early day and on a suitable occasion you are to present in substance to the British Government are applicable to the two contingencies contemplated by the accompanying acts of Congress. In either of these cases, however, the United States, you may add, intend nothing more than the preservation of the peace and quiet of the Territory, the prevention of anarchy, and the exclusion of all external interference; and in this posture to await the re-establishment of a state of things, in which all matters in dispute may be amicably and satisfactorily adjusted upon principles of right and equity with the competent authority.

In making the communication to the British Government now confided to your discretion, you will of course, be fully sensible of the importance of doing it in a manner that will guard as much as possible, against irritating or precipitating it, into the measure to be obviated; and you will lose not a moment in transmitting intelligence as to the temper in which the communication may be received, and as to the effect likely to be produced by it on the policy of that Cabinet.

I have the honor [etc.].

10

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Joel Robert Poinsett, United States Consul General at Buenos Aires[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *April 30, 1811.*

The instructions already given you[2] are so full, that there seems to be little cause to add to them at this time. Much solicitude is felt to hear from you on all the topics to which they relate. The disposition shewn by most of the Spanish provinces to separate from Europe and to erect themselves into independent States excites great interest here. As Inhabitants of the same Hemisphere, as Neighbors, the United States cannot be unfeeling Spectators of so important a moment. The destiny of those provinces must depend on themselves. Should such a revolution however take place, it cannot be doubted that our relation with them will be more intimate, and our friendship stronger than it can be while they are colonies of any European power.

I have [etc.].

[1] MS. Dispatches to Consuls, I, 365. James Monroe, of Virginia: Commissioned Secretary of State by President Madison, April 2, 1811; was appointed Secretary of War, September 26, 1814, and confirmed by the Senate, September 27, 1814; continued to serve as Acting Secretary of State also. President Madison offered the position to Daniel D. Tompkins, September 28, 1814, who declined it. Mr. Monroe was again commissioned as Secretary of State by President Madison, February 28, 1815, and retired, March 4, 1817, on becoming President.

[2] See above, doc. 5, Smith to Poinsett, June 28, 1810.

11

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to John Quincy Adams, United States Minister to Russia[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *November 23, 1811.*

Various considerations, which will readily suggest themselves to you, have induced this Government to look with a favorable eye to a Revolution which is now taking place in South America. Several of the Provinces have sent Deputies to this Country, to announce a complete Revolution in some, and the approach of it in others, but as yet a formal recognition of a Minister from neither has been made, nor has it been urged.

12

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Joel Barlow, United States Minister to France[2, 3]

WASHINGTON, *November 27, 1811.*

SIR: A Revolution in the Spanish Provinces, South of the United [States] is making a rapid progress. The Provinces of Venezuela have declared themselves independent and announced the event to this Government. The same step it is said, will soon be taken at Buenos Ayres and in other quarters. The Provinces of Venezuela have proposed to the President the recognition of their independence, and reception of a Minister from them; and altho' such recognition in form has not been made, yet a very friendly and conciliatory answer has been given to them. They have also been informed that the Ministers of the United States in Europe, will be instructed to avail themselves of suitable opportunities to promote their recognition by other powers. You will not fail to attend to this object, which is thought to be equally due to the just claims of our Southern Brethren, to which the United States cannot be indifferent, and to the best interests of this Country.

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VII, 179. John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts: Commissioned minister plenipotentiary to Russia, June 27, 1809. Took leave, April 7, 1814. Commissioned (with others) minister plenipotentiary and extraordinary, January 18, 1814, with power to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace and a treaty of commerce with Great Britain. Commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain, February 28, 1815. Took leave, May 14, 1817. Commissioned (with others) envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, April 17, 1813, with power, jointly and severally, to conclude a peace with Great Britain. Commissioned Secretary of State by President Monroe, March 5, 1817; retired, March 4, 1825, on becoming President.

[2] A circular identical with the first paragraph of this letter was sent to the United States Ministers to Great Britain, Russia and Denmark.

[3] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VII, 183. Joel Barlow, of Connecticut: Commissioned minister plenipotentiary to France, February 27, 1811. Died at Zarnowice, December 26, 1812, on his return to Paris from Vilna.

In so doing you will be careful not to compromit the pacifick relations subsisting between the United States and other powers.

A late communication from Mr Russell,[1] supported by one made today, by Mr Serurier [2] by the order of his Government shews that France is disposed to harmonise on this great subject, with the policy which has been adopted by the United States.

I have the honor [etc.].

13

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Samuel L. Mitchill, United States Representative from New York [3]

WASHINGTON, *December 9, 1811.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you, in compliance with the request contained in your letter of the 5th inst.,[4] a copy of the declaration of in-

[1] Jonathan Russell of Rhode Island: Chargé d'affaires to France. Left in charge of legation, September 14, 1810. Left Paris in November, 1811. Appointed chargé d'affaires at London, July 27, 1811. He was received by the British government, November 15, 1811. Received passport, at his request, September 2, 1812. Commissioned minister plenipotentiary and extraordinary (with others), January 18, 1814, with power to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace and a treaty of commerce with Great Britain. Commissioned minister plenipotentiary to Sweden and Norway, January 18, 1814. Took leave, October 16, 1818.

[2] Mr. Serurier, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary from France: Presented credentials about February 21, 1811. Took leave, January 22, 1816.

[3] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, III, 539.

[4] The letter of the 5th instant from the Hon. Samuel L. Mitchill to Secretary Monroe was the following, copied from the same page:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, *December 5, 1811.*

SIR: In behalf of the committee appointed to consider so much of the President's message of the 5th November as relates to the Spanish American provinces, I beg leave to inquire whether it is known to our Government that any of those provinces have declared themselves independent, or that material changes have taken place in their political relations. It is not expected, however, that my request will be understood to extend to those communications which, in the opinion of the Executive, it would be improper to disclose.

Be pleased, sir, to accept [etc.].

The committee submitted to the House the following recommendation:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, *December 10, 1811.*

The committee to whom was referred so much of the President's message as relates to the Spanish American colonies, have, in obedience to the order of the House, deliberately considered the subject before them, and directed a report, in part, to be submitted to the consideration of the House, in the form of a public declaration, as follows:

Whereas, several of the American Spanish provinces have represented to the United States that it has been found expedient for them to associate and form federal Governments upon the elective and representative plan, and to declare themselves free and independent: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That they behold, with friendly interest, the establishment of independent sovereignties by the Spanish provinces in America, consequent upon the actual state of the monarchy to which they belonged; that, as neighbors and inhabitants of the same hemisphere, the United States feel great solicitude for their welfare; and that, when those provinces shall have attained the condition of nations, by the just exercise of their rights, the Senate and House of Representatives will unite with the Executive in establishing with them, as sovereign and independent States, such amicable relations and commercial intercourse as may require their legislative authority.

dependence made by the provinces of Venezuela. This act was communicated to this Government by order of the Congress, composed of deputies from those provinces, assembled at Caraccas. It is not ascertained that any other of the Spanish provinces have, as yet, entered into similar declarations; but it is known that most, if not all of them, on the continent, are in a revolutionary state. The progress made in that direction by some of them will best appear in the documents which have already been communicated to you.

I have the honor [etc.].

14

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Talisfero de Orea, Commissioner of Venezuela to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *December 19, 1811.*

SIR: I have already had the honor to inform you that I had laid before The President the copy of the declaration of Independence entered into by the Provinces of Venezuela, which you presented to me, and that he had received it with the interest which so important an event was calculated to excite.

Of the interest which The President takes in this important event, and in the welfare of the inhabitants of all the Spanish Provinces South of the United-States, you have had an unequivocal proof in his remarks on that subject, in the message to Congress at the commencement of the session. And by the report of the committee to whom that part of the message was referred, a strong indication is given, that the legislative branch of our government participates in the sentiments which have been expressed by the chief Magistrate.

I will add, Sir, that the Ministers of the United-States in Europe have been made acquainted with these sentiments of their government, and instructed to keep them in view in their communications, with the Courts, near which they respectively reside.

I have the honor [etc.].

15

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Alexander Scott, United States Agent to Caracas[2]

WASHINGTON, *May 14, 1812.*

SIR: Having sometime since apprised you of your appointment to the Caraccas, I have now to inform you that the President wishes you to proceed there without delay, in discharge of the duties of the trust confided to you.

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 17.
[2] House Report Number 72, 20th Congress, 2d session.

You will obtain a passage in one of the vessels by which the provisions procured, in compliance with a late act of Congress, for the Government of Venezuela, will be forwarded.

I cannot better convey to you an idea of the duties which you will have to perform with the Government of Venezuela, than by communicating to you a copy of the instructions which were given to the Agent of the United States at Buenos Ayres.[1] The independence of the Provinces of Venezuela forms an essential difference between their situation and that of the other Provinces of Spain in America; but still, until their independence is more formally acknowledged by the United States, it cannot materially affect your duties. Until such acknowledgment may be made, your agency will be of a character suited to the case; for which you will receive herewith credential letters, such as are held by the Agent of the United States at Buenos Ayres.

A principal motive in delaying to recognize in greater form the independence of the Government of Venezuela proceeds from a desire to ascertain how far those Provinces are competent to its support; by which is to be understood the intelligence of the people, and their union and decision in its favor. If the people are resolved to maintain their independence, their success seems to be inevitable. The United States take a sincere interest in it, from generous sentiments, and from a conviction, also, that, in many ways, it will prove reciprocally advantageous. France favors it, and Great Britain will not long oppose it, if she does at all, by force, or by exposing herself to war. Nothing, however, would be more absurd than for the United States to acknowledge their independence in form, until it was evident that the people themselves were resolved and able to support it. Should a counter-revolution take place after such acknowledgment, the United States would sustain an injury, without having rendered any advantage to the people.

A friendly communication may, in the mean time, be preserved, with the same advantage as if their independence had been thus formally acknowledged. The United States are disposed to render to the Government of Venezuela, in its relations with foreign powers, all the good offices that they may be able. Instructions have been already given to their Ministers at Paris, St. Petersburgh, and London, to make known to those courts that the United States take an interest in the independence of the Spanish Provinces.

It will be your duty to make yourself acquainted with the state of the public mind in the Provinces of Venezuela, and in all the adjoining Provinces of Spain; their competence to self-government; state of political and other intelligence; their relations with each other; the spirit which prevails generally among them as to independence; their disposition towards the United States, towards Old Spain, England, and France: and, in case of their final

[1] See above, doc. 5, Secretary of State to Poinsett, June 28, 1810.

dismemberment from the parent country, what bond will hereafter exist between them; what form it will take; how many confederations will probably be formed, and what species of internal government is likely to prevail. You will be sensible that the United States cannot fail to take a deep interest in the establishment of a Republican Government in those Provinces, from a belief that the people will be happier under it, and the greater confidence which must exist, in consequence of it, between us.

You will also be particularly attentive to the protection of our commerce with the Government of Venezuela, to see that it enjoys all the advantages which may be fairly claimed; and you will furnish all useful information relative to their exports and imports.

You are already apprised of the supplies which have been procured, in compliance with an act of Congress, for the Government of Venezuela, in consequence of the distress occasioned by the late dreadful earthquake there. These supplies will be forwarded by vessels from Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York, and are intended to be presented, on the part of this Government, to that of Venezuela, for the relief of the People. You will receive with this letter a copy of the act of Congress, which will be your guide in communicating the measure to that Government. It is hoped that you will arrive at —— in time to take charge of all these supplies; but as it is possible that this may not happen, a conditional instruction will be forwarded to Mr. Lowry, to act in the business in your absence.

You will not fail to intimate, in suitable terms, that this interposition for the relief of the distressed people of Venezuela is a strong proof of the friendship and interest which the United States take in their welfare.

I have the honor [etc.].

16

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to M. Palacio, Agent of Cartagena to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *December 29, 1812.*

SIR: The United-States being at peace with Spain cannot take any step in relation to the contests between the different sections of the Spanish monarchy, which would be of a character to compromit their neutrality. At the same time it is proper to observe, that as inhabitants of the same hemisphere, the government and people of the United-States take a lively interest in the prosperity and welfare of their neighbours of South-America, and will rejoyce at any event which has a tendency to promote their happiness.

I have the honor [etc.].

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 51.

17

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to John Quincy Adams, United States Minister to Great Britain[1]

WASHINGTON, *December 10, 1815.*

SIR: Reports continue to circulate that the Spanish government has ceded to Great Britain the Floridas and Louisiana. It is also stated that measures are taken, for the equipment of an expedition to that quarter, to consist of so large a body of men, as would not be contemplated, if it was the intention of the British government, to preserve the existing friendly relations between the two countries. Ten thousand men, it is said, are likely to be sent from Great-Britain and Ireland; and it has been intimated, that some foreign troops, will be taken into British pay and employed in the expedition. The Prussian troops, near the channel, are spoken of.

If the British government has accepted a cession of this territory from Spain, and is taking measures for its occupancy, her conduct must be considered as decidedly hostile to the U. States. As well might the British government send an army, to Philadelphia, or to Charlestown, as to New Orleans, or to any portion of Louisiana Westward of the Perdido, knowing as it does the just title of the United States to that limit. To send a considerable force to East-Florida, even should the British government state, that it had accepted the cession of that province only, could not be viewed in a friendly light. Why send a large force there, if Spain has ceded, and is ready to surrender the province, unless the British government has objects in view, unjust in their nature, the pursuit of which must of necessity, produce war with the United-States? East-Florida in itself is comparatively nothing; but as a post, in the hands of Great-Britain, it is of the highest importance. Commanding the Gulph of Mexico, and all its waters, including the Mississippi with its branches, and the streams emptying into the Mobile, a vast proportion of the most fertile and productive parts of this Union, on which the navigation and commerce so essentially depend, would be subject to its annoyance, not to mention its influence on the Creeks and other neighbouring Indians. It is believed if Great-Britain has accepted the cession of East-Florida, and of it only, that she has done it with intention to establish a strong post there, and to avail herself of it for all the purposes above suggested. If the cession has greater extent, the design is more apparent.

The President desires that you will bring this subject before the British government, without delay, in a friendly and conciliatory manner, and ascertain, if it is disposed to give the information, whether such cession has been made, and if it has, to what extent. If none has been made, the British government, will, it is presumed, take an interest in removing the impression,

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 13.

which these reports, coming from so many quarters, could not fail to make. If a cession has been made, it is probable that she will explain its extent and her future views in regard to it, as a frank and open policy is most becoming a great nation, and if her policy is peace, most likely to preserve it. If she acquired it in war, be the extent of it what it may, it may have been obtained, as an instrument to subserve the purposes of that period only; peace having since taken place on conditions satisfactory to both parties, her views in regard to that territory, may have undergone a similar change. In this case she may be willing to rid herself of a property, which she may reasonably anticipate, will never be advantageous to her, and may be productive of much harm. If a cession has been made to Great-Britain of East-Florida, and her views in regard to it have undergone such a change, it will be agreeable to this government to obtain it of her, at a fair equivalent, as you may suggest, in your conferences on the subject, should circumstances justify it.

The revolution which is making rapid progress in South-America, becomes daily more interesting to the United-States. From the best information that we can obtain, there is much cause to believe, that those provinces will separate from the mother-country. Several of them have already abrogated its authority, and established independent governments. They insist on the acknowledgment of their governments by the United-States, and when it is considered that the alternative is between governments, which, in the event of their independence, would be free and friendly, and the relation which, reasoning from the past, must be expected from them, as colonies, there is no cause to doubt in which scale our interest lies. What are the views and intentions of the British government on this important subject? Is it not the interest of Great-Britain that the Spanish provinces should become independent? Will her government promote it, at what time and under what circumstances? In case of a rupture, between the U. S. & Spain at any future time, what part will Great-Britain take in the contest, it being distinctly to be understood, that we shall ask, in regard to the Spanish provinces, no privileges in trade which shall not be common to other nations? Spain has been long unfriendly to the United-States, and done them positive injuries, for which reparation has been withheld, and her government still assumes a tone, which, in other respects, is far from being satisfactory. The part which the United-States may act hereafter, towards that power, must depend on circumstances. Should the Spanish government persevere in its unjust policy, it might have some influence on our measures, and it would be advantageous to know the views of the British government in these respects.

The President has agreed, on considerations which have been thought sufficient to justify it, to waive objections of a personal nature, and to receive Mr. Onis, as Minister from Spain.

Before entering into any communications with the British government,

relating to the part Great-Britain will take towards the Spanish provinces in South-America, who have declared themselves independent, or may hereafter, you will satisfy yourself that the British government puts a just value on the existing relations between the United-States and Great-Britain, and will not convert the communication which is a proof of amity, and intended to be confidential, into an instrument for promoting hostility between Spain and the United-States. Your communication, in any view, had therefore better be informal, and apparently proceeding from yourself only.

I have the honor [etc.].

18

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States[1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *January 19, 1816.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letters[2] of the 30. of December, and 2. of January and to submit them to the President.

You demand that your Sovereign shall be put in possession of West-Florida; that certain persons whom you have mentioned, shall be arrested and tried on the charge of promoting insurrection in the Spanish provinces, and exciting citizens of the United-States to join in it; and thirdly, that the flags of Carthagena, the Mexican Congress, Buenos-Ayres, and other revolting Provinces, shall be excluded from the ports of the United-States. . . .

You demand next that Mr. Toledo and others whom you mention, charged with promoting revolt in the Spanish provinces, and exciting citizens of the United-States to join in it, shall be arrested and tried, their troops disarmed and dispersed.

You intimate that troops are levying in Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Georgia, for the invasion of the Spanish provinces, of whom one thousand are from Kentucky, and three hundred from Tennessee, to be commanded by American citizens, but you do not state at what points these men are collected, or by whom commanded, and as to the forces said to be raised in Louisiana and Georgia, your communication is more indefinite. The information recently obtained by this Department, from persons of high consideration, is of a very different character. It is stated that no men are collected, nor is there evidence of an attempt or design to collect any in Kentucky, Tennessee, or Georgia, for the purpose stated, and that the force

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 121. This letter is printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 424. The record shows Luis de Onis as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Spain from October 7, 1809, to May 10, 1819.

[2] See below, pt. XIII, docs. 1037 and 1038.

said to be assembled under Mr. Toledo, is very inconsiderable, and composed principally of Spaniards and Frenchmen. If any portion of it, consists of citizens of the United-States, their conduct is unauthorized and illegal. This force is not within the settled parts of Louisiana, but in the wilderness, between the settlements of the United-States and Spain, beyond the actual operation of our laws. I have to request that you will have the goodness to state, at what points, in Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia and Louisiana, any force is collected, the number in each instance, and by whom commanded. If such force is collected, or collecting, within the United-States, for the purpose suggested, or other illegal purpose, it will be dispersed, and the parties prosecuted according to law.

This government is under no obligation, nor has it the power, by any law or treaty, to surrender any inhabitant of Spain, or the Spanish provinces, on the demand of the government of Spain; nor is any such inhabitant punishable by the laws of the United-States, for acts committed beyond their jurisdiction, the case of pirates alone excepted. This is a fundamental law of our system. It is not however confined to us. It is believed to be the law of all civilized nations, where not particularly varied by Treaties.

In reply to your third demand, the exclusion of the Flag of the revolting provinces, I have to observe, that in consequence of the unsettled state of many countries, and repeated changes of the ruling authority in each, there being, at the same time, several competitors, and each party bearing its appropriate flag, the President thought it proper, some time past, to give orders to the Collectors, not to make the flag of any vessel, a criterion on condition of its admission into the ports of the United-States. Having taken no part, in the differences and convulsions, which have disturbed those countries, it is consistent with the just principles, as it is with the interests of the United-States, to receive the vessels of all countries, into their ports, to whatever party belonging, and under whatever flag sailing, pirates excepted, requiring of them only the payment of the duties, and obedience to the laws while under their jurisdiction; without adverting to the question whether they had committed any violation of the allegiance or laws obligatory on them, in the countries to which they belonged, either in assuming such flag, or in any other respect.

In the differences which have subsisted between Spain and her colonies, the United-States have observed all proper respect to their friendly relations with Spain. They took no measure to indemnify themselves for losses and injuries; none to guard against the occupancy of the Spanish territory, by the British forces in the late war, or to occupy the territory to which the United-States consider their title good, except in the instance of West-Florida, and in that instance, under circumstances, which made their interposition, as much an act of accommodation to the Spanish authority there, as of security to themselves. They have also prohibited their citizens, from

taking any part in the war, and the inhabitants of the colonies and other foreigners connected with them, from recruiting in the United-States for that purpose. The proclamations, which have been issued by the Governors of some of the States and Territories, at the instance of the President, and the Proclamation lately issued by the President himself, are not unknown to your government. This conduct, under such circumstances, and at such a time, is of a character too marked, to be mistaken by the impartial world.

What will be the final result of the civil war, which prevails, between Spain and the Spanish provinces in America, is beyond the reach of human foresight. It has already existed many years, and with various success, sometimes one party prevailing and then the other. In some of the Provinces, the success of the Revolutionists, appears to have given to their cause, more stability than in others. All that your government had a right to claim of the United-States, was, that they should not interfere in the contest, or promote by any active service, the success of the Revolution, admitting that they continued to overlook the injuries received from Spain, and remained at peace. This right was common to the colonists. With equal justice, might they claim, that we would not interfere to their disadvantage: that our ports should remain open to both parties, as they were, before the commencement of the struggle: that our laws regulating commerce with foreign nations, should not be changed to their injury. On these principles the United-States have acted.

So much have I thought proper to state respecting the relations existing between the United-States and Spain. The restoration of the diplomatic intercourse between our governments forms an epoch which cannot fail to be important to both nations. If it does not produce a result, favorable to their future friendship and good understanding, to your government will the failure be imputable. The United-States have at all times been willing, to settle their differences, on just principles and conditions, and they still are.

19

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to John Quincy Adams, United States Minister to Great Britain[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *February 2, 1816.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of a late communication[2] with the Minister of Spain, on subjects highly interesting to the United-States. You will I am persuaded see strong proof of the justice and modera-

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 23.
[2] See above, doc. 18, Monroe to Onis, January 19, 1816.

tion of this government, as well in what regards the future as the past, in the reply to his letters.

A strong suspicion is entertained here by many that the Spanish government relies on the support, of the British, if it is not instigated by it, to make those demands. It will be very satisfactory, and is indeed highly important, to ascertain what the views of the British government are in these respects. You have I presume received my letter of the 10 of December,[1] which suggests enquiries much connected with the present one. . . .

20

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Levett Harris, United States Chargé d'Affaires in Russia[2]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *February 2, 1816.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of a late communication[3] with the Minister of Spain, on subjects highly interesting to the United-States. You will I am persuaded see strong proof of the justice and moderation of the United-States, as well in what regards the future as the past, in the reply to his letters.

It is important to be made acquainted with the views of the Emperor of Russia, respecting the independence of the Spanish Provinces. In former communications we had reason to believe that he favored it. It will be highly gratifying to find that he still entertains that disposition. You will doubtless have no difficulty in ascertaining his sentiments, which I shall be glad to be apprized of without delay. The anxiety to possess this information, is increased by a presumption, that the Spanish government would not make these extraordinary demands, if it was not countenanced in them by some other power.

[1] See above, doc. 17.
[2] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 24.
[3] See above, doc. 18, Monroe to Onis, January 19, 1816.

21

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to William Eustis, United States Minister to the Netherlands[1,2]

WASHINGTON, *February 2, 1816.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of a late communication with the Minister of Spain, on subjects highly interesting to the United-States. You will I am persuaded see strong proof of the justice and moderation of this government, as well in what regards the future as the past, in the reply to his letters.

I have the honor [etc.].

22

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States[3]

WASHINGTON, *February 21, 1816.*

SIR: It is represented that many American Citizens have been made prisoners at Carthagena, by order of the Commander of the forces of His Catholic Majesty, and that they are treated with the greatest severity. A number of these persons are said to have been seized on the high seas, on a charge of having violated the blockade of the port, or on pretexts of other kinds; others to have been decoyed there after the place was captured; some who were resident merchants; and it is possible, that some may have been engaged, as parties, in the civil war, between Spain and her colonies.

With respect to all those, first above mentioned, it is presumed, that they will be discharged, as soon as the circumstances of their respective cases are known. With respect to the last class of prisoners, such of our citizens as may have been taken in arms, I flatter myself that you will not be less ready to interpose your good offices to obtain their discharge. In such commotions, individuals of various nations, often find themselves, in that situation, and it is as contrary to the Law of nations as it is to humanity, to treat them otherwise than with the lenity due to prisoners of war.

The President intends to send immediately a public vessel to Carthagena, for these persons, and it will be very satisfactory to commit to the Officer, who may be charged with his commands, a letter from you to the Governor

[1] A circular identical with this was on the same date sent to Jonathan Russell, United States minister to Sweden and Norway, to Thomas Sumter, United States minister to Brazil, and to Henry Jackson, United States secretary of legation in France acting as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from April 22, 1815, to July 9, 1816.

[2] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 25. William Eustis, of Massachusetts: Commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the Netherlands, December 19, 1814. Took leave, May 5, 1818.

[3] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 131.

of the Province, or other person in authority there, favorable to the object of his mission.

I have the honor [etc.].

23

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to George W. Erving, appointed United States Minister to Spain[1]

WASHINGTON, *March 11, 1816.*

SIR: You will set out in discharge of the duties of your mission to Spain as soon after the receipt of this letter as circumstances will permit. Our relations with that country are, from many causes, becoming daily more and more interesting. They will require your assiduous and zealous attention as soon as you are recognised by the Spanish Government.

The restoration of the diplomatic intercourse between the two countries, long interrupted by causes well known to you, presents a favorable opportunity for the settlement of every difference with that Power. The President has already manifested his sincere desire to take advantage of it for that purpose, and hopes that the Spanish Government cherishes a similar disposition.

The primary causes of difference proceeded from spoliations on their commerce, for which Spain is held responsible, the justice of which she admitted by a convention; and from the refusal of the Spanish Government to settle on just principles the boundaries of Louisiana, and to compensate, on like principles, for the injuries arising from the suppression of the deposite at New Orleans in the breach of the treaty of 1795. The grounds of these differences have been so often discussed, and the justice of our claims so completely established in the instructions heretofore given, and in communications with the Spanish Government, that it is thought unnecessary to enter into them in this letter. Other injuries have likewise been since received from Spain, particularly in the late war with Great Britain, to which it may be proper for you to advert. I shall transmit to you, herewith, such papers relating to our claims in every instance, as will place their merits in a just light.

In a conversation with Mr. Onis, shortly after the late correspondence with him, he intimated that his Government was sincerely desirous of settling these differences, and that it might be willing to cede its claim to territory on the eastern side of the Mississippi, in satisfaction of claims, and in ex-

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 433. George W. Erving, of Massachusetts: Commissioned secretary of legation in Spain, November 22, 1804. Acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from January 12, 1805. (Direct and official relations with Spain were broken off in 1808 and not renewed until 1814. Mr. Erving, however, remained until February, 1810.) Commissioned minister plenipotentiary to Spain, August 10, 1814. Took leave April 29, 1819.

change for territory on the western side. He expressed also a desire that the negotiation might take place at Madrid, rather than in this city. It was expected that he had been already furnished with full powers to negotiate such a treaty, and it would be more agreeable to conclude it here if he had such powers, or might soon procure them, provided there was any ground to hope an early termination of it. But, from the experience we have already had, it may be fairly apprehended that a negotiation here would lead to very extraordinary delays, which it is wished to avoid.

The President will soon decide on the whole subject; after which, you shall be duly instructed of the course to be pursued, and of the measures to be taken. These instructions shall be forwarded to you at Madrid by Mr. Henry B. Smith.

24

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *March 13, 1816.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that the President has decided to send Christopher Hughes Esqre., late Secretary of Legation at Ghent, in the frigate Macedonian, to Carthagena, to make application, to the Commander of the Spanish forces there, for the restoration of such American citizens as may have been made prisoners within the dominions of Spain under his command, relative to whom I lately addressed you.[2] Mr. Hughes will have the honor to deliver you this letter, and I have to request that you will have the goodness to give him the letter to the proper authority promised in yours to me of the 26. ultimo.

Altho' you make a distinction between the prisoners to the disadvantage of those engaged in the contest prevailing between Spain and the Provinces, yet as the latter are entitled by the law of nations, as well as by humanity, to be considered and treated as prisoners of war, I flatter myself, on reconsideration of the subject, that you will include them likewise in the benefit of your intercession.

Orders will be given to the Commander of the Macedonian to bring home all the citizens of the United-States, who may be thus discharged.

I have the honor [etc.].

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 132.
[2] On February 21, 1816. See above, doc. 22.

25

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *March 20, 1816.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of March 2d. announcing the continuance of a blockade of the Spanish coast, in South-America, from Santa Marta, to the River Atrato, inclusive of the latter, by the Commander in Chief of His Catholic Majesty's forces, and that if any vessel is met South of the mouths of the Magdalena, or North of the parallel of Cape Tiburon, on the Mosquito Coast, and between the meridian of those points, she shall be seized and condemned as prize, whatever may be her documents or destination. You state also that the ports of Santa Marta and Porto-Bello are left open to neutrals.

I have to state that this proclamation of General Morillo, is evidently repugnant to the law of nations, for several reasons, particularly the following, that it declares a coast of several hundred miles, to be in a state of blockade, and because it authorizes the seizure of neutral vessels, at an unjustifiable distance from the coast. No maxim of the law of nations is better established, than that a blockade shall be confined to particular ports, and that an adequate force shall be stationed at each, to support it. The force should be stationary, and not a cruizing squadron, and placed so near the entrance of the harbour, or mouth of the river, as to make it evidently dangerous for a vessel to enter. I have to add that a vessel entering the port, ought not to be seized, except in returning to it, after being warned off, by the blockading squadron, stationed near it.

I am instructed by the President to state to you these objections, to the blockade, which has been announced in your letter, that you may communicate them to your government, and in confidence that you will, in the mean time, interpose your good offices, and prevail on General Morillo, to alter his proclamation and practice under it, in such manner, as to conform in both respects to the law of nations.

In stating to you these well founded objections, to this blockade, of General Morillo, I have the honor to observe that your motive for communicating it, is duly appreciated.

I have the honor [etc.]

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 134. The same is printed in *American State Papers. Foreign Relations*, IV, 156.

26

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Christopher Hughes, Jr., Special Agent of the United States to Cartagena[1]

WASHINGTON, *March 25, 1816.*

SIR: In discharge of the trust reposed in you, by the President, you will embark on board the Frigate, Macedonian, at Boston, and proceed without delay to Carthagena.

You will receive with this, a letter to the Commander in Chief of the Spanish forces, or other person in authority, informing him that you are instructed by the President to request the discharge of such of our citizens as may have been taken and detained as prisoners there, or elsewhere within the sphere of his command, with their property and to bring them home. It is presumed that General Morillo is the officer to whom the letter ought to be addressed, but it is given to you, blank, that in case the authority should be vested in another, you may direct it to him.

My letter to the Chevr. de Onis, of February 21,[2] states the causes, so far as they are known here, for which these persons have been made prisoners. By his reply, it may be inferred, that the objections entertained to the discharge of all who have not borne arms, on the side of the Revolutionists, may be, without much difficulty, surmounted. If a difficulty exists with respect to any of either of the first classes, it must apply, as is presumed, to those who are charged with having violated the blockade. That that should have been made a pretext, even had the blockade been legal, is cause of surprise, since the forfeiture of the property is the highest penalty recognized by the law of nations for such an act. But the blockade is not legal, for the reasons stated in my letter to the Chevr. de Onis, of the 20 instant,[3] to which I have not yet received an answer. The illegality of the blockade vitiates the whole proceeding, and is an additional reason for an accommodation in that and all similar cases.

The claim to the discharge of such as have been confined, for joining the Revolutionists, is considered, fully sanctioned by the law of nations. The war between Spain and her provinces, is marked with all the circumstances which characterize a civil war. It has been of long continuance: governments regularly organized, are established in the provinces, by whom troops are raised, and the war is carried on. Very different is the situation of the Spanish provinces from that of an ordinary popular movement, which is called an insurrection or rebellion. Nor does the contest take the character

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 40. Christopher Hughes, Jr., of Maryland: Commissioned secretary of legation to Sweden and Norway, September 26, 1816. Acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from the middle of April to December 10, 1817. Was left in charge by Mr. Russell on retiring, October 16, 1818, and remained until he received a commission as chargé d'affaires, January 20, 1819. Retired, July 15, 1825, having been appointed chargé d'affaires to the Netherlands.

[2] See above, doc. 22.

[3] See above, doc. 25.

of a civil war, from the manner of its termination, as is known by the example of our own revolution. Till the peace of 1783, the fortune of the war was not settled; notwithstanding which, the rights of war were observed on both sides, flags passed between them, discussions took place, cartels were settled and exchanges made, from the commencement. Just principles, as well as example, require, that these humane usages should be observed in the war between Spain and her colonies, and if yielding to a more vindictive spirit, they be disregarded, the consequences will excite the horror of the civilized world. Should either of the parties disregard these rules in respect to the other, it does not follow that it has a right to do it, with respect to the citizens or subjects of other powers. As to the latter, the character of the war, is still the same, and the United-States have a right, that the protection secured by the law of nations, be extended to them. In the war of our Revolution, foreigners in our service, were not only exchanged, but treated with marked attention by the British authorities.

We have seen a Proclamation in the Gazettes, imputed to General Morillo, of the vindictive character above described, which, as the Spanish Minister has not announced it, may possibly be, a fabrication. In the project of a cool and deliberate massacre of prisoners, for various offences, which it avows and threatens, it appears that our citizens and the subjects of other powers, are equally comprized, with the inhabitants of the Provinces. It is hoped that this is not the act of General Morillo, and that he will disavow it. It would be a cause of deep regret, if it be his act, that it should be carried into effect, against any citizen of the United-States.

The restoration of the property is supposed to be a necessary consequence of the discharge of the persons to whom it belongs. The Blockade being unlawful, and the whole proceeding against our citizens of the same character, authorizes the expectation that a conciliatory spirit will be manifested, even in cases of doubtful right, should there be such, in deciding on this application.

It is believed that no example can be adduced, in such a contest, under all the circumstances attending it, where the inhabitants of a neighbouring country, have participated so little in it. This neutrality and impartiality of the United-States, will, doubtless, be duly appreciated by the Spanish commander.

The application which you are instructed to make for the restoration of our citizens with their property, rests on the ground of right. It will nevertheless be proper, while you enforce it on that principle, to mingle in your communications with the Spanish commander, in the manner, a spirit of friendly conciliation.

I have the honor [etc.].

27

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Albert Gallatin, United States Minister to France[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *April 15, 1816.*

You are acquainted with our situation with Spain, and with the state of her contest with her American provinces. It is believed to be the interest of most, if not all the other powers of Europe that the provinces should establish their Independence. It is very uncertain what part England will take in this contest, on which much will depend. If she aids the parent country, the colonies may fail. Equally uncertain is it, what part France will take. Another attempt will be made to settle our differences with Spain, on the most liberal conditions, but, reasoning from the past, it is impossible to foresee a satisfactory result. Should this fail, and a brilliant success attend the Spanish operations against the colonies, its effect will probably be felt in our negotiations with the Spanish government. It is therefore important to ascertain what the views of the French government are, respecting the Independence of these Provinces, and the differences existing between the United-States and Spain, and generally what the connexion is between France and Spain, and the support which the latter may derive under any circumstances, from the former. It will be your duty to promote such views as may be favorable to the United-States.

28

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to William Pinkney, United States Minister to Russia[2]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *May 10, 1816.*[2]

To the general policy of Russia with other powers, your attention will be very properly directed. It is particularly desirable however to ascertain it,

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 45. Albert Gallatin, of Pennsylvania: Commissioned with James A. Bayard and John Quincy Adams envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary, April 22, 1813, jointly and severally empowered to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Russia. The Senate, on the 19th of July, 1813, assented to the appointment of Messrs. Adams and Bayard and rejected Mr. Gallatin. Mr. Gallatin addressed a note to the chancellor on November 2, 1813, stating that he was no longer a member of the Mission. Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard left St. Petersburg, January 25, 1814. Commissioned, with others, minister plenipotentiary and extraordinary, February 9, 1814, empowered to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace and a treaty of commerce with Great Britain. Commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France, February 28, 1815. Left Paris, May 16, 1823, on leave. Was associated with Richard Rush, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain, May 22, 1818, to conclude treaties for the renewal of the convention of July 3, 1815, and for commerce with Great Britain.

[2] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 52.

in regard to the contest now existing between Spain and her colonies, in which, the latter are contending for their Independence. To the result of this contest the United-States, from a variety of considerations, cannot be altogether indifferent. The government of Spain has long manifested a jealousy of the growth of the United-States, and in several instances done them serious injury, for which it has hitherto refused to make reparation. An attempt will soon be made to adjust these differences, on fair conditions, but such has been the conduct of the Spanish government, that much dependence cannot be placed on a favorable result.

29

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to William Pinkney, United States Minister to Russia[1]

WASHINGTON, *May 27, 1816.*

SIR: As the letters[2] of Mr Onis to this Department which were published during the last session of Congress, may have excited some interest in Europe, I have deemed it proper to put you in possession of the enclosed copy of a communication[3] to me from the Attorney of the United-States for the District of Louisiana. It will enable you, should occasion require it, to place the conduct of this government and its agents, in relation to the contest between Spain and her Provinces, in a proper point of view.

From this communication you will see that the statements of Mr Onis, as respects both the military movements and the conduct of the local authorities in Louisiana, are entirely groundless. I need scarcely add that what he has said about the collection of large bodies of armed men in Kentucky & Tennessee, for the purpose of invading the possessions of His Catholic Majesty is equally so.

I have the honor [etc.].

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 70.
[2] See above, doc. 18, Monroe to Onis, January 19, 1816, first paragraph.
[3] See below, pt. 1, doc. 31, note 4.

30

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to José Rademaker, Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *June 5, 1816.*

SIR: I have received the letter which you did me the honor to address to me, with a copy of the order or law, by which your Sovereign has erected Brazil into a Kingdom, and annexed it to his Kingdoms of Portugal and Algarves, so as to form one and the same political Body under the Title of the United-Kingdoms of Portugal, Brazil and Algarves.

Having submitted these Papers to the President, I have it in charge from him to assure you that the measure adopted by your Sovereign is seen with great satisfaction by this Government, as it cannot fail to promote the prosperity of his dominions, and may probably strengthen the ties of friendship and good understanding which have long happily subsisted between the two nations. Both these objects interest the United-States and any measure calculated to promote them will be highly acceptable to them.

You will be pleased to communicate these sentiments to your government and to accept the assurances of the great respect with which

I have the honor [etc.].

31

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States[2]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *June 10, 1816.*

In adverting to the parts of your letter which relate to the revolted Provinces of Spain in America, and the aid which you state, the revolutionary party have derived from the United-States, I cannot avoid expressing, equally my surprize and regret. I stated in my letter to you of Jan. 19:[3] that no aid had ever been afforded them, either in men, money or supplies of any kind, by the government, not presuming that the gratuitous supply of provisions, to the unfortunate people of Caraccas, in consequence of the calamity with which they were visited, would be viewed in that light, and that aid to them from our citizens, inconsistent with the laws of the United-States and with the law of nations, had been prohibited, and that the prohi-

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 139. José Rademaker, consul general of Portugal in the United States: Acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim.*

[2] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 146.

[3] See above, doc. 18.

bition had been enforced with care and attention. You stated in your letter of Jany. 2d,[1] that forces were collecting in different parts of our Western and Southern country, particularly in Kentucky, Tennessee and Louisiana for the purpose of invading the Spanish Provinces. I stated to you in reply,[2] that I knew of no such collection of troops in any quarter, and that from information derived from the highest authorities, I was satisfied that none such had been made. I requested you to state, at what points these troops were collected, and who were the commanders. You have sent me in reply[3] extracts of letters from persons whose names are withheld, which establish none of the facts alledged as to the raising of troops in the United-States, but recite only vague rumours, to that effect. I have the honor to transmit to you a copy of a letter on this subject from Mr Dick,[4] the Attorney of the United-States

[1] See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1038.
[2] See above, doc. 18, Monroe to Onis, January 19, 1816.
[3] See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1039, Onis to Secretary of State, February 22, 1816.
[4] The enclosed letter from Mr. John Dick to the Secretary of State, above referred to, which follows, is reprinted from *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 431:

NEW ORLEANS, *March 1, 1816.*

SIR: I have just had an opportunity of perusing the letters of the Chevalier de Onis, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of His Catholic Majesty, addressed to you under dates of the 30th of December and the 2d of January. As these letters dwell largely upon transactions affecting the neutrality of the United States, which are said to have occurred, and to be still occurring here, and as they charge the public authorities of this city with giving, in the face of the President's proclamation of the 1st of September last, protection and support to the enemies of His Catholic Majesty, I think it not improper to address you in relation to these charges.

It is affirmed by the Chevalier de Onis, "and it is," says he, "universally public and notorious, that a factious band of insurgents and incendiaries continue with impunity, in the province of Louisiana, and especially in New Orleans and Natchitoches, the uninterrupted system of raising and arming troops to light the flame of revolution in the kingdom of New Spain. All Louisiana," he continues, "has witnessed these armaments, the public enlistments, the transportation of arms, the junction of the insurgents, and their hostile and warlike march from the territory of this republic against the possessions of a friendly and neighboring Power."

No troops at present are, or at any former period were, openly raised, armed, or enlisted, at Natchitoches, or at New Orleans, or at any other point within the State of Louisiana. Arms have been transported from this place, by sea and otherwise, as objects of merchandise, and probably have been disposed of to some of the revolutionary Governments of New Spain. It has not been supposed here that there was any law of the United States, any provision by treaty, or any principle of national law, that prohibits this species of commerce. It was considered that the purchasing and exporting, by way of merchandise, of articles termed contraband, were free alike to both belligerents; and that, if our citizens engaged in it, they would be abandoned to the penalties which the laws of war authorize.

What is said, too, about the junction of the insurgents, and their hostile and warlike march from the territory of the United States against the possessions of Spain, is unfounded. In the summer of the year 1812, a band of adventurers, without organization, and apparently without any definite object, made an incursion into the province of Texas, as far as San Antonio, by the way of Nacogdoches. No doubt many of the persons belonging to this party passed by the way of Natchitoches, but separately, in no kind of military array, and under such circumstances as to preclude the interference of the civil or military authorities of the United States, or of the State of Louisiana.

What could be effected in this respect was done; twice in the years 1811–'12, parties of adventurers, who had assembled between the Rio Hondo and the Sabine, (the neutral territory,) were dispersed by the garrison of Natchitoches, their huts demolished, and their whole establishment broken up.

for the District of Louisiana, by which you will see how attentive the public authorities there have been to the execution of the Laws of the United-States

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The party that marched upon San Antonio assembled to the west of the Sabine, beyond the operation of our laws, and from thence carried on their operations. So far from troops, upon this occasion, assembling at different points, forming a junction within the territories of the United States, and marching thence, I am assured, by various and most respectable authorities, that, although it was generally understood at Natchitoches that some enterprise was on foot, it was extraordinary to see two of the persons supposed to be engaged in it together. The officer commanding at that time the United States troops at Natchitoches (Major Wolstoncraft) offered his services to the civil authorities in aid of the laws, and to preserve inviolate the neutrality which they enforce.

In consequence, several individuals found with arms were arrested; they alleged that they were hunters; and there being no evidence to the contrary, or rather no proof of their being engaged in any illegal undertaking, they were, of course, discharged. So well satisfied, indeed, were the Spanish authorities of the adjoining province that neither our Government nor its agents gave succors or countenance to this expedition, that, during the time they knew it to be organized, or organizing, they applied to the garrison at Natchitoches for an escort to bring in some specie, which was immediately granted.

Toledo, who, at the time of its defeat, commanded the party that penetrated to San Antonio, came to this city in the autumn of 1814, when he was immediately arrested, and recognised to answer, at the succeeding term of the federal court, to a charge of setting on foot, within the territory of the United States, a military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territories or dominions of the King of Spain; six months having passed, and no testimony whatever appearing against him, his recognizance was delivered up.

After the discomfiture of the party under Toledo, no enterprise destined to aid the revolutionists of New Spain appears to have been set on foot from the vicinity of the United States, until late in the summer of last year, when it was rumored that a party, under a person of the name of Perry, was forming for that purpose somewhere on the western coast of Louisiana. Upon the first intimation that this enterprise was meditated, steps were taken here to frustrate it. Nothing occurred to justify prosecutions or arrests; a large quantity of arms, however, supposed to be intended for this party, were seized on the river, and detained at the custom-house for several months; and Commodore Patterson, commanding naval officer on this station, instructed the officers under his command, cruising in the neighborhood of the suspected place of rendezvous, (Belleisle, at the mouth of Bayou Teche,) to ascertain the truth of the rumors in circulation, and, if verified, to use the force under their respective commands in dispersing the persons assembled, and in frustrating their illegal intentions. In obedience to these orders, the coast, as far as the Sabine, was examined, and no persons discovered. It is now ascertained that Perry, Humbert, and their followers, inconsiderable in number, passed separately through Attakapas, and assembled about two leagues to the west of the Sabine. Thence they embarked for some place on the coast of Mexico, were wrecked, dispersed, and their plans, whatever they were, totally defeated.

I have, in the foregoing detail, sir, given, partly from information entitled to perfect confidence, and partly from my own knowledge, a brief and hurried outline of two fruitless attempts of a handful of restless and uninfluential individuals, stimulated by the desire of aiding the cause of Mexican independence, or that of bettering their own fortunes. These are the only military enterprises against the dominions of the Spanish Crown that have drawn any portion of their aid or support from Louisiana: in both, the mass of adventurers was composed of Spaniards, Frenchmen, and Italians. I need not say that these enterprises, whether in aid of the revolutionists or merely predatory, were not only feeble and insignificant, but that they were formed under circumstances which forbid a surmise of their being sanctioned or connived at. Every man acquainted with the state of public feeling throughout the southern and western sections of the United States knows that had our Government but manifested the slightest disposition to sanction enterprises in aid of the revolutionists of New Spain, the condition of these provinces would not at this day be doubtful.

It is said that troops have been recently enlisted, and that expeditions have been preparing, or are prepared, in this city to invade the dominions of Spain. The enlisting of men and the preparing of enterprises, or the means for enterprises, of the kind

and to the orders of their government, and how little they have deserved the charges made against them.

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spoken of, cannot be accomplished without means, or be carried on in the midst of a populous city in solitude and silence. Yet it is known, in the first place, that neither Mr. Toledo nor Mr. Herrera had or have pecuniary means for such purposes; and, in the second, so far as negative proof can go, or so far as the absence of one thing implies another, it is most certain that no enlistments have taken place, and that no expeditions, or the means of expeditions, have been prepared or are preparing here.

A regard to truth makes it necessary to say that what is alleged respecting the arming and fitting out of vessels within the waters of Louisiana, to be employed in the service of the revolutionary Governments against the subjects or property of the King of Spain, is unfounded. At no period since the commencement of the struggle between the Spanish colonies and the mother country have vessels, to be employed in the service of the colonies, been permitted to fit out and arm, or to augment their force at New Orleans, or elsewhere within the State of Louisiana.

On the contrary, it is notorious that to no one point of duty have the civil and military authorities of the United States directed more strenuously, or, it is believed, more successfully, their attention, than to the discovering and suppression of all attempts to violate the laws in these respects. Attempts to violate them by fitting out and arming, and by augmenting the force of vessels, have no doubt been frequent, but certainly in no instance successful, except where conducted under circumstances of concealment that eluded discovery and almost suspicion, or where carried on at some remote point of the coast beyond the reach of detection or discovery. In every instance where it was known that these illegal acts were attempting, or where it was afterwards discovered that they had been committed, the persons engaged, as far as they were known, have been prosecuted, while the vessels fitted out, or attempted to be fitted out, have been seized and libelled, under the act of the 5th of June, 1794; and when captures have been made by vessels thus fitted out and armed, or in which their force was augmented or increased within our waters, where the property taken was brought within our jurisdiction, or even found upon the high seas by our cruisers, and brought in, it has been restored to the original Spanish owners, and, in some instances, damages awarded against the captors.

An enumeration of the cases in which individuals have been prosecuted for infringing, or attempting to infringe, our neutrality, in aid of the Governments of New Spain, and in which vessels have been seized and libelled, under the act of the 5th June, 1794, together with a list of the vessels and property restored to the original Spanish owners, (confining the whole to the operations of the year commencing March, 1815, and ending February, 1816,) will show more conclusively, perhaps, than any thing else can, how totally without foundation are the complaints of Spain on this head.

The names of individuals presented in the district court of the United States for the Louisiana district, during the year 1815, for violating, or attempting to violate, the neutrality of the United States, in aid of the Governments of the United Provinces of New Granada and of the United Provinces of Mexico

José Alvarez de Toledo,
Julius Cæsar Amazoni,
Vincent Gambie,
John Robinson,
Romain Very,
Pierre Scœmeson,
Bernard Bourdin.

List of vessels libelled for illegal outfits, in aid of the same Governments, during the same period

Brig Flora Americana, restored.
Schooner Presidente, condemned.
Schooner Petit Milan, condemned.
Schooner General Bolivar, discontinued.
Schooner Eugenia, alias Indiana, condemned.
Schooner Two Brothers, restored.

Enumeration of vessels and property brought within the Louisiana district, captured under the flags and by the authority of the Governments of New Granada and of Mexico, libelled on the part of the original Spanish owners, and restored upon the ground that the capturing vessels had been fitted out and armed, or had their force augmented, within the waters of the United States

1. Schooner Cometa, restored April, 1815.
2. Schooner Dorada, proceeds restored 16th May, 1815, $3,050.
3. Schooner Amiable Maria, proceeds restored 16th May, 1815, $3,850.

As I cannot doubt that you have taken erroneous impressions, from the misrepresentation, of partial or misinformed individuals, and that you have communicated the same to your government, I rely on your candour to adopt such measures, as may appear to you best calculated to place the whole subject before it, in a true light. It is important that the effort which The President is now making to adjust our differences with Spain, should have the desired result, and it is presumable that a correct knowledge of the conduct of the United-States, in these circumstances, would promote it.

I have the honor [etc.].

32

James Monroe Secretary of State to George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *July 20, 1816.*

SIR: You have been apprized already of a similar measure which was taken in regard to the vessels which had been seized at Carthagena, and the citizens of the United States, who, under various pretexts, had been arrested and imprisoned there. I have the pleasure to state that the application[2] succeeded as to our citizens, though it failed as to the vessels. You will interpose directly with the Spanish Government in favor of the latter; documents respecting which shall be forwarded to you, either by the present or some other early opportunity.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 157.
[2] See above, doc. 26, Monroe to Hughes, March 25, 1816.

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4. Schooner Experimento, restored 3d August.
5. The polacre brig De Regla and cargo, proceeds restored 18th December, 1815, $19,209.50.
6. Schooner Alerta and cargo, being the proceeds of the capture of about eighteen small vessels, restored 18th December, 1815, $62,150.05.

Damages awarded to the original owners against the captors in the two foregoing cases, $55,272.97.

7. The cargo of the schooner Petit Milan, restored February, 1816, $2,444.31.
8. The cargo of the schooner Presidente, February 1, 1816, $10,931.15.
9. Schooner Sankita and cargo, restored February 1, 1816, $37,962.94.

The preceding account of Spanish property restored to the original proprietors, after being in possession of the enemies of Spain, is defective, inasmuch as it does not comprehend the whole of the cases of restoration that have taken place within the period to which the detail is confined; the very hasty manner in which I have made this enumeration did not admit of a more accurate statement. The principal cases, however, are included in it. In several other cases, where the property was claimed for the original Spanish owners, the claims were dismissed, because it did not appear that any violation of our neutrality had taken place.

The capturing vessels were not armed, nor was their force augmented within our jurisdiction; nor had the captures been made within a marine league of our shore. The principles that guided the decisions of the court, as well in restoring the property captured, where our neutral means had been used, as in declining all interference where that was not the case, manifest, I think, a disposition to, and an exercise of, the most rigid neutrality between the parties.

I have the honor [etc.].

33

James Monroe, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *July 30, 1816.*

SIR: I had the honor to receive your Letter of the 3d. instant.

As the discussion of the subjects to which it principally relates, has been transferred to Madrid, I shall confine my reply to that part of it in which, after manifesting your satisfaction at the measures that had been adopted at New Orleans, as detailed in the Letter of the District Attorney of which I had the honor to transmit you a copy,[2] you express regret that like measures were not adopted in other ports of the United-States and state, that five vessels had been armed in the port of Baltimore, by a company of merchants residing in different parts of the Union, and that one was now arming in the port of New-York, all of which were to be sent to cruize off the port of Cadiz, under the flag of Buenos-Ayres, for the purpose of intercepting vessels belonging to the subjects of His Catholic Majesty.

As such a proceeding would have been inconsistent with the laws of the United-States, and with what is due to the government of His Catholic Majesty, I considered it proper to communicate the statement you had made, to the officers of this government, whose duty it was to act upon it. I accordingly wrote to the Collector of the Customs at Baltimore, and to the Attorney of the United-States at New-York. I have now the honor to transmit you the answers I have received in relation to the vessels named. From these you will perceive that there is no reason known to these officers for supposing that either of the vessels was destined to cruize against the commerce of your country. It appears however one of them was so employed, having changed her character and destination after she left the port of Baltimore, and that measures the most prompt and efficient were immediately taken for her arrest and detention. Her Crew are now in confinement under a warrant from the Judge of the Court for the District of Virginia, and orders are given to prosecute the owners for a violation of our laws.

Had you given me the facts on which your allegations as to the other vessels rested, they should have been particularly enquired into; but until this is done, I cannot doubt that you will be perfectly satisfied with the steps already taken, more especially as you will find that one of the vessels you have named is not known to have been in the port where you state she was fitted out, and that two of the others have been sold to your government, and are now employed to protect that commerce upon which you had supposed they were destined to commit depredations.

I have the honor [etc.]

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 157.
[2] See above, doc. 31, Monroe to Onis, June 10, 1816, and note 4.

34

Richard Rush, Secretary of State ad interim, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *March 28, 1817.*

SIR: I have had the honor to receive your two notes,[2] dated the 26th of this month, stating that you have been informed that two armed vessels, which have been committing unauthorized depredations upon the commerce of Spain, have recently arrived at Norfolk, and that a third, liable to the same charge, has arrived at Baltimore; thus bringing themselves within the reach of those laws against which, in the above, and in other ways, it is alleged they have offended.

Conformably to the constant desire of this Government to vindicate the authority of its laws and the faith of its treaties, I have lost no time in writing to the proper officers, both at Norfolk and Baltimore, in order that full inquiry may be made into the allegations contained in your notes, and adequate redress and punishment enforced, should it appear that the laws have been infringed by any of the acts complained of.

I use the present occasion to acknowledge also the receipt of your note of the 14th[3] of this month, which you did me the honor to address to me, communicating information that had reached you of other and like infractions of our laws within the port of Baltimore; in relation to which I have to state, that letters were also written to the proper officers in that city, with a view to promote every fit measure of investigation and redress. Should it prove necessary, I will have the honor to address you more fully at another time upon the subjects embraced in these several notes. In the mean time, I venture to assure myself, that in the readiness with which they have thus far been attended to, you will perceive a spirit of just conciliation on the part of this Government, as well as a prompt sensibility to the rights of your sovereign.

I pray you, sir, to accept [etc.].

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 190. Richard Rush, of Pennsylvania: Acting Secretary of State from March 11, 1817, to September 22, 1817; commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain, October, 1817; confirmed, December 16; took leave, April 27, 1825. Albert Gallatin, of Pennsylvania, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France, was associated with him, May 22, 1818, to conclude treaties for the renewal of the convention of July 3, 1815, and for commerce.

[2] See below, pt. XIII, docs. 1058 and 1059.

[3] The 11th? See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1056.

35

Richard Rush, Secretary of State ad interim, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *April 22, 1817.*

SIR: By direction of The President I have the honor to ask, whether you have received instructions from your Government to conclude a Treaty for the adjustment of all differences existing between the two nations, according to the expectation stated in your note to this Department of the 21st. of February. If you have, I shall be happy to meet you for that purpose. If you have not, it is deemed improper to entertain discussions of the kind invited by your late notes.[2] This Government, well acquainted with and faithful to its obligations, and respectful to the opinion of an impartial world, will continue to pursue a course in relation to the civil war between Spain and the Spanish Provinces in America, imposed by the existing laws, and prescribed by a just regard to the rights and honor of the United-States.

I have the honor [etc.].

36

Richard Rush, Secretary of State ad interim, to Charles Morris, Commander of the United States Frigate "Congress"[3]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *April 25, 1817.*

Having performed this service, it is the desire of the President that you extend your cruise to the Spanish Main. It is important that this government should possess correct information as to the progress of the revolutionary movement in the Spanish Colonies, and of its probable result. It is specially with a view to this object that you will cruise along the Main, endeavoring to obtain, in every practicable way, all the information that can be had upon this subject. It is thought best that you should go as far to the east as Margarita and thence proceed westwardly as far as Carthagena, looking in at Cumana, Barcelona, Caracas, Guayra, and any other ports or places as you coast along. The design however being to obtain as much and as precise information of events as may be, comprehending not only the actual posture of the countries in that quarter in relation to Spain but their known or probable dispositions, you will not consider yourself as restricted to

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 223. The same is printed in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 197.

[2] Regarding Spanish American privateers in ports of the United States. See below, pt. XIII, docs. 1046 to 1054.

[3] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 27.

the above limits or places. You will be at liberty to deviate from them as your own judgment, acting upon circumstances and looking to the special object in view, may point out. Wherever you may touch, you will take care to respect the existing authority, the United States holding a neutral attitude between Spain and the colonies.

I have only to add, that the President has great confidence in the discretion and effect, so far as the latter may be found practicable, with which you will fulfil the instructions given to you.

With great respect [etc.].

37

James Monroe, President of the United States, to Joel R. Poinsett of Charleston, South Carolina[1]

WASHINGTON, *April 25, 1817.*

DEAR SIR: The progress of the Revolution in the Spanish Provinces, which has always been interesting to the U. States, is made much more so, by many causes, and particularly by a well founded hope, that it will succeed. It is of

[1] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 29. Poinsett declined the appointment and it was conferred on others. See below, pt. 1, docs. 40 and 44, Rush to Rodney and Graham, July 18, 1817, and Adams to Rodney, Graham and Bland, November 21, 1817. The following letter from Poinsett to the Acting Secretary of State contained suggestions for the guidance of the Commission (MS. South American Missions, I):

CHARLESTON, *23d. May 1817.*

DEAR SIR: In compliance with the President's request contained in your letter of the 15th. inst. I have the honor to enclose to you some letters for the Spanish Colonies, which will, I hope, prove useful to the gentleman entrusted with this commission.

As far as my information extends, there is no government in Mexico, and no reasonable hopes of success can be entertained from the disunited efforts of the present commanders, who act independently, and who would rather sacrifice the safety of the cause they are engaged in, than resign their command. They support their followers by plunder, and the better class of Creoles are united against them, and in some instances have volunteered their services to preserve order. Should the Liberales, who are numerous in Mexico, and the Creoles of that city unite, the revolution would be speedy and effectual. It would spread rapidly from the Capital to the extreme provinces; but I much doubt the success of a revolution, which begins at the extremities of a Kingdom, and has to work its way to such a capital as Mexico.

In Caraccas there is no government, but the forces are united under the command of Bolivar. It would be important to know the connection existing between this Chief and the authorities of San Domingo; and the number of negroes in arms.

In Buenos Ayres it will be well to ascertain the stability of the existing government, and the probable policy of their successors. It is rare that the same party remains in power two years. It will be necessary to enquire, particularly, into the extent of their Authority, as many of the provinces have established separate and independent governments. All the Commanders, both civil and military, will be found extremely jealous of their dignity, and it will be useful to observe a great deal of form and ceremony in treating with them.

With regard to a revolution in the Brazils, I have always been of opinion that to be permanent and successful, it must arise from the interior, where the strength of that country resides.

I have the honor [etc.].

the highest importance to obtain correct information, of its actual state, in the principal sections of the country, and through an organ, whose talents and character, will facilitate, enquiries in the colonies, and give weight to his report to this Government, throughout the U. States, in case their Independence should be acknowledged.

To obtain the desired information, it is decided, to send an agent of the prominent character stated, in a public ship, along the coast, as far at least as Buenos Ayres, with instructions to communicate with the existing governments, at different points, in order that all the light practicable, being derived, on the progress and prospect of events, this Government may be the better enabled to determine on the part, it may be proper for it to take. No one has better qualifications for this trust than yourself, and I can assure you that your acceptance of it will be particularly gratifying to me. Your compensation will be put on a liberal footing. As a public Ship, will be ready for this service in a few weeks, I shall be happy to receive your early answer to this Letter.

I am Dear Sir [etc.].

38

Richard Rush, Secretary of State ad interim, to José Correa de Serra, Portuguese-Brazilian Minister to the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *May 28, 1817.*

It appears that the notification of the blockade of Pernambuco and the coast adjacent, inserted in the National Intelligencer of Thursday last, was a measure taken by you on full deliberation; and that, on grounds which you have particularly explained, you feel yourself called upon to justify it.

It is with great regret I have the honor to state, that, on a careful examination of these grounds, this Government is not at all able to view them in the same light. Settled and approved usage, founded upon reasons too familiar to be dwelt upon, required, that whatever communication you had to make relative to the alleged blockade, and upon whatever foundation it rested, should have been made, if at all, to this Government, not promulgated without its knowledge through the medium of a news-paper. Had you been pleased to communicate it to the Government upon any intelligence or grounds less than the highest, it would have remained with itself to judge, on its own responsibility, whether or not to make it known to its citizens. The illustrations deduced from the merit of timely warnings, on the approach of

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 229. José Correa da Serra, minister plenipotentiary of Portugal to the United States. Transmitted copy of letter of credence to the Secretary of State, July 22, 1816. Announced intention to leave United States, November 9, 1820.

natural perils, if of force under any view, are not supposed to hold up just analogies to so well regulated a proceeding between nations as the notification of a blockade. It is obvious, that if the Minister of a foreign power can pass by the Government and address himself to the country in a case like the present, he may do so in any other. Equally obvious are the consequences to which such a departure from rules long sanctioned in their application to publick Ministers might lead.

Nor is the justification perceived in the imputed delay in answering your note of the 13th of this month. The intervening space from that date until the 22d lays no ground for the charge, keeping in mind that other engagements may be supposed to press upon the time of this Department. I add, that I had the honor to inform you verbally of its receipt, and that it had been submitted to The President. But most of all I have to remark, that the note itself, as well as the one from you of the 20th of this month, to which mine of the 22d also replied, treated of matters in relation to which none of the duties of this Government rendered it necessary to take any act, or express any opinion. An answer was not, therefore, to have been looked for as of official obligation; nor is it seen how the anticipation of one, of whatever character, could justly have coupled itself with the step taken. That which I had the honor to transmit, was founded in the spirit of conciliation which this Government, is ever desirous to cultivate between the two nations, and which it has always been happy in occasions of manifesting towards you personally.

As you now not only communicate to this Government, the existence of the blockade in question, but also candidly declare, that it is not founded upon any order or intelligence derived from your Government, the information will naturally be respected as resting upon your own responsibility alone, without the instructions of your Sovereign.

I have the honor [etc.].

39

Richard Rush, Secretary of State ad interim, to Thomas Sumter, Jr., United States Minister to the Portuguese Court in Brazil[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *July 18, 1817.*

SIR: This letter will be delivered to you by Caesar Rodney and John Graham Esquires, who are visiting several parts of the coast of South America in the capacity of Commissioners, and are directed to call in the first instance at Rio de Janeiro. The objects upon which they go are interesting

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 142.

and they will unfold them to you in person with all the fulness that is necessary. You will doubtless enter cordially into them and feel a disposition to advance them in every way that you may find in your power. You cannot fail to derive from an intercourse with these gentlemen while at Rio de Janeiro, as much gratification as they anticipate from seeing you. I also beg leave to commend to your kind notice and attentions their Secretary, Mr Brackenridge.

The events which took place at Pernambuco in March last gave rise to some correspondence between this government and the Minister of Portugal. Copies of all the Notes that passed are enclosed for your information. The correspondence closed with the note from this Department of the 28th of May.[1] Altho' Mr Correa's conduct was deemed irregular and unjustifiable, yet it has not been thought necessary to take any further notice of it than that which is presented in the note last mentioned, and none other than harmonious intercourse continues to exist between the Government and himself. The blockade and other events at Pernambuco, which have become subsequently known, are not supposed to alter in any degree the views that have been taken of the Minister's conduct.

The President is still engaged in making a tour through part of the United States, for the interesting nature and progress of which I must refer you to Mr. Rodney and Mr. Graham, from whose conversation upon all subjects you will not fail to derive great pleasure.

40

Richard Rush, Secretary of State ad interim, to Caesar A. Rodney and John Graham, Special Commissioners of the United States to South America[2]

WASHINGTON, *July 18, 1817.*

GENTLEMEN: The contest between Spain and the Spanish colonies in the southern parts of this continent has been, from its commencement, highly interesting, under many views, to the United States. As inhabitants of the same hemisphere, it was natural that we should feel a solicitude for the

[1] See above, doc. 38.

[2] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 34. Caesar A. Rodney, of Delaware; John Graham; and Theodorick Bland: The two former instructed as commissioners, July 18, 1817, to visit Buenos Ayres and Montevideo for obtaining accurate information respecting the conflict between Spain and her colonies. Bland added to the commission, November 21, 1817. Caesar A. Rodney: Commissioned minister plenipotentiary, January 27, 1823, to Argentine Confederation. Accredited to Buenos Ayres. Died at his post, June 10, 1824. John Graham, of Virginia: Commissioned minister plenipotentiary to Portugal, January 6, 1819. Accredited to the Portuguese court, residing in Brazil. Left Rio de Janeiro on account of illness, June 13, 1820. Died in the United States, July 31, 1820. They were prevented from departing at the anticipated time but were sent later. See below, pt. 1, docs. 42 and 44, Adams to Erving, November 11, 1817, and Adams to Rodney, Graham and Bland, November 21, 1817. The last is a supplementary instruction.

welfare of the colonists. It was nevertheless our duty to maintain the neutral character with impartiality and allow of no privileges of any kind to one party, which were not extended to the other. The government of Spain viewing the colonies as in a state of rebellion, has endeavored to impose upon foreign powers in their intercourse with them, the conditions applicable to such a state. This pretension has not been acceded to by this government, which has considered the contest in the light of a civil war, in which the parties were equal. An entire conviction exists that the view taken on this point has been correct, and that the United States have fully satisfied every just claim of Spain.

In other respects we have been made to feel sensibly the progress of this contest. Our vessels have been seized and condemned, our citizens made captives and our lawful commerce, even at a distance from the theatre of the war, been interrupted. Acting with impartiality towards the parties, we have endeavored to secure from each a just return. In whatever quarter the authority of Spain was abrogated and an independent government erected, it was essential to the security of our rights that we should enjoy its friendship. Spain could not impose conditions on other powers incident to complete sovereignty in places where she did not maintain it. On this principle the United States have sent agents into the Spanish colonies, addressed to the existing authority, whether of Spain or of the colony, with instructions to cultivate its friendship and secure as far as practicable the faithful observance of our rights.

The contest, by the extension of the revolutionary movement and the greater stability which it appears to have acquired, becomes daily of more importance to the United States. It is by success that the colonists acquire new claims on other powers, which it may comport neither with their interest nor duty to disregard. Several of the colonies having declared their independence and enjoyed it for some years, and the authority of Spain being shaken in others, it seems probable that, if the parties be left to themselves, the most permanent political changes will be effected. It therefore seems incumbent on the United States to watch the movement in its subsequent steps with particular attention, with a view to pursue such course as a just regard for all those considerations which they are bound to respect may dictate.

Under these impressions, the President deems it a duty to obtain, in a manner more comprehensive than has heretofore been done, correct information of the actual state of affairs in those colonies. For this purpose he has appointed you commissioners, with authority to proceed, in a public ship, along the coast of South America, touching at the points where it is probable that the most precise and ample knowledge may be gained. The Ontario, Captain Biddle, is prepared to receive you on board at New York, and will have orders to sail as soon as you are ready to embark.

It is the President's desire that you go first to the River la Plate, visiting Buenos Ayres and Monte Video. On your way thither, you will call at Rio Janeiro delivering to our minister at that court the despatches which will be committed to your hands. On your return from Buenos Ayres, you will also touch, should circumstances allow it, at St. Salvador and Pernambuco. You will thence proceed to the Spanish Main, going to Margaretta, Cumana, Barcelona, Caracas and as far westward as Carthagena, looking in at any other convenient ports or places as you coast along.

In the different provinces or towns which you visit, your attention will be usefully, if not primarily, drawn to the following objects.

1. The form of government established, with the amount of population and pecuniary resources and the state and proportion as to numbers intelligence and wealth of the contending parties, wherever a contest exists.

2. The extent and organization of the military force on each side, with the means open to each of keeping it up.

3. The names and characters of leading men, whether in civil life or as military chiefs, whose conduct and opinions shed an influence upon events.

4. The dispositions that prevail among the public authorities and people towards the United States and towards the great nations of Europe, with the probability of commercial or other connections being on foot, or desired, with either.

5. The principal articles of commerce, regarding the export and import trade. What articles from the United States find the best market? What prices do their productions, most useful in the United States, usually bear? The duties on exports and imports; are all nations charged the same?

6. The principal ports and harbors, with the works of defence.

7. The real prospect, so far as seems justly inferrable from existing events and the operation of causes as well moral as physical in all the provinces where a struggle is going on, of the final and permanent issue.

8. The probable durability of the governments that have already been established with their credit, and the extent of their authority, in relation to adjoining provinces. This remark will be especially applicable to Buenos Ayres. If there be any reason to think, that the government established there is not likely to be permanent, as to which no opinion is here expressed, it will become desirable to ascertain the probable character and policy of that which is expected to succeed it.

9. In Caracas it is understood that there is, at present, no government, but that the forces are united under General Bolivar. It might be useful to know, whether any and what connection exists between this chief, and the chiefs or rulers at St. Domingo; also the number of negroes in arms.

Your stay at each place will not be longer than is necessary to a fair accomplishment of the objects held up. You will see the propriety, in all instances, of showing respect to the existing authority or government of

whatever kind it may be, and of mingling a conciliatory demeanor with a strict observance of all established usages.

The track marked out for your voyage has been deemed the most eligible; but you will not consider yourselves as positively restricted to the limits or places specified. You will be free to deviate and touch at other places as your own judgments, acting upon circumstances and looking to the objects in view, may point out. In this respect the commander of the ship will have orders to conform to such directions as you may think fit to give him. You will however call first at Rio Janeiro, and not go further south than Buenos Ayres. At this point it is hoped that you may be able to command the means of obtaining useful information as respects Chili and Peru. You will also not fail to go to the Spanish Main, returning to the United States at as early a day as will comport with the nature and extent of your mission. Your observation and enquiries will not be exclusively confined to the heads indicated, but take other scope, keeping to the spirit of these instructions, as your own view of things upon the spot may suggest.

It only remains for me to add, that the President has great confidence in the ability and discretion with which you will execute, in all things, the trust committed to you, and that he anticipates from your report to this department such a statement of facts and views as may prove highly useful to the nation.

I have the honor [etc.].

41

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *September 29, 1817.*

SIR: Circumstances having occurred to suspend for the present the execution of the purposes upon which you were instructed on the 20. of July last, to embark in the Corvette Ontario, Captain Biddle, upon a voyage from New-York to Buenos-Ayres, and thence to proceed by land over the South-American Continent to Chili and Peru:—The President has seen fit to give that vessel another direction; to point out for you a different mode of conveyance, and to commit additional trusts to your charge.

In pursuance therefore of directions from him, you are now instructed to embark as soon as possible in that vessel; to touch at Rio Janeiro, and there deliver to Mr. Sumter the despatches for him which will be delivered to you by the Collector of New-York—Thence to proceed in the same vessel round Cape Horn, and afterward, to touch at the principal port in Chile (Callao) and at Lima in Peru. At each of these ports the vessel is to make a short

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 148.

stay to afford you the opportunity of writing to this Department, for which it is hoped you will be enabled to find some means of conveyance for your letters. . . . The ship is then to return to the United-States, stopping at Lima, where you are to disembark, and to remain there and in the adjoining Province, to act under the instructions from this Department heretofore given, and now in your possession.

I have the honor [etc.].

42

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *November 11, 1817.*

Early in the course of the last Summer Mr Caesar A. Rodney and Mr John Graham were appointed[2] by The President Commissioners, to proceed and touch at various places on the Eastern Coast of South-America, to obtain and report to this Government, correct information with regard to the real state of affairs in that Country; to explain to the existing Authorities wherever they might land the principles of impartial neutrality between all the contending parties in that region which this Government had adopted and should continue to pursue, and to make reclamations in behalf of citizens of the United-States who had suffered in their persons or property, by the agency of persons possessing or pretending authority from the various existing Powers whether derived from Spain or from the Provinces in revolt. Circumstances of a private nature in the family of one of the Commissioners prevented them from sailing at the time that had been intended. They are now on the point of embarking together with Mr Theodoric Bland, appointed the third Commissioner, and will proceed in the Congress Frigate from Annapolis to Buenos-Ayres. The measures above noticed in regard to Amelia Island and Galvezton, have formed additional motives to The President for directing their immediate departure—To the end that they may give such explanations and make such representations of the views of this Government in adopting those measures, as the circumstances may require. The subject will be noticed in The President's Message to Congress at the opening of the ensuing Session; and if any reference to it should occur in your communications with the Spanish Government, you will explain it upon these grounds which it is not doubted will prove satisfactory to them. The Ontario Captain Biddle sailed some weeks since, with Mr. J. B. Prevost, going on a similar mission round Cape-Horn.

I am [etc.].

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 170.
[2] See above, doc. 40, Rush to Rodney and Graham, July 18, 1817.

43

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Thomas Sumter, United States Minister to the Portuguese Court in Brazil[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *November 19, 1817.*

These Gentlemen [Messrs. Rodney, Graham and Bland] have been appointed Commissioners, to proceed to various parts of South-America, upon objects which they will particularly explain to you. They are specially recommended to any assistance which it may be in your power to give them, in executing the purposes of their mission. Among these purposes is that of explaining where it may be necessary, the views of this Government, and its policy in relation to the contest between Spain and the South American Provinces. In this respect they will enable you to give it is presumed a satisfactory answer to the Note of 19 March, from the late Count da Barca, founded on a complaint from the Governor of Madeira; unless you shall before their arrival have already given an answer.

44

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Caesar A. Rodney, John Graham, and Theodorick Bland, Special Commissioners of the United States to South America[2]

WASHINGTON, *November 21, 1817.*

GENTLEMEN: In reviewing the Instructions to you from this Department of 18 July,[3] a copy of which has been furnished to Mr. Bland, the President finds little in them, which subsequent occurrences have rendered it necessary to alter, but he thinks that some additional observations to you, relating to the execution of the trust committed to you, may be not inexpedient.

Since the circumstances occurred, which prevented the departure of Messrs. Rodney, and Graham, at the time first contemplated, another destination has been given to the Corvette Ontario, and you are now to embark in the Frigate Congress Captain Sinclair, which has been ordered to Annapolis to receive you.

You will as before directed proceed in the first instance to Rio de Janeiro, & there deliver the despatches committed to you, for Mr. Sumter. From thence you will go to Buenos Ayres, but without touching at St. Salvador or Pernambuco. On your return you will visit such places of the Spanish

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 174.
[2] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 72.
[3] See above, doc. 40, and note 2 thereto.

Main, as you shall yourselves deem expedient without being restricted to any of the places mentioned in your former Instructions.

Among the objects, to which it is desired that you will call the attention of the existing revolutionary authorities, with whom you may have occasion to enter into communication, will be the irregular, injurious, and it is hoped unwarranted use of their flags and of Commissions real or pretended derived from them.

You have been made acquainted through the public channels of information, with the lodgments which separate and successive bands of these adventurers have made at Amelia Island and at Galveston. At the former, possession was first taken early in the course of last summer, by a party, under the command of a British subject named M'Gregor, pretending authority from Venezuela. He was succeeded by persons disgracing and forfeiting by such acts the character of Citizens of the United States, and pretending authority from some pretended Government of Florida; and they are now by the last accounts received, sharing the fruits of their depredations, and at the same time contesting the command of the place with a Frenchman having under him a body of Blacks from St. Domingo, and pretending authority from a Government of Mexico. In the mean time the place from its immediate vicinity to the United States, has become a receptacle for fugitive negroes, for every species of illicit traffic, and for slave-trading ships by means of which multitudes of African Blacks are surreptitiously introduced into the Southern States and Territories, in defiance of the Laws. The Revenue, the Morals, and the Peace of the country are so seriously menaced and compromitted by this state of things, that the President after observing the feeble and ineffectual effort made by the Spanish Government of Florida, to recover possession of the Island, and the apparent inability of Spain to accomplish that recovery, has determined to break up this nest of foreign Adventurers, with pretended South American commissions, but among whom not a single South American name has yet appeared. The settlement at Galveston is of the same character and will be treated in the same manner. Possession will be taken of Galveston as within the limits of the United States; and of Amelia Island, to prevent the repetition of the same misuse of it in future, and subject to explanations to be given of the motives for the measure to Spain. Should you find that any of the Revolutionary Governments with whom you may communicate have really authorized any of these foreign Adventures to take possession of those places, you will explain to them that this measure could not be submitted to or acquiesced in by the United States; because Galveston is considered as within their limits, and Amelia Island is too insignificant in itself and too important by its local position in reference to the United States, to be left by them in the possession of such persons.

You will at the same time remonstrate to them in the most serious

manner against the practice itself of issuing indiscriminate Commission, to the abandoned and desperate characters of all other nations, whose objects in using their authority and their flags, are not to promote the cause of their Liberty and Independence, but merely to amass plunder for themselves. You will inform them that a citizen of the United States cannot accept and act under such a commission, without at once violating the Laws of his country, and forfeiting his rights and character as a citizen. That the fitting out of privateers in our Ports, to cruize either for or against them is prohibited by our Laws; that many such privateers have been fitted out in our Ports, (unknown to this Government) and though manned and officered entirely by people of this country they have captured the property of nations with whom we are at peace, and have used the flags sometimes of more than one of the South American Governments, just as it suited their purposes to be Officers of Buenos Ayres or of Chili, of Caraccas or of Venezuela. That if these clandestine and illegal armaments in our Ports have been made with the sanction and by the authority of those Governments, the United States have just cause to complain of them, and to claim satisfaction and indemnity for all losses and damages which may result to them or to any of their citizens from them; and if they have not been thus authorized, it would be but justly reasonable that those Governments should not only publicly disavow them, but in issuing their commissions and authorizing the use of their flags, subject them at least to the restrictions conformable to the Law of Nations. That the licentious abuse of their flags by these freebooters, of every nation but their own, has an influence unpropitious to the cause of their freedom, and tendency to deter other countries from recognizing them as regular Governments.

It is expected that your absence from the United States will be of seven or eight months. But if while in the execution of your Instructions at Buenos Ayres you should find it expedient, or useful with reference to the public service, that one or more of you should proceed over land to Chili, you are authorized to act accordingly. Should only one of you go, he will there co-operate jointly with Mr. J. B. Prevost, whom it is probable he will find already there, and a copy of whose Instructions is herewith furnished. The compensation which the President has thought proper to fix for the performance of the service assigned to you is of six thousand dollars to each of you; from which it is understood you are to defray all your expenses while on shore. Stores have been provided for you, for the passage, both outward and returning. You will communicate with this Department, by any direct opportunity that may occur from any of the Ports at which you may touch.

I have the honor [etc.].

45

Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the Fifteenth Congress of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

December 2, 1817.

It was anticipated at an early stage that the contest between Spain and the colonies would become highly interesting to the United States. It was natural that our citizens should sympathize in events which affected their neighbors. It seemed probable, also, that the prosecution of the conflict along our coast, and in contiguous countries, would occasionally interrupt our commerce, and otherwise affect the persons and property of our citizens. These anticipations have been realized. Such injuries have been received from persons acting under the authority of both the parties, and for which redress has, in most instances, been withheld. Through every stage of the conflict the United States have maintained an impartial neutrality, giving aid to neither of the parties in men, money, ships, or munitions of war. They have regarded the contest, not in the light of an ordinary insurrection or rebellion, but as a civil war between parties nearly equal, having, as to neutral Powers, equal rights. Our ports have been open to both; and every article, the fruit of our soil, or of the industry of our citizens, which either was permitted to take, has been equally free to the other. Should the colonies establish their independence, it is proper now to state that this Government neither seeks nor would accept from them any advantage in commerce or otherwise which will not be equally open to all other nations. The colonies will, in that event, become independent States, free from any obligation to or connexion with us, which it may not then be their interest to form on the basis of a fair reciprocity.

In the summer of the present year, an expedition was set on foot against East Florida, by persons claiming to act under the authority of some of the colonies, who took possession of Amelia island, at the mouth of the St. Mary's river, near the boundary of the State of Georgia. As this province lies eastward of the Mississippi, and is bounded by the United States and the ocean on every side, and has been a subject of negotiation with the Government of Spain as an indemnity for losses by spoliation, or in exchange for territory of equal value westward of the Mississippi, (a fact well known to the world,) it excited surprise that any countenance should be given to this measure by any of the colonies. As it would be difficult to reconcile it with the friendly relations existing between the United States and the colonies, a doubt was entertained whether it had been authorized by them, or any of them. This doubt has gained strength, by the circumstances which have unfolded themselves in the prosecution of the enterprise, which have marked it as a mere private, unauthorized adventure. Projected and commenced with an incompetent force, reliance seems to have been placed on what

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 129.

might be drawn, in defiance of our laws, from within our limits; and of late, as their resources have failed, it has assumed a more marked character of unfriendliness to us; the island being made a channel for the illicit introduction of slaves from Africa into the United States, an asylum for fugitive slaves from the neighboring States, and a port for smuggling of every kind.

A similar establishment was made, at an earlier period, by persons of the same description in the Gulf of Mexico, at a place called Galvezton, within the limits of the United States, as we contend, under the cession of Louisiana. This enterprise has been marked, in a more signal manner, by all the objectionable circumstances which characterized the other, and more particularly by the equipment of privateers which have annoyed our commerce, and by smuggling. These establishments, if ever sanctioned by any authority whatever, which is not believed, have abused their trust, and forfeited all claim to consideration. A just regard for the rights and interests of the United States required that they should be suppressed, and orders have been accordingly issued to that effect. The imperious considerations which produced this measure will be explained to the parties whom it may in any degree concern.

To obtain correct information on every subject in which the United States are interested, to inspire just sentiments in all persons in authority, on either side, of our friendly disposition, so far as it may comport with an impartial neutrality, and to secure proper respect to our commerce in every port, and from every flag, it has been thought proper to send a ship of war, with three distinguished citizens, along the southern coast, with instruction to touch at such ports as they may find most expedient for these purposes. With the existing authorities, with those in the possession of and exercising the sovereignty, must the communication be held; from them alone can redress for past injuries, committed by those persons acting under them, be obtained; by them alone can the commission of the like, in future, be prevented.

46

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Mr. G. Hyde de Neuville, French Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *December 5, 1817.*

SIR: In reference to your Letter of the 12. September[2] last, and the communications to this Department with which it was accompanied, I have the

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 261. G. Hyde de Neuville, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of France to the United States: Forwarded his letter of credence from New York, June 18, 1816. Took leave, June 29, 1822.

[2] Not printed in this collection. The note of about six pages and enclosures of about thirty report a supposed plot by Napoleonic exiles from France to start an expedition in the United States to seize control of Mexico and there proclaim the restoration of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain and the Indies.

honour to inform you, that they were received by The President with a just sensibility to the disposition friendly to the Peace and tranquility of the United-States, with which they were made—That immediate measures were taken by the Government to ascertain whether any levies of men were making within the United-States, such as those which you apprehended, and to repress any project of unlawful combination which might exist for purposes of hostility to the foreign Provinces bordering upon the United-States. I have much satisfaction in assuring you that no such levies of men have been carried into effect, and that whatever absurd projects may have been in the contemplation of one or more individuals, nothing is to be dreaded from them in regard to the Peace of the United-States and the due observance of their Laws.

I pray you, Sir, [etc.].

47

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Thomas Sumter, United States Minister to the Portuguese Court in Brazil [1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *December 30, 1817.*

SIR: Your letter of 1st July, with its enclosures, relating to the extraordinary controversy between the Russian Ambassador Mr. Balk Poleff and the Portuguese Government, or rather with the late Count da Barca, has been received since I had the honor of writing you last. As the measure of furnishing Credentials with the highest diplomatic rank, to a Minister already residing at the Court with a character of the second order, was ostensibly complimentary, and for the express purpose of doing honor to the King of Portugal, it is natural to infer that the coolness with which it was received and which appears in the first instance to have given offence to the Russian Minister, was occasioned by some cause, not apparent upon the face of the papers communicated by either of the parties. It is remarkable that, while these indications of misunderstanding between Portugal and Russia have been exhibited to the world, the appearances of more than usual good intelligence have been manifesting themselves between Russia and Spain. If the object of Mr. Balk Poleff's new Credentials had simply been to give additional dignity and solemnity to the Emperor's compliments to the King upon his accession to the throne, it is hardly to be imagined that it would have been so uncourteously received—As a mere question of courtly etiquette this dispute can be of little interest to us; but if, as appears probable, it was connected with affairs of business between the two Governments, it would be very acceptable to have information more particular concerning it.—

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 302.

This will be still more desirable, if, as has been represented by some of the public Journals abroad, Mr. Balk upon arriving in Europe, and proceeding towards St. Petersburgh was stopped on his way by an order from the Emperor to turn back and return to Rio de Janeiro—an order, if the news be authentic, either of extreme disapprobation of the Ambassador's conduct, or of insulting defiance to the Court upon which he has thus been forced back—There are at the same time movements of military and naval forces between Russia and Spain, which have given rise to much speculation in Europe, and of which South America, if not even Brazil, has been conjectured to be the ultimate object and destination—In that event (for we are as yet left concerning it to the wide field of conjecture) we hope to receive early and authentic intelligence from you.—

48

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to G. Hyde de Neuville, French Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *January 27, 1818.*

SIR: Your Notes [2] to this Department of 20 November, and of 15 and 22 December, and of 17 January have remained until this time unanswered, only with the view of communicating to you the result of the measures taken by the Government of the United States, in regard to the subjects to which they relate.

In the civil wars which for several years past have subsisted between Spain and the Provinces heretofore her Colonies in this Hemisphere, the policy deliberately adopted and invariably pursued by the United-States has been that of impartial neutrality. It is understood that the Policy of all the European Powers, and particularly that of France has been the same.

As a consequence from this principle, while the Ports of the United-States have been open to both the parties to this war, for all the lawful purposes of Commerce, the Government of the United-States both in its Legislative and Executive Branches, have used every exertion in their power warranted by the Laws of Nations, and by our own Constitution, to admonish and restrain the Citizens of these States from taking any part in this Contest, incompatible with the obligations of Neutrality. If in these endeavours they have not been entirely successful, the Governments of Europe have not been more so, and among the occupants of Amelia-Island, for the piratical purposes complained of in your Notes, natives or Subjects of France have been included no less than Citizens of these States.

It is known to you Sir, that the Leader of the Party which first occupied

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 278.
[2] Not printed as insufficiently apropos. Their purport is evident from this reply.

Amelia-Island in the course of the last Summer, was a British Subject. From the time when that Event was first made known to this Government, it was perceived that its immediate consequences would be very injurious to the Laws, Commerce and Revenue of this Country; and measures of precaution adapted to the circumstances were immediately taken, the effect of which was partially to give the protection necessary to the Commerce of Nations at peace with the United States, endangered by that establishment as well as our own. Those measures however not proving effectual while a Port in the immediate vicinity of the United States, but not within the reach of their Jurisdiction continued to be held by the persons who had wrested the Island from the possession of Spain, this Government after having seen the total inability of Spain either to defend the place from the assault of the insignificant forces by which it was taken, or to recover it from them, found it necessary, to take the possession of it into its own hands—Thereby depriving those lawless plunderers of every Nation and Colour, of the refuge where they had found a shelter, and from whence they had issued to commit their depradations upon the peaceful commerce of all Nations, and among the rest upon the French vessels mentioned in your Notes—the Confiance—en Dieu, the Jean Charles and the Maly.

It is hoped Sir, that this measure will prove effectual to prevent the repetition of such outrages upon the commercial Vessels of France frequenting our coasts. An intimation in your Note of the 20 November, that due attention had not been paid to the demand of the Agent of the French Consul at Savannah in regard to the seizure of some of the Merchandize captured in the above mentioned Vessels and introduced into the United States, is believed to have arisen from misapprehension—The restitution of the property could by the Nature of our Institutions be effected only through the prosecution of their claims by the original owners or their Agents before the ordinary Tribunals—The illness of the Judge of the District Court of the United States in Georgia, and that of the District attorney are circumstances to be lamented, as having necessarily caused some delay; but which it is presumed you will consider as occasions rather of regret than of complaint.

By your Letter of 22 December it appears that the Captain and another man, belonging to the crew of the Privateer which had taken the Maly, were at the instance of the French Consul at Charleston arrested upon a charge of piracy; but that the Consul has thought proper to desist from the prosecution of this charge, upon the advice of legal Counsel, founded upon a supposed defect in the 8th. Section of the Law of the U. States in which the crime of Piracy is defined—I have had the honour of observing to you, that the opinion of this defect, has not received the sanction of the Supreme Court of the U. States, the only authority competent to pronounce upon it in the last resort—That the crime of Piracy has been more than once prosecuted, and punished, under the Section of the Law to which your Letter refers, and that

if the Consul has thought proper in deference to the advice given him, to abandon the prosecution of the persons who had captured the Maly, it cannot be inferred that he would have failed to obtain their conviction, if he had persisted in his pursuit for the execution of the Law.

Be pleased, Sir, to accept [etc.].

49

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Baptis Irvine, Special Agent of the United States to Venezuela[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *January 31, 1818.*

Among the papers of which copies are furnished you, is a communication[2] rec'd at this dept. in July last, by the course of the mail from Baltimore, and appearing to have been transmitted from the Island of Jamaica. It is in official form, and announces the re-establishment of the Supreme Government of the Venezuelan Republic, consisting of the Provinces of Barcelona, Caraccas, Cumana, Margarita, Merida, Truxillo & Varinas; mentioning Don Jos. Cortes Madariaga, as the person charged with the correspondence with foreign Governments. This act appears to have been consummated in the Island of Margarita, and one of the parties of it is Admiral Brion. No other communication has however been rec'd from them, and if credit can be given to the very imperfect information from that country which reaches us thro' the medium of the public Prints, General Bolivar has refused to acknowledge this Government, and another constitutional organization has taken place, by which the Executive authority is vested in a Council with General Bolivar at its head, & of which Brion himself is a member. To the Supreme authority, recognized by Brion, however constituted and wheresoever residing, you will make application for the restitution or indemnity due to our citizens in these two cases. You will pursue this object with all that discretion, moderation, & conciliatory deportment towards the existing authority, which would be due to any Government firmly established & universally recognized. But with every proper & respectful deference in point of form, it is expected you will maintain with firmness, and it is hoped, with effect the rights of the injured sufferers, committed to your charge.

You will at the same time take suitable occasion, to ask explanations, and to make known the sentiments of this Government, with regard to certain other proceedings, in which the name of the Venezuelan Republic, has been used, & a pretence of authority from its Government, set forth, it is hoped altogether without foundation, and in a manner deeply affecting both the

[1] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 95.

[2] See below, pt. VI, doc. 577, the President of Venezuela to the President of the United States, May 21, 1817.

rights & the interests of the U. S. You will represent that General M'Gregor came to this country, & enjoyed its hospitality as an individual foreigner; that while here, without the permission of this Government, contrary to the laws of nations, and in violation of those of the U. S., he is believed to have prepared and fitted out a military expedition against the territories of a nation with which we are at peace; to have levied a force, and enlisted men within our jurisdiction, and by their means so far to have accomplished his purpose as to take forcible possession of Amelia Island, situated close upon the borders of this country, and the occupation of which for the purposes intended by him, could not but be in a high degree noxious to the interests of this Union; that while in possession of the Island, he issued public proclamations declaring the purpose of taking possession of the whole and of both the Floridas; and issued commissions to vessels secretly fitted out and armed in our ports and officered & manned by our citizens, to cruize against a nation with which we are at peace; that finding himself unable to maintain possession of the Island he abandoned it to some of his followers, after which it was occupied by another armed force, under a pretended authority from Mexico, & became a seat of disorders of a character so directly hostile to the U. S., that the President found himself under the necessity of taking possession of it in the name of the U. S. It is not expected either that the proceedings of M'Gregor, here referred to, will be avowed as having been authorized by the Government of Venezuela, or that any dissatisfaction will be manifested by them at the occupation of the Island by the U. S. Should it however prove otherwise, you will have no difficulty in demonstrating that the conduct of M'Gregor was an infraction of our neutral rights, of which we have serious cause to complain. Besides the Laws of the U. S., for the preservation of our neutrality, I refer you to the correspondence between Mr. Jefferson & the Ministers of France & Great Britain in the year 1793, in the first volume of the American State Papers, for a full and luminous exposition of the rights and obligations of neutrality then recognized by this Government and applicable with encreased force to the present occasion, from the sanction of our practice then given to the principles generally admitted by the usages of civilized nations.[1] With regard to the Floridas the Messages of the President to Congress during their present session, & the Acts of January 1811 & Feby. 1813 now published will enable you to explain the views & the policy of the United States in relation to them. You will give it distinctly to be understood that the dispositions of this Government are as friendly towards the South Americans, as can be consistent with the obligations of neutrality; but that the United States have been for several years in negotiation with Spain for the cession of all her remaining rights in those Provinces to them;

[1] See *American State Papers*, vol. 1, pp. 71, 81, 92. (140. Vattel, bk. 3, sec. 104, Wolff 1174; Vattel, bk. 3, sec. 15) pp. 142, 143, 149, 150, 154. These citations are in the manuscript.

that it has been long an established part of our Laws not to permit them to pass into the hands of any other Power; and that those Laws must receive their execution.

Since the suppression of the establishment at Amelia-Island, attempts have been made to impress upon the public in this country the belief that the Government of the United States were acquainted with and even privy to the design of Mac Gregor upon that place, before it was carried into execution. That Mac Gregor himself avowed to various persons here that he had such a design in contemplation, and that it was thus communicated as a project of adventure, to persons connected with the administration may be true. But it was never disclosed as a subject upon which their approbation was desired or their opinion consulted; nor was it ever stated as involving a violation either of the neutrality or the Laws of the Union. No communication was ever had between the Government of the U. S. and M'Gregor, and if he or those with whom he connected himself here gave obscure & illusive hints of his purpose, in order to ascertain for his information the moment when their unequivocal illegality, ascertained by the Government, might draw upon him the active enforcement of the Laws, such ambiguous intimations, far from evincing the connivance of the Executive in his plan, would only prove their ignorance of his real designs, and his consciousness of the opposition to them which he must encounter, if they should be explicitly made known. The same suggestions which imparted his project, to a person in the confidence of the President, at the same time led to the idea, that it was concerted with the concurrence and favor of the British Government. Thus one deception was laid as the foundation for the superstructure of another; and while the exposure to this Government of the object, was, in a point of view concealing its illegal features, their attention was studiously averted from the means of execution, involving the violation of the Laws, towards others against which neither direct resistance, nor immediate preparation could be made. Neither M'Gregor nor his partizans made it known either that the authority by which he was to act, was assumed to be given him within our jurisdiction, or that the force with which he was to operate, would be levied, within our limits. Had either of these circumstances been divulged to this Government, its resistance to them would have been as immediate, as its duty to make such resistance would have been indubitable.

Should any intimation be given to you of a desire that a formal acknowledgement of the Venezuelan Government should be made by that of the United States, you will observe that in the present stage of the conflict, that step would be a departure from that system of neutrality, which the U. S. have adopted, and which is believed to be as much the interest of the South-Americans themselves as of the U. S. You may add that without this formal acknowledgement they enjoy all the advantages of a friendly & commercial intercourse with us, which they could enjoy with it; and that

the effect of such a measure might probably be, without benefiting them, to entangle us in disputes with other powers. You may take occasion at the same time, in a friendly & respectful manner to suggest that such irregular proceedings as those of which you are deputed to complain, as they could not be justified by any established and recognized Government, cannot but operate as a discouragement to the U. S., and to all other nations of the disposition to recognize a new power, in whose name, and under the pretense of whose authority such practices are pursued; that they cannot claim the rights & prerogatives of independent States, without conforming to the duties by which independent States are bound; that the usurped exercise of Sovereign authority by individuals, is the essential character of lawless power; and that the practices of pirates are inconsistent with the obligations of every constituted State.

The situation of the country to which you are to proceed, and the state of the respective parties to the war, render it uncertain whether you will find it expedient to make more than a very transient residence in any one place; or to remain long without returning to the U. S. The determination upon this subject, will in the first instance be left to your own judgment & discretion. After obtaining a definitive answer, upon the two claims of restitution & indemnity with which you are charged, and making the representations herein directed, there may be no public interest of adequate importance to require your continuance there any longer; in which case, you will take as early an opportunity to return as may be convenient. In the mean time, you will collect & transmit to this dept. the most correct information that you can obtain, respecting the real state of the country; the relative situation & prospects of the Patriot & Royal forces; the present effects & probable consequences of the emancipation of the slaves; the population & resources of the Provinces in the Venezuelan Confederation; their views & expectations in relation to the other South American Provinces; their commercial situation & prospects, especially with reference to the U. S. & to our commercial intercourse with them; and generally whatever may fall under your observation, and the knowledge of which it may be interesting to us to possess. [1]

I am [etc.].

[1] Irvine's reports to the Department fill a manuscript volume of several hundred pages, about a third consisting of correspondence between him and Bolivar at Angostura chiefly regarding rights and claims of United States merchant vessels in view of the pretended blockade and his transmitting dispatches to the Department. The rest consists of "Notes on Venezuela," a detailed description written after his return. Though interesting, his papers are not sufficiently apropos to warrant printing in this collection. An injudicious though not entirely incorrect response to his cordial reception, to the effect that the United States had "in effect" recognized the independence of Venezuela gave rise to a false impression.

50

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to President Monroe, for transmission to the United States House of Representatives [1]

WASHINGTON, *March 25, 1818.*

The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 5th December, has the honor of submitting the documents herewith transmitted, as containing the information possessed at this Department requested by that resolution.

In the communications received from Don Manuel H. de Aguirre, there are references to certain conferences between him and the Secretary of State, which appear to require some explanation.

The character in which Mr. Aguirre presented himself was that of a public agent from the Government of La Plata, and of private agent from that of Chili. His commissions from both simply qualified him as agent. But his letter from the Supreme Director (Pueyrredon) to the President of the United States requested that he might be received with the consideration due to his *diplomatic* character. He had no commission as a public minister of any rank, nor any full power to negotiate as such. Neither the letter of which he was the bearer, nor he himself, at his first interviews with the Secretary of State, suggested that he was authorized to ask the acknowledgment of his Government as independent; a circumstance which derived additional weight from the fact that his predecessor, Don Martin Thompson, had been dismissed by the Director Pueyrredon, for having transcended his powers, of which the letter brought by Mr. Aguirre gave notice to the President.

It was some time after the commencement of the session of Congress that he made this demand, as will be seen by the dates of his written communications to the Department. In the conferences held with him on that subject, among other questions which it naturally suggested were those of the manner in which the acknowledgment of his Government, should it be deemed advisable, might be made; and what were the territories which he considered as forming the state or nation to be recognised. It was observed, that the manner in which the United States had been acknowledged as an independent Power by France was by a treaty concluded with them, as an existing independent Power; and in which each one of the States then composing the Union was distinctly named; that something of the same kind seemed to be necessary in the first acknowledgment of a new Government, that some definite idea might be formed, not of the precise boundaries, but of the general extent of the country thus recognised. He said the Government of which he desired the acknowledgment was the country which had, before the

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 173. By a letter of the same date the President communicated this and its enclosed documents to the House of Representatives.

revolution, been the viceroyalty of La Plata. It was then asked whether that did not include Montevideo, and the territory occupied by the Portuguese; the Banda Oriental, understood to be under the government of General Artigas; and several provinces still in the undisputed possession of the Spanish Government? He said it did; but observed that Artigas, though in hostility with the Government of Buenos Ayres, supported, however, the cause of independence against Spain; and that the Portuguese could not ultimately maintain their possession of Montevideo. It was after this that Mr. Aguirre wrote the letter offering to enter into a negotiation for concluding a treaty, though admitting that he had no authority to that effect from his Government. It may be proper to observe, that the mode of recognition by concluding a treaty had not been suggested as the only one practicable or usual, but merely as that which had been adopted by France with the United States, and as offering the most convenient means of designating the extent of the territory acknowledged as a new dominion.

The remark to Mr. Aguirre, that, if Buenos Ayres should be acknowledged as independent, others of the contending provinces would, perhaps, demand the same, had particular reference to the Banda Oriental. The inquiry was, whether General Artigas might not advance a claim of independence for those provinces, conflicting with that of Buenos Ayres, for the whole viceroyalty of La Plata. The Portuguese possession of Montevideo was noticed in reference to a similar question.

It should be added, that these observations were connected with others, stating the reasons upon which the present acknowledgment of the Government of La Plata, in any mode, was deemed by the President inexpedient, in regard as well to their interests as to those of the United States.

51

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Manuel H. de Aguirre, Argentine Agent at Washington [1]

WASHINGTON, *April 11, 1818.*

SIR: I have had the honour of receiving your Note of the 5. instant. You suppose me to have stated in the Report to The President, communicated to Congress in his Message of 25 March,[2] that you had said General Artigas supported the cause of *the* Independence of Spain—But as the Cause of Spain in South-America, is not Independence, that would have been an absurdity which I neither understood you, nor have represented you as asserting. The Cause of *Independence of Spain* in South America, is not the

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 318. [2] See above, doc. 50.

Cause of Spain's Independence, but the Cause in opposition to Spain; and that is the Cause which I understood you to say General Artegas supported, though being at the same time in hostility with the Government of Buenos-Ayres.

With regard to the merits of the controversies between the Government of Buenos-Ayres and General Artegas, I certainly never expressed, nor do I recollect that you expressed to me any opinion. I understood you to say, that so far as related to the opposition to Spain, the Government of Buenos-Ayres and General Artegas were supporting a common cause.

I forbear to notice the remarks in your Note, preceding the quotation from the Report of the passage which you have understood as conveying an idea, directly contrary to that which I intended; being persuaded that you also have used expressions, without intending to convey the exceptionable meaning of which they are susceptible.

I have the honour [etc.].

52

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to George W. Erving, United States Minister to Spain [1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *April 20, 1818.*

From the complexion of the Debates in the House of Representatives during the Session of Congress which terminates this day, you will infer the great and increasing interest felt in this Country with regard to the Events occurring in that part of the American Hemisphere. The part pursued by the Government of the United-States in this contest, has been unequivocal Neutrality. None of the Revolutionary Governments has yet been formally acknowledged; but if that of Buenos Ayres, should maintain the stability which it appears to have acquired since the Declaration of Independence of 9 July 1816 it cannot be long before they will demand that acknowledgment of right—and however questionable that right may be now considered; it will deserve very seriously the consideration of the European Powers, as well as of the United States, how long that acknowledgment can rightfully be refused. Since beginning this letter I have received your Despatch No. 60 of 26 February,[2] enclosing the Memoir of Russia,[3] on these South American affairs.

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 179.
[2] See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1079.
[3] See below, pt. XII, doc. 1011, under date, November 17, 1817.

53

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States [1]

WASHINGTON, *April 22, 1818.*

SIR: William Davis Robinson, a Citizen of the United-States, landed in the Month of April 1816 on the Coast of Vera Cruz, at a place then in the possession of the Revolutionists—He proceeded to the city of Tehaucan, where he remained Several Months, without ever bearing arms, or accepting any Military or other Commission. He left that City the last of July of the same year, with the intention of reaching the Sea-Coast, and of embarking to return to the United States—Having by various incidents been prevented from accomplishing this intention; on the 12th of September 1816. he voluntarily gave himself up, at the Village of Playa Vicente, to the Commandant of the Royal Troops—claiming the benefit of the Royal Amnesty, or *Indulto*, which had then recently been proclaimed and offered to all persons without distinction who had been connected with the Insurgents, upon the condition of surrendering themselves. He delivered to the same Commandant, a Certificate of his birth at Philadelphia, and his Passport as a Citizen of the United-States, and claimed the benefit of the Royal Indulto, which was promised himself explicitly by the Commandant. He was nevertheless sent under a guard of Soldiers to the City of Oaxaca—was there confined several months in a Cell in the Convent of St. Domingo—Then transferred to Vera-Cruz and imprisoned in the Castle of San Juan de Ulloa—The Government of the United States, having in July last been informed of these Circumstances, an Instruction was sent to the Minister of the United States at Madrid, to make application to your Government for the release of Mr. Robinson—Mr. Erving received assurances from Don José Pizarro, that no information had been received in Spain of Robinson's imprisonment, and he was afterwards told by a person from Vera Cruz that Robinson had been allowed the benefit of the Indulto, and was to be sent to the United States to be delivered up by you to the Government of the United States.

This Statement was not correct—Mr. Robinson, was embarked as a Prisoner in close confinement on board the Spanish Frigate Iphigenia, at Vera-Cruz, to be sent to Spain—That Ship having by stress of weather been compelled to put into the Port of Campeachy, and having been there condemned as unseaworthy, Mr. Robinson, was landed there; and on the 4th of March last, was still kept as a Prisoner, to be sent by some other conveyance to Spain.

I have the honour therefore, to ask your good offices, that such application shall be made as may obtain if possible the release of Mr. Robinson, at Campeachy—a sufficient motive for which will surely be found in

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 321.

the solemn promise of the Royal Indulto, the accomplishment of which he is entitled to claim. But if the Reclamation to this effect should not reach that place in season to effect his liberation there; that you will make known to your Government his case, so that he may be immediately discharged upon his arrival in Spain.

It appears from the Public Journals, that Eight other American Citizens, were in like manner landed as Prisoners from the Frigate Iphigenia, at Campeachy, to be sent from thence to Spain—I have to request, Sir, that your good office, may be also extended to obtain their release, or satisfactory proof to this Government of the Justice of their detention.

I have the honor [etc.]

54

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States [1]

WASHINGTON, *April 25, 1818.*

SIR: I have the honour of transmitting to you the Copy of a statement received at this Department, from which it appears, that the Ship Beaver[2] and her very valuable cargo, belonging to Citizens of the United-States, have been unjustly seized by officers acting under colour of authority from your Government, at Talcahuano in South-America. I am directed to address you, to demand satisfaction of your Government for these outrages upon the persons and property of Citizens of this Nation, and express to you the confidence of The President, in your disposition to promote by your good offices with your Government, the restitution of the property, and satisfaction for the personal injuries of the sufferers.

I am [etc.].

55

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Albert Gallatin, United States Minister to France [3]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *May 19, 1818.*

By the newspapers and public documents transmitted to you, the extraordinary interest which has been felt in the contest between Spain and the

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 323.
[2] See below, pt. v, doc. 449.
[3] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 184.

South American Provinces will be disclosed, in the various forms under which it has occupied the deliberations of Congress. You will see how it has been complicated with our own Spanish relations, by the transactions relating to Amelia Island; by the negotiation which Spain has thought fit, to have the appearance of keeping alive, and by the questions incidental to our neutrality in that warfare, which the course of events has frequently produced. . . .

A motion was made in the house of representatives, while the general appropriation bill was under consideration to introduce the appropriation of an outfit and a year's salary, for a minister to be sent to the provinces of La Plata, if the President should think proper to make such an appointment. The object of this motion was to obtain the sanction of a legislative opinion, in favour of the immediate acknowledgment of the government of Buenos-Ayres; but it was rejected by a majority of 115 to 45. Independently of the objection to it, that it had the appearance of dictating to the Executive, with regard to the execution of its own duties and of manifesting a distrust of its favourable disposition to the independence of the colonies, for which there was no cause, it was not thought advisable to adopt any measure of importance upon the imperfect information then possessed, and the motive for declining to act was the stronger, from the circumstance that three commissioners had been sent to visit several parts of the South-American continent, chiefly for the purpose of obtaining more precise and accurate information. Despatches have been received from them, dated 4 March, immediately after their arrival at Buenos-Ayres. They had touched on their way, for a few days, at Rio de Janeiro; where the Spanish minister, Count Casa-Flores, appears to have been so much alarmed by the suspicion that the object of this mission was the formal acknowledgment of the government of La Plata, that he thought it his duty to make to Mr. Sumter an official communication that he had received an official despatch from the Duke of San Carlos, the Spanish ambassador at London, dated the 7th of November last, informing him, *that the British government had acceded to the proposition made by the Spanish government of a general mediation of the powers to obtain the pacification of Spanish America, the negotiation of which, it was upon the point of being decided, whether it should be at London or at Madrid.*

This agitation of a Spanish minister, at the bare surmise, of what might be the object of the visit of our commissioners to Buenos-Ayres, affords some comment upon the reserve, which *all* the European powers have hitherto observed in relation to this affair, towards the United States. No official communication of this projected general mediation has been made to the government of the United-States, by any one of the powers, who are to participate in it; and although the Duke de Richelieu and the Russian ambassador both, in conversation with you, admit the importance of the United States to the subject, and of the subject to the United States, yet

the former abstains from all official communication to you, of what the allies are doing in it, and the latter, apologizes for the silence of his government to us, concerning it, on the plea, that being upon punctilious terms with England, they can shew no mark of confidence to us, but by concert with her.

On the 27th of January last, Mr. Bagot, at the same time when he informed us of the proposal of Spain, to Great Britain, to mediate between the United-States and Spain, did also by instruction from Lord Castlereagh, state that the European Allies were about to interpose in the quarrel between Spain and her revolted colonies; and that very shortly a further and full communication should be made to us, of what was proposed to be done—with the assurance, that Great Britain would not propose or agree to any arrangement in which the interests of all parties concerned, including those of the United States should not be placed on the same foundation. Nearly four months have since elapsed; and the promised communication has not been—but we have a copy of the Russian *answer*, dated in November at Moscow, to the first proposal, made by Great Britain to the European allies, and we know the course which will be pursued by Portugal, in regard to this mediation. If the object of this mediation be any other than to promote the total independence political and commercial of South-America, we are neither desirous of being invited to take a part in it, nor disposed to accept the invitation if given. Our policy, in the contest between Spain and her colonies has been impartial neutrality. The policy of all the European States has been hitherto the same. Is the proposed general mediation to be a departure from that line of neutrality? If it is, which side of the contest, are the allies to take?—The side of Spain?—on what principle, and by what right? As contending parties in a civil war, the South-Americans have rights, which other powers are bound to respect as much as the rights of Spain; and after having by an avowed neutrality, admitted the existence of those rights, upon what principle of justice can the allies, consider them as forfeited, or themselves as justifiable in taking side with Spain against them?

There is no discernible motive of justice or of interest, which can induce the allied sovereigns to interpose for the restoration of the Spanish colonial dominion in South America. There is none even of policy; for if all the organized power of Europe is combined, to maintain the authority of each Sovereign over his own people, it is hardly supposable that the sober senses of the allied cabinets will permit them to extend the application of this principle of union to the maintenance of colonial dominion beyond the Atlantic and the Equator.

By the usual principles of international law, the state of *neutrality*, recognizes the cause of both parties to the contest, as *just*—that is, it avoids all consideration of the merits of the contest—But when abandoning that neutrality, a nation takes one side, in a war of other parties, the first question

to be settled is the *justice* of the cause to be assumed. If the European allies, are to take side with Spain, to reduce her South-American colonies to submission, we trust they will make some previous enquiry into the justice of the cause they are to undertake. As neutrals we are not required to decide the question of justice. We are sure we should not find it on the side of Spain.

We incline to the belief that on a full examination of the subject, the allies will not deem it advisable, to interpose in this contest, by any application of force. If they advise the South Americans, to place themselves again under the Spanish government, it is not probable their advice will be followed. What motives can be adduced to make the Spanish government acceptable to them? Wherever Spain can maintain her own authority she will not need the co-operation of the allies—Where she cannot exact obedience, what value can be set upon her protection?

The situation of these Countries has thrown them open to commercial intercourse with other nations, and among the rest with these United-States. This state of things has existed several years, and cannot now be changed without materially affecting our interests. You will take occasion not by formal official communication, but verbally as the opportunity may present itself to let the Duke de Richelieu understand, that we think the European allies would act but a just and friendly part towards the United States, by a free and unreserved communication to us, of what they do, or intend to do in the affair of Spain and South America—That it is our earnest desire to pursue a line of policy, at once just to both the parties in that contest, and harmonious with that of the European allies—That we must know their system, in order to shape our own measures accordingly; but that we do not wish to join them in any plan of interference between the parties; and above all that we can neither accede to nor approve of any interference to restore any part of the Spanish supremacy, in any of the South-American Provinces.

I have the honour [etc.].

56

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *May 20, 1818.*

. . . As it was not anticipated that any disposition existed in the British government, to start questions of title with us, on the borders of the South Sea, we could have no possible motive for reserve or concealment with regard to the expedition of the Ontario. In suggesting these ideas to Lord Castle-

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 189.

reagh, rather in conversation than in any more formal manner, it may be proper to remark the minuteness of the present interest either to Great-Britain or the United States, involved in this concern; and the unwillingness for that reason of this government, to include it among the objects of serious discussion with them—At the same time you might give him to understand, though not unless in a manner to avoid every thing offensive in the suggestion; that from the nature of things, if in the course of future events, it should ever *become* an object of serious importance to the United States, it can scarcely be supposed that Great Britain would find it useful or advisable to resist their claim to possession by systematic opposition. If the United States leave her in undisturbed enjoyment of all her holds upon Europe, Asia, and Africa, with all her actual possessions in this hemisphere, we may very fairly expect that she will not think it consistent either with a wise or a friendly policy, to watch with eyes of jealousy and alarm, every possibility of extension to our natural dominion in North America, which she can have no solid interest to prevent, until all possibility of her preventing it shall have vanished.

This circumstance will afford also a very suitable occasion for opening to the British government, the wish of the President, for a frank, candid, and unreserved mutual communication of the views of policy entertained by each party, upon objects of serious interest to both; among which the affairs of South-America, are preeminently deserving of attention—The reserve with which it appears from your number 11.[1] that every thing done by the European allies on this subject, has been withheld from you, is the more remarkable, by the consideration, that the Russian Ambassador at Paris, has alledged to Mr Gallatin, the necessity under which his government felt itself of not being more communicative without the concurrence of England, as an apology for a like reserve on their part. To England therefore it is attributed by her allies.—On the 27th of January last, Mr Bagot, in communicating the request of Spain, that Great-Britain would undertake the mediation between her and us, at the same time gave us an assurance from Lord Castlereagh that a full communication should *very shortly* be made to us, of the whole proceedings of the European allies in this affair of South-America. Not a line upon the subject has since then been received by Mr Bagot, and a mere accident has put us in possession of an official communication from the Duke of San Carlos to the Spanish Minister at Rio Janeiro, written in *November* last, and announcing that Great-Britain had acceded to the proposal of Spain, that there should be a general mediation of the European Alliance for the pacification of the Spanish Colonies, and that it was then to be immediately determined, whether the negotiation should be held at London, or at Madrid.—This communication was made with great earnestness by Count Casa-Flores to Mr Sumter, on the mere entrance of

[1] See Rush to Adams, March 21, 1818, pt. VIII, doc. 762.

the Congress frigate, with our commissioners, to South-America, at Rio de Janeiro. That Spanish Minister, apprehensive that the object of our Mission was to acknowledge the Independence of the Government of Buenos-Ayres, appears to have supposed that this critical disclosure of the intention of the Allies, would have been a sufficient inducement for our Commissioners to retrace their steps, and instead of proceeding to Buenos-Ayres, to return immediately home.—His alarm was premature. But among the reflexions suggested by this incident, is, the importance to the European Alliance, as well as to the United-States, that this Government should be frankly, and candidly, and fully informed of what the allies do, and of what they intend to do with regard to South-America—Hitherto the policy of Europe, and that of the United States in this matter has been the same, Neutrality.—It cannot have escaped the recollection of Lord Castlereagh, how often he has been assured of the wish of this Government to proceed in relation to South-American affairs, in good understanding and harmony with Great-Britain; most especially so long as their mutual policy should be neutrality—He will probably recollect his having observed that in *their* idea of neutrality, the non-acknowledgment of the Independence of the Colonies was an essential point; which so long as their Independence is the precise question of the war, is undoubtedly true. But it is also true that the non-acknowledgment of the Colonial Supremacy of Spain, during the contest, is equally essential to *Neutrality*. The proclamation of the Prince Regent, prohibiting British Subjects from serving on either side in this war, is a signal acknowledgment of this principle, and a plain admission of the obligation of neutral duties, as well towards the South-Americans as towards Spain—Now the first point upon which we desire and think ourselves entitled to explicit information from the Alliance is, whether their plan of mediation, and of pacification, proceeds upon the basis of *neutrality*. If so, the allies are pledged to take no part against the South-Americans—If not, upon what principle of right will the allies, upon what principle will especially Great-Britain, depart from the neutrality which she has observed and proclaimed?—If the plan of pacification is to be founded upon the basis of neutrality, it must be offered to the free acceptance of the South Americans, without any pretence or intention of compulsion—We think there is no prospect that any such proposal to them will be successful, even if it should be backed by the new armament and the Russian fleet lately purchased by Spain—From this transaction, as well as from some other indications, among which is the purport of the Memorial, from Moscow, dated the 17th of November 1817[1] to serve for Instructions to the Russian Ministers at the Several allied Courts, the disposition of Russia to say the least appears to incline strongly against the South-Americans—The substance of that Memorial is an exhortation to Spain by certain territorial concessions to Portugal, on the Rio de la Plata, to secure the co-operation of the Government of Brazil, against the South-

[1] See below, pt. XII, doc. 1011.

American Insurgents; and then with the support of the whole European alliance, to offer certain privileges to the South-Americans, as the condition of their return to subjection. It does not however contemplate the exercise of force, on the part of the allies, but intimates that the fate of South-America, may be settled by General Treaties, like those of Vienna for the abolition of the Slave Trade. This memorial refers to one previously received from the British cabinet; and alludes to certain conditions, upon which they proposed that the interposition of the allies should be granted—and to other particulars in the British memorial, involving the questions of armistice, co-operation, guarantee, and neutrality which naturally arose from the subject—All these, the Russian memorial sets aside, as objects of a subordinate nature, approving however a remark of the Spanish Government, that the term *armistice*, might have a dangerous impression upon the insurgent South-Americans.

It is hoped that the free communication promised by Lord Castlereagh, through Mr. Bagot, will have been forwarded from England before you receive this letter. But should the reserve towards you, noticed in your number 11.[1] on South American concerns, be still continued, you will take occasion to remind Lord Castlereagh, of this promise, remarking the satisfaction which it gave to the President, and the entire confidence with which he is expecting its fulfilment. You will observe that if the European alliance, are undertaking jointly to arrange the affairs of Spain and South-America, the United-States have so deep an interest in the result, that it will be no more than justice to them on the part of the alliance, to give them clear, explicit and immediate notice, not only of their acts, but of their intentions—not only of their final decisions, but of the propositions of each of their members. If they do not think proper to *consult* the United-States, before coming to their conclusions, they will of course expect that the United-States, will come to their conclusions, without consulting them. What we ask, and what we promise, is immediate notice of what is done or intended to be done. You will at the same time bear in mind, and if the occasion should be given by any intimation of a disposition to invite the United-States, to take a part in the negotiation, you will let it be known that we have no desire to participate in it; and above all that we will join in no plan of pacification founded on any other basis than that of the entire Independence of the South-Americans.

It is presumed that this will very soon be, if it is not already the real policy of Great-Britain; however, in deference to the powerful members of the European alliance, she may acquiesce in the project of a compromise under the sanction of the alliance, between political resubjugation, and commercial liberty or privileges. We believe this compromise will be found utterly impracticable, at least as a permanent establishment; and we con-

[1] See below, pt. VIII, doc. 762, Rush to Adams, March 21, 1818.

jecture that the British Cabinet have already made up their minds to the total Independence of South-America, placing little reliance on the issue of this joint negotiation. When they have satisfied their sense of duty to their ties of amity with Spain, it is supposed they will soon discover the great interest of Great-Britain in the total Independence of Spanish America, and will promote that event, just so far as their obligations towards Spain will permit. The time is probably not remote, when the acknowledgment of the South-American Independence, will be an act of friendship towards Spain herself.—When it will be kindness to her, to put an end to that self-delusion under which she is wasting all the remnant of her resources in a war, infamous by the atrocities with which it is carried on, and utterly hopeless of success. It may be an interesting object of your attention, to watch the moment when this idea will become prevalent in the British Councils, and to encourage any disposition which may consequently be manifested to a more perfect concert of measures between the United-States and Great-Britain towards that end; the total Independence of the Spanish South-American Provinces.

Among the symptoms of the approach of that period, we cannot overlook, the sentiments avowed by Lord Castlereagh, in Parliament, in his answer to some observations of Mr. Lyttleton, in the debate upon the late Slave Trade Abolition Treaty with Spain—The policy which he in that Speech recommends of throwing open all the gates of commerce, and the universal approbation with which it was received, shew the direction in which the current of opinion is running; and we may fairly hope will find its application, not only in all the questions relating to South-America, but also in the commercial arrangements which must soon be resumed between us and Great-Britain—I shall, in another letter, make known to you the President's views on this subject, and in the mean time, remain, [etc.].

57

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *June 2, 1818.*

Sir: In the Letter which I had the honour of addressing to you on the 22d of April last,[2] in behalf of William D. Robinson, then detained as a Prisoner at Campeachy, landed from the Frigate Iphigenia, it was mentioned that Eight other Persons, Citizens of the United-States were confined with him and under similar circumstances. I requested your good offices, in behalf of them all—Information has since then been received, at this

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 326. [2] See above, doc. 53.

Department, that among them was William Thompson, who served with reputation as an officer in the army of the United States, during their late war with Great-Britain; and who having landed on the coast of Mexico in the Year 1817—without joining in any act of hostility against Spain had embarked on board of an American vessel at Mariana Bar, for the purpose of returning to the United States; when he was captured by a Spanish Frigate and treated as a Prisoner—Having made his escape from that Ship to the Shore, he took refuge in a fort, from whence he surrendered himself on the express condition of being restored to Liberty—This Condition was for some time complied with; but after having been ten days at large he was again forcibly seized, sent far into the interior of the Country, cast into a Dungeon and there confined five months, after which he was transported, to be removed to Spain; and very recently, was confined in the Moro Castle at the Havana expecting very shortly to be sent from thence to Cadiz.

For him and his fellow-sufferers, one of whom is of the name of La Rogue, I solicit again the interposition of your good offices with your Government; and especially that in consideration of the promises made to them in the name of His Majesty the King of Spain; they may be immediately liberated on their arrival in that Kingdom.

I am [etc.].

58

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to George W. Campbell, United States Minister to Russia[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *June 28, 1818.*

. . . The influence of these Principles may account for the part which the Emperor of Russia has hitherto taken in the quarrel which has arisen between Spain and Portugal from the occupation by the latter of Montevideo, and for the sentiments which he has manifested with regard to the contest between Spain and her American Colonies.

The Portuguese Government of Brazil took Montevideo and the Eastern Banks of the River La Plata, from the possession not of Spain, but of the Revolutionary South-Americans who had cast off the authority of the Spanish Monarchy. Spain unable to defend herself either against her

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 211. George W. Campbell, of Tennessee: Commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Russia, April 16, 1818. Took leave July 5, 1820. Was instructed, June 28, 1818, to stop at Copenhagen and endeavor to procure a satisfactory adjustment of the claims growing out of the spoliations committed under the Danish flag on the commerce of the United States.

revolted Subjects or against the Brazilian invasion, immediately appealed for support, to the *European Alliance*, against the attack of Portugal. The European Alliance, apparently not reflecting that they could not interfere in this affair, without making themselves parties, both to the controversy between Spain and Portugal, and to that between Spain and her Colonies, took up the cause of Spain with a decision equally precipitate and peremptory; offered their Mediation to Portugal, with high encomiums upon the moderation and magnanimity of Spain in asking for it, and with unqualified menaces that if Portugal should decline their Mediation, and withhold the explanations which they demanded, they would throw the whole weight of their Power on the side of Spain. Portugal accepted the Mediation and gave the explanations—And although She had old pretensions to the Territory which She had occupied, and an unsettled claim for the restoration of Olivenza in Europe, she offered to waive all these demands, and to restore Montevideo to Spain whenever Spain should be in a condition to receive it, that is, when she should have subdued the Revolution in the Provinces of La Plata. Spain utterly unable to comply with this condition, without which She saw that her demand upon Portugal for the restoration of Montevideo was not only nugatory but ridiculous, was now reduced to the humiliation of imploring the Mediation of the European Alliance, between her and her revolted Colonies; or in other words of asking the aid of the Allied Force to recover her authority over her American Dominions.

The Emperor of Russia, who as the Conservator of the Peace of Europe had already sided with Spain against the aggression of Portugal, seems now to have taken the same bias against the Colonies, as the Restorer of what he considers legitimate authority. Having no immediate interests of his own, involved in the Question, he appears to have viewed it only as a Question of Supremacy and Obedience, between the Sovereign and his Subjects; and to have taken it for granted that the Sovereign must have the right, and the Subjects the wrong of the cause. But Great-Britain, the other efficient Member of the Alliance, had a great and powerful interest of her own to operate upon her consideration of the case. The Revolution in South-America had opened a new World to her Commerce, which the restoration of the Spanish Colonial Dominion, would again close against her. Her Cabinet therefore devised a middle term, a compromise between Legitimacy and Traffic; a project by which the Political Supremacy of Spain should be restored, but under which the Spanish Colonies should enjoy Commercial Freedom, and intercourse with the rest of the World. She admits all the pretensions of Legitimacy until they come in contact with her own Interest; and then She becomes the patroness of liberal principle, and colonial emancipation.

In the correspondence between the European Allies which has hitherto

taken place on this subject we have seen only the Memoir of the Russian Cabinet, dated at Moscow in November 1817, from which it would seem that the Russian Project is a compromise between Spain and Portugal, and then a co-operation between them to reduce the South-Americans to submission. The Memoir speaks in vague and general terms of certain favours or privileges to be promised and secured to the Colonists; but its general Import shews the design of restoring the entire authority of Spain.

It is remarkable that the European Allies have hitherto withheld from the Government of the United-States all their proceedings on this intended Mediation between Spain and her Colonies. That they had acceded to the request of Spain to that effect, we should know only by unauthenticated rumour, but for the accident of our Commissioners to South-America having touched at Rio de Janeiro. The Spanish Minister in a moment of alarm, lest the object of their Mission should be to recognize the Government of Buenos-Ayres, and seemingly with the hope of intimidating them from proceeding, made a formal disclosure to Mr. Sumter [1] of this purposed interference of the European Alliance. In January last, Mr. Bagot by Instruction from Lord Castlereagh, informed me, that he expected *very shortly* to make to us a full communication of their proceedings in this concern, but we have to this day, heard no further from him of it. There is some reason to believe that nothing decisive will be agreed upon, until the meeting of Sovereigns, expected to be held in the course of the present Summer, and then ulterior measures may probably depend on the Expedition to be fitted out from Cadiz of the Ships of War lately sold by The Emperor of Russia to Spain.

At the time of your arrival at St. Petersburg, it is probable that The Emperor will have returned from his excursion; and it will be among the most interesting objects of your enquiry, to ascertain the results of that meeting. Perhaps it will no longer be deemed necessary by the Allies, to withhold from this Government what they have done, and what they intend, in relation to the affairs of Spain and South-America. Instructions have been forwarded to Mr. Gallatin and to Mr. Rush,[2] to give the French and English Cabinets informally to understand that the Interests of this Nation are so deeply concerned, and the feelings of the Country are so much excited, on this subject, that we have a just claim to be informed of the intentions as well as the acts of the European Alliance concerning it—That our Policy hitherto, has like that of the European Powers been Neutrality between Spain and the Colonies—That we earnestly wish to pursue a course for the future, in harmony with that of the Allies; but that we will not participate in, and cannot approve any interposition of other Powers, unless it be to promote the total Independence, political and commercial, of the Colonies—That we believe

[1] See above, doc. 55, Adams to Gallatin, May 19, 1818.
[2] See above, docs. 55 and 56, Adams to Gallatin, May 19, 1818; and Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818.

it must eventually come to this result, and that it is rendering no service to either of the parties to endeavour to prevent or to retard it. In your interview with the Russian Ministry it may be proper that you should express similar Sentiments to them; avoiding however all animadversion which might be understood as censuring the part taken by the Emperor, in favour of Spain.

It is not unlikely that Spain in her general recurrence to the Allies, to support her against all her Adversaries and to extricate her from all her difficulties, may have resorted to them, and particularly to The Emperor of Russia, for countenance, in her differences with the United-States.

59

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *July 30, 1818.*

The Congress Frigate has returned with two of the Commissioners who went to Buenos-Ayres. Judge Bland proceeded to Chili. Their unanimous opinion is that the resubjugation of the Provinces of La Plata, to Spain is impossible. Of their internal condition the aspect is more equivocal.

60

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain[2]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *August 15, 1818.*

Referring you to my late Letters on the subject of South-American Affairs, I am now directed to enquire what part you think the British Government will take in regard to the dispute between Spain and her Colonies, and in what light they will view an acknowledgment of the Independence of the Colonies by the United-States? Whether they will view it as an act of hostility to Spain, and in case Spain should declare War against us, in consequence, whether Great-Britain will take part with her in it?

I am [etc.].

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 235. [2] *Ibid.*, 246.

61

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Albert Gallatin, United States Minister to France[1]

WASHINGTON, *August 20, 1818.*

SIR: Referring you to my late Letters on the subject of South-American Affairs, I am now directed to enquire what part you think the French Government will take in regard to the dispute between Spain and her Colonies, and in what light they will view an acknowledgment of the Independence of the Colonies by the United-States? Whether they will view it as an act of hostility to Spain, and in case Spain should declare War against us, in consequence, whether France will take part with her in it.

I am [etc.].

62

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to George W. Campbell, United States Minister to Russia[1]

WASHINGTON, *August 20, 1818.*

SIR: Referring you to your Instructions on the subject of South-American Affairs, I am now directed to enquire what part you think the Russian Government will take in regard to the dispute between Spain and her Colonies, and in what light they will view an acknowledgment of the Independence of the Colonies by the United-States? Whether they will view it as an act of hostility to Spain, and in case Spain should declare War against us, in consequence, whether Russia will take part with her in it.

I am [etc.].

63

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States[2]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *August 24, 1818.*

SIR: I have received your letters of the 27th ulto.[3] and of the 5th Instant with their respective enclosures, all of which have been laid before The President.—With regard to the two Vessels alledged to have been equipped at New York for the purpose of cruizing, under the flag of Buenos Ayres,

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 247.
[2] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 334.
[3] See below, pt. xiii, doc. 1084.

against Spanish subjects, the result of the examination which has taken place before a Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, has doubtless convinced you that no prosecution commenced by the Government of the United States, against the persons charged with a violation of their laws and their neutrality could have been necessary or useful to you, no transgression of the law having been proved against them.

64

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Manuel H. de Aguirre, Argentine Agent at Washington[1]

WASHINGTON, *August 27, 1818.*

SIR: Your letter of the 10th Instant has been laid before The President who has directed me to inform you that The Executive Administration is not authorized to make the purchase of the two ships which have been built under your direction at New York and which you now propose for sale.—

From the time when the civil war between Spain and the Spanish Colonies in South America commenced, it has been the declared policy of the United States, in strict conformity to their existing laws, to observe between the Parties an impartial neutrality.—They have considered it as a civil war in which, as a foreign nation, they were authorized to allow to the parties engaged in it equal rights, which equality the colonies have invariably enjoyed in the United States.—In the month of July 1816, The Congress assembled at Tucuman, issued a declaration of Independence for the Provinces of La Plata, including as you have heretofore stated, all the Provinces previously comprehended within the Vice Royalty of that name.—From that period the United States have considered the question of that Independence as the precise question and object of the war.—The President is of opinion that Buenos Ayres has afforded strong proof of its ability to maintain its Independence, a sentiment which, he is persuaded, will daily gain strength with the powers of Europe, especially should the same career of good fortune continue in its favor.—In deciding the question respecting the Independence of Buenos Ayres many circumstances claim attention, in regard to the colonies as well as to the United States, which make it necessary that he should move in it with caution.—Without mentioning those relating to the United States, which he is bound to weigh, it is proper to notice one in regard to the colonies, which presents a serious difficulty.—You have requested the recognition of the Independence of the Government of Buenos Ayres, as Supreme over the Provinces of La Plata, while Monte Video, the Banda Oriental and Paraguay are not only possessed in fact by others but under Gov-

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 337.

ernments disclaiming all dependence upon Buenos Ayres, no less than upon Spain.

The Government of the United States have extended to the people of Buenos Ayres all the advantages of a friendly intercourse which are enjoyed by other nations and every mark of friendship and good will which were compatible with a fair neutrality.—Besides all the benefits of a free Commerce and of national hospitality, and the admission of their Vessels into our Ports, the Agents of Buenos Ayres have, though not recognized in form, had the freest communication with The Administration, and have received every attention to their representations which could have been given to the accredited Officers of any Independent Power.—No person has ever presented himself from your Government with the credentials or Commission of a public Minister.—Those which you have exhibited give you the express character of *Agent* only; which neither by the Laws of Nations, nor by those of the United States, confers the priviledge of exemption from personal arrest.—That you have been, as mentioned in your letter, subjected to the inconvenience of such an arrest is sincerely regretted by The President, but is a circumstance which he had no power to prevent.—By the nature of our Constitution, the Supreme Executive possessing no authority to dispense with the operation of the laws, except in cases prescribed by the laws themselves.—This observation appears to be the more deserving of your consideration as you mention, as your motive for communicating to the acting Secretary of State at the time of your arrival in this Country in July 1817, the object of your Agency—the building of a number of Vessels of war for the Governments of Buenos Ayres and Chili—namely that you believed The President had a discretionary power to suspend the laws against fitting out, equipping and arming in our Ports, Vessels of War, for the belligerent purposes of other powers.—Of the conversation which passed between you and the then acting Secretary of State a statement has been drawn up by him, a copy of which is herewith enclosed.—He informed you, that to maintain the neutral obligations of the United States, the Laws prohibited the arming of Vessels in our Ports for the purpose of committing hostilities against any nation with which they were at Peace, and also prohibited our Citizens from enlisting or being enlisted within the territory or Jurisdiction of the United States in the service of any foreign State, as a soldier or as a marine or Seaman on board of any Vessel of War, from accepting and exercising any Commission, but that Vessels even suited for warlike purposes, and arms and ammunition of every kind, might be purchased within our Country as articles of merchandize by either of the belligerent parties, without infringement of our laws or neutrality.—How far this condition of our laws was compatible with the practical execution of the Commission with which you were charged, you were to judge, and in the case of doubts entertained by yourself, you were advised to consult the opinions of Council learned in the

law, from any of whom you might obtain information under which your course of proceeding would be correct and safe.—But that the Executive possessed no power to dispense with the Execution of the laws, and was on the contrary bound by his Official duty and his oath to take care that they should be faithfully executed.—On the 14th of November last I had the honor of receiving a note from you in which after referring to this previous conversation with my Predecessor, you stated that you had proceeded to carry into immediate execution the orders of your Government upon the terms of that conversation, but that finding it impossible to conduct the business, as had been your desire, with secresy, while you were engaged in the execution of formal contracts, an act of Congress was presented to you, prohibiting under heavy penalties, all persons from fitting out Vessels of the description of those you had ordered to be built at New York and which must consequently be unable to proceed to their destination—and you requested of me information on these points. Through the medium of two of the Commissioners then about to proceed to South America, you were again reminded that the Secretary of State could not with propriety draw the line or define the boundary which you should not pass.—That the interpretation and exposition of the laws, under our free institutions, belonged peculiarly to the judiciary and that if, as a stranger, unacquainted with our legal provisions, you wanted any advice on this subject, there were professional men of eminence in every State to whom in common with others, you might recur for their opinion.—It was understood that you were fully satisfied with this explanation.—You have, therefore constantly been aware of the necessity of proceeding in such manner in executing the orders of your Government to avoid violating the laws of the United States and although it has not been possible to extend to you the priviledge of exemption from arrest (an exemption not enjoyed by the President of the United States himself, in his individual capacity) yet you have all the benefit of those laws, which are the protection of the rights and personal liberties of our own Citizens.—Although you had built and equipped and fitted for Sea and manned, two Vessels suitable for purposes of War, yet as no proof was adduced that you had armed them, you were immediately liberated and discharged by the decision of the Judge of the Supreme Court, before whom the case was brought.—It is yet impossible for me to say that the execution of the orders of your Government is impracticable; but the Government of the United States can no more countenance or participate in any expedient to evade the intention of the laws, than it can dispense with their operation.—

Of the friendly disposition of The President towards your Government and Country, many proofs have been given.—I am directed by him to renew the assurance of that disposition, and to assure you that it will continue to be manifested in every manner compatible with the laws of this Union and with the observance of its duties towards others.—

I am [etc.].

65

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Thomas Sumter, Jr., United States Minister to the Portuguese Court in Brazil [1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *August 27, 1818.*

Your Correspondence with the Spanish Minister Count Casa-Flores, has had the effect, of first disclosing to us with official authenticity the Mediation which the five great European Allied Powers, have projected, between Spain, and her South-American Colonies. The Allies have not been very communicative with the United States, with regard to their measures and intentions in this respect, but we know that they have not and we have strong [sic] to believe that they will not agree upon any coercive measures in the case. There is little doubt that the real Policy of Great-Britain is to promote the cause of the Independents, and although they will not aid them by a public acknowledgment, and will take no step of which Spain can complain, they will take special care that the European Alliance shall take no active measures against the Independents. The Agents of Buenos-Ayres and of New-Granada, in England have sent in to the British Government, *Protests* against the interposition of the Allies, unless upon the basis of the total Independence of the Colonies, unanswerable upon the argument both of right and fact; and the views of Great-Britain and Russia, as to what *is to be done*, are so widely apart, with so little desire on either side to come upon this point to an agreement that there can be no doubt but this appeal of Spain to the thunder bolts of the Allies will terminate in utter disappointment.

Two of the late Commissioners to South America, Messrs. Rodney and Graham have returned to this Country. Mr. Bland, as you doubtless know, proceeded to Chili.

66

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Joel R. Poinsett of South Carolina, ex-Consul General of the United States at Buenos Aires [2]

WASHINGTON, *October 23, 1818.*

SIR: I am directed by the President of the United States to request of you such information, in relation to the affairs of South America, as your long residence in that country, and the sources of intelligence from thence which have remained open to you since your return, have enabled you to collect, and which you may think it useful to the public to communicate to the Executive Government of this Union.

I have the honor [etc.].

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 248.

[2] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 323. For replies to this, see below, pt. II, docs. 242 and note thereto and 243, pt. V, doc. 461, and pt. XI, doc. 942.

67

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States [1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *October 31, 1818.*

Sir: Your letter of the 24th instant,[2] and the proposals contained in it, offered as the basis of a treaty for the adjustment of all the subjects in discussion between the United States and Spain, have been received, and laid before the President of the United States. . . .

Your sixth proposition is inadmissible. The United States do not know that any additional laws or declarations are necessary to secure the fulfilment, on the part of Spain, of her engagements in the treaty of 1795. Numerous and just as their complaints have been of the violations of that treaty, under the authority of Spain, they consider the Spanish Government fully competent to make reparation for them, and to secure the faithful observance of their engagements, in future, without new laws or declarations. Nor are they aware of any vague or arbitrary interpretation in any of the ports of this Union, by which, contrary to the laws of nations, or to the stipulations of the treaty of 1795, the law is eluded. The interpretation or construction given to the stipulations of the treaty of 1795 within the United States is subject to the decisions of the judicial tribunals of the United States, who are bound to consider all treaties as the supreme law of the land. Their proceedings are all public, and their decisions upon all questions of interpretation are recorded and published. In this there is surely nothing vague or arbitrary; nothing requiring new laws or declarations. Of the many complaints which you have addressed to this Government in relation to alleged transactions in our ports, the deficiency has been, not in the meaning or interpretation of the treaty, but in the proofs of the facts which you have stated, or which have been reported to you, to bring the cases of complaint within the scope of the stipulations of the treaty. . . . The President is deeply penetrated with the conviction that further protracted discussion of the points at issue between our Governments cannot terminate in a manner satisfactory to them. From your answer to this letter, he must conclude whether a final adjustment of all our differences is now to be accomplished, or whether all hope of such a desirable result is, on the part of the United States, to be abandoned.

I pray you to accept [etc.].

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 530.
[2] See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1087.

68

President Monroe's message to the United States Congress, November 16, 1818[1]

[EXTRACTS]

Our relations with Spain remain nearly in the state in which they were at the close of the last session. . . .

In suppressing the establishment at Amelia island, no unfriendliness was manifested towards Spain, because the post was taken from a force which had wrested it from her. The measure, it is true, was not adopted in concert with the Spanish Government, or those in authority under it; because, in transactions connected with the war in which Spain and the colonies are engaged, it was thought proper, in doing justice to the United States, to maintain a strict impartiality towards both the belligerent parties, without consulting or acting in concert with either. It gives me pleasure to state, that the Governments of Buenos Ayres and Venezuela, whose names were assumed, have explicitly disclaimed all participation in those measures, and even the knowledge of them, until communicated by this Government; and have also expressed their satisfaction that a course of proceedings had been suppressed, which, if justly imputable to them, would dishonor their cause. . . .

The civil war which has so long prevailed between Spain and the provinces in South America still continues, without any prospect of its speedy termination. The information respecting the condition of those countries, which has been collected by the commissioners recently returned from thence, will be laid before Congress, in copies of their reports, with such other information as has been received from other agents of the United States.

It appears, from these communications, that the Government of Buenos Ayres declared itself independent in July, 1816, having previously exercised the power of an independent Government, though in the name of the King of Spain, from the year 1810; that the Banda Oriental, Entre Rios, and Paraguay, with the city of Santa Fé, all of which are also independent, are unconnected with the present Government of Buenos Ayres; that Chili has declared itself independent, and is closely connected with Buenos Ayres; that Venezuela has also declared itself independent, and now maintains the conflict with various success; and that the remaining parts of South America, except Montevideo, and such other portions of the eastern bank of the La Plata as are held by Portugal, are still in the possession of Spain, or, in a certain degree, under her influence.

By a circular note, addressed by the ministers of Spain to the allied Powers with whom they are respectively accredited, it appears that the allies have undertaken to mediate between Spain and the South American provinces, and that the manner and extent of their interposition would be settled by a

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 212.

congress which was to have met at Aix-la-Chapelle in September last. From the general policy and course of proceeding observed by the allied Powers in regard to this contest, it is inferred that they will confine their interposition to the expression of their sentiments; abstaining from the application of force. I state this impression, that force will not be applied, with the greater satisfaction, because it is a course more consistent with justice, and likewise authorizes a hope that the calamities of the war will be confined to the parties only, and will be of shorter duration.

From the view taken of this subject, founded on all the information that we have been able to obtain, there is good cause to be satisfied with the course heretofore pursued by the United States in regard to this contest, and to conclude that it is proper to adhere to it, especially in the present state of affairs.

69

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Lino de Clemente, Agent of Venezuela in the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *December 16, 1818.*

SIR: Your note of the 11th instant[2] has been laid before the President of the United States, by whose direction I have to inform you that your name having been avowedly affixed to a paper, drawn up within the United States, purporting to be a commission to a foreign officer for undertaking and executing an expedition in violation of the laws of the United States, and also to another paper avowing that act, and otherwise insulting to this Government, which papers have been transmitted to Congress by the message of the President of the 25th of March last, I am not authorized to confer with you, and that no further communication will be received from you at this Department.

I am [etc.].

70

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to David C. de Forest, Agent of the United Provinces of South America at Georgetown[3]

WASHINGTON, *December 31, 1818.*

Mr. Adams presents his compliments to Mr. De Forest, and has the honor of assuring him, by direction of the President of the United States, of the continued interest that he takes in the welfare and prosperity of the provinces

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 414. See below, pt. 1, doc. 73.
[2] See below, pt. VI, doc. 581
[3] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 416.

of La Plata, and of his disposition to recognise the independent Government of Buenos Ayres as soon as the time shall have arrived when that step may be taken with advantage to the interests of South America as well as of the United States.

In the mean time, he regrets that an exequatur to Mr. De Forest, as consul general of the United Provinces of South America, cannot be issued, for reasons stated in part by the President, in his message to Congress at the commencement of their present session; and further explained to Mr. De Forest by Mr. Adams, in the conversation which he has had the honor of holding with him. Mr. De Forest must have seen that any privileges which may be attached to the consular character cannot avail, in the judicial tribunals of this country, to influence in any manner the administration of justice; and, with regard to the schooner brought into Scituate, such measures have been taken, and will be taken, by the authorities of the United States, as are warranted by the circumstances of the case and by the existing laws.

With respect to the acknowledgment of the Government of Buenos Ayres, it has been suggested to Mr. De Forest, that, when adopted, it will be merely the recognition of a fact, without pronouncing or implying an opinion with regard to the *extent* of the territory or provinces under their authority, and particularly without being understood to decide upon their claim to control over the Banda Oriental, Santa Fé, Paraguay, or any other provinces disclaiming their supremacy or dominion. It was also observed that, in acknowledging that Government as independent, it would be necessary for the United States to understand whether Buenos Ayres claims itself an entire, or only an imperfect independence. From certain transactions between persons authorized by the Supreme Director, and an agent of the United States, (though unauthorized by their Government,) after the declaration of independence by the Congress at Tucuman, and within the last year, it appears that the Supreme Director declined contracting the engagement that the United States should hereafter enjoy at Buenos Ayres the advantages and privileges of the most favored nation, although with the offer of a reciprocal stipulation on the part of the United States. The reason assigned by the Supreme Director was, that Spain having claims to the sovereignty of Buenos Ayres, special privileges and advantages might ultimately be granted to the Spanish nation as a consideration for the renunciation of those claims. It is desirable that it should be submitted to the consideration of the Government of Buenos Ayres whether, while such a power is reserved, their independence is complete; and how far other Powers can rely that the authority of Spain might not be eventually restored. It has been stated by Mr. De Forest that the Congress at Tucuman had passed a resolution to offer special advantages to the nation which should first acknowledge their independence; upon which the question was proposed whether such a

resolution, if carried into effect, would not be rather a transfer of dependence from one nation to another, than the establishment of independence? rather to purchase support than to obtain recognition? The United States have no intention of exacting favors of Buenos Ayres for the acknowledgment of its independence; but, in acknowledging it, they will expect either to enjoy, in their intercourse with it, the same privileges and advantages as other foreign nations, or to know precisely the extent and character of the benefits which are to be allowed to others, and denied to them. It should, indeed, be known to the Supreme Director that, while such an indefinite power is reserved, of granting to any nation advantages to be withheld from the United States, an acknowledgment of independence must be considered premature.

In adverting to these principles, it was observed to Mr. De Forest that their importance could not but be peculiarly felt by the United States, as having been invariably and conspicuously exemplified in their own practice, both in relation to the country whose colonies they had been, and to that which was the first to acknowledge their independence. In the words of their declaration, issued on the 4th of July, 1776, they resolved thenceforth "to hold the British nation *as they hold the rest of mankind*—enemies in war; in peace, friends"; and in the treaty of amity and commerce, concluded on the 6th of February, 1778, between the United States and France, being the first acknowledgment by a foreign Power of the independence of the United States, and the first treaty to which they were a party, the preamble declares that the King of France and the United States, "willing to fix, in an equitable and permanent manner, the rules which ought to be followed relative to the correspondence and commerce which the two parties desire to establish between their respective countries, states, and subjects, have judged that the said end could not be better obtained than by taking, for the basis of their agreement, the most perfect equality and reciprocity, and by carefully avoiding all those burdensome preferences which are usually sources of debate, embarrassment, and discontent; by leaving, also, each party at liberty to make, respecting commerce and navigation, those interior regulations which it shall find most convenient to itself; and by founding the advantage of commerce solely upon reciprocal utility and the just rules of free intercourse; reserving, withal, to each party the liberty of admitting, at its pleasure, other nations to a participation of the same advantage."

In the second article of the same treaty it was also stipulated that neither the United States nor France should thenceforth grant any particular favor to other nations, in respect of commerce and navigation, which should not immediately become common to the other nations, freely, if the concession was free, or for the same compensation, if conditional.

In answer to Mr. De Forest's note of the 12th instant,[1] Mr. Adams has the honor of assuring him that the President has received with much

[1] See below, pt. II, doc. 247

satisfaction the information contained in it, and will derive great pleasure from every event which shall contribute to the stability and honor of the Government of Buenos Ayres.

Mr. Adams requests Mr. De Forest to accept [etc.].

71

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *January 1, 1819.*

It is mentioned in one of your despatches that Lord Castlereagh had made some enquiry of you, in what light the deputies from the South-American Revolutionary Governments were considered by that of the United-States? They have not been received or recognized in their official capacities, because that would have been equivalent to a formal recognition of the Governments from which they came, as Independent. But informal communications have been held with them, both verbal and written, freely and without disguise. We have considered the struggle between Spain and those Colonies, as a *Civil War*, the essential question of which was, their Independence of, or subjection to Spain. To this War, the avowed and real policy of the United-States has been to remain neutral; and the principles of Neutrality which we consider as applicable to the case are these. First; that the parties have, in respect to Foreign Nations, equal rights, and are entitled, as far as is practicable, to equal and the same treatment. Secondly; that while the contest is maintained, on both sides, with any reasonable prospect of eventual success, it would be a departure from Neutrality, to recognize, either the supremacy contended for by Spain, or the Independence contended for by the South-Americans. For to acknowledge either would be to take the side of that party, upon the very question at issue between them.

But while this state of things continues, an entire equality of treatment of the parties is not possible. There are circumstances arising from the nature of the contest itself, which produce unavoidable inequalities. Spain, for instance, is an acknowledged Sovereign Power, and as such, has Ministers and other accredited and priviledged agents to maintain her interests, and support her rights conformably to the usages of Nations. The South-Americans, not being acknowledged as Sovereign and Independent States, cannot have the benefit of such officers. We consider it, however, as among the obligations of Neutrality, to obviate this inequality, as far as may be

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 296.

practicable, without taking a side, as if the question of the War was decided. We listen therefore to the representations of their deputies or agents, and do them Justice as much as if they were formally accredited. By acknowledging the existence of a *Civil War*, the right of Spain, *as understood by* herself, is no doubt affected. She is no longer recognized as the Sovereign of the Provinces in Revolution against her. Thus far Neutrality itself operates against her, and not against the other party. This also is an inequality arising from the nature of the struggle: unavoidable, and therefore not incompatible with Neutrality.

But this state of things is temporary; and neither do the obligations of Neutrality require, nor do the rights, duties or interests of the neutral State permit that it should be unreasonably protracted. It naturally terminates with the preponderating success of either of the parties to the War.—If therefore we consider the Civil War, as no longer existing between Spain and Mexico, because there is no longer in that Province an organized Government, claiming to be Sovereign and Independent, and maintaining that claim by force of arms, upon the same principle, though differently applied, we think the period is fast approaching when it will be no longer a Civil War between Spain and Buenos-Ayres: because the Independence of the latter will be so firmly established, as to be beyond the reach of any reasonable pretension of Supremacy on the part of Spain. The mediation of the Allied European Powers, between Spain and her revolted Colonies, was solicited by Spain, with the professed object of obtaining from the Allies a guarantee of the restoration of her Sovereign authority in South-America. But the very acceptance of the office of Mediators, upon such a basis, would have been a departure from Neutrality by the Allies. This was clearly seen by Great-Britain, who very explicitly and repeatedly declared that her intention was in no event whatever resulting from the mediation to employ force against the South-Americans.

The Allies did, however, assent to become the mediators at the request of Spain alone, and upon the basis, that the object of the mediation should be, the restoration of the Spanish authority, though with certain modifications favourable to the Colonies. As the United-States were never invited to take a part in that mediation, so, as you have been instructed, they neither desired, nor would have consented to become parties to it, upon that basis. It appears, that in one of your conversations with Lord Castlereagh, he expressed some regret that the views of this Government, in relation to that question, were not precisely the same as those of the British Cabinet, and that we disapprove of any interposition of third parties, upon any basis other than that of the total emancipation of the Colonies.

The President wishes you to take an early and suitable occasion to observe to Lord Castlereagh, that he hopes the difference between our views and those of Great-Britain is more of form than of substance; more founded in

the degree of complacency respectively due by the parties to the views of Spain, than to any inherent difference of opinion upon the question to be solved;—that as Neutrals to the Civil War, we think that no mediation between the parties ought to be undertaken, without the assent of both parties to the War; and that whether we consider the question of the conflict between Spanish Colonial Dominion, and South-American Independence, upon principles, moral, or political, or upon those of the interest of either party to the War, or of all other Nations as connected with them, whether upon grounds of right or of fact, they all bring us to the same conclusion, that the contest cannot and ought not to terminate otherwise than by the total Independence of South-America. Anxious, however, to fulfil every obligation of good neighbourhood to Spain, notwithstanding our numerous and aggravated causes of complaint against her, and especially desirous to preserve the friendship and good-will of all the Allied European Powers, we have forborne, under circumstances of strong provocation, to take any decisive step which might interfere with the course of their policy in relation to South-America. We have waited patiently to see the effect of their mediation, without an attempt to disconcert or defeat any measures upon which they might agree for assuring its success. But convinced as we are that the Spanish Authority never can be restored at Buenos-Ayres, in Chili, or in Venezuela, we wish the British Government and all the European Allies, to consider, how important it is to them as well as to us, that these newly formed States should be regularly recognized: not only because the right to such recognition cannot with Justice be long denied to them, but that they may be held to observe on their part the ordinary rules of the Law of Nations, in their intercourse with the civilized World. We particularly believe that the only effectual means of repressing the excessive irregularities and piratical depredations of armed vessels under their flags and bearing their Commissions, will be to require of them the observance of the principles, sanctioned by the practice of maritime Nations. It is not to be expected that they will feel themselves bound by the ordinary duties of Sovereign States, while they are denied the enjoyment of all their rights.

The Government of Buenos-Ayres have appointed a Consul-General to reside in the United-States. He has applied as long since as last May, and again very recently for an *Exequatur*, which has not been issued; because that would be a formal recognition of his Government. You will in the most friendly manner mention to Lord Castlereagh, that the President has it in contemplation to grant this Exequatur, or otherwise to recognize the Government of Buenos-Ayres, at no remote period, should no event occur which will justify a further postponement of that intention. If it should suit the views of Great-Britain to adopt similar measures at the same time and in concert with us, it will be highly satisfactory to the President. When adopted, it will be a mere acknowledgment of the fact of Independence,

and without deciding upon the extent of their Territory, or upon their claims to Sovereignty, in any part of the Provinces of La Plata, where it is not established and uncontested.

I am [etc.].

72

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to David C. de Forest, Agent of the United Provinces of South America at Georgetown [1]

WASHINGTON, *January 1, 1819.*

Mr. Adams presents his compliments to Mr. De Forest, and, in reference to the case of the schooner brought into Scituate, mentioned in Mr. De Forest's communication of the 9th instant, as well as to several others which have occurred of a similar character, requests him to have the goodness to impress upon the Government of Buenos Ayres the necessity of taking measures to repress the excesses and irregularities committed by many armed vessels sailing under their flag and bearing their commissions. The Government of the United States have reason to believe that many of these vessels have been fitted out, armed, equipped, and manned in the ports of the United States, and in direct violation of their laws.

Of the persons composing the prize crew of the vessel at Scituate, and now in confinement upon charges of murder and piracy, it is understood that three are British subjects, and one a citizen of the United States. It is known that commissions for private armed vessels to be fitted out, armed, and manned in this country, have been sent from Buenos Ayres to the United States, with the names of the vessels, commanders, and officers in blank, to be filled up here, and have been offered to the avidity of speculators stimulated more by the thirst for plunder than by any regard for the South American cause.

Of such vessels it is obvious that neither the captains, officers, nor crews can have any permanent connexion with Buenos Ayres; and, from the characters of those who alone could be induced to engage in such enterprises, there is too much reason to expect acts of atrocity such as those alleged against the persons implicated in the case of the vessel at Scituate.

The President wishes to believe that this practice has been without the privity of the Government of Buenos Ayres, and he wishes their attention may be drawn to the sentiment, that it is incompatible both with the rights and the obligations of the United States: with their rights, as an offensive exercise of sovereign authority by foreigners within their jurisdiction and without their consent; with their obligations, as involving a violation of the neutrality which they have invariably avowed, and which it is their deter-

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 417.

mination to maintain. The President expects, from the friendly disposition manifested by the Supreme Director towards the United States, that no instance of this cause of complaint will hereafter be given.

Mr. Adams requests Mr. De Forest to accept [etc.].

73

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to President James Monroe[1]

WASHINGTON, *January 28, 1819.*

The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 14th instant, requesting of the President information whether any application has been made by any of the independent Governments of South America to have a minister or consul general accredited by the Government of the United States, and what was the answer given to such application, has the honor of submitting copies of applications made by Don Lino de Clemente to be received as the representative of the republic of Venezuela; and of David C. De Forest, a citizen of the United States, to be accredited as consul general of the United Provinces of South America, with the answers respectively returned to them.[2] The reply of Mr. De Forest is likewise enclosed, and copies of the papers, signed and avowed by Mr. Clemente, which the President considered as rendering any communication between this Department and him, other than that now enclosed, improper.

It is to be observed that, while Mr. Clemente, in March, 1817, was assuming, with the name of deputy from Venezuela, to exercise with the United States powers transcending the lawful authority of any ambassador, and while, in January, 1818, he was commissioning, in language disrespectful to this Government, Vicente Pazos, in the name of the republic of Venezuela, to "protest against the invasion of Amelia island, and all such further acts of the Government of the United States as were contrary to the rights and interests of the several republics and the persons sailing under their respective flags duly commissioned," he had himself not only never been received by the Government of the United States as deputy from Venezuela, but had never presented himself to it in that character, or offered to exhibit any evidence whatsoever of his being invested with it. The issuing of commissions authorizing acts of war against a foreign nation is a power which not even a sovereign can lawfully exercise within the dominions of another in amity with him, without his consent. Mr. Pazos, in his memorial to the President, communicating the commission signed by Mr. Clemente at

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 412.
[2] See below, pt. VI, doc. 581, and pt. II, doc. 246.

Philadelphia, and given to General McGregor, alleges, in its justification, the example of the illustrious Franklin in Europe; but this example, instead of furnishing an exception, affords a direct confirmation of the principle now advanced. The commissions issued by the diplomatic agents of the United States in France, during our revolutionary war, were granted with the knowledge and consent of the French Government, of which the following resolution from the Secret Journal of Congress of 23d December, 1776, is decisive proof:

"*Resolved*, That the commissioners [at the court of France] be authorized to arm and fit for war any number of vessels, not exceeding six, at the expense of the United States, to war upon British property; and that commissions and warrants be for this purpose sent to the commissioners: *provided the commissioners be well satisfied this measure will not be disagreeable to the court of France.*"

It is also now ascertained, by the express declaration of the supreme chief, Bolivar, to the agent of the United States at Angostura, "that the Government of Venezuela had never authorized the expedition of General McGregor, nor any other enterprise, against Florida or Amelia." Instructions have been forwarded to the same agent to give suitable explanations to the Government of Venezuela of the motives for declining further communication with Mr. Clemente, and assurances that it will readily be held with any person not liable to the same or like objection.

The application of Mr. De Forest to be accredited as consul general of the United Provinces of South America was first made in May last: his credential was a letter from the Supreme Director of Buenos Ayres, Pueyrredon, announcing his appointment by virtue of articles concluded in the names of the United States of America and of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, between persons authorized by him, and W. G. D. Worthington, as agent of this Government, who neither had, nor indeed pretended to have, any power to negotiate such articles. Mr. De Forest was informed, and requested to make known to the Supreme Director, that Mr. Worthington had no authority whatsoever to negotiate on the part of the United States any articles to be obligatory on them, and had never pretended to possess any full power to that effect; that any communication interesting to the Supreme Director, or to the people of Buenos Ayres, would readily be held with Mr. De Forest; but that the recognition of him as a consul general from the United Provinces of South America could not be granted, either upon the stipulation of supposed articles, which were a nullity, or upon the commission or credential letter of the Supreme Director, without recognising thereby the authority from which it emanated as a sovereign and independent Power.

With this determination, Mr. De Forest then declared himself entirely satisfied. But, shortly after the commencement of the present session of Congress, he renewed his solicitations, by the note dated the 9th of December,

to be accredited as the consul general of the United Provinces of South America, founding his claim on the credentials from his Government, which had been laid before the President last May.

A conversation was shortly afterwards held with him, by direction of the President, in which the reasons were fully explained to him upon which the formal acknowledgment of the Government of Buenos Ayres for the present was not deemed expedient. They were also, at his request, generally stated in the note dated the 31st of December.

It has not been thought necessary, on the part of this Government, to pursue the correspondence with Mr. De Forest any further, particularly as he declares himself unauthorized to agitate or discuss the question with regard to the recognition of Buenos Ayres as an independent nation. Some observations, however, may be proper, with reference to circumstances alleged by him, as arguing that a consul general may be accredited without acknowledging the independence of the Government from which he has his appointment. The consul of the United States, who has resided at Buenos Ayres, had no other credential than his commission. It implied no recognition by the United States of any particular Government; and it was issued before the Buenos Ayrean declaration of independence, and while all the acts of the authorities there were in the name of the King of Spain.

During the period while this Government declined to receive Mr. Onis as the minister of Spain, no consul received an exequatur under a commission from the same authority. The Spanish consuls, who had been received before the contest for the government of Spain had arisen, were suffered to continue the exercise of their functions, for which no new recognition was necessary. A similar remark may be made with regard to the inequality alleged by Mr. De Forest to result from the admission of Spanish consuls officially to protest before our judicial tribunals the rights of Spanish subjects generally, while he is not admitted to the same privileges with regard to those of the citizens of Buenos Ayres. The equality of rights to which the two parties to a civil war are entitled, in their relations with neutral Powers, does not extend to the rights enjoyed by one of them, by virtue of treaty stipulations contracted before the war; neither can it extend to rights, the enjoyment of which essentially depends upon the issue of the war. That Spain is a sovereign and independent Power, is not contested by Buenos Ayres, and is recognised by the United States, who are bound by treaty to receive her consuls. Mr. De Forest's credential letter asks that he may be received by virtue of a stipulation in supposed articles concluded by Mr. Worthington, but which he was not authorized to make; so that the reception of Mr. De Forest, upon the credential on which he founds his claim, would imply a recognition, not only of the Government of the Supreme Director, Pueyrredon, but a compact as binding upon the United States, which is a mere nullity.

Consuls are, indeed, received by the Government of the United States from acknowledged sovereign Powers with whom they have no treaty. But the exequatur for a consul general can obviously not be granted without recognising the authority from whom his appointment proceeds as sovereign. "The consul," says Vattel, (book 2, chap. 2, § 34,) "is not a public minister; but *as he is charged with a commission from his sovereign*, and received in that quality by him where he resides, he should enjoy, to a certain extent, the protection of the law of nations."

If, from this state of things, the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres cannot enjoy the advantage of being officially represented before the courts of the United States by a consul, while the subjects of Spain are entitled to that privilege, it is an inequality resulting from the nature of the contest in which they are engaged, and not from any denial of their rights as parties to a civil war. The recognition of them, as such, and the consequent admission of their vessels into the ports of the United States, operate with an inequality against the other party to that contest, and in their favor.

It was stated in conversation to Mr. De Forest, and afterwards in the note of 31st December, that it would be desirable to the United States to understand whether Buenos Ayres itself claims an entire, or only an imperfect independence; that the necessity of an explanation upon this point arose from the fact that, in the negotiation of the supposed article with Mr. Worthington, the Supreme Director had declined contracting the engagement, though with the offer of reciprocity, that the United States should enjoy at Buenos Ayres the advantages and privileges of the most favored nation; that the reason given by him for refusing such an engagement was, that Spain having claims of sovereignty over Buenos Ayres, the right must be reserved of granting special favors to her for renouncing them, which other nations, having no such claims to renounce, could not justly expect to obtain. Without discussing the correctness of this principle, it was observed that the United States, in acknowledging Buenos Ayres as independent, would expect either to be treated on the footing of the most favored nation, or to know the extent and character of the benefits which were to be allowed to others and denied to them; and that, while an indefinite power should be reserved, of granting to any nation advantages to be withheld from the United States, an acknowledgment of independence must be considered premature.

Mr. De Forest answers that this reservation must appear to every one contrary to the inclination as well as interest of the Government of Buenos Ayres; that it must have been only a proposition of a temporary nature, not extending to the acknowledgment by the United States of the independence of South America, which he is confident would have rendered any such reservation altogether unnecessary, in the opinion of the Government of Buenos Ayres, who must have seen they were treating with an unauthorized person, and suggested the idea from an opinion of its good policy; and, he

adds, that Portugal is acknowledged by the United States as an independent Power, although their commerce is taxed higher in the ports of Brazil than that of Great Britain.

It had not been intended to suggest to Mr. De Forest that it was, in any manner, incompatible with the independence or sovereignty of a nation to grant commercial advantages to one foreign state, and to withhold them from another. If any such advantage is granted for an equivalent, other nations can have no right to claim its enjoyment, *even though entitled to be treated as the most favored nations*, unless by the reciprocal grant of the same equivalent. Neither had it been meant to say that a nation forfeited its character of acknowledged sovereignty, even by granting, without equivalent, commercial advantages to one foreign Power, and withholding them from another. However absurd and unjust the policy of a nation granting to one, and refusing to another, such gratuitous concessions might be deemed, the question whether they affected its independence or not would rest upon the nature of the concessions themselves. The idea meant to be conveyed was, that the reservation of an indefinite right to grant hereafter special favors to Spain for the remuneration of her claims of sovereignty, left it uncertain whether the independence of Buenos Ayres would be complete or imperfect, and it was suggested with a view to give the opportunity to the Supreme Director of explaining his intentions in this respect, and to intimate to him that, while such an indefinite right was reserved, an acknowledgment of independence must be considered as premature. This caution was thought the more necessary, inasmuch as it was known that, at the same time while the Supreme Director was insisting upon this reservation, a mediation between Spain and her colonies had been solicited by Spain, and agreed to by the five principal Powers of Europe, the basis of which was understood to be a compromise between the Spanish claim to sovereignty and the colonial claim to independence.

Mr. De Forest was understood to have said that the Congress at Tucuman had determined to offer a grant of special privileges to the nation which should be the first to acknowledge the independence of Buenos Ayres. He stated in his notes that he knew nothing of any such resolution by that Congress, but that it was a prevailing opinion at Buenos Ayres, and his own opinion also, that such special privileges would be granted to the first recognising Power, if demanded. It has invariably been avowed by the Government of the United States that they would neither ask nor accept of any special privilege or advantage for their acknowledgment of South American independence; but it appears that the Supreme Director of Buenos Ayres, far from being prepared to grant special favors to the United States for taking the lead in the acknowledgment, declined even a reciprocal stipulation that they should enjoy the same advantages as other nations. Nor was this reservation, as Mr. De Forest supposes, defeasible by the acknowledg-

ment on the part of the United States of South American independence. The Supreme Director could not be so ignorant that it was impossible for this Government to ratify the articles prepared by his authority with Mr. Worthington, and yet to withhold the acknowledgment of independence. He knew that, if that instrument should be ratified, the United States must thereby necessarily be the first to grant the acknowledgment; yet he declined inserting in it an article securing to each party in the ports of the other the advantages of the most favored nation. It is, nevertheless, in conformity to one of those same articles that Mr. De Forest claimed to be received in the formal character of consul general.

With regard to the irregularities and excesses committed by armed vessels sailing under the flag of Buenos Ayres, complained of in the note of the 1st of January, it was not expected that Mr. De Forest would have the power of restraining them, otherwise than by representing them to the Supreme Director, in whom the authority to apply the proper remedy is supposed to be vested. The admission of Mr. De Forest in the character of consul general would give him no additional means of suppressing the evil. Its principal aggravation arises from the circumstance that the cruisers of Buenos Ayres are almost, if not quite, universally manned and officered by foreigners, having no permanent connexion with that country, or interest in its cause. But the complaint was not confined to the misconduct of the cruisers; it was stated that blank commissions for privateers, their commanders, and officers, had been transmitted to this country, with the blanks left to be filled up here, for fitting out, arming, and equipping them for purposes prohibited by the laws of the United States, and in violation of the laws of nations. It was observed, that this practice being alike irreconcilable with the rights and the obligations of the United States, it was expected by the President that, being made known to the Supreme Director, no instance of it would again occur hereafter. No reply to this part of the note has been made by Mr. De Forest; for it is not supposed that he meant to disclaim all responsibility of himself or of the Government of Buenos Ayres concerning it, unless his character of consul general should be recognised. As he states that he has transmitted a copy of the note itself to Buenos Ayres, the expectation may be indulged that the exclusive sovereign authority of the United States within their own jurisdiction will hereafter be respected.

All which is respectfully submitted.

74

President James Monroe to the United States House of Representatives, communicated January 30, 1819[1]

WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1819.*

I transmit to the House of Representatives, in compliance with their resolution of the 14th of this month, a report[2] from the Secretary of State concerning the applications which have been made by any of the independent Governments of South America to have a minister or consul general accredited by the Government of the United States, with the answers of this Government to the applications addressed to it.

75

General instructions of John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain[3]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *March 8, 1819.*

There are in various parts of Spain and of the Spanish Colonies, numbers of Citizens of the United States, who having been taken, either engaged in the land or Sea Service of the South Americans, or merely having been found within the Spanish Colonial territories, are confined as Prisoners of State and have applied to the Government of the United States to obtain their release.—Many of them claim the benefit of the Act of Amnesty or Indulto, upon the promise of which they alledge that they surrendered themselves.—Others assert that British subjects, taken under the same circumstances with them, have been released at the requisition of the Officers or Agents of their Country.—A Public Ship of the United States has very recently been sent to the Havanna for the purpose of obtaining the deliverance of a number of them who are there.—We have yet no information with what success.—But one of the persons for whose liberation that Vessel was despatched, William Davis Robinson, is known to have been embarked, before her arrival there, for Cadiz. Repeated applications in his behalf have been made from this Government, both to that of Spain directly and through Mr. Onis to the Vice Roy of Mexico and to the Governor General of the Havanna. Mr. Erving who was last Summer instructed to claim his release, was then erroneously informed that he had been set at liberty. If, upon

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 412.
[2] See above, doc. 73.
[3] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 305. John Forsyth, of Georgia: Commissioned minister plenipotentiary to Spain, February 16, 1819. Took leave, March 2, 1823. Later was Secretary of State.

your arrival in Spain you should find that he is still kept as a Prisoner, you will take every measure that may be proper for procuring his discharge.—He affirms that he was never in arms with the insurgents and that he was expressly promised the benefit of the Indulto—Mr. Onis has communicated a decree of the Spanish Government that all foreigners taken in the service of the Revolutionary South Americans shall be considered as standing on the same footing as the Insurgents themselves.—We admit the correctness of this principle, provided the Insurgents are treated as parties to a Civil War. But as it is understood that no exchange of prisoners has been practised between the Parties in the South American Conflict, as these Citizens of the United States must, while Prisoners be chargeable upon Spain, and as it will tend to confirm the harmony and friendly disposition between the two nations, which it was the main object of the Treaty to establish, the hope is entertained that the discharge of all American Citizens, thus confined, will be readily granted by the Spanish Government. . . .

. . . Besides the subjects of immediate concern to the United States which will constitute the principal duties of your mission, you will be watchful of all the important political movements of Spain as a member of the European System, of the internal State of the Nation—Of the progress and changes of affairs in her struggles against the Revolution in her colonies, and of the aspects which her controversy with Portugal may yet assume under the mediation of the five allied Powers.

76

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain[1]

WASHINGTON, *March 16, 1819.*

SIR: You will receive herewith a list of several Citizens of the United States who were held in captivity under the authority of the Colonial or military Officers of Spain at the Havanna and Campeachy sometime ago, upon the charge of having been taken while in the service of some one or other of the Revolutionary Governments of South America; and there is reason to believe that some if not all of those persons have been transported to Spain and to Fortresses belonging to Spain, upon the coast of Africa, where they are now confined.—The Spanish Minister here has more than once interested himself for them, by writing to the Governor General of Cuba in their behalf; but it is feared that this Officer may not have considered himself as invested with sufficient authority to permit their discharge

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 312.

and that they are all, as some of them are known to have lately been, in the situations abovementioned.—Under these circumstances, and for the reasons particularly stated in your general instructions the hope is cherished by this Government, that the discharge of these American Citizens, and of all others, thus confined, will be readily granted by the Spanish Government; and you will not fail to impress upon it, how much such a measure would tend to confirm the spirit of harmony and friendly disposition between the two nations.

I have the honor [etc.].

77

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Luis de Onis, Spanish Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *April 7, 1819.*

SIR: The Act of Congress of the last Session to protect the Commerce of the United States and punish the crime of piracy, referred to in your Note of the 9th ulto. has two objects.—One, to protect the property of the Citizens of the United States from *piratical* aggressions and the other, to provide for the punishment of foreigners, guilty of the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, who may be taken on the high Seas and brought within the jurisdiction of the United States.—The question, what aggression will in any individual case be deemed piratical is, by the nature of our Institutions, to be determined by the Judicial Department of the Government.—The Executive Government recognizes no Commissions issued by foreign Agents here, for any armed Vessel, whether fitted out here or elsewhere, but if such Commissions have been issued, whether any aggressions committed under colour of them would or would not be piratical, is a question in no wise affected by the above-mentioned Act of Congress, and its decision is strictly within the Province of the Tribunals before whom it may be brought to issue.—The same observation may be applied to all the other questions, suggested in your note.—The Act of Congress to which you refer has made no change in the laws, municipal or international, upon any of the points to which your queries are directed; neither can the Executive Administration consider as having any bearing upon those questions.—In these respects the law remains as it was before the passage of the act—It was not the intention of Congress to discriminate between the pretensions of the several Provinces in South America, asserting their Independence by war or to determine which of them were competent and which were not to exercise the ordinary rights of belligerent powers—Of the several classes of Commissions enumerated by you, some are not known by this Government to exist, the

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, II, 355.

validity of others may depend upon the time when they were issued, or other circumstances on which no decision can be formed by anticipation.—It is however distinctly to be observed, that no example is known of any nation that has ever classed among Pirates an armed Vessel, merely for not having a Captain and two thirds or even half its Crew *natives* of the Country or Government granting the Commission.—I take much satisfaction in renewing to you [etc.].

78

General instructions of John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to John Graham, United States Minister to the Portuguese Court in Brazil [1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *April 24, 1819.*

SIR: Your long, faithful and assiduous service in this Department, has made you familiarly acquainted with all the important relations of the United States with foreign powers, and particularly with those subsisting between this Government and that of Portugal at Rio de Janeiro.—Your late mission [2] to South America has given you opportunities of acquiring a still more particular knowledge of the Country and these considerations have concurred to induce The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate to appoint you Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to the Court of Portugal, now residing in Brazil.

The subjects which will require your earnest attention and active exertions in the discharge of the duties of this mission, relate 1. To the general Commercial intercourse between the two Countries and 2. To particular incidents which in the course of the last three or four years have occurred, of a tendency to impair the mutual good understanding which it is the undoubted interest of both nations, and believed to be the sincere intention of both Governments to cultivate and promote. . . .

A more important cause of misunderstanding between the Portuguese Government and ours has sprung from the consequences of their invasion of the eastern borders of the River La Plata and their occupation of Montevideo, combining with the irregular and piratical armaments which have taken place in our Ports, during the latter stages of the convulsions in South America. The invasion of that territory by the Portuguese was avowedly without any claim to it as their own. It brought them immediately into a controversy with Spain, which is not yet terminated; but it also brought

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 319.

[2] See above, doc. 40, Rush to Rodney and Graham, July 18, 1817; also see below, pt. II, doc. 244, for his report dated November 5, 1818.

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them into collision with the revolutionary Government of Buenos Ayres, and into actual conflict with that of General Artigas, which was in actual possession of the Country.—By a formal treaty or a tacit understanding with Buenos Ayres, they have mutually abstained from hostilities against each other and Portugal, like the rest of Europe, and like the United States, recognized a state of civil war between Spain and her colonies to which she avows her own neutrality. But while She acknowledges the belligerent rights of Buenos Ayres, She has found it necessary to dispute those of Artigas, against whom She makes a war de facto, without a declaration and whom She has not even the claim which Spain alleges against the revolutionary South Americans, that they are her subjects.—Copies are herewith communicated to you of a memoir from Count Palmella, addressed to the Sovereigns at the Congress of Aix La Chapelle, soliciting their interposition with this Government to accomplish as far as possible, the suppression of Piratical Armaments in the Ports of the United States, and urging that all armed Vessels sailing under the flag of and with Commissions of Artigas may be declared Pirates. The same claim is advanced in the note of the Portuguese Minister here. But this request was not complied with by the European Sovereigns at Aix la Chapelle, nor can it be complied with by this Government. The Government of Artigas exists in fact as much as that of Buenos Ayres or at least did exist to the latest period of our intelligence from that Country. The only ground of distinction taken by Count Palmella and Mr. Correa to invalidate the Commissions of Artigas is, that he possesses no Sea Ports, from which Privateers could be fitted out. If that were strictly true, it does not necessarily follow that by the laws of nations a Government possessing no Ports is absolutely incompetent to issue Commissions to armed Vessels—and if it did, it is well known that Artigas did possess a port, which was taken from him by the Portuguese. It is too much for a neutral Power to say that the right which the argument of the Portuguese Ministers admits him to have possessed while he held Montevideo, should have been forfeited by their military occupation of that place. But, in no case could he have the authority to give Commissions to Vessels armed and fitted out and manned in the Ports of the United States; nor will any such Commission be recognized by the United States as valid. That, contrary to the intentions of this Government, armed Vessels have been fitted out and armed within our Ports and have afterwards committed acts of hostility against Portuguese Vessels, *under the colours of Artigas and with Commissions from him*, is believed to be true, though no authentic proof of the fact has been produced before our judicial tribunals. Against these illegal armaments, every Department of the Government of the United States has used, and you may give the strongest assurances, will continue to use every effort in their Power. The Note of Count Palmella to the Congress of Aix la Chapelle very justly remarks, that these irregular

and piratical depredations (in which the subjects of other powers and even of those in the most friendly and intimate relations with Portugal have participated more than the Citizens of the United States) originating in the peculiar character of the struggle between Spain and her South American Colonies, cannot be expected to be entirely suppressed, while that contest shall continue. No Government has the power of preventing them entirely, and none has taken measures more decisively indicating its abhorrence of them and its determination to put them down, than the United States. The act of Congress of March 1817 was passed expressly with that view and is stated by Count Palmella's Note to have been introduced in consequence of the solicitations of the Minister of Portugal. Although in the first instance limited to a period of two years, it had, many months before the date of Count Palmella's note [20th April 1818 Acts of 15th Congress, First Session p. 76], been in substance reenacted and made permanent. An additional Act passed on the third of March last [Acts 15 Cong 2 Sess p 75] manifests the continued and earnest solicitude of the legislature against these outrages. The Executive Government has, in like manner, exercised all its powers to the same end. One of its principal motives for the occupation of Amelia Island at the close of the year 1817 was to deprive these adventurers of a Station which they had taken in the pursuit of their nefarious purposes, and which was so peculiarly adapted to them that a bare inspection of the map will shew the importance of the measure in counteracting them—a conclusion confirmed no less by the occurrence of events during the short time while they possessed the Islands, than by those which have happened since it was wrested from them. Cotemporaneous with this step and concurrent with it, was the dispatching of three Commissioners to visit Buenos Ayres and Chili, and one of the primary objects of their instructions, as you, one of the Commissioners know was to make earnest representation, to the existing Governments of South America, requiring them to discountenance these piratical plunderers and to controul the privateers duly provided with their Commission and to hold them under proper responsibility according to the ordinary laws of nations. Similar injunctions were given to an Agent of the United States despatched early in the last year to Venezuela, and have been executed by him. The correspondence of which a copy is furnished you, with Don Lino Clemente, who presented himself here as the Agent of Venezuela and with D. C. de Forest who had a Commission as Consul General from Buenos Ayres is a further manifestation of the same spirit. The prosecutions for Piracy which have been commenced in several instances, in some of which the Attorney General of the United States has been specially directed to give his assistance and the measures still taken for bringing such offenders to Justice are all proofs and pledges of the sincerity and energy with which the Executive Administration has discharged its duty of protecting to the utmost of its power the rights of Portuguese subjects from

depredations upon the Ocean by Citizens of the United States, in violation of their laws. Portuguese Property which had been captured by Privateers fitted out or even the force of which had been augmented within the United States, has in various instances been restored by the decrees of the judicial tribunals at the claim of the Portuguese Consuls. The cases of the *Sociedad Felix* at Baltimore and of the *Poquila* in the district of Maine, are recent instances of such decisions. In December last Mr. Correa addressed a note to this department, complaining of outrages committed on the coast of Brazil by the Privateer Irresistible, Captain John Daniels, and requesting, in case he should return within the United States that he might be prosecuted. Daniels having lately returned, the prosecution against him will be commenced, if evidence should appear sufficient to warrant his conviction. Copies of Mr. Correa's note and of the answer to it are herewith furnished. The case of the Ship Monte Allegre has not yet been definitively decided, but a letter from the District Attorney who is of Counsel for the Claimants assures me that he has no doubt she will be restored to the Owners. He affirms also that all the captures which have been brought into the United States were made by Vessels fitted out before the act of 1817.

In impressing on the Brazilian Government these circumstances in proof of the constant determination of the Government of the United States to discharge all the duties of their friendly relations with Portugal and of the earnest wish with which it is animated of cultivating the friendship subsisting between the two Countries, you will urge, with a conciliatory temper, with all suitable respect, but with firmness and energy the right of the United States to a return of these amicable dispositions and the interests of their Citizens depending upon them. . . .

Your communications to this Department, as well upon the subject properly belonging to your mission, as upon South American Affairs Generally, and upon every thing which you shall consider to have a bearing upon the public interest, will be as frequent as the opportunities for conveyance will admit.

I am [etc.].

79

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy[1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *May 20, 1819.*

SIR: The paper, a copy of which is herewith enclosed, will exhibit to you the object of the President in directing that Captain Oliver H. Perry should

[1] MS. Domestic Letters, XVII.

be instructed to take the command of the United States' Ship John Adams, and proceed on a voyage, first to Venezuela, and afterwards to Buenos Ayres—If the depth of water drawn by the ship should render it impracticable for her to pass over the bar at the entrance of the River Orinoco, Captain Perry will leave the ship in the command of his first Officer at the Island of Margarita, or at any other more convenient station for a time sufficient for him to perform the duties now to be assigned to him—During his absence the ship may be employed on a cruize between that Island and St. Domingo, for the purpose of protecting the commerce of the United States in those waters, under the special instructions from the Navy Department, in execution of the acts of the last session of Congress, relating to Piracy & the Slave trade—It is supposed that the absence of Captain Perry will not exceed one month, at the end of which he will direct that the ship should return to a place of rendezvous, either of the Island of Margarita, or at any other point where he can with most convenience join her, and resume the command. He will then proceed without delay to the River La Plata, and if the depth of water will permit, to Buenos Ayres. If not, he will leave the ship again at Montevideo, and proceed in person to Buenos Ayres—In both cases it will be desirable, if possible, that he should go in the ship; but at all events he will appear only in the character of her commander.

He will nevertheless, on his arrival at Angostura and at Buenos Ayres, by personal visit to the supreme chief and Director, or to the persons who may have succeeded them, at the head of the respective Governments, place himself in such relations with them, as will enable him to communicate with them freely, and to inform them that he is authorized, on the part of this Government, to give and to receive, in return, explanations upon certain points highly interesting to the Friendly intercourse, between the United States and them.

As there have been agents of the United States both at Angostura and at Buenos Ayres, and Commissioners at the latter place with avowed public characters, and as the desire, both of Venezuela, and of the Provinces of La Plata, to be recognized by the United States, as Sovereign and Independent Governments, has been signified through them, the first object upon which satisfactory explanations of the views of the President are to be given will naturally refer to this—and Captain Perry will remark, that the President has preferred to give them, through a Naval Officer, rather than through an Agent, expressly appointed for the purpose, precisely because he thinks the communication may be the more Friendly and Confidential for being entirely informal. . . . This then will be one of the objects upon which Captain Perry will give a full and candid explanation to the existing supreme authority of Venezuela. He will state that the good wishes of this Government have been constantly favorable to all the South Americans, and particularly to the people of Venezuela. That their good offices have kept

pace with their wishes; and although it has been considered, the duty as well as the policy of the United States, to observe, in the struggle between Spain and her Colonies a faithful and impartial neutrality, yet that the countenance which within the bounds of that neutrality, they have given to the South Americans, and the part they have taken by negotiation with the European powers, has unquestionably contributed, far more efficaciously, to promote the cause of South American Independence, than could possibly have been accomplished, had the United States made common cause with them against Spain. It is now well ascertained that before the Congress of the great European Powers at Aix La Chapelle, their mediation had been solicited by Spain, and agreed to be given by them for the purpose of restoring the Spanish Dominion throughout South America, under certain conditions of commercial privileges to be guaranteed to the Inhabitants. The Government of the United States had been informed of this project before the meeting at Aix La Chapelle, and that it had been proposed by some of the allied powers that the United States should be invited to join them in this mediation. When this information was received, the Ministers of the United States to France, England, and Russia, were immediately instructed to make known to those respective Governments that the United States, would take no part in any plan of mediation or interference, in the contest between Spain and South America, which should be founded on any other basis, than that of the total Independence of the Colonies. This declaration was communicated before the meeting, to Lord Castlereagh and to the Duke de Richlieu, at the Congress. It occasioned some dissatisfaction to the principal allies, particularly France & Russia, as it undoubtedly disconcerted their proposed mediation—Great Britain, concurring with them in the plan of restoring the Spanish authority, but aware that it could not be carried into effect, without the concurrence of the United States, declared it an indispensable condition of her participation in the mediation, that there should be no resort to Force against the South Americans, whatever the result of the mediation might be—To this condition, France and Russia, after some hesitation, assented; but they proposed, that if the South Americans should reject the terms of accommodation to be offered them, with the sanction of the mediating Powers, they should prohibit all commercial intercourse of their subjects respectively with them. To this condition Great Britain declined giving her assent; her motive for which is sufficiently obvious, when it is considered that after the Declaration of the United States, the practical operation of such a non-intercourse between the allies and the South Americans, would have been to transfer to the United States the whole of the valuable commerce carried on with them by the merchants of Great Britain. As a last expedient it was proposed that the Duke of Wellington, should be sent to Madrid, with the joint powers of all the allied Sovereigns, to arrange with the Spanish Cabinet, the terms to be offered to

the South Americans, which was again defeated by the Duke's insisting that if he should go, a previous entry should be made upon the protocol at Aix La Chapelle, that no force against the South Americans, was in any result of his Embassy, to be used. But Spain had always connected with the project of the mediation, a demand that the Allies should ultimately guarantee the restoration of her authority; and finding that this was not to be obtained, she declined accepting the interposition upon any other terms.

But while the Government of the United States have thus taken every occasion offered them in the course of events, to manifest their good wishes in favor of the South Americans, they have never lost sight of the obligations incumbent on them, as avowedly *neutral* to the contest between them and Spain—They have considered this contest as a civil War, the object of which, on the part of Spain, was the re-establishment of her supremacy; and on the part of the South Americans the establishment of their Independence, as Sovereign States—While this struggle continued the United States, as neutral to it, could neither recognize the Supremacy for which Spain was contending; nor the Independence which the Colonies were asserting by Arms—To have recognized the Supremacy of Spain, would have been to take her side—To have acknowledged the Independence of the Colonies would have been to take theirs, on the very question which was to be decided by the event of the War. But as neutrals, the duty of the United States was to consider the parties, as having equal rights in relation to third parties, in every respect, excepting cases which involved the issue of the War itself. As a consequence of this neutrality, they could not permit either of the parties to fit out equip and arm ships within their jurisdiction, to cruize against the other. Neither could they permit any Agent or Officer of either party to issue Commissions, or enlist men within their Territory for purposes of War against the other. The act of Mr. Clemente, in issuing such a Commission at Philadelphia, was an outrage upon the neutrality and Sovereignty of the United States, which, had he been a regularly accredited Agent of a recognized Government, would have been highly offensive—It was for acts of the same character that President Washington had demanded and obtained the recall of a French Minister, at an early period of the existence of this Government; and nothing but an unwillingness to exercise any severity which might bear unfavorably upon the South American cause, could have justified the forbearance of the Government, to cause Mr. Clemente to be prosecuted for the violation of the Law. He had at a subsequent period treated the Government in a disrespectful manner, and the President deemed it improper that any communication should be held with him. Captain Perry will signify in a delicate and Friendly manner to the supreme chief, that it would be agreeable to the President if Mr. Clemente should be recalled, unless he should already have left this Country. . . .

Of all the Governments which have arisen in the Spanish South American Colonies, since their struggle to throw off the Domination of Spain, that of Buenos Ayres appears to have the strongest claims to be recognized as Sovereign and Independent. But every question of National Sovereignty and Independence, is a complicated question of *right*, and of *fact*—and accordingly the words of our own Declaration were, that these United Colonies, *are*, and of *right aut* [ought] *to be*, free and Independent States. So long therefore as this question remains at stake upon the issue of Flagrant War no third party can recognize the one contending for Independence as Independent without assuming as decided, the question, the decision of which depends upon the issue of the War; and without thereby making itself a party to the question—no longer neutral to the question, the recognizing power can no longer claim the right of being neutral to the War—These positions are clear in principle, and they are confirmed, by the experience of our own revolutionary History. The acknowledgement of our Independence by France, was the immediate and instantaneous cause of War between France and Great Britain. It was not acknowledged by the Netherlands, until after the War between them and Great Britain had broken out. It was acknowledged by no other European Power, till it had been recognized by Great Britain herself at the Peace. Had it been the Interest and policy of the United States, to make a common cause with Buenos Ayres, the acknowledgement of her Independence would have followed of course—But it was the Interest of all South America that the United States should be neutral—Neutrality itself was a system which operated altogether in favor of the South Americans; for it recognized them as lawful Belligerents, and no longer as Spanish subjects. As neutrals it has been in the power of the United States, to render services to South America, which they could not have rendered them as co-belligerents. Their neutrality has effectually neutralized Europe, whose principal Governments have invariably avowed that their wishes, are in favor of Spain; as freely as the United States have avowed theirs to be in favor of South America.

The Government of the United States is convinced that the Independence of the Provinces of La Plata, will ultimately be maintained—But while Spain is able to maintain a fierce and Bloody War against it, and while the whole European alliance not only refuses to acknowledge it, but has been in continual active negotiation to devise means of aiding Spain to recover her supremacy, the most efficient service the United States could render the Provinces, was to pronounce their opinion against every such project, to declare their determination to take no part in it, and to manifest their readiness to recognize the Government of Buenos Ayres in concert with them. This proposal has been made both to Great Britain and France, and will be made as soon as circumstances shall render it prudent that it should be made to the Emperor of Russia.

In the mean time the President is convinced that the precipitate formal recognition of the Government of Buenos Ayres on the part of the United States, would be highly disadvantageous to both the parties.—Should the weakness of Spain induce her still after such an event to consider the United States as neutral, the only possible benefit that Buenos Ayres could derive from it, and which she does not in the existing state of things possess, would be that of having, if she thought proper, Diplomatic and Consular Agents in the United States formally accredited—Mr. De Forrest in the correspondence above mentioned alledges nothing else—His only complaint is, that while the Consuls of Spain are admitted before the judicial Tribunals of the United States to support and defend the Commercial Interests of Spanish subjects generally, the people of Buenos Ayres have not the same advantage, because they cannot have a Consul Officially recognized as such—The answer given to him was, that this inconvenience arose not from any inequality in the treatment of the two parties as Belligerents, but to the inequality arising from the nature of the contest itself—the Sovereignty of Spain not being contested, and having been recognized before the existence of the War, while that of Buenos Ayres could only be established by its issue. . . .

Captain Perry will reside on shore at Buenos Ayres until the arrival of a Frigate which is to follow him thither, and of which he will then take the command. In the interval you will give him such instructions with regard to the employment, of both the Ships, upon the South American Coast as the service of the Navy Department may call for—Captain Perry will report as frequently as opportunities of conveyance may render practicable, directly to this Department, or if you think proper to the Department of the Navy for communication to this, all his proceedings under these instructions, and all interesting information respecting the condition, of the Countries which he is to visit—their internal situation and prospects, and the successive fortunes of the War in which they are engaged.

A letter to J. B. Prevost is herewith transmitted, which Captain Perry unless he should meet him at Buenos Ayres, will forward to him wherever he may learn it will be most likely to find him. It is a duplicate of one already despatched to Mr. Prevost by Mr. Graham. It directs Mr. Prevost to repair immediately to Buenos Ayres; and upon his arrival there, it will be no longer necessary for Captain Perry to remain there—He will furnish Mr. Prevost with a copy of these instructions, which will serve as a guide to him so far as they can be executed by him—Mr. Prevost will then remain at Buenos Ayres, to receive further instructions from this Department, and Captain Perry rejoining his ship, take the directions which your further instructions shall prescribe to him. Should Mr. Prevost be already there, when he arrives, he will communicate immediately these instructions to him, and make in concert with him the communication herein authorized, to the

Supreme Director. In this case it will not be necessary for him to prolong his residence on shore at Buenos Ayres.

The Compensation, for this extra service, to Captain Perry, will be at the rate of One Thousand Dollars a year, while he is on shore or absent from his ship, without suspension of his regular compensation in the naval service.

Should you on perusal of the enclosed paper from the President, think proper to make any addition to these instructions, founded upon it, you will have the goodness to give such directions accordingly.

I am [etc.].

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John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to George W. Campbell, United States Minister to Russia[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *June 3, 1819.*

The course of policy pursued by the European Governments and by the United States on this subject has been that of *neutrality*. But Europe has been neutral with a leaning of inclination on the side of authority and Spain, while the United States have been neutral, with a leaning of inclination on the side of liberty and South America. The United States have manifested the sincerity and earnestness of their neutrality by repeated acts of Legislation, to secure its effectual preservation, by many adjudications in their Tribunals restoring property captured in violation of their neutral principles and by resisting frequent and earnest applications from the Governments organized in South America, to be recognized as Sovereign and Independent. Great Britain has recognized the obligations of neutrality by refusing to prohibit, at the requisition of Spain that Commercial intercourse between her subjects and the South Americans, which existed only by the overthrow of the Spanish dominion; and by a proclamation prohibiting British subjects from serving either the King of Spain or the South Americans in this *Civil War*. Individuals, as well British subjects as Citizens of the United States have, in a great multitude of cases, disregarded the neutral duties and injunctions of their respective Countries, and taken side with Spain or with South America, according to the dictates of their individual interests or inclinations. It is remarkable, however, that the *national* feeling of England has been strongly manifested on the side of the South Americans, by the well known fact that, while thousands of British subjects have joined the revolutionary South American Standard, a few individuals are known to have engaged in the Royal Service of Spain. The Russian Government has

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, VIII, 340.

indeed shown an interest in behalf of Spain which may perhaps not be reconcilable with a very rigid neutrality, by the sale of a whole Squadron of Ships of War, and by sending them, during the war, full armed to the Ports of Spain. Mr. Poletica however does not consider it in this light, but as a simple sale, without reference to the objects to which Spain might appropriate the ships, and without at all intending to take a decided part against the colonies. It is understood also that at the Congress of Aix La Chapelle the disposition of Russia against the Colonies and in favor of Spain was more strongly marked than that of any other of the powers, and Mr. Poletica has made known to me that he was instructed, if the recognition of Buenos Ayres by the United States should not have taken place upon his arrival here, to use whatever influence he might possess, consistent with a due respect and deference for this Government, to dissuade us from the adoption of this measure, as an *act of hostility* against Spain the Emperor's ally.

We have not recognized the Independence of Buenos Ayres, nor is it the intention of the President to adopt that measure with precipitation. Should it take place after an adjustment of our own differences with Spain, it will certainly not be with any views of hostility to her. I shall perhaps at a future day, communicate to you more fully the sentiments which The President entertains and the principles which he holds to be correct as applicable to this contest in its various past and future stages.

81

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to William Lowndes, Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations of the United States House of Representatives[1]

WASHINGTON, *December 21, 1819.*

SIR: In answer to the questions contained in your letter of the 10th instant, I have the honor to state for the information of the committee—

1st. That information has been received by the Government of the United States, though not through a direct channel, nor in authentic form, that another motive besides those alleged in the letter of the Duke of San Fernando to Mr. Forsyth did operate upon the Spanish cabinet to induce the withholding of the ratification of the treaty, namely, the apprehension that the ratification would be immediately followed by the recognition by the United States of the independence of one or more of the South American provinces. It has been suggested that, probably, the most important of the

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 674.

explanations which the minister to be sent by Spain will be instructed to ask, will consist of an explicit declaration of the intentions of this Government in that respect. There is reason, also, to believe that the impunity with which privateers fitted out, manned, and officered, in one or more of our ports, have committed hostilities upon the Spanish commerce, will be alleged among the reasons for delay, and perhaps some pledge may be required of the effectual execution against these practices of laws which appear to exist in the statute book.

It may be proper to remark that, during the negotiation of the Florida treaty, repeated and very earnest efforts were made, both by Mr. Pizarro at Madrid, and by Mr. Onis here, to obtain from the Government of the United States either a positive stipulation or a tacit promise that the United States would not recognise any of the South American revolutionary Governments; and that the Spanish negotiators were distinctly and explicitly informed that this Government would not assent to any such engagement, either express or implied.

2d. By all the information which has been obtained of the prospective views of the French and Russian Governments in relation to the course which it was by them thought probable would be pursued by the United States, it is apparent that they strongly apprehended the immediate forcible occupation of Florida by the United States, on the non-ratification by Spain of the treaty within the stipulated time. France and Russia both have most earnestly dissuaded us from that course, not by any regular official communication, but by informal friendly advice, deprecating immediate hostility, on account of its tendency to kindle a general war, which they fear would be the consequence of a war between the United States and Spain. It was alleged that, in the present state of our controversy with Spain, the opinion of all Europe on the point at issue was in our favor, and against her; that, by exercising patience a little longer, by waiting, at least, to hear the minister who was announced as coming to give and receive explanations, we could not fail of obtaining, ultimately, without resort to force, the right to which it was admitted we were entitled; but that precipitate measures of violence might not only provoke Spain to war, but would change the state of the question between us, would exhibit us to the world as the aggressors, and would indispose against us those now the most decided in our favor.

It is not expected that, in the event of a war with Spain, any European Power will openly take a part in it against the United States; but there is no doubt that the principal reliance of Spain will be upon the employment of privateers in France and England as well as in the East and West India seas and upon our own coast, under the Spanish flag, but manned from all nations, including citizens of our own, expatriated into Spanish subjects for the purpose.

3d. The enclosed copies of letters from Mr. Fromentin contain the most particular information possessed by the Executive with regard to the subjects mentioned in your third inquiry. In the month of September, a corps of three thousand men arrived at the Havana from Spain, one-third of whom are said to have already fallen victims to the diseases of that climate. By advices from the Havana, as recent as the 4th of this month, we are assured that no part of this force is intended to be, in any event, employed in Florida.

4th. A communication from the Secretary of War, also herewith enclosed, contains the information requested by the committee upon this inquiry.

5th. At the time when Captain Read left Madrid, (13th October,) Mr Forsyth had no positive information even of the appointment of the person who is to come out as the minister. Indirectly, we have been assured that he might be expected to arrive here in the course of the present month.

I am [etc.].

82

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to General Francisco Dionisio Vives, Spanish Minister to the United States[2]

WASHINGTON, *April 21, 1820.*

SIR: I am directed by the President of the United States to express to you the surprise and concern with which he has learned that you are not the bearer of the ratification by His Catholic Majesty of the treaty signed on the 22d February, 1819, by Don Luis de Onis, by virtue of a full power equally comprehensive with that which you have now produced—a full power, by which His Catholic Majesty promised, "on the faith and word of a King, to approve, ratify, and fulfil whatsoever might be stipulated and signed by him."

By the universal usage of nations, nothing can release a sovereign from the obligation of a promise thus made, except the proof that his minister, so impowered, has been faithless to his trust, by transcending his instructions.

Your sovereign has not proved, nor even alleged, that Mr. Onis had transcended his instructions; on the contrary, with the credential letter which you have delivered, the President has learned that he has been relieved from the mission to the United States only to receive a new proof of the continued confidence of His Catholic Majesty, in the appointment to another mission of equal dignity and importance.

On the faith of this promise of the King, the treaty was signed and ratified

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 681. Francisco Dionisio Vives, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Spain to the United States: Presented credentials, April 12, 1820. Last official communication from him, September 23, 1821.

on the part of the United States; and it contained a stipulation that it should also be ratified by His Catholic Majesty, so that the ratifications should, within six months from the date of its signature, be exchanged.

In withholding this promised ratification beyond the stipulated period, His Catholic Majesty made known to the President that he should forthwith despatch a person possessing entirely his confidence to ask certain *explanations* which were deemed by him necessary previous to the performance of his promise to execute the ratification.

The minister of the United States at Madrid was enabled, and offered, to give all the *explanations* which could justly be required in relation to the treaty. Your Government declined even to make known to him their character; and they are now, after the lapse of more than a year, first officially disclosed by you.

I am directed by the President to inform you that explanations which ought to be satisfactory to your Government will readily be given upon all the points mentioned in your letter of the 14th instant;[1] but that he considers none of them, in the present state of the relations between the two countries, as points for *discussion*. It is indispensable that, before entering into any new negotiation between the United States and Spain, that relating to the treaty already signed should be closed. If, upon receiving the *explanations* which your Government has asked, and which I am prepared to give, you are authorized to issue orders to the Spanish officers commanding in Florida to deliver up to those of the United States who may be authorized to receive it, immediate possession of the province, conformably to the stipulations of the treaty, the President, if such shall be the advice and consent of the Senate, will wait (with such possession given) for the ratification of His Catholic Majesty till your messenger shall have time to proceed to Madrid; but if you have no such authority, the President considers it would be at once an unprofitable waste of time, and a course incompatible with the dignity of this nation, to give explanations which are to lead to no satisfactory result, and to resume a negotiation the conclusion of which can no longer be deferred.

Be pleased to accept [etc.].

83

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to General Francisco Dionisio Vives, Spanish Minister to the United States[2]

WASHINGTON, *May 3, 1820.*

SIR: The explanations upon the points mentioned in your letter of the 14th ultimo,[1] which I had the honor of giving you at large in the conference

[1] See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1094. [2] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 683.

between us on Saturday last, and the frankness of the assurances which I had the pleasure of receiving from you, of your conviction that they would prove satisfactory to your Government, will relieve me from the necessity of recurring to circumstances which might tend to irritating discussions. In the confident expectation that, upon the arrival of your messenger at Madrid, His Catholic Majesty will give his immediate ratification to the treaty of the 22d February, 1819, I readily forbear all reference to the delays which have hitherto retarded that event, and all disquisition upon the perfect right which the United States have had to that ratification.

I am now instructed to repeat the assurance which has already been given you, that the representations which appear to have been made to your Government of a system of hostility, in various parts of this Union, against the Spanish dominions and the property of Spanish subjects, of decisions marked with such hostility by *any* of the courts of the United States, and of the toleration in any case of it by this Government, are unfounded. In the existing unfortunate civil war between Spain and the South American provinces, the United States have constantly avowed, and faithfully maintained, an impartial neutrality. No violation of that neutrality by any citizen of the United States has ever received sanction or countenance from this Government. Whenever the laws previously enacted for the preservation of neutrality have been found, by experience, in any manner defective, they have been strengthened by new provisions and severe penalties. Spanish property, illegally captured, has been constantly restored by the decisions of the tribunals of the United States; nor has the *life itself* been spared of individuals guilty of piracy committed upon Spanish property on the high seas.

Should the treaty be ratified by Spain, and the ratification be accepted by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the boundary line recognised by it will be respected by the United States, and due care will be taken to prevent any transgression of it. No new law or engagement will be necessary for that purpose. The existing laws are adequate to the suppression of such disorders, and they will be, as they have been, faithfully carried into effect. The miserable disorderly movement of a number of (not exceeding seventy) lawless individual stragglers, who never assembled within the jurisdiction of the United States, into a territory to which His Catholic Majesty has no acknowledged right other than the yet unratified treaty, was so far from receiving countenance or support from the Government of the United States, that every measure necessary for its suppression was promptly taken under their authority; and, from the misrepresentations which have been made of this very insignificant transaction to the Spanish Government, there is reason to believe that the pretended expedition itself, as well as the gross exaggerations which have been used to swell its importance, proceed from the same sources, equally unfriendly to the United States and to Spain.

As a necessary consequence of the neutrality between Spain and the South American provinces, the United States can contract no engagement not to form any relations with those provinces. This has explicitly and repeatedly been avowed and made known to your Government, both at Madrid and at this place. The demand was resisted both in conference and written correspondence between Mr. Erving and Mr. Pizarro. Mr. Onis had long and constantly been informed that a persistance in it would put an end to the possible conclusion of any treaty whatever. Your sovereign will perceive that, as such an engagement cannot be contracted by the United States, consistently with their obligations of neutrality, it cannot be justly required of them; nor have any of the European nations ever bound themselves to Spain by such an engagement.

With regard to your *proposals*, it is proper to observe that His Catholic Majesty, in announcing his purpose of asking *explanations* of the United States, gave no intimation of an intention to require new articles to the treaty. You are aware that the United States cannot, consistently with what is due to themselves, stipulate new engagements as the price of obtaining the ratification of the old. The declaration which Mr. Forsyth was instructed to deliver at the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty, with regard to the eighth article, was not intended to annul, or in the slightest degree to alter or impair, the stipulations of that article; its only object was to guard your Government, and all persons who might have had an interest in any of the annulled grants, against the possible expectation or pretence that those grants would be *made valid* by the treaty. All grants subsequent to the 24th January, 1818, were declared to be positively null and void; and Mr. Onis always declared that he signed the treaty, fully *believing* that the grants to the Duke of Alagon, Count Punon Rostro, and Mr. Vargas, were subsequent to that date. But he had, in his letter to me of 16th November, 1818, declared that those grants were null and void, because the essential conditions of the grants had not been fulfilled by the grantees. It was distinctly understood by us both that no grant, of whatever date, should be made valid by the treaty, which would not have been valid by the laws of Spain and the Indies if the treaty had not been made. It was therefore stipulated that grants prior to the 24th January, 1818, should be confirmed only "to the same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of His Catholic Majesty." This, of course, excluded the three grants above mentioned, which Mr. Onis had declared invalid for want of the fulfilment of their essential conditions—a fact which is now explicitly admitted by you. A single exception to the principle that the treaty should give no confirmation to any imperfect title was admitted; which exception was, that owners in *possession of lands*, who, by reason of the recent circumstances of the Spanish nation, and the revolutions in Europe, had been *prevented* from fulfilling *all* the conditions of their

grants, should *complete* them within the terms limited in the same from the date of the treaty. This had obviously no reference to the above-mentioned grants, the grantees of which were not in possession of the lands, who had fulfilled *none* of their conditions, and who had not been *prevented* from fulfilling any of them by the circumstances of Spain or the revolutions of Europe. The article was drawn up by me, and, before assenting to it, Mr. Onis inquired what was understood by me as the import of the terms "shall complete them." I told him that, in connexion with the terms "all the conditions," they necessarily implied that the indulgence would be limited to grantees who had performed *some* of the conditions, and who had commenced settlements, which it would allow them to complete. These were precisely the cases for which Mr. Onis had urged the equity of making a provision, and he agreed to the article, fully understanding that it would be applicable only to them. When, after the signature of the treaty, there appeared to be some reason for supposing that Mr. Onis had been mistaken in believing that the grants to the Duke of Alagon, Count Punon Rostro, and Mr. Vargas, were subsequent to the 24th of January, 1818, candor required that Spain and the grantees should never have a shadow of ground to expect or allege that this circumstance was at all material in relation to the bearing of the treaty upon those grants. Mr. Onis had not been mistaken in declaring that they were invalid, because their conditions were not fulfilled. He had not been mistaken in agreeing to the principle that no grant invalid as to Spain should, by the treaty, be made valid against the United States. He had not been mistaken in the knowledge that those grantees had neither commenced settlements, nor been prevented from completing them by the circumstances of Spain or the revolutions in Europe. The declaration which Mr. Forsyth was instructed to deliver was merely to caution all whom it might concern not to infer, from an unimportant mistake of Mr. Onis as to the date of the grants, other important mistakes which he had not made, and which the United States would not permit to be made by any one. It was not, therefore, to annul or to alter, but to fulfil the eighth article as it stands, that the declaration was to be delivered; and it is for the same purpose that this explanation is now given. It was with much satisfaction, therefore, that I learned from you the determination of your Government to assent to the total nullity of the above-mentioned grants.

As I flatter myself that these explanations will remove every obstacle to the ratification of the treaty by His Catholic Majesty, it is much to be regretted that you have not that ratification to exchange, nor the power to give a pledge which would be equivalent to the ratification. The six months within which the exchange of the ratifications were stipulated by the treaty having elapsed, by the principles of our constitution the question whether it shall now be accepted must be laid before the Senate for their advice and consent. To give a last and signal proof of the earnest wish of this Govern-

ment to bring to a conclusion these long-standing and unhappy differences with Spain, the President will so far receive that solemn promise of immediate ratification, upon the arrival of your messenger at Madrid, which, in your note of the 19th ultimo, you declare yourself authorized, in the name of your sovereign, to give, as to submit it to the Senate of the United States whether they will advise and consent to accept it for the ratification of the United States heretofore given.

But it is proper to apprize you that, if this offer be not accepted, the United States, besides being entitled to resume all the rights, claims, and pretensions which they had renounced by the treaty, can no longer consent to relinquish their claims of indemnity, and those of their citizens, from Spain, for all the injuries which they have suffered, and are suffering, by the delay of His Catholic Majesty to ratify the treaty. The amount of claims of the citizens of the United States, which existed at the time when the treaty was signed, far exceeded that which the United States consented to accept as indemnity. Their right of territory was, and yet is, to the Rio del Norte. I am instructed to declare that, if any further delay to the ratification by His Catholic Majesty of the treaty should occur, the United States could not hereafter accept either of $5,000,000 for the indemnities due to their citizens by Spain, nor of the Sabine for the boundary between the United States and the Spanish territories.

Please to accept [etc.].

84

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to General Francisco Dionisio Vives, Spanish Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *May 6, 1820.*

SIR: In the letter which I have the honor of receiving from you, dated yesterday, you observe that you renew the assurance that you will submit to His Majesty *the verbal discussion we have had* on the third point, concerning which you were instructed to ask for explanations. I have to request of you to state specifically the representation which you propose to make to His Majesty of what passed between us in conference on this subject.

I pray you to accept [etc.].

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 685.

85

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to General Francisco Dionisio Vives, Spanish Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *May 8, 1820.*

SIR: In the letter which I had the honor of writing to you on the 3d instant,[2] it was observed that all reference would readily be waived to the delays which have retarded the ratification by His Catholic Majesty of the treaty of the 22d February, 1819, and all disquisition upon the perfect right of the United States to that ratification, in the confident expectation that it would be immediately given upon the arrival of your messenger at Madrid, and subject to your compliance with the proposal offered you in the same note, as the last proof which the President could give of his reliance upon the termination of the differences between the United States and Spain by the ratification of the treaty.

This proposal was, that, upon the explanations given you on all the points noticed in your instructions, and with which you had admitted yourself to be personally satisfied, you should give the solemn promise, in the name of your sovereign, which, by your note of the 19th ultimo, you had declared yourself authorized to pledge, that the ratification should be given immediately upon the arrival of your messenger at Madrid; which promise the President consented so far to receive as to submit the question for the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, whether the ratification of Spain should, under these circumstances, be accepted in exchange for that of the United States heretofore given. But the President has, with great regret, perceived by your note of the 5th instant that you decline giving even that unconditional promise, upon two allegations: one, that, although the explanations given you on one of the points mentioned in your note of the 14th ultimo[3] are satisfactory to yourself, and you hope and believe will prove so to your sovereign, they still were not such as you were authorized by your instructions to accept; and the other, that you are informed a great change has recently occurred in the Government of Spain, which circumstance alone would prevent you from giving a further latitude to your promise previous to your receiving new instructions.

It becomes, therefore, indispensably necessary to show the absolute obligation by which His Catholic Majesty was bound to ratify the treaty within the term stipulated by one of its articles, that the reasons alleged for his withholding the ratification are altogether insufficient for the justification of that measure, and that the United States have suffered by it the violation of a perfect right, for which they are justly entitled to indemnity and satisfaction—a right further corroborated by the consideration

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 685.
[2] See above, doc. 83,
[3] See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1094.

that the refusal of ratification necessarily included the non-fulfilment of another compact between the parties which had been ratified—the convention of August, 1802.

While regretting the necessity of producing this proof, I willingly repeat the expression of my satisfaction at being relieved from that of enlarging upon other topics of an unpleasant character. I shall allude to none of those upon which you have admitted the explanations given to be satisfactory, considering them as no longer subjects of discussion between us or our Governments. I shall with pleasure forbear noticing any remarks in your notes concerning them, which might otherwise require animadversion.

With the view of *confining* this letter to the only point upon which further observation is necessary, it will be proper to state the present aspect of the relations between the contracting parties.

The treaty of 22d February, 1819, was signed after a succession of negotiations of nearly twenty years' duration, in which all the causes of difference between the two nations had been thoroughly discussed, and with a final admission on the part of Spain that there were existing just claims on her Government, at least to the amount of five millions of dollars, due to citizens of the United States, and for the payment of which provision was made by the treaty. It was signed by a minister who had been several years residing in the United States in constant and unremitted exertions to maintain the interests and pretensions of Spain involved in the negotiation—signed after producing a full power, by which, in terms as solemn and as sacred as the hand of a sovereign can subscribe, His Catholic Majesty had promised to approve, ratify, and fulfil whatever should be stipulated and signed by him.

You will permit me to repeat that, by every principle of natural right, and by the universal assent of civilized nations, nothing can release the *honor* of a sovereign from the obligation of a promise thus unqualified, without the proof that his minister has signed stipulations unwarranted by his instructions. The express authority of two of the most eminent writers upon national law to this point were cited in Mr. Forsyth's letter of 2d October, 1819, to the Duke of San Fernando. The words of Vattel are: "But to refuse with honor to ratify that which has been concluded in virtue of a full power, the sovereign must have strong and solid reasons for it; *and, particularly, he must show* that his minister transcended his instructions."[1] The words of Martens are: "Every thing that has been stipulated by an agent, in conformity to his full powers, ought to become obligatory on the state from the moment of signing, without ever waiting for the ratification. However, not to expose a state to the errors of a single

[1] "Mais pour refuser avec honneur de ratifier ce qui a été conclué en vertu d'un pleinpouvoir, il faut que le souverain en ait de fortes et solides raisons, et qu'il fasse voir, en particulier, que son ministre s'est écarté de ses instructions. Liv. 2, chap. 12, sec. 156.

person, it is now become a general maxim that public conventions do not become obligatory until ratified. The motive of this custom clearly proves that the ratification can never be refused with justice, except when he who is charged with the negotiation, keeping within the extent of his public full powers, has gone beyond his secret instructions, and consequently rendered himself liable to punishment, or when the other party refuses to ratify."[1] In your letter of the 24th ultimo, you observe that these positions have already been refuted by your Government, which makes it necessary to inquire, as I with great reluctance do, how they have been refuted.

The Duke of San Fernando, in his reply to this letter of Mr. Forsyth, says, maintains, and repeats "that the very authorities cited by Mr. Forsyth literally declare that the sovereign, for strong and solid reasons, *or* if his minister has exceeded his instructions, may refuse his ratification; (Vattel, book 2, chap. 12,) and that public treaties are not obligatory until ratified." (Martens, book 2, chap. 3. See note.) In these citations the Duke of San Fernando has substituted for the connective term *and*, in Vattel, which makes the proof of instructions transcended indispensable to justify the refusal of ratification, the disjunctive term *or*, which presents it as an alternative, and unnecessary on the contingency of other existing and solid reasons. Vattel says the sovereign must have strong and solid reasons, *and particularly* must show that the minister transcended his instructions. The Duke of San Fernando makes him say the sovereign must have strong and solid reasons, *or if* his minister has exceeded his instructions. Vattel not only makes the breach of instructions indispensable, but puts upon the sovereign the obligation of proving it. The Duke of San Fernando cites Vattel not only as admitting that other reasons, without a breach of instructions, may justify a refusal of ratification, but that the mere fact of such a breach would also justify the refusal, without requiring that the sovereign alleging should prove it.

Is this refutation?

The only observation that I shall permit myself to make upon it is, to mark how conclusive the authority of the passage in Vattel must have been to the mind of him who thus transformed it to the purpose for which he was contending. The citation from Martens receives the same treatment. The Duke of San Fernando takes by itself a part of a sentence—"that public treaties are not obligatory until ratified." He omits the preceding

[1] "Ce qui a été stipulé par un subalterne en conformité de son plein-pouvoir devient à la rigueur obligatoire pour la nation du moment même de la signature sans que la ratification soit nécessaire. Cependant, pour ne pas abandonner le sort des états aux erreurs d'un seul, il a été introduit par un usage généralement reconnu que les conventions publiques ne deviennent obligatoires que lorsqu'elles ont été ratifiées. Le motif de cet usage indique assez qu'on ne peut y provoquer avec justice, que lorsque celui qui est chargé des affaires de l'état, en se tenant dans les bornes de son plein-pouvoir publique, a franchi celle, de son instruction secrette, et que, par conséquent, il s'est rendu punissable." Liv. 2, chap. 3, sec. 31.

sentence, by which Martens asserts that a treaty signed in conformity to full powers is in rigor obligatory from the moment of signature, without waiting for the ratification. He omits the part of the sentence cited, which ascribes the necessity of a ratification to a usage founded upon the danger of exposing a state to the errors of its minister. He omits the following sentence, which explicitly asserts that this usage can never be resorted to in justification of a refusal to ratify, unless when the minister has exceeded his secret instructions; and thus, with this half of a sentence, stripped of all its qualifying context, the duke brings Martens to assert that which he most explicitly denies.

Is this refutation?

While upon this subject, permit me to refer you to another passage of Vattel, which I the more readily cite, because, independent of its weight as authority, it places this obligation of sovereigns upon its immovable foundation of eternal justice in the law of nature. "It is shown by the law of nature that he who has made a promise to any one has conferred upon him a true right to require the thing promised; and that, consequently, not to keep a perfect promise is to violate the right of another, and is as manifest an injustice as that of depriving a person of his property. All the tranquillity, the happiness, and security of the human race rest on justice, on the obligation of paying a regard to the rights of others. The respect of others for our rights of domain and property constitutes the security of our actual possessions. The faith of promises is our security for the things that cannot be delivered or executed on the spot. There would be no more security, no longer any commerce between mankind, did they not believe themselves obliged to preserve their faith and keep their word. This obligation is then as necessary as it is natural and indubitable between nations that live together in a state of nature, and acknowledge no superior upon earth, to maintain order and peace in their society. Nations and their conductors ought, then, to keep their promises and their treaties inviolable. This great truth, *though too often neglected in practice*, is generally acknowledged by all nations."[1]

The melancholy allusion to the frequent practical neglect of this unques-

[1] "On demontre en droit naturel, que celui qui promet à quelqu' un a lui conféré un véritable droit d'exiger la chose promisée; et que, par conséquent, ne point garder une promesse par faite, c'est violer le droit d'autrui, c'est une injustice aussi manifeste que celle de dépouiller quelqu'un de son bien. Toute la tranquillité, le bonheur, et la sûreté du genre humain reposent sur la justice, sur l'obligation de respecter les droits d'autrui. Le respect des autres pour nos droits de domaine et de propriété fait la sûreté de nos possessions actuelles; la foi des promesses est notre garant pour les choses qui ne peuvent être livrées ou exécutées sur-le-champ. Plus de sûreté, plus de commerce, entre les hommes, s'ils ne se croient point obligés de garder la foi, de tenir leur parole. Cette obligation est, donc, aussi nécessaire qu'elle est naturelle et indubitable entre les nations qui vivent ensemble dans l'état de nature, et qui ne connaissent point de supérieur sur la terre, pour maintenir l'ordre et la paix dans leur société. Les nations et leurs conducteurs doivent, donc, garder inviolablement leurs promesses et leurs traités. Cette grande vérité, quoique trop souvent negligée dans la pratique, est genéralement reconnue de toutes les nations." Liv. 2, chap. 12, sec. 163.

tionable principle would afford a sufficient reply to your assertion that the ratification of treaties has often been refused, though signed by ministers with unqualified full powers, and without breach of their instructions. No case can be cited by you in which such a refusal has been justly given; and the fact of refusal, separate from the justice of the case, amounts to no more than the assertion that sovereigns have often violated their engagements and their duties: the obligation of His Catholic Majesty to ratify the treaty signed by Mr. Onis is therefore complete.

The sixteenth and last article of this treaty is in the following words: "The present treaty *shall be ratified*, in due form, by the contracting parties, and the ratification shall be exchanged in six months from this time, *or sooner if possible*." On the faith of His Catholic Majesty's promise, the treaty was, immediately after its signature, ratified on the part of the United States, and, on the 18th of May following, Mr. Forsyth, by an official note, informed the Marquis of Casa Yrujo, then Minister of Foreign Affairs at Madrid, that the treaty, duly ratified by the United States, had been intrusted to him by the President, and that he was prepared to exchange it for the ratification of Spain. He added that, from the nature of the engagement, it was desirable that the earliest exchange should be made, and that the American ship of war Hornet was waiting in the harbor of Cadiz, destined in a few days to the United States, and affording an opportunity peculiarly convenient of transmitting the ratified treaty to the United States.

No answer having been returned to this note, on the 4th of June Mr. Forsyth addressed to the same minister a second, urging, in the most respectful terms, the necessity of the departure of the Hornet, the just expectation of the United States that the ratified treaty would be transmitted by that vessel, and the disappointment which could not fail to ensue should she return without it.

After fifteen days of further delay, on the 19th of June, Mr. Forsyth was informed by a note from Mr. Salmon, successor to the Marquis of Casa Yrujo, that "His Majesty, on reflecting on the great importance and interest of the treaty in question, was under the indispensable necessity of *examining* it with the greatest caution and deliberation before he proceeded to ratify it, and that this was *all* he was enabled to communicate to Mr. Forsyth on that point."

Thus, after the lapse of more than a month from the time of Mr. Forsyth's first note, and of more than two months from the time when your Government had received the treaty, with knowledge that it had been ratified by the United States, the ratification of a treaty which His Catholic Majesty had solemnly promised, so that it might be exchanged within six months from the date of its signature, *or sooner if possible*, was withheld merely to give time to His Catholic Majesty to *examine* it; and this treaty

was the result of a twenty years' negotiation, in which every article and subject contained in it had been debated and sifted to the utmost satiety between the parties, both at Washington and Madrid—a treaty in which the stipulations by the Spanish minister had been sanctioned by successive references of every point to his own Government, and were, by the formal admission of your own note, fully within the compass of his instructions.

If, under the feeling of such a procedure on the part of the Spanish Government, the minister of the United States appealed to the just rights of his country in expressions suited more to the sense of its wrongs than to the courtesies of European diplomacy, nothing had till then occurred which could have restrained your Government from asking of him any explanation which could be necessary for fixing its determination upon the ratification. No explanation was asked of him.

Nearly two months afterwards, on the 10th of August, Mr. Forsyth was informed that the King would not come to a final decision upon the ratification without previously entering into several *explanations* with the Government of the United States, to some of which that Government had given rise, and that His Majesty had charged a person possessed of his full confidence, who would *forthwith* make known to the United States His Majesty's intentions. Mr. Forsyth offered himself to give every explanation which could be justly required; but your Government declined receiving them from him, assigning to him the shortness of the time—a reason altogether different from that which you now allege, of the disrespectful character of his communications.

From the 10th of August till the 14th of last month, a period of more than eight months, passed over, during which no information was given by your Government of the nature of the explanations which would be required. The Government of the United States, by a forbearance perhaps unexampled in human history, has patiently waited for your arrival, always ready to give, in candor and sincerity, every explanation that could with any propriety be demanded. What, then, must have been the sentiments of the President upon finding, by your note of the 14th ultimo, that, instead of *explanations*, His Catholic Majesty has instructed you to demand the negotiation of another treaty, and to call upon the United States for stipulations derogatory to their honor, and incompatible with their duties as an independent nation? What must be the feelings of this nation to learn that, when called upon to state whether you were the bearer of His Catholic Majesty's ratification of the treaty to be exchanged upon the explanations demanded being given, you explicitly answered that you were *not?* and, when required to say whether you are authorized, as a substitute for the ratification, to give the pledge of immediate possession of the territory from which the acknowledged just claims of the citizens of the United States were

stipulated to be indemnified, you still answer that you are *not;* but refer us back to a solemn promise of the King, already pledged before in the full power to your predecessor, and to a ratification *as soon as possible*, already stipulated in vain by the treaty which he, in full conformity to his instructions, had signed?

The ratification of that treaty can now no longer be accepted by this Government without the concurrence of a constitutional majority of the Senate of the United States, to whom it must be again referred. Yet even this promise you were, by my letter of the 3d instant, informed that, rather than abandon the last hope of obtaining the fulfilment of His Catholic Majesty's promise already given, the President would, so far as was constitutionally within his power, yet accept.

The assurances which you had given me, in the first personal conference between us, of your own entire satisfaction with the explanations given you upon *all* the points on which you had been instructed to ask them, would naturally have led to the expectation that the promise which you were authorized to give would, at least, not be withheld. From your letter of the 5th instant,[1] however, it appears that no discretion has been left you to pledge even His Majesty's promise of ratification in the event of your being yourself satisfied with the explanations upon *all* the points desired; that the only promise you can give is *conditional*, and the condition a point upon which your Government, when they prescribed it, could not but know it was *impossible* that the United States should comply—a condition incompatible with their independence, their neutrality, their justice, and their honor.

It was also a condition which His Catholic Majesty had not the shadow of a *right* to prescribe. The treaty had been signed by Mr. Onis with a full knowledge that no such engagement as that contemplated by it would ever be acceded to by the American Government, and after long and unwearied efforts to obtain it. The differences between the United States and Spain had no connexion with the war between Spain and South America. The object of the treaty was to settle the boundaries, and adjust and provide for the claims between your nation and ours; and Spain, at no time, could have a right to require that any stipulation concerning the contest between her and her colonies should be connected with it. As His Catholic Majesty could not justly require it during the negotiation of that treaty, still less could it afford a justification for withholding his promised ratification after it was concluded.

The proposal which, at a prior period, had been made by the Government of the United States to some of the principal Powers of Europe for a recognition, in concert, of the independence of Buenos Ayres, was founded, as I have observed to you, upon an opinion then and still entertained that this recognition must, and would at no very remote period, be made by Spain herself; that the joint acknowledgment by several of the principal Powers

[1] See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1097.

of the world at the same time might probably induce Spain the sooner to accede to that necessity, in which she must ultimately acquiesce, and would thereby hasten an event propitious to her own interests, by terminating a struggle in which she is wasting her strength and resources without a possibility of success—an event ardently to be desired by every friend of humanity afflicted by the continual horrors of a war, cruel and sanguinary almost beyond example; an event, not only desirable to the unhappy people who are suffering the complicated distresses and calamities of this war, but to all the nations having relations of amity and of commerce with them. This proposal, founded upon such motives, far from giving to Spain the right to claim of the United States an engagement not to recognise the South American Governments, ought to have been considered by Spain as a proof at once of the moderation and discretion of the United States; as evidence of their disposition to discard all selfish or exclusive views in the adoption of a measure which they deemed wise and just in itself, but most likely to prove efficacious by a common adoption of it, in a spirit entirely pacific, in concert with other nations, rather than by a precipitate resort to it on the part of the United States alone.

The conditional promise, therefore, now offered by you, instead of the positive one which you have declared yourself authorized to give, cannot be accepted by the President; and I am constrained to observe that he can consider the procedure of your Government, in thus providing you with powers and instructions utterly inefficient for the *conclusion* of the negotiation with which you are charged, in no other light than as proceeding from a determination on its part still to protract and baffle its final successful issue. Under these circumstances, he deems it his duty to submit the correspondence which has passed between us, since your arrival, to the consideration of the Congress of the United States, to whom it will belong to decide how far the United States can yet, consistently with their duties to themselves, and the rights of their citizens, authorize the further delay requested in your note of the 5th instant.

In the conclusion of that note, you have remarked, alluding to a great change which appears to have taken place since your departure from Madrid in the Government of Spain, that this circumstance *alone* would impose on you the obligation of giving *no greater latitude to your promise* previous to your receiving new instructions. If I have understood you right, your intention is to remark that this circumstance alone would restrain you, in any event, from giving, without new instructions, the unconditional promise of ratification, which, in a former note, you had declared yourself authorized, in the name of your sovereign, to give. This seems to be equivalent to a declaration that you consider your powers themselves, in the extent to which they were intrusted to you, as suspended by the events to which you thus refer. If I am mistaken in taking this as your meaning,

will you have the goodness to inform me how far you do consider your powers affected by the present state of your information from Spain?

Please to accept [etc.].

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President James Monroe to the United States House of Representatives[1]

WASHINGTON, *May 9, 1820.*

TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES:

I communicate to Congress a correspondence which has taken place between the Secretary of State and the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of His Catholic Majesty, since the message of the 27th March last, respecting the treaty which was concluded between the United States and Spain on the 22d February, 1819.

After the failure of His Catholic Majesty for so long a time to ratify the treaty, it was expected that this minister would have brought with him the ratification, or that he would have been authorized to give an order for the delivery of the territory ceded by it to the United States. It appears, however, that the treaty is still unratified, and that the minister has no authority to surrender the territory. The object of his mission has been to make complaints, and to demand explanations, respecting an imputed system of hostility, on the part of citizens of the United States, against the subjects and dominions of Spain, and an unfriendly policy in their Government, and to obtain new stipulations against these alleged injuries, as the condition on which the treaty should be ratified.

Unexpected as such complaints and such a demand were, under existing circumstances, it was thought proper, without compromitting the Government as to the course to be pursued, to meet them promptly, and to give the explanations that were desired on every subject with the utmost candor. The result has proved, what was sufficiently well known before, that the charge of a systematic hostility being adopted and pursued by citizens of the United States against the dominions and subjects of Spain is utterly destitute of foundation; and that their Government, in all its branches, has maintained with the utmost rigor that neutrality in the civil war between Spain and the colonies which they were the first to declare. No force has been collected, nor incursions made, from within the United States, against the dominions of Spain; nor have any naval equipments been permitted in favor of either party against the other. Their citizens have been warned of the obligations incident to the neutral condition of their country; the public officers have been instructed to see that the laws were faithfully executed, and severe examples have been made of some who violated them.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 676.

In regard to the stipulation proposed as the condition of the ratification of the treaty, that the United States shall abandon the right to recognise the revolutionary colonies in South America, or to form other relations with them, when, in their judgment, it may be just and expedient so to do, it is manifestly so repugnant to the honor and even to the independence of the United States that it has been impossible to discuss it. In making this proposal, it is perceived that His Catholic Majesty has entirely misconceived the principles on which this Government has acted in being a party to a negotiation so long protracted for claims so well-founded and reasonable, as he likewise has the sacrifices which the United States have made, comparatively with Spain, in the treaty, to which it is proposed to annex so extraordinary and improper a condition.

Had the minister of Spain offered an unqualified pledge that the treaty should be ratified by his sovereign on being made acquainted with the explanations which had been given by this Government, there would have been a strong motive for accepting and submitting it to the Senate for their advice and consent, rather than to resort to other measures for redress, however justifiable and proper. But he gives no such pledge; on the contrary, he declares explicitly that the refusal of this Government to relinquish the right of judging and acting for itself hereafter, according to circumstances, in regard to the Spanish colonies—a right common to all nations—has rendered it impossible for him, under his instructions, to make such engagement. He thinks that his sovereign will be induced by his communications to ratify the treaty; but still he leaves him free either to adopt that measure or to decline it. He admits that the other objections are essentially removed, and will not in themselves prevent the ratification, provided the difficulty on the third point is surmounted. The result, therefore, is, that the treaty is declared to have no obligation whatever; that its ratification is made to depend, not on the considerations which led to its adoption, and the conditions which it contains, but on a new article, unconnected with it, respecting which a new negotiation must be opened of indefinite duration and doubtful issue.

Under this view of the subject, the course to be pursued would appear to be direct and obvious, if the affairs of Spain had remained in the state in which they were when this minister sailed. But it is known that an important change has since taken place in the Government of that country, which cannot fail to be sensibly felt in its intercourse with other nations. The minister of Spain has essentially declared his inability to act, in consequence of that change. With him, however, under his present powers, nothing could be done. The attitude of the United States must now be assumed, on full consideration of what is due to their rights, their interest, and honor, without regard to the powers or incidents of the late mission. We may, at pleasure, occupy the territory which was intended and pro-

vided by the late treaty as an indemnity for losses so long since sustained by our citizens; but still nothing could be settled definitively without a treaty between the two nations. Is this the time to make the pressure? If the United States were governed by views of ambition and aggrandizement, many strong reasons might be given in its favor. But they have no objects of that kind to accomplish; none which are not founded in justice, and which can be injured by forbearance. Great hope is entertained that this change will promote the happiness of the Spanish nation. The good order, moderation, and humanity which have characterized the movement are the best guaranties of its success. The United States would not be justified in their own estimation should they take any step to disturb its harmony. When the Spanish Government is completely organized, on the principles of this change, as it is expected it soon will be, there is just ground to presume that our differences with Spain will be speedily and satisfactorily settled.

With these remarks, I submit it to the wisdom of Congress whether it will not still be advisable to postpone any decision on this subject until the next session.

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John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Charles S. Todd (Baltimore), Confidential Agent of the United States to Colombia[1]

WASHINGTON, *June 5, 1820.*

SIR: The copies of Instructions[2] heretofore given to Baptis Irvine Esq. and to the late Commodore Perry, which have been furnished you, will put you in possession of the general views of the President, respecting the agency with which you are charged, and also of the claims of several citizens of the U. S. for depredations upon their property committed under color of authority from the Govt. lately styled that of the Republic of Venezuela.

Since those Instructions were given, the Congress of Venezuela by a public act on the 17th of Dec. 1819, declared the Republics of Venezuela, and of New-Grenada, to be united under the denomination of the Republic of Colombia.

By the same Act the General Congress of Colombia is to assemble on

[1] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 180. Charles S. Todd, of Kentucky: Confidential agent, appointed, February 22, 1820, to obtain information concerning condition of affairs in Colombia, the relations with Spain, and concerning claims of citizens of United States against Colombia. Returned to United States about January 19, 1824. Commissioned secretary of legation, January 27, 1823, but declined.

[2] See above, docs. 49 and 79, Adams to Irvine, January 31, 1818, and Adams to Thompson, Secretary of Navy, May 20, 1819, suggesting instructions for Captain Perry.

the first of Jany. next at the city of Rosario de Cucuta, where they are to form a new constitution for the Republic.

It is the wish of the President that you should repair as soon as you shall find it convenient to the seat of Govt. of this Republic which is yet at Angostura, but will probably be soon or at least before the meeting of the Congress, transferred to Cucuta. You will make known your authority to the existing Govt., which has undergone so frequent and essential changes, that the persons whom you will find in power, will very probably be different from those most recently known to us. Your appointment being to a country in a state of Revolution, you will give no unnecessary publicity to it.

The principal object of your attention will be to procure and transmit to this Dept. as frequently as you may have opportunity correct information concerning the state of the country & the progress of its affairs both political and military. The state of their relations with Spain since the recent changes of Govt. there will be peculiarly interesting. If as has heretofore been the case, there should be strong internal parties constantly operating against one another, you will cautiously abstain from taking any side among them, or interposing in any manner with their concerns.

In the answer of Dr. Roscio to the representation made by Captain Perry in behalf of Messrs. Nicklye & Lowell, it is admitted that the condemnation of the Schooner Paloma & Cargo was invalid by the defect of legality in the Commission of the captor & of power in the jurisdiction which tried the case to adjudicate a prize made by a privateer not then belonging to Venezuela—but this admission is annulled for all purposes of justice, or restitution to the injured parties by the assertion that the government of Venezuela had a right to retain them as enemy's property which had fallen into their hands. This is incorrect in principle. The decision of a competent tribunal of admiralty is according to the Laws of Nations, the only means by which the fact could be ascertained whether the property belonged to enemies or neutrals—No such tribunal having had possession of the cause, the Government of Venezuela, could not take it for granted that the property was Spanish, upon the faith of any proceedings before an incompetent tribunal—The Vice President of Venezuela could not be authorized to constitute himself a Court of Appeal from a tribunal which had confessedly no jurisdiction in the case; nor assume to give legality to that which it is acknowledged had been done in violation of all Law. He could not possess authority to summon either of the parties before him, or to require of them the production of any testimony whatever—The proceedings suggested by Dr. Roscio, have been if pursued, equally arbitrary and irregular with those of the former trial—It is not doubted that before a competent tribunal the property would have been proved to belong to Messrs. Lowell and Nicklye, because such is confidently believed to have been the fact;

but the admission of the principle, that the whole question should be revised and decided by the Vice President of Venezuela, not as a regular Court of Appeal, but by a Jurisdiction assumed for the occasion, would be so contrary not only to the ordinary usages of Nations, but to the maxims which form the safeguard of human rights and liberties in the mutual intercourse of mankind, that it is hoped a different course will be adopted, and the property restored, with compensation to the parties injured, without subjecting them to incur further expenses, or to produce proofs which could not with propriety be required of them.

In the case of the Tyger, the letter of Dr. Roscio positively promises that restoration and compensation both for the vessel and the cargo shall be made. You will therefore in behalf of the owners use every suitable exertion to have this Promise carried into effect.

The promise of restitution is equally positive with regard to the schooner Liberty, but it is asserted that her cargo was justly condemned on the ground of her being taken in the Act of carrying provisions to a blockaded place. The objection to the regularity of the proceedings in the trial of this case appears upon the fact of the papers to be as strong as in the others, and from the correspondence of Mr. Irvine with General Bolivar, the fact of the Blockade itself appears to have been fully though perhaps less courteously than might have been desired, disproved.

In all these cases, the interests of our fellow-citizens who have suffered by these transactions are confidently committed to your zeal and assiduous attention. In your communications with the proper authorities, you will be careful to preserve a tone and manner at once firm and conciliatory. Yielding no principle of right and justice, but using no harsh or offensive expressions. The papers relating to these cases which are supposed to be in the possession of Mr. Irvine will be forwarded to you as soon as they can be obtained; and I would recommend to you to correspond directly with the parties interested concerning their claims and with the view to obtain effectual justice for them.

Dr. Roscio mentions in the communications to Commodore Perry the *Spanish Regulations of Letters of Marque and Privateers*, which he says have been adopted in Venezuela with certain Modifications. I will thank you to obtain and forward to this Department a copy of this Ordinance as modified by the adoption of Venezuela.

The system of privateering, which has been carried on from several of the ports and by too many of the citizens of the United States under the various South American flags has been a reproach and calamity to this Country. Though disavowed by all the South American governments and among the rest by that of Venezuela, as its tendency was to annoy their enemy, none of them have discountenanced it so explicitly as we had a right to expect they would; nor has any one of them taken effectual

measures for its suppression. Until the Act of 3 March 1819 to protect the Commerce of the United States and punish the crime of Piracy had passed, our own Laws had been found insufficient to secure the property of our own countrymen or of friendly Nations against these unhallowed robberies wearing the mask of patriotism. The solicitude of Congress to put an end to these shameful practices has been further manifested by two acts passed at their session recently concluded—one of which is an Act to continue the Act above mentioned, and to make further provision for punishing the crime of piracy; and another, an Act designating the ports within which only foreign armed vessels shall be permitted to enter. Under the Act of 3 March 1819 numerous convictions have already taken place, and several of the criminals have paid the forfeit of their lives. It is to be lamented however that the hand of Justice hitherto has fallen more upon the mere instruments than upon the still more guilty movers and causers of these atrocious deeds; many of whom have hitherto eluded detection or evaded conviction. The trials have in several cases disclosed scenes from which humanity turns with abhorrence; but which are the natural and unavoidable consequences of privateering by the people of one Nation under the banners of another. Among your important duties will be that of contributing by every proper exertion in your power to the total suppression of this evil. Friendly explanations were given by Commodore Perry to the Vice President of Venezuela, concerning the object and intention of the act of 3 March 1819 and of the act of the same session against the Slave-trade; which from the answer returned by Dr. Roscio, appear to have been satisfactory; but the list of armed ships and privateers sailing under the real flag of Venezuela, requested by Commodore Perry was not furnished, nor was any notice taken of his application to obtain it. The act of 15 May last unites both objects which had been separately acted upon at the former session, and declares the Slave-trade itself, by citizens of the United States Piracy, punishable by Death.

You will give information of these acts of the last session to the Government, and suitable explanations concerning them, in the spirit of those given by Commodore Perry, with regard to the acts of the preceding Session. You will renew the application in the most friendly manner for a list of the armed vessels in the actual service of the Republic, and if you obtain it, forward a copy of it to this Department. If the request to furnish this list should be declined, you will transmit to us lists of such armed vessels publicly known to belong to Venezuela, and from the most correct information that you can obtain, designate those really armed in their ports from those fitted out in ours, in violation of our Laws, or elsewhere not in the ports of Venezuela. You will urge without importunity but whenever a suitable occasion for it may present itself the necessity for a real discountenance to the practice of assuming their flag by foreigners—

for an establishment of admiralty courts to proceed upon principles and with forms recognized by all established Governments—for subjecting the owners and commanders of privateers to effective bonds, to guard against the heavy abuses to which this species of armed force is more than all others liable, and for inspiring neutral and foreign nations with confidence in the justice of their proceedings, as the most substantial guarantee to the stability of their new Institutions.

With regard to the formal recognition by the Government of the U. S. of the Republic of Colombia, should any thing be said to you, the obvious reply will be that you have not been authorized to discuss the subject—As a reason for this reserve it may be alleged that besides the actual war still waged by Spain, during which the Independence of the other party, could not be acknowledged without a departure from our avowed and long established system of neutrality, the changes still occurring will require some lapse of time to give to the Republic that character of permanency which would justify the formal acknowledgment of it by foreign powers. The Union decreed by the Congress was the immediate result of military operations, and appears not to have been authorized by delegations of power to form it, from either the people of Venezuela or of New Granada. The Congress which may sanction it, and form a definitive constitution for the whole Republic are to assemble on the first of January next, and an exact account of their proceedings as well as of the manner by which its members may be elected and the portions of Country represented by them will be among the interesting communications which we shall expect to receive from you.

I am [etc.].

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John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to John M. Forbes (New York), Special Agent of the United States to Chile or Buenos Aires[1]

WASHINGTON, *July 5, 1820.*

SIR: The certificate from this Department, which has been made out and transmitted to you, constitutes you agent for commerce and seamen for either of the provinces of Buenos Ayres or of Chili, in whichsoever of them Mr. J. B. Prevost shall not be. He is at this time at Buenos Ayres; but having, at one period, intimated to the President a preference to return to Chili, where he some time resided, it is thought due to him to leave the selection of his residence, after your arrival at Buenos Ayres, to himself. Should

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 820. John M. Forbes, of Florida: Commissioned chargé d'affaires to Argentine Confederation, March 9, 1825. Was commissioned as secretary of legation at Buenos Aires, January 27, 1823. Acted as chargé d'affaires from June 10, 1824. Died at his post, June 14, 1831.

he determine to continue there, you will proceed, either by land over the Andes, or in the frigate Constellation round Cape Horn, to Valparaiso, and take up your residence there, or at St. Jago de Chili, which is understood to be the seat of the revolutionary Government of that province. If he should prefer to return thither, you will remain at Buenos Ayres.[1]

The commercial intercourse between the United States and those countries, though not very considerable, is deserving of particular attention. Whatever accurate information you can obtain relating to it, as well as to the commerce of those countries with other nations, and to their internal trade, will be particularly acceptable. The condition of our seamen there will also deserve your notice. The performance of these duties will involve also the political relations between those countries and the United States. In the progress of their revolution, Buenos Ayres and Chili have, to the extent of their powers, and, indeed, far beyond their natural means, combined maritime operations with those of their war by land. Having no ships or seamen of their own, they have countenanced and encouraged foreigners to enter their service, without always considering how far it might affect either the rights or the duties of the nations to which those foreigners belonged. The privateers which, with the commissions and under the flag of Buenos Ayres, have committed so many and such atrocious acts of piracy, were all either fitted out, manned, and officered by foreigners, at Buenos Ayres, or even in foreign countries, not excepting our own, to which blank commissions, both for the ships and officers, have been sent. In the instructions to the late Commodore Perry, (which his lamented decease prevented from being executed by him, and a copy of which is now furnished to you,) certain articles in the Buenos Ayrean privateering ordinance were pointed out, particularly liable to the production of these abuses, and which, being contrary to the established usages among civilized nations, it was hoped would have been revoked, or made to disappear from their otherwise unexceptionable code. These instructions were renewed to Commodore Morris; but the time of his stay at Buenos Ayres was so short, and he was there at a moment of so great a change in the ruling power of the state, that, although he communicated to the then existing Director the substance of the representations which Commodore Perry had been instructed to make, we know not that it was attended with any favorable result. You will consider the parts of Commodore Perry's instructions which may be still applicable on your arrival in South America as directed to yourself, and, should you proceed to Chili, will execute them there, no communication upon the subject having yet been made there. Among the inconveniences consequent upon this system of carrying on maritime warfare by means of foreigners, has been occasionally, and to a considerable extent, the enticement of seamen belonging to mer-

[1] See below, pt. II, note 1 to doc. 260. Forbes to Secretary of State, December 4, 1820, for an explanation of the reason why Forbes remained at Buenos Aires.

chant vessels in the ports of Buenos Ayres and Chili from their engagements, to enlist them in privateers or public armed vessels of those countries. In attending to the numerous trials and convictions for piracy which have recently afflicted our country, and cast an unusual gloom over our annals, you will remark that a great proportion of the guilty persons have been seamen thus engaged, foreigners at Buenos Ayres, or enlisted in our own ports, in violation of our laws. Whether at Buenos Ayres or in Chili, you will use every exertion in your power, consistent with the respect and conciliatory deportment to be constantly observed towards the existing public authorities, to protect the seamen of the United States from all such enlistments, and the owners and masters of the merchant vessels from time to time arriving there from the loss of their men by such means.

The Commercial Digest of the Laws of Foreign Countries with which the United States are in relation, a copy of which has been furnished you, may suggest to you the nature of part of the information which is desirable from South America.

Political information will be equally acceptable. The more particular and correct the information of this nature which you can obtain, the more acceptable it will prove. Besides the struggle in South America for independence, against which Spain is the only opposite party, internal feuds and civil wars have peculiarly marked every step of the revolutions in progress upon that theatre. As an agent and citizen of the United States, the first advice I shall give you is, to observe and report, with all the vigilance and discernment, and penetration and fidelity to your own country, that you possess, the movements of all parties, but to make yourself a partisan to none. From the documents lately received here, it is apparent that a negotiation has been some time on foot between the late Government of Buenos Ayres and France. It is well known that a negotiation of much longer standing has existed between the same Government and Portugal; nor has Mr. Rivadavia been residing two or three years to no purpose in England. To ascertain the real movements of all these parties, a neutral position, a neutral heart, and an observing mind, are indispensable. In recommending it to your attention, I would add the caution, neither to take upon trust what any man shall tell you, without asking yourself what it is his interest or wish that you should believe, nor to give more weight to conjectures than the circumstances under which they are formed will warrant.

By the latest accounts that we have received, the Government, the Congress, and the constitution of the provinces of La Plata were overthrown; the province of Buenos Ayres stood alone, with Don Manuel de Sarratea as governor, at its head. They were in negotiation with General Artigas, of the Oriental Banda, and with General Ramirez, commander of the Monteneros. In what those negotiations will result, we are to learn hereafter; and what their effect will be upon the relations of all with the Portuguese at Monte-

video is yet to be seen. Should you remain at Buenos Ayres, we shall expect full communications from you as frequently as opportunities for transmitting them may occur.

I am [etc.].

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John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to John M. Forbes (New York), Special Agent of the United States to Chile or Buenos Aires[1]

WASHINGTON, *July 7, 1820.*

SIR: A letter from Mr. Prevost to this department of 20th March 1819 enclosed a representation addressed to him from Mr. Echevarria, Secretary of State of the Government of Chili complaining of certain transactions of Captain Biddle while in the command of the U. S. corvette Ontario, in the South Sea during the years 1817 and 1818. Although a full year has elapsed since this letter of Mr. Prevost was received, yet as the orders for his removal to Buenos Ayres, had already been despatched to him, no opportunity has until now occurred for giving to the government of Chili the explanations concerning those transactions which the President hopes will prove satisfactory to them.

There are herewith enclosed a translation of the complaint of Mr. Echevarria and of the answer to it which has been given by Captain Biddle upon reference of the complaint to him by the Navy department. From these papers you will collect the facts from which you will make such a communication to the Government of Chili, as may at once tend to justify the conduct of Captain Biddle, and to manifest the disposition entirely friendly of the President towards Chili. It is apparent that the intentions of Captain Biddle were altogether of that character; and that if in one or two incidents they had unfortunately a different appearance, it arose from circumstances unknown to him and over which he had no controul. It is observed by Mr. Prevost "that there exists a peculiar sensibility (in Chili) to every act emanating from the Government (of the U. S.) or done by an individual *although strictly neutral.* They seem (he adds) to claim a sympathy from us in their struggle that they look for no where else, and cannot bear any circumstance that indicates a contrary feeling." You will be careful to avoid giving umbrage to this sensibility and jealousy, as far as may be compatible with the rights and duties of our neutrality, which you

[1] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 194. An instruction dated July 6, 1820, addressed to Forbes indicates that while he was charged with making representations to the Chilean Government on losses suffered by a United States merchant vessel he was to go to Buenos Aires and conduct them from there unless he should find it necessary to go in person to Chile. The instruction to Prevost of July 10, 1820 (see below, pt. 1, doc. 90) states that Forbes was carrying a commission to either place and would reside at that one of the two where Prevost might prefer not to reside. See below, pt. II, note 1 to doc. 260.

will in no instance either infringe or surrender. The Government of the U. S. have unequivocal proofs of their friendly Sentiments towards the South Americans in general and those of Chili in particular. The President would lament any occurrence which should tend to awaken other feelings, either there or here. He relies upon your discretion, and conciliatory deportment, to make these Sentiments manifest, and at the same time to secure to the U. S. and their citizens, that Justice which is their undoubted right, and their only claim in return.

I am, [etc.].

P.S. With reference to the complaint against Captain Biddle, I enclose an extract from the instructions which have been given by the Navy department to the Commanders of our armed vessels, a copy of which you are at liberty to communicate to the Government of Chili.

Papers enclosed:[1]

1. Mr. Echevarria to Mr. Prevost (translation).
2. Captain Biddle to the President (copy).
3. Extract of Instructions from Navy Department to Commanders of U. S. vessels.

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John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to John B. Prevost (Buenos Aires), Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru[2]

WASHINGTON, *July 10, 1820.*

SIR: I have had the honour of receiving letters from you of the following dates, with the enclosures to which they respectively refer, excepting the new Tariff referred to in that of the 13th September 1819 and the paper marked 4 in that of 16 May 1819, copies of which you are requested to forward. Dates—3 & 4 Octr. & 25 Novr. 1817—9 & 13 Feb.—8 March, 9 April, 10 & 20 June, 8 & 27 July & 11 Novr. 1818—15 Janry. 20 March, 15 April, 16 May, 3 July, 13 & 25 Septr. and 12 Decr. 1819—and 10 Janry. 14 Febry. and 9, 15 and 21 March 1820.

The documents relating to a project of Negotiation with France, and the proceedings of the late Congress upon them, are of a very interesting

[1] Not printed. The Chilean complaint against Biddle grew out of a charge made by Lord Cochrane that when in Chilean waters Biddle had carried on his vessel Spanish subjects from Lima, assumed to be spies. The charge also said Biddle neglected and afterwards refused to salute the Chilean flag; and that he had on board $920,000 belonging to enemies of Chile. The last two charges were not pressed.

[2] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 196. See above, note 1 to doc. 89. For the dispatches acknowledged which are pertinent to this collection, see below, under these dates, in pt. V, except that of January 15, 1819, which is in pt. XI, and those subsequent to September 13, 1819, which are in pt. II.

nature;[1] though some obscurity rests upon the real intentions of the Congress in the countenance which they appear to have given to the project of the late French Minister of foreign affairs—Other copies of the documents transmitted by you have found their way to this country, and with them, one, w^h^. seems not to have been known to you, and which has a tendency to change in some degree the aspect of the proceedings of the Congress. If the prosecution of the members who took part in that Negotiation which you mention as to be commenced should be carried through it will probably produce new and further interesting lights upon the history of South American affairs—We long since understood that Mr. Rivadavia went originally to Spain with proposals not unlike those which appear in these papers to come *from* the French Minister to Mr. Gomez—We have heard also of another Negotiation, said to have been commenced through an officer of the Spanish regiment of Cantabria, taken prisoner, perhaps in the frigate Iphigenia; and of which if you can obtain correct information it will be acceptable to learn the sequel—The refusal of the Director Pueyrredon to agree to an article, by which the U. S. should be placed upon a footing of commercial intercourse, equal to that of other nations, was more deeply rooted than might appear from Mr. Tagle's answer to your note.

The Constellation frigate, captain Ridgely goes into the Pacific to take the place of the Macedonian which is to return home. By this occasion Mr. Forbes goes out with a mission similar to yours—The President leaves it entirely at your option to remain at Buenos Ayres in which case Mr. Forbes will proceed to Chili; or to return there in which case he will be definitively fixed at Buenos Ayres—His commission is to either of the two, at which you shall not be; an alternative directed by the President for the express purpose of leaving your future residence at the one or the other to your own choice.[2] There is however one subject which the President has thought it would be most satisfactory to you to leave to the management of Mr. Forbes: it is the claim of the owners of the Macedonian and of the money taken by Lord Cochrane from Captain Smith and from the French vessel the Gazelle. The owners of that property are citizens of the U. S. of respectable character—No complaint has been made by them of the course which you thought it advisable to take in this case nor have they expressed a wish that the representations in their behalf to the Chilian Government should be given in charge to any other person—But you are doubtless aware that Captain Smith himself has intimated apprehensions that your favourable opinions of the South Americans might have some bias upon your judgment, unfriendly to the interests of his owners; and

[1] For further reference to this negotiation with France, see below, pt. I, doc. 93, Secretary of State to Forbes, July 12, 1820, and pt. II, doc. 254, Prevost to Adams, March 20, 1820, especially note 1 thereto.

[2] See below, pt. II, doc. 260, Forbes to Secretary of State, December 4, 1820, for an explanation of the reason why Prevost did not remain at Buenos Aires.

that animadversions of a similar character have appeared in the public journals of this country—Under these circumstances the President has directed that the instructions on this affair should be given in special charge to Mr. Forbes.

He has also directed me to transmit to you the copy of a paper purporting to be a letter to the late Supreme Director of Buenos Ayres, from a person said to be in Official Station in Chili, relating in so special a manner to you, that he has thought you should be made acquainted with it—It is alleged to have been intercepted by some officer of the Montoneros and was forwarded to this country without comment—The President has doubts whether it is a genuine letter; of which however you will be able to judge with certainty.

In the instructions to Commodore Perry and afterwards to Commodore Morris, which were communicated to you, there were some observations respecting certain articles in the Ordinance of Buenos Ayres for the regulation of privateers, to which I am under the necessity of requesting you to call again the attention of that Government—The cases of Piracy and murder committed by the crews of vessels sailing under the flag and with commissions of Buenos Ayres, have been numerous and of the most atrocious character. They continue to be committed from day to day, and are multiplied to such an extent that even the severest laws made here are found ineffectual to suppress them. Within a few months upwards of fifty persons have been convicted and had sentence of death passed upon them in the U. S. for crimes of that description committed in vessels bearing that flag and commission: but having scarcely an individual Buenos Ayrean in them. These crimes are all distinctly to be traced to the Articles in that Code against which we have remonstrated—namely, to the article which gives the privileges of a Buenos-Ayrean, and a right to their flag, to every foreigner, who has never even been in the country; and to that which they are the only judges, to send their prizes where they please—There is scarcely a Buenos Ayrean privateer which has not committed piracy of every description—It appears that at Buenos Ayres itself commissions of Artigas have been sold to the Captains of the Buenos Ayres privateers, who have gone to sea, and used one or the other commission as suited their purposes—Daniels, Captain of the Irresistible, fought during the same cruise under the commission of Buenos Ayres; and of Artigas, and long after he had been declared a pirate at Buenos Ayres, carried his prizes to the island of Margarita, where an irregular court has been instituted which condemns vessels taken under *any* of the South American flags and commissions—Within these few weeks another privateer called the General Rondeau, commanded by a Captain *Miles*, has been destroyed by a part of her own crew, who mutinied, killed one of their officers, and turned off the others, with Captain Miles in a boat to the island of Grenada.—

Captain Miles after reaching the island of Margarita, has published an account of the mutiny, in which he says of his crew, "there is no doubt but they will capture and rob indiscriminately every vessel they fall in with," and expresses great anxiety that "the armed vessels of all nations may be on the alert to capture these pirates"—What sort of a personage Captain Miles himself is, may be inferred from his having gone to Valparaiso in one of his prizes, and there entered her as a merchant vessel of the U. S. under forged papers, which were detained and transmitted to this department by Mr. Hill. Of this crew forty or fifty persons have been disgorged upon our shores; and a large portion of them are in various prisons, to be tried for this piracy upon their Captain—but what security has the Government of Buenos Ayres against the piracies of Miles?—He had turned his back upon Buenos Ayres, and sent all his prizes to Margarita.—There is another case of a vessel which has been several months at Norfolk, passing under the name of Wilson, with a pretended Captain of the same name and clandestinely recruiting men in violation of our Laws. Not ten days since she sailed from Norfolk, and has already taken a Spanish vessel bound to Baltimore, almost within our own jurisdiction—her name is now the Bolivar and her Captain Almeida, the same man who commanded the Louisa, with whose piracies, all the world are acquainted.—There is not a day passes, but we hear of new crimes of this description, committed under the flag & commission of Buenos Ayres by people of every other nation; for, to find among them a native or even a genuine citizen of Buenos Ayres, is almost without example—A very earnest Representation should be addressed immediately to the Government there, recurring to these events as affording a demonstration of the great inconveniences resulting from those articles of the Prize Code; and insisting upon the adoption of measures which shall hold the Captains and owners of privateers sailing by their authority, under a real responsibility to them.

I shall have the honour of writing to you again upon this subject and in the mean time am with great respect,

Sir [etc.].

P.S. Your letter of 30 April 1820 has been this day received.

91

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Henry Hill, Vice Consul of the United States at Valparaiso[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *July 11, 1820.*

SIR: I have had the honour of receiving your letters of 30 June, 24 July and 31 Decr. 1818, and of 15 May, 30 June and 25 Septr. 1819, with their enclosures; and am happy to inform you that your conduct in relation to the ship Mercury is approved—The name of Captain Miles[2] is at this moment very notorious here, for adventures subsequent to that of his attempting to enter Valparaiso, with forged papers of the U. S. It is by men like him and by transactions like his that an odium is cast upon the South American Cause, to which it ought not to be subjected.

92

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to John M. Forbes (New York), Special Agent of the United States to Chile or Buenos Aires[3]

WASHINGTON, *July 11, 1820.*

SIR: You have seen in the public journals from various parts of the U. S. that a considerable number of Seamen have been taken up, and are under charges of Piracy and Murder committed on board a privateer called the General Rondeau commanded by David M. Miles (of Baltimore) and carrying the flag of Buenos Ayres—The Piracy and murder *charged*, is for a mutiny of this crew against their captain and officers, one of whom it appears they killed, and the rest they turned adrift in a boat, near the island of Grenada, which they reached in safety—From thence Captain Miles found his way to the island of Margarita, where he advertised his crew as pirates, who would no doubt capture indiscriminately the vessels of all nations.

From all that has hitherto transpired, it appears that after cashiering him, they made no captures—On the contrary they released one prize taken by him; and after distributing among them the money on board the General Rondeau, they scuttled that vessel, near the coast of the U. S. and came ashore in a boat; dispersing themselves as well as they could to escape detection; notwithstanding which a large number of them have been taken, and must be tried probably for their lives; and perhaps executed.

[1] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 199. The despatches here acknowledged are not sufficiently pertinent to be printed in this collection.

[2] For brief account of the conduct of Miles and his crew see below, pt. 1, doc. 92, Secretary of State to Forbes, July 11, 1820.

[3] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 199.

What sort of a person Captain Miles himself is may be seen from the following facts—Some months since there was received at this department a letter from Henry Hill, acting as Vice Consul of the U. S. at Valparaiso, enclosing a forged *Register*, *Sea Letter* and *Mediterranean Pass*, of a pretended ship Mercury, Captn. David M. Miles, which entered at Valparaiso as a vessel of the U. S. on the 7 of May 1819, then coming from Buenos Ayres—The pretended ship Mercury was a Prize to the privateer Union, sold at auction at Buenos Ayres, where the forged papers were bought for 500 dollars. Mr. Hill who had received notice of this transaction, demanded the papers of Captain Miles—detained them as forgeries, and transmitted them to this department—Some time after he received from a certain *Juan Higinbotham*, a letter, of which you have herewith a copy. This Higinbotham, I have reason to believe was part or whole owner of the privateer General Rondeau.

There does not appear to have been a single Buenos Ayrean on board of this privateer—Captain Miles is stated to have had no intention of returning there—his prizes were ordered to the island of Margarita.—These incidents are all pressed upon your attention, to renew the remarks upon certain Articles in the Privateering Ordinance of Buenos Ayres, and to urge you (or Mr. Prevost) to present them again in the most earnest manner to the existing Government there. I have written to the same effect to Mr. Prevost. While those articles remain in force the Government of Buenos Ayres hold no controul over their own privateers—They can neither punish the guilty, nor make satisfaction to the injured—They let loose upon the Ocean, under the countenance of their commissions and the protection of their flags, gangs of the most desperate Banditti; robbery and murder prowl upon the waters of every sea, and retributive Justice itself has no means of correcting or arresting the mischief but by rousing Rapine and Murder to turn upon itself and punishing the crimes of the leaders through the rebellion of their associates. The frequency of these mutinies, and the horrible outrages by which they are made infamous, point in the most unequivocal manner to the sources of the mischief. There were no such examples in the privateering history of our Wars, because our Privateering Regulations had no such articles as those against which we remonstrate. Our privateersmen were under effective Bonds; we gave no indiscriminate licence to foreigners, to take our commissions and flag; and we required every capture to be brought to trial before our own tribunals—South American privateers and pirates will be synonymous terms till the same rules are adopted and practiced upon by their Governments—To the honour of their cause and to the administration of general Justice this reform in their Prize Code is indispensable.

I am [etc.].

93

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to John M. Forbes (New York), Special Agent of the United States to Chile or Buenos Aires[1]

WASHINGTON, *July 12, 1820.*

SIR: Since your instructions were prepared I have received a letter of 30 April from Mr. Prevost, with a sequel of printed papers relating to the prosecution for High Treason, of several members of the late Congress, on account of the secret Negotiations with France and Portugal, under the late Government of the Supreme Director Pueyrredon.

It appears from Mr. Prevost's letter that towards the close of the month of March, a new effort was made to overthrow the Government of Sarratea, by a party at the head of which was the sometime Director Alvear—it was unsuccessful; Alvear and his party were proclaimed guilty of High Treason, and had withdrawn from the city. By the accounts in the public journals it appears that they were in arms, but whether with or against the Montoneros we are left to conjecture.

The letter speaks doubtfully of the continuance of the power of Sarratea, and represents him as desirous of withdrawing from the public service. It does not appear that Artigas had ratified the Treaty of February made with Ramirez; probably he makes a declaration of war against Portugal a *Sine qua non*, and that measure may be one for which the People of Buenos Ayres are not prepared.

It is impossible to consider the present condition of Buenos Ayres otherwise than as temporary, and other changes in the Government will probably have happened before you arrive. At the time when Mr. Worthington drew up articles of a Treaty with the Commissioners of Pueyrredon, they declined inserting an article, to secure to the U. S. commercial advantages equal to those which might be enjoyed by any other nation. Mr. Prevost on his first arrival at Buenos Ayres, much surprized to find that such an objection had been made, entered into a correspondence upon the subject with Mr. Tagle, who was still the Secretary of State, and from whom he received an ambiguous answer—intimating that whatever Mr. Pueyrredon had intended the Government of Buenos Ayres would secure the privileges of the most favoured nation to those who should first acknowledge their Independence—Mr. De Forrest had told us as much here before.

Should any thing be said to you on the subject of the acknowledgement of the Government of Buenos Ayres, you will of course let it be understood that you have no authority to discuss the subject. The changes constantly happening there will occur as a probable reason for the delay of the Government of the U. S. The first claim of the acknowledgement from Buenos Ayres was to be recognized as *the United Provinces of South America*. The

[1] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 202.

next was under the stile of *the United Provinces of La Plata*, including the whole Vice Royalty of La Plata. This claim was made by Pueyrredon through Mr. Aguirre and Mr. De Forrest. All this has been swept away, and if [we] were now to recognize the single province of Buenos Ayres, the recognition upon reaching that city might probably find it no longer Independent.

You will take occasion to remark whenever it may be proper that the Government of the U. S. have never intended to secure to themselves any advantage, commercial or otherwise, as an equivalent for acknowledging the Independence of any part of South America. They do not think it a proper subject for equivalent; and they have entire confidence that no exclusive privilege will be granted to any other nation to the prejudice of the U. S. They think themselves entitled to this, and consider it as essential to the Independence itself to be acknowledged—aware that no such exclusive privileges can be granted but by a sacrifice of the interests of the nation which grants them, they have never intended to ask them to the detriment of others, as they rely that they will not be conceded to others in detriment to them.

I am [etc.].

94

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to John James Appleton, United States Chargé d'Affaires at Rio de Janeiro[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *September 30, 1820.*

Mr. Correa de Serra the Minister Plenipotentiary from Portugal to the United States is about to leave this country for Brazils and has presented Mr. Amado, as the Chargé d'Affaires during his absence.

Copies are herewith enclosed of Notes which have been lately addressed to this Department by Mr. Correa, and of the answer which has been given them—You will see in the answer the views of the President, in relation to the subject to which they refer.

The situation of the Brazilian Government must be materially affected, as well by that of Portugal, and the political transactions in its immediate

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, IX, 48. John J. Appleton, of Massachusetts: Acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* to the Netherlands from October 20, 1817, to April 18, 1818, and from May 5, 1818, to January 4, 1819. Commissioned secretary of legation to Portugal, March 3, 1819. Acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from June 13, 1820, to June —, 1821. Commissioned secretary of legation to Spain, May 8, 1822. Acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from March 2 to December 4, 1823. Left November 23, 1824. Commissioned chargé d'affaires to Sweden and Norway, May 2, 1826. Left August 20, 1830. Also acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from September 20, 1833, to January 9, 1834. See above note 1 to doc. 3.

neighbourhood Europe, as by the course of affairs in South America, especially in the Provinces of La Plata—You have doubtless seen the documents published at Buenos Ayres, disclosing a negotiation for uniting French and Portuguese interests, in a projected monarchy for that portion of South America—It is reported from France that Mr. Hyde de Neuville, who has lately returned home has received the appointment of Minister to Rio de Janeiro—Should he arrive there you will be watchful of his movements, and communicate such information as you can obtain concerning them.

I am [etc.].

95

Message of President James Monroe to the United States Congress [1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *November 15, 1820.*

The contest between Spain and the colonies, according to the most authentic information, is maintained by the latter with improved success. The unfortunate divisions which were known to exist some time since at Buenos Ayres, it is understood, still prevail. In no part of South America has Spain made any impression on the colonies, while in many parts, and particularly in Venezuela and New Granada, the colonies have gained strength, and acquired reputation, both for the management of the war, in which they have been successful, and for the order of the internal administration. The late change in the Government of Spain, by the re-establishment of the constitution of 1812, is an event which promises to be favorable to the revolution. Under the authority of the Cortes, the Congress of Angostura was invited to open a negotiation for the settlement of differences between the parties; to which it was replied that they would willingly open the negotiation, provided the acknowledgment of their independence was made its basis, but not otherwise. Of further proceedings between them we are uninformed. No facts are known to this Government to warrant the belief that any of the Powers of Europe will take part in the contest; whence it may be inferred, considering all circumstances which must have weight in producing the result, that an adjustment will finally take place on the basis proposed by the colonies. To promote that result by friendly counsels with other Powers, including Spain herself, has been the uniform policy of this Government.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 646.

96

Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the first session of the Seventeenth Congress of the United States, communicated December 5, 1821 [1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *December 3, 1821.*

The Government of His Most Faithful Majesty, since the termination of the last session of Congress, has been removed from Rio de Janeiro to Lisbon, where a revolution, similar to that which had occurred in the neighboring kingdom of Spain, had, in like manner, been sanctioned by the accepted and pledged faith of the reigning monarch. The diplomatic intercourse between the United States and the Portuguese dominions, interrupted by this important event, has not yet been resumed; but the change of internal administration having already materially affected the commercial intercourse of the United States with the Portuguese dominions, the renewal of the public missions between the two countries appears to be desirable at an early day.

It is understood that the colonies in South America have had great success during the present year in the struggle for their independence. The new Government of Colombia has extended its territories, and considerably augmented its strength; and at Buenos Ayres, where civil dissensions had for some time before prevailed, greater harmony and better order appear to have been established. Equal success has attended their efforts in the provinces on the Pacific. It has long been manifest that it would be impossible for Spain to reduce these colonies by force, and equally so that no conditions short of their independence would be satisfactory to them. It may, therefore, be presumed, and it is earnestly hoped, that the Government of Spain, guided by enlightened and liberal counsels, will find it to comport with its interests, and due to its magnanimity, to terminate this exhausting controversy on that basis. To promote this result, by friendly counsel with the Government of Spain, will be the object of the Government of the United States.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 739.

97

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Manual Torres (Philadelphia), Colombian Agent in the United States [1]

WASHINGTON, *January 18, 1822.*

SIR: In reference to your letters [2] of the 30th, of November last, and the 2d. of this month, I have the honor of informing you that the subject to which they relate, is under the consideration of the President of the United States, whose definitive decision concerning it, shall, when taken, be forthwith communicated to you. In the mean time, should you receive advices of the surrender of Porto Cavello, and the Isthmus of Panama, I have to request you would favour me with the information of those events as early as may suit your convenience.

I pray you [etc.].

98

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Charles S. Todd (Frankfort, Kentucky), Confidential Agent of the United States to Colombia [3]

WASHINGTON, *January 28, 1822.*

SIR: I have the honour of informing you that it is the President's desire that you should proceed as soon as will suit your convenience to South America, to resume the duties of your Station there.

By a letter received from Mr. Torres, a copy of which is herewith enclosed, you will see that the Seat of Government of the Republic of Colombia has been fixed at the city of Bogota, to which you will accordingly repair as speedily as possible.

The claims of certain citizens of the U. S. upon the Government of Venezuela, which were heretofore recommended to your attention, you will continue to urge, until that Justice which has been acknowledged to be due, shall have been rendered. I would particularly remind you of that of John A. Leamy of Philadelphia, the papers relative to which are in your possession.

It is probable that the formal recognition of the Republic of Colombia, will ensue at no distant day. In the mean time I have to request the transmission as frequently as you may find opportunities of all information of an interesting nature which you may be able to obtain.

You are authorized to draw upon this Department for the amount of half a year's salary in advance, to commence on the day of your leaving home to proceed to your destination. The necessary traveling expenses to Bogota, will be allowed you.

I am [etc.].

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 96. Manuel Torres, chargé d'affaires of Colombia to the United States: Presented credentials June 18, 1822, and served until June 10, 1823, at or about which time he died.

[2] See below, pt. VI., docs. 609 and 611.

[3] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 242.

99

Daniel Brent, Chief Clerk of the Department of State, to John M. Forbes, Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *February 19, 1822.*

. . . Upon a call from the House of Representatives respecting the state of things in the South American Governments, with a view to the propriety and expediency of a formal acknowledgment of them on our part, we are preparing a Report to the President, which will include extracts, not very voluminous, from some of your recent dispatches. We would send more but for the difficulty of making selections that might prove agreeable or safe to yourself. I know not how the cat jumps in relation to this great question; but am apt to believe that a discretionary power will be given to the President, to acknowledge, or not, according to his view of circumstances, the sovereignty and Independence of any or all of these Governments. That of Buenos Ayres has given a good moral Lesson to older and long established States, in the formal suppression of Privateering under its flag.

100

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to President James Monroe[2]

WASHINGTON, *March 7, 1822.*

The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 30th of January last, requesting the President of the United States to lay before that House such communications as might be in the possession of the Executive from the agents of the United States with the Governments south of the United States which have declared their independence, and the communications from the agents of such Governments in the United States with the Secretary of State as tend to show the political condition of their Governments, and the state of the war between them and Spain, as it might be consistent with the public interest to communicate, has the honor of submitting to the President the papers required by that resolution.

The communications from the agents of the United States are only those most recently received, and exhibiting their views of the actual condition of the several South American revolutionary Governments. No communication has yet been received from Mr. Prevost since his arrival at Lima.

[1] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 244.
[2] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 819.

There has been hitherto no agent of the United States in Mexico; but among the papers herewith submitted is a letter recently received from a citizen of the United States, who has been some years residing there, containing the best information in possession of the Government concerning the late revolution in that country, and specially of the character embraced by the resolution of the House.

101

President James Monroe to the United States House of Representatives, communicated March 8 and April 26, 1822 [1]

WASHINGTON, *March 8, 1822.*

TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES:

In transmitting to the House of Representatives the documents called for by the resolution of that House of the 30th January, I consider it my duty to invite the attention of Congress to a very important subject, and to communicate the sentiments of the Executive on it, that, should Congress entertain similar sentiments, there may be such co-operation between the two departments of the Government as their respective rights and duties may require.

The revolutionary movement in the Spanish provinces in this hemisphere attracted the attention and excited the sympathy of our fellow-citizens from its commencement. This feeling was natural and honorable to them, from causes which need not be communicated to you. It has been gratifying to all to see the general acquiescence which has been manifested in the policy which the constituted authorities have deemed it proper to pursue in regard to this contest. As soon as the movement assumed such a steady and consistent form as to make the success of the provinces probable, the rights to which they were entitled by the law of nations, as equal parties to a civil war, were extended to them. Each party was permitted to enter our ports with its public and private ships, and to take from them every article which was the subject of commerce with other nations. Our citizens, also, have carried on commerce with both parties, and the Government has protected it with each in articles not contraband of war. Through the whole of this contest the United States have remained neutral, and have fulfilled with the utmost impartiality all the obligations incident to that character.

This contest has now reached such a stage, and been attended with such decisive success on the part of the provinces, that it merits the most profound consideration whether their right to the rank of independent nations, with all the advantages incident to it in their intercourse with the United States,

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* V, 818.

is not complete. Buenos Ayres assumed that rank by a formal declaration in 1816, and has enjoyed it since 1810, free from invasion by the parent country. The provinces composing the republic of Colombia, after having separately declared their independence, were united by a fundamental law of the 17th of December, 1819. A strong Spanish force occupied at that time certain parts of the territory within their limits, and waged a destructive war; that force has since been repeatedly defeated, and the whole of it either made prisoners or destroyed, or expelled from the country, with the exception of an inconsiderable portion only, which is blockaded in two fortresses. The provinces on the Pacific have likewise been very successful. Chili declared independence in 1818, and has since enjoyed it undisturbed; and of late, by the assistance of Chili and Buenos Ayres, the revolution has extended to Peru. Of the movement in Mexico our information is less authentic, but it is, nevertheless, distinctly understood that the new Government has declared its independence, and that there is now no opposition to it there, nor a force to make any. For the last three years the Government of Spain has not sent a single corps of troops to any part of that country; nor is there any reason to believe it will send any in future. Thus, it is manifest that all those provinces are not only in the full enjoyment of their independence, but, considering the state of the war and other circumstances, that there is not the most remote prospect of their being deprived of it.

When the result of such a contest is manifestly settled, the new Governments have a claim to recognition by other Powers, which ought not to be resisted. Civil wars too often excite feelings which the parties cannot control. The opinion entertained by other Powers as to the result may assuage those feelings, and promote an accommodation between them useful and honorable to both. The delay which has been observed in making a decision on this important subject will, it is presumed, have afforded an unequivocal proof to Spain, as it must have done to other Powers, of the high respect entertained by the United States for her rights, and of their determination not to interfere with them. The provinces belonging to this hemisphere are our neighbors, and have, successively, as each portion of the country acquired its independence, pressed their recognition by an appeal to facts not to be contested, and which they thought gave them a just title to it. To motives of interest this Government has invariably disclaimed all pretension, being resolved to take no part in the controversy, or other measure in regard to it, which should not merit the sanction of the civilized world. To other claims a just sensibility has been always felt, and frankly acknowledged; but they, in themselves, could never become an adequate cause of action. It was incumbent on this Government to look to every important fact and circumstance on which a sound opinion could be formed, which has been done. When we regard, then, the great length of time which this war has been prosecuted, the complete success which has attended it in favor of the provinces,

the present condition of the parties, and the utter inability of Spain to produce any change in it, we are compelled to conclude that its fate is settled, and that the provinces which have declared their independence, and are in the enjoyment of it, ought to be recognised.

Of the views of the Spanish Government on this subject, no particular information has been recently received. It may be presumed that the successful progress of the revolution through such a long series of years, gaining strength, and extending annually in every direction, and embracing, by the late important events, with little exception, all the dominions of Spain south of the United States on this continent, placing thereby the complete sovereignty over the whole in the hands of the people, will reconcile the parent country to an accommodation with them on the basis of their unqualified independence. Nor has any authentic information been recently received of the disposition of other Powers respecting it. A sincere desire has been cherished to act in concert with them in the proposed recognition, of which several were some time past duly apprized; but it was understood that they were not prepared for it. The immense space between those Powers, even those which border on the Atlantic and these provinces, makes the movement an affair of less interest and excitement to them than to us. It is probable, therefore, that they have been less attentive to its progress than we have been. It may be presumed, however, that the late events will dispel all doubt of the result.

In proposing this measure, it is not contemplated to change thereby, in the slightest manner, our friendly relations with either of the parties, but to observe, in all respects, as heretofore, should the war be continued, the most perfect neutrality between them. Of this friendly disposition an assurance will be given to the Government of Spain, to whom, it is presumed, it will be, as it ought to be, satisfactory. The measure is proposed under a thorough conviction that it is in strict accord with the law of nations; that it is just and right as to the parties; and that the United States owe it to their station and character in the world, as well as to their essential interests, to adopt it. Should Congress concur in the view herein presented, they will doubtless see the propriety of making the necessary appropriations for carrying it into effect.

102

Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives, March 19, 1822 [1]

The Committee of Foreign Affairs, to whom were referred the message of the President concerning the recognition of the late Spanish provinces in

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 848.

America, and the documents therewith communicated, having examined the same with the most profound attention, unanimously report:

That the provinces of Buenos Ayres, after having, from the year 1810, proceeded in their revolutionary movements without any obstacle from the Government of Spain, formally declared their independence of that Government in 1816. After various intestine commotions and external collisions, those provinces now enjoy domestic tranquillity, and a good understanding with all their neighbors, and actually exercise, without opposition from within, or the fear of annoyance from without, all the attributes of sovereignty.

The provinces of Venezuela and New Granada, after having separately declared their independence, sustained, for a period of more than ten years, a desolating war against the armies of Spain, and having severally attained, by their triumph over those armies, the object for which they contended, united themselves, on the 19th of December, 1819, in one nation, under the title of "the Republic of Colombia."

The republic of Colombia has now a well-organized Government, instituted by the free will of its citizens, and exercise all the functions of sovereignty, fearless alike of internal and foreign enemies. The small remnant of the numerous armies commissioned to preserve the supremacy of the parent state is now blockaded in two fortresses, where it is innoxious, and where, deprived as it is of all hope of succor, it must soon surrender at discretion. When this event shall have occured, there will not remain a vestige of foreign power in all that immense republic, containing between three and four millions of inhabitants.

The province of Chili, since it declared its independence, in the year 1818, has been in the constant and unmolested enjoyment of the sovereignty which it then assumed.

The province of Peru, situated, like Chili, beyond the Andes, and bordering on the Pacific ocean, was for a long time deterred from making any effectual effort for independence, by the presence of an imposing military force, which Spain had kept up in that country. It was not, therefore, until the 12th of June of the last year that its capital, the city of Lima, capitulated to an army, chiefly composed of troops from Buenos Ayres and Chili, under the command of General San Martin. The greater part of the royal troops which escaped on that occasion retreated to the mountains, but soon left them to return to the coast, there to join the royal garrison in the fortress of Callao. The surrender of that fortress, soon after, to the Americans, may be regarded as the termination of the war in that quarter.

When the people of Peru found themselves, by this event, free to express their will, they most unequivocally expressed it in favor of independence, and with a unanimity and enthusiasm which have nowhere been excelled.

The revolution in Mexico has been somewhat different in its character and

progress from the revolutions in the other Spanish American provinces, and its result, in respect to the organization of its internal government, has also not been precisely the same. Independence, however, has been as emphatically declared and as practically established, since the 24th of August last, by the "Mexican empire," as ever it has been by the republics of the south; and her geographical situation, her population, and her resources, eminently qualify her to maintain the independence which she has thus declared, and now actually enjoys.

Such are the facts which have occupied the attention of your committee, and which, in their opinion, irresistibly prove that the nations of Mexico, Colombia, Buenos Ayres, Peru, and Chili, in Spanish America, are in fact independent.

It now remains for your committee to examine the right and the expediency, on the part of the United States, of recognising the independence which those nations have thus effectively achieved.

In this examination, it cannot be necessary to inquire into the right of the people of Spanish America "to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the earth that separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them." The right to change the political institutions of the state has, indeed, been exercised equally by Spain and by her colonies; and for us to deny to the people of Spanish America the right to independence on the principles which alone sanction it here, would be virtually to renounce our own.

The political right of this nation to acknowledge their independence, without offending others, does not depend on its justice, but on its actual establishment. To justify such a recognition by us, it is necessary only to show, as is already sufficiently shown, that the people of Spanish America are, within their respective limits, exclusively sovereign, and thus, in fact, independent. With them, as with every other Government possessing and exercising the power of making war, the United States, in common with all nations, have the right of concerting the terms of mutual peace and intercourse.

Who is the rightful sovereign of a country, is not an inquiry permitted to foreign nations, to whom it is competent only to treat with "the powers that be."

There is no difference of opinion on this point among the writers on public law; and no diversity, with respect to it, in the practice of civilized nations. It is not necessary here to cite authority for a doctrine familiar to all who have paid the slightest attention to the subject, nor to go back for its practical illustration to the civil wars between the houses of York and Lancaster. Long since the chiefs of those conflicting houses alternately triumphed and ruled, and were alternately obeyed at home and recognised abroad, according

as they successively exercised the power, without demonstrating the right; monarchies have become commonwealths or republics, and powerful usurpers have been recognised by foreign nations, in preference to legitimate and powerless pretenders. Modern history is replete with instances in point. Have we not, indeed, within the brief period of our own remembrance, beheld Governments vary their forms and change their rulers according to the prevailing power or passion of the moment, and doing so in virtue of the principle now in question, without materially and lastingly affecting their relations with other Governments? Have we not seen the emperors and kings of yesterday receive, on the thrones of exiled sovereigns who claimed the right to reign there, the friendly embassies of other Powers with whom those exiled sovereigns had sought an asylum? and have we not seen to-day those emperors and kings, thus courted and recognised yesterday, reft of their sceptres, and, from a mere change of circumstances, not of right, treated as usurpers by their successors, who, in their turn, have been acknowledged and caressed by the same foreign Powers?

The peace of the world and the independence of every member of the great political family require that each should be the exclusive judge of its own internal proceedings, and that the fact alone should be regarded by foreign nations. "Even when civil war breaks the bonds of society and of government, or at least suspends their force and effect, it gives birth in the nation to two independent parties, who regard each other as enemies, and acknowledge no common judge." It is of necessity, therefore, that these two parties should be considered by foreign states as two distinct and independent nations. To consider or treat them otherwise, would be to interfere in their domestic concerns, to deny them the right to manage their own affairs in their own way, and to violate the essential attributes of their respective sovereignty. For a nation to be entitled, in respect to foreign states, to the enjoyment of these attributes, "and to figure directly in the great political society, it is sufficient that it is really sovereign and independent; that is, that it governs itself by its own authority and laws." The people of Spanish America do notoriously so govern themselves, and the right of the United States to recognise the Governments which they have instituted is incontestable. A doubt of the expediency of such a recognition can be suggested only by the apprehension that it may injuriously affect our peaceful and friendly relations with the nations of the other hemisphere.

Can such an apprehension be well founded?

Have not all those nations practically sanctioned, within the last thirty years, the very principle on which we now propose to act; or have they ever complained of one another, or of us, for acting on that principle?

No nation of Europe, excepting Spain herself, has hitherto opposed force to the independence of Spanish America. Some of those nations have not only constantly maintained commercial and friendly intercourse with them

in every stage of the revolution, but indirectly and efficiently, though not avowedly, aided them in the prosecution of their great object. To these the acknowledgment by the United States of the attainment of that object must be satisfactory.

To the other nations of Europe, who have regarded the events occurring in Spanish America not only without interference, but with apparent indifference, such an acknowledgment ought not to be offensive.

The nations who have thus respectively favored or never opposed the Spanish American people during their active struggle for independence cannot, it is believed, regard with dissatisfaction the formal recognition of that independence by a nation which, while that struggle lasted, has religiously observed towards both the conflicting parties all the duties of neutrality. Your committee are, therefore, of opinion that we have a right on this occasion confidently to expect, from what these nations have done or forborne to do, during the various fortunes of the civil war which has terminated, that they will frankly approve the course of policy which the United States may now think proper to adopt in relation to the successful party in that war. It surely cannot be reasonably apprehended that nations, who have thus been the tranquil spectators, the apparent well-wishers, if not the efficient supporters of this party, and who have not made the faintest attempt to arrest its progress, or to prevent its success, should be displeased with a third Power for merely recognising the Governments which, owing to that success, have thus been virtually permitted, or impliedly approved, in acquiring the undisputed and exclusive control of the countries in which they are established. It is, therefore, on the consistency as well as on the justice of these nations of Europe that we may confidently reply that the simple recognition, on the part of the United States, of the necessary effect of what has already been done will not be considered as a just cause of complaint against them, while the interested and immediate agents who have been directly and actively engaged in producing that effect have neither been opposed nor censured.

Your committee, therefore, instead of seriously apprehending that the recognition by the United States of the independence of Spanish America will be unacceptable to these nations, are not without hope that they may practically approve it, by severally adopting a similar measure. It is not, indeed, unreasonable to suppose that those Governments have, like this, waited only for the evidence of facts which might not only suffice to justify them, under the laws and usages of nations, but to satisfy Spain herself that nothing has been prematurely done, or which could justly offend her feelings, or be considered as inconsistent with her rights. As their motives for not having hitherto recognised the independence of Spanish America may thus be supposed to have been analogous to our own, it is permitted to presume that the facts and reasons which have prevailed on us no longer to hesitate

will, confirmed as they are by our example, have a like influence on them.

No nation can entertain a more sincere deference for the feelings of Spain, or take a more lively interest in her welfare, than the United States. It is to this deference, too evident to be doubted or misunderstood, that ought to be ascribed the hesitation of this Government, until now, to yield to the claims of Spanish America, although these claims were in perfect accordance with our own principles, feelings, and interests. Having thus forborne to act, even at the hazard of having those principles and feelings misunderstood on this side of the Atlantic, we have, as your committee believe, given at once satisfactory proof of our disinterestedness and moderation, and of our scrupulous respect to the principle which leaves the political institutions of every foreign state to be directed by its own view of its own rights and interests.

Your committee have been particularly anxious to show, in a manner satisfactory to Spain herself, that the measure which this Government now proposes to adopt has been considered with the most respectful attention, both in relation to her rights and to her feelings.

It is not on the laws and usages of nations, or on the practice of Spain herself, on like occasions, that your committee have relied for our justification towards her.

The fact that for the last three years she has not sent a single company of troops against her transatlantic colonies has not been used as evidence of their actual independence, or of her want of power to oppose it. This fact, explained as it is by the public acts of Spain herself, is regarded by your committee as evidence only of her policy.

The last troops collected at Cadiz in 1819, which were destined to suppress the revolutionary movements in Spanish America, not only rejected that service, but joined in the revolution which has since proved successful in Spain herself. The declaration of the leaders in that revolution was, that "Spanish America had a right to be free, and that Spain should be free." Although the constitution which was re-established by that revolution guarantied the integrity of the Spanish dominions, yet the principles on which that constitution was founded seem to discountenance the employment of force for the accomplishment of that object, in contempt of the equal rights and declared will of the American portion of the Spanish people. The conduct of the Government organized under that constitution has uniformly been, in this respect, in conformity to those principles. Since its existence, there has not been even a proposal by that Government to employ force for the subjugation of the American provinces, but merely *recommendations of conciliatory measures for their pacification.*

The answer of the Cortes, on the 10th of July, 1820, to the address of the King, furnishes conclusive proof of this policy.

"The intimate union," says this answer, "of the Cortes with your Majesty, the re-establishment of the constitution, the faithful performance of promises, depriving malevolence of all pretext, will facilitate the *pacification* of the ultramarine provinces, which are in a state of agitation and dissension. The Cortes, on its part, will omit no opportunity to propose and adopt measures necessary for the *observance of the constitution and restoration of tranquillity in those countries, to the end that the Spains of both worlds may thus form a single and happy family.*"

Although the ultramarine provinces are not here encouraged to expect absolute independence, yet they are no longer treated as vassal colonies, or threatened with subjugation, but are actually recognised as brothers in the great constitutional and free family of Spain.

A report made to the Cortes on the 24th of June, 1821, by a committee appointed by that body, not only manifestly corroborates the policy above stated, but sufficiently intimates that the recognition of the independence of Spanish America by Spain herself had nearly been the measure recommended by that committee.

That report avers that "*tranquillity is not sufficient*, even if it should extend throughout America with a prospect of permanency: no! *it falls short of the wishes of the friends of humanity.*"

In speaking of the measure demanded by the crisis, it says that this measure was not only *warmly approved* by the committee, but *at first entirely assented to by the ministers*, with whom it had been discussed, and failed only to be proposed to the Cortes "*by these ministers having, on account of peculiar occurrences, suspended their judgment.*" It speaks of this measure as indicative of a new and glorious resolution; that it was demanded by America and the true interests of the Peninsula; that from it Spain might reap advantages which otherwise she could never expect; and that the *ties of kindred* and the uniformity of religion, with *commercial relations*, and those emanating from *free institutions*, would be the *surest pledge* of mutual harmony and close union.

Your committee do not feel themselves authorized to say positively what that measure was, but they do not hesitate to declare their entire conviction that no measure short of a full recognition of unconditional independence could have deserved the character, nor been capable of producing the effects ascribed to it.

It is, therefore, sufficiently manifest that Spain, far from wishing to call into action her means of prosecuting hostilities against the people of Spanish America, has *renounced even the feelings of an enemy towards* them, and, but for "peculiar occurrences," had been prepared, nearly a year ago, to consent to their independence.

She has not only practically discontinued, and even emphatically deprecated, the employment of force to restore tranquillity to Spanish America,

but she has declared that even universal and permanent tranquillity there "falls short of the wishes of the friends of humanity."

While she appeals to "the ties of kindred," she undoubtedly feels them; and if she has not abandoned her desire, so often avowed, of mere constitutional union and equal commercial intercourse with her former colonies, as *between provinces of the same empire*—a union and an intercourse which intervening Andes and oceans seem to render highly inconvenient, if not utterly impracticable—she evidently refers the accomplishment of this desire to the unawed deliberations and to the congenial and kindred feelings of the people of those colonies, and thus substantially acknowledges their independence.

Whatever may be the policy of Spain, however, in respect to her former American colonies, our recognition of their independence can neither affect her rights, nor impair her means, in the accomplishment of that policy. We cannot, for this, be justly accused of aiding in the attainment of an independence which has already been established without our assistance. Besides, our recognition must necessarily be co-existent only with the fact on which it is founded, and cannot survive it. While the nations of Spanish America are actually independent, it is simply to speak the truth to acknowledge them to be so.

Should Spain, contrary to her avowed principles and acknowledged interests, renew the war for the conquest of South America, we shall indeed regret it, but we shall observe, as we have done, between the independent parties, an honest and impartial neutrality; but, on the other hand, should Spain, faithful to her own glory and prosperity, consent that her offspring in the new world should enjoy the right of self-government equally with their brethren in the old, we shall sincerely rejoice; and we shall cherish with equal satisfaction, and cultivate with equal assiduity, the friendship of regenerated Spain and of emancipated America.

Your committee, in justice to their own feelings and to the feelings of their fellow-citizens, have made this declaration without disguise; and they trust that the uniform character and conduct of this people will save it from all liability to misinterpretation.

Happy in our own institutions, we claim no privilege; we indulge no ambition to extend them to other nations; we admit the equal rights of all nations to form their own governments and to administer their own internal affairs as they may judge proper; and, however they may, in these respects, differ from us, we do not on that account regard with the less satisfaction their tranquillity and happiness.

Your committee having thus considered the subject referred to them in all its aspects, are unanimously of opinion that is is *just and expedient* to acknowledge the independence of the several nations of Spanish America, without any reference to the diversity in the forms of their governments;

and, in accordance with this opinion, they respectfully submit the following resolutions:

Resolved, That the House of Representatives concur in the opinion expressed by the President in his message of the 8th of March, 1822, that the American provinces of Spain which have declared their independence, and are in the enjoyment of it, ought to be recognised by the United States as independent nations.

Resolved, That the Committee of Ways and Means be instructed to report a bill appropriating a sum not exceeding one hundred thousand dollars, to enable the President of the United States to give due effect to such recognition.

103

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Joaquin de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the United States [1]

WASHINGTON, *April 6, 1822.*

SIR: Your Letter of the 9th of March [2] was, immediately after I had the honour of receiving it, laid before the President of the United States, by whom it has been deliberately considered, and by whose direction I am, in replying to it, to assure you of the earnestness and sincerity with which this Government desires to entertain and to cultivate the most friendly relations with that of Spain.

This disposition has been manifested, not only by the uniform course of the United States, in their direct political and commercial intercourse with Spain, but by the friendly interest which they have felt in the welfare of the Spanish Nation, and by the cordial sympathy with which they have witnessed their spirit and energy, exerted in maintaining their Independence of all foreign controul, and their right of self-government.

In every question relating to the Independence of a Nation, two principles are involved; one of *right*, and the other of *fact*; the former exclusively depending upon the determination of the Nation itself, and the latter resulting from the successful execution of that determination—This right has been recently exercised as well by the Spanish Nation in Europe, as by several of those Countries in the American Hemisphere, which had for two or three Centuries been connected as Colonies with Spain—In the conflicts which have attended these Revolutions, the United States, have carefully abstained from taking any part, respecting the right of the nations concerned in them to maintain or now organize their own political Constitutions, and

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 53. Joaquin de Anduaga, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Spain in the United States: Presented credentials, October 31, 1821. Gave notice of intended departure, March 15, 1823.

[2] See below, pt. XIII, doc. 1105.

observing wherever it was a contest by arms, the most impartial neutrality—But the civil war, in which Spain was for some years involved with the inhabitants of her Colonies in America, has in substance, ceased to exist—Treaties equivalent to an acknowledgement of Independence, have been concluded by the Commanders and Viceroys of Spain herself, with the Republic of Colombia, with Mexico, and with Peru; while in the Provinces of La Plata, and in Chili, no Spanish force has for several years existed, to dispute the independence, which the Inhabitants of those Countries had declared.

Under these circumstances, the Government of the United States, far from consulting the dictates of a policy, questionable in its morality yielded to an obligation of duty of the highest order, by recognizing as Independent States, Nations which, after deliberately asserting their right to that character, have maintained and established it against all the resistance which had been or could be brought to oppose it. This recognition is neither intended to invalidate any right of Spain, nor to affect the employment of any means, which she may yet be disposed or enabled to use, with the view of re-uniting those Provinces to the rest of her dominions—It is the mere acknowledgement of existing facts, with the view to the regular establishment, with the Nations newly formed, of those relations, political and commercial, which it is the moral obligation of civilized and Christian Nations to entertain reciprocally with one another.

It will not be necessary to discuss with you a detail of facts, upon which your information appears to be materially different, from that which has been communicated to this Government, and is of public notoriety; nor the propriety of the denominations which you have attributed to the Inhabitants of the South American Provinces—It is not doubted that other and more correct views of the whole subject will very shortly be taken by your Government, and that it will, as well as the other European Governments, shew that deference to the example of the United States, which you urge it as the duty or the policy of the United States, to shew to theirs—The effect of the example of one Independent Nation upon the counsels and measures of another, can be just, only so far as it is voluntary: and as the United States desire that their example should be followed, so it is their intention to follow that of others, upon no other principle—They confidently reply that the time is at hand, when all the Governments of Europe friendly to Spain, and Spain herself, will not only concur in the acknowledgement of the Independence of the American Nations, but in the sentiment, that nothing will tend more effectually to the welfare and happiness of Spain, than the universal concurrence in that recognition.

I pray you, Sir, to accept [etc.]

104

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to President James Monroe[1]

WASHINGTON, *April 25, 1822.*

The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred a resolution of the Senate of this day, requesting the President to communicate to the Senate any information he may have, proper to be disclosed, from our minister at Madrid, or from the Spanish minister resident in this country, concerning the views of Spain relative to the recognition of the independence of the South American colonies, and of the dictamen of the Spanish Cortes, has the honor to submit to the President copies of the papers particularly referred to.

105

President James Monroe to the United States Senate[1]

WASHINGTON, *April 26, 1822.*

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I transmit to the Senate, agreeably to their resolution of yesterday, a report from the Secretary of State,[2] with copies of the papers requested by that resolution, in relation to the recognition of the South American provinces.

106

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain[3]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *May 13, 1822.*

Among the Congressional Documents which you will receive, there are two relating to subjects of interest to the general affairs of Europe, and which it is presumed will meet attention, from their bearing on the policy of the principal European Powers. I refer to the message[4] from the President to Congress, recognizing the Independence of the South American States, with the proceedings of Congress consequent thereon, and the Correspond-

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 845.
[2] See above, doc. 104.
[3] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, IX, 119.
[4] See above, doc. 101, under date March 8, 1822.

ence[1] between this Department and the Spanish Minister Don Joaquin d'Anduaga relating to it; . . .

The recognition Message, and the proceedings almost unanimous of both Houses of Congress on the Bill making appropriations for five Diplomatic Missions to the South, are strong and clear indications of the disposition of the Public mind in this Country. Of the view, which will be taken of this measure as well by Spain, as by the preponderating Powers of the European Alliance, we are yet to be informed. We trust it will not be considered even by the British Cabinet a Rash or Hasty measure at this time. Should the subject be mentioned to you by the Marquess of Londonderry, you will remark that it was not understood or intended as a change of policy on the part of the United States, nor adopted with any design of turning it to the account of our own Interests. Possibly no one of the proposed Diplomatic Missions may be actually sent before the next Session of Congress. The neutrality of the United States towards the parties, so far as neutrality can be said to exist where there is scarcely any War, will be continued. The relations of the United States with both parties will remain the same, with the only exception of an interchange of official, instead of informal political and commercial Agents.

Upon both the subjects above mentioned, it will be acceptable to learn in what light they are considered by the British Government.

107

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to David C. de Forest of New Haven, Connecticut[2]

WASHINGTON, *May 23, 1822.*

SIR: Having submitted to the consideration of the President of the United States, your letter of ——— ulto, I am directed by him to inform you

That, in the recognition of the independence of the several Governments of South America, it is not his intention, by discriminating between them, with regard to time, to admit any claim to prior recognition, in favor of any one over the other.

That the letter heretofore produced by you as a voucher of your appointment as Consul General from the United Provinces of La Plata, having been issued by a government which no longer exists, cannot be received as conferring upon you that office from a federation, neither in its component parts, nor in its existing political institutions, nor in its ruling administration, the same.

[1] See above, doc. 103, Adams to Anduaga, April 6, 1822.
[2] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 104.

That the above mentioned letter appears upon its face, to have been issued in conformity to certain articles of agreement in the form of a commercial treaty which had never been authorized by the Government of the United States, and have always been held by them, null and void.

That even if, under all these changes, the present government of Buenos Ayres, could be considered as the same, with that, under the authority of which the letter produced by you, was issued, the confirmation of your commission by the present ruling Administration, would be indispensable to your obtaining an Exequatur under it; authentic information having been received at this Department of the intention of the present authorities of Buenos Ayres, to revoke it.

That, with regard to your claim to be received in the character of Chargé d'Affaires from that country the President does not think proper to receive, as invested with the privileges peculiar to the diplomatic Agents of foreign Powers, any person being a native citizen of the United States, and domiciliated in them.

I am [etc.].

108

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Manuel Torres (Philadelphia), Colombian Agent in the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *May 23, 1822.*

SIR: I have the honor of informing you, by direction of the President of the United States, that he will receive you in the character of Chargé d'Affaires from the Republic of Colombia, whenever it may suit your convenience, and be compatible with the state of your health to repair to this place for that purpose.

I am [etc.].

109

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Colonel Charles S. Todd (Norfolk), Confidential Agent of the United States to Colombia[2]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *July 2, 1822.*

SIR: It is the President's desire that you should proceed immediately to the Seat of Government of the Republic of Colombia. Under the authority heretofore given you, you will communicate with the Minister of foreign

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 104.
[2] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 260.

affairs of that Republic, and inform him that Mr. Manuel Torres has been received by the President in the character of its Chargé d'affaires. That with regard to the diplomatic intercourse between the two Countries, the President's wish is to place it on the footing most agreeable to the Republic of Colombia itself. Mr. Torres has suggested to me his belief that a Minister Plenipotentiary will shortly be appointed by the Colombian Government to the United States, and that he will be authorized to negotiate a Treaty of Amity and Commerce founded upon principles of entire reciprocity. He has been informed that the Minister will be received with pleasure and every proposition of negotiation with the most attentive and friendly consideration. And you will make known to the Colombian Government that a Minister of equal rank will be sent from the United States, in the event of the arrival of a Minister from that Republic here. You will add that the rank of Chargé d'affaires corresponding with that of Mr. Torres here would be given you, but that it would require the sanction of the Senate, who are not in session.

Should a Minister Plenipotentiary be appointed at any time before the next Session of the Senate, or then, you will be nominated as the Secretary to the Legation.

110

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Pedro Gual, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia[1]

WASHINGTON, *July 2, 1822.*

SIR: Colonel Charles S. Todd, the bearer of this letter, will communicate to you the documents which exhibit the recognition by the Government of the United States, of the independence of the Republic of Colombia, and their disposition to enter into those relations of friendly intercourse, political and commercial, with that Republic, which are customary between independent Nations. With this view, Don Manuel Torres has been received by the President of the United States, in the capacity of Chargé d'Affaires, with which he has been clothed by the Government of the Republic of Colombia. And I am directed by the President of the United States to inform you that a person with diplomatic character will be appointed at an early day, to reside, on the part of the United States, at the seat of your government. Colo. Todd will, in the mean time, have the honor of communicating further with you on this subject; and I pray you to give credit, as heretofore, to whatever he shall represent to you on the part of this government.

Be pleased, Sir, to accept [etc.].

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 105.

111

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain[1]

WASHINGTON, *July 24, 1822.*

SIR: Mr Manuel Torres, late Chargé d'Affaires from the Republic of Colombia, wrote me a few days before his decease, a Letter, requesting me to recommend to your kind attentions Mr. Ravenga, now the Representative of the Colombian Government in England. I take a melancholy satisfaction in complying with this request, not only with the view to fulfil the last wishes of a man of the most amiable and respectable character, but as it is altogether conformable to the wishes of the President, who will be gratified, should it be in your power to promote, by any suitable service, the views of Mr. Ravenga, and of his Government; particularly in obtaining that entire and unreserved acknowledgement of the independence of his Nation, which the United States have believed to be justly due to them, and of which they have been the first to set the example. You will of course understand that any step of this nature to be taken by you, will be deliberately weighed, and adapted in its time and circumstances, as well to the delicacy due to Spain, as to that which it is proper to observe towards the British Government.

I am [etc.].

112

Message of President James Monroe at the commencement of the second session of the Seventeenth Congress of the United States, communicated to the Senate, December 3, 1822[2]

[EXTRACT]

A strong hope was entertained that peace would, ere this, have been concluded between Spain and the independent Governments south of the United States in this hemisphere. Long experience having evinced the competency of those Governments to maintain the independence which they had declared, it was presumed that the considerations which induced their recognition by the United States would have had equal weight with other powers, and that Spain herself, yielding to those magnanimous feelings of which her history furnishes so many examples, would have terminated, on that basis, a controversy so unavailing and at the same time so destructive. We still cherish the hope that this result will not long be postponed.

Sustaining our neutral position, and allowing to each party, while the war

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, IX, 137.
[2] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 144.

continues, equal rights, it is incumbent on the United States to claim of each, with equal rigor, the faithful observance of our rights according to the well-known law of nations. From each, therefore, a like co-operation is expected in the suppression of the piratical practice which has grown out of this war, and of blockades of extensive coasts on both seas, which, considering the small force employed to sustain them, have not the slightest foundation to rest on.

113

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to John Forsyth, United States Minister to Spain[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *January 3, 1823.*

Besides the correspondence with Mr. Anduaga, copies of which are herewith transmitted, I have received several very long and earnest communications from that minister, the replies to which have been and yet are delayed, in the hope that they may be received by him in a disposition more calm and temperate than that which is manifested by his notes. He appears to think it material to the interest of his Government to maintain the attitude of loud complaint in regard to transactions with respect to which the primary cause of complaint is on our side. The only exception to this remark relates to a miserable attempt at an expedition against the island of Porto Rico, headed by a foreign officer named Decoudray de Holstein, but on board of which were some misguided citizens of the United States. One of the vessels appears to have been fitted out at Philadelphia and one at New York, but the first intimation of these facts, received by this Government, was long after they had sailed, and from the island of St. Bartholomew's.

We have since learned that the masters of the vessels were deceived with regard to their destination; and that when it was discovered by them they positively refused to proceed upon it, and insisted upon going into the island of Curaçoa, where the chief and others of the expedition were arrested. You will make this known to the Spanish Government, and assure them that this Government knew nothing of this expedition before the departure of the vessels from the United States. This will not be surprising when it is known that it escaped equally the vigilance of Mr. Anduaga himself, who divides his residence between New York and Philadelphia, and of all the other Spanish official agents and consuls at those places.

Mr. Anduaga has taken this occasion to renew, with much sensibility, all his own complaints and those of his predecessors against armaments in our

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* V, 378.

ports in behalf of the South American patriots, and even against that commerce which our citizens, in common with the subjects of all the maritime nations of Europe, have for many years maintained with the people of the emancipated colonies. These complaints have been so fully and repeatedly answered that there is some difficulty in accounting for Mr. Anduaga's recurrence to them with the feelings which mark his notes concerning them. Should the occasion present itself, you will give it distinctly to be understood, that, if some of those notes remain long, and may even finally remain unanswered, it is from a principle of forbearance to him and of unequivocal good will towards his Government and his country.

I am [etc.].

114

President James Monroe to the United States Senate, communicated to the Senate in executive session, February 26, 1823,[1] and the injunction of secrecy since removed

WASHINGTON, *February 25, 1823.*

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

By a resolution of the 27th of December last the President of the United States was requested to communicate to the Senate such information as he might possess respecting the political state of the island of St. Domingo; whether the government thereof was claimed by any European nation; what our commercial relations with the Government of the island were, and whether any further commercial relations with that Government would be consistent with the interest and safety of the United States.

From the import of the resolution it is inferred that the Senate was fully aware of the delicate and interesting nature of the subject embraced by it in all its branches. The call supposes something peculiar in the nature of the Government of that island, and in the character of its population, to which attention is due. Impressed always with an anxious desire to meet every call of either House for information, I most willingly comply in this instance, and with a view to the particular circumstances alluded to.

In adverting to the political state of St. Domingo, I have to observe that the whole island is now united under one Government, under a constitution which retains the sovereignty in the hands of the people of color, and with provisions which prohibit the employment in the Government of all white persons who have emigrated there since 1816, or who may hereafter emigrate there, and which prohibit also the acquisition by such persons of the right of citizenship or to real estate in the island. In the exercise of this sovereignty

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* V, 240.

the Government has not been molested by any European power. No invasion of the island has been made or attempted by any power. It is, however, understood that the relations between the Government of France and the island have not been adjusted; that its independence has not been recognized by France, nor has peace been formally established between the parties.

The establishment of a Government of people of color in the island, on the principles above stated, evinces distinctly the idea of a separate interest and a distrust of other nations. Had that jealousy been confined to the inhabitants of the parent country it would have been less an object of attention; but by extending it to the inhabitants of other countries, with whom no difference ever existed, the policy assumes a character which does not admit of a like explanation. To what extent that spirit may be indulged or to what purpose applied our experience has yet been too limited to enable us to form a just estimate. These are inquiries more peculiarly interesting to the neighboring islands. They nevertheless deserve the attention of the United States.

Between the United States and this island a commercial intercourse exists, and it will continue to be the object of this Government to promote it. Our commerce there has been subjected to higher duties than have been imposed on like articles from some other nations. It has, nevertheless, been extensive, proceeding from the wants of the respective parties and the enterprise of our citizens. Of this discrimination to our injury we had a right to complain and have complained. It is expected that our commercial intercourse with the island will be placed on the footing of the most favored nation. No preference is sought in our favor, nor ought any to be given to others. Regarding the high interest of our happy Union, and looking to every circumstance which may, by any possibility, affect the tranquillity of any part, however remotely, and guarding against such injury by suitable precautions, it is the duty of this Government to promote, by all the means in its power and by a fair and honorable policy, the best interest of every other part and thereby of the whole. Feeling profoundly the force of this obligation, I shall continue to exert, with unwearied zeal, my best faculties to give it effect.

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John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Robert K. Lowry, appointed United States Consul at La Guayra [1]

WASHINGTON, *April 11, 1823.*

SIR: It gives me very great pleasure to be able to transmit to you the Secretary's letter, enclosing your Commission, as Consul of the United

[1] MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 277.

States at La Guayra. Circumstances, connected with the unsettled state of things in Colombia, and the determination of the President to give as few formal Commissions as possible, till the complete recognition by the United States of the South American Governments should be given, have been the main obstacles to your getting such a Document as is now transmitted, a long time ago.

I am [etc.].

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General instructions from John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Hugh Nelson, United States Minister to Spain[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *April 28, 1823.*

The critical and convulsed condition of Spain may indeed bring forth many incidents now unforeseen, and upon which the President relies upon your own judgement for the course which, under them, you will find it prudent to pursue. But with regard to the ordinary relations between the two countries there are various objects upon which I now proceed to request your attention.

The renewal of the war in Venezuela has been signalized on the part of the Spanish commanders by proclamations of blockade unwarranted by the laws of nations, and by decrees regardless of those of humanity. With no other naval force than a single frigate, a brig, and a schooner, employed in transporting supplies from Curaçoa to Porto Cabello, they have presumed to declare a blockade of more than twelve hundred miles of coast. To this outrage upon all the rights of neutrality they have added the absurd pretension of interdicting the peaceable commerce of other nations with *all* the ports of the Spanish Main, upon the pretence that it had heretofore been forbidden by the Spanish colonial laws; and on the strength of these two inadmissible principles they have issued commissions, at Porto Cabello and in the island of Porto Rico, to a swarm of privateers, which have committed extensive and ruinous depredations upon the lawful commerce of the United States as well as upon that of other nations, and particularly of Great Britain.

It was impossible that neutral nations should submit to such a system; the execution of which has been as strongly marked with violence and cruelty as was its origin with injustice. Repeated remonstrances against it have been made to the Spanish Government, and it became necessary to give the protection of our naval force to the commerce of the United States exposed to these depredations.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 408.

By the act of Congress, of March 3, 1819, "to protect the commerce of the United States and punish the crime of piracy," the President was authorized to instruct the commanders of the public armed vessels of the United States to *take* any armed vessel "which shall have attempted or committed any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure upon any vessel of the United States, or of the citizens thereof, *or upon any other vessel;* and, also, to retake any vessel of the United States, or its citizens, which may have been *unlawfully* captured upon the high seas."

A copy of this act and of the instructions from the Navy Department to the officers who have been charged with the execution of it are herewith furnished you. The instructions will enable you to show how cautiously this Government, while affording the protection due to the lawful commerce of the nation, has guarded against the infringement of the rights of all others.

The privateers from Porto Rico and Porto Cabello have been, by their conduct, distinguishable from pirates only by commissions of most equivocal character, from Spanish officers, whose authority to issue them has never been shown; and they have committed outrages and depredations which no commission could divest of the piratical character. During the same period swarms of pirates and of piratical vessels, without pretence or color of commission, have issued from the island of Cuba and the immediate neighborhood of the Havana, differing so little in the composition of their crews and their conduct from the privateers of Porto Cabello and Porto Rico as to leave little distinction other than that of being *disavowed* between them. These piracies have now been for years continued, under the immediate observation of the Government of the island of Cuba, which, as well as the Spanish Government, has been repeatedly and ineffectually required to suppress them. Many of them have been committed by boats within the very harbors and close upon the shores of the island. When pursued by superior force the pirates have escaped to the shores; and twelve months have elapsed since the late Captain General Mahy refused to Captain Biddle the permission to land even upon the desert and uninhabited parts of the island where they should seek refuge from his pursuit. Governor Mahy at the same time declared that *he had* taken the necessary measures to defend his territorial jurisdiction and for the apprehension of every description of outlaws.

Governor Mahy is since deceased; but neither the measures which he had then taken nor any since adopted by the Government of the island have proved effectual to suppress or in any manner even to restrain the pirates. From the most respectable testimony we are informed that these atrocious robberies are committed by persons well known, and that the traffic in their plunder is carried on with the utmost notoriety. They are

sometimes committed by vessels equipped as merchant vessels, and which clear out as such from the Havana. It has also been remarked that they cautiously avoid molesting Spanish vessels, but attack without discrimination the defenceless vessels of all other nations. You will see by a letter from Lieutenant Gregory to the Secretary of the Navy (p. 64 of the printed documents) that a large portion of the crews of the Porto Rico privateers consist of these same pirates from Cuba.

In November last, a gallant officer of the Navy, Lieutenant Allen, lost his life in a conflict with some of these pirates; and an armament was immediately afterwards fitted out, and is now on the spot under the command of Commodore Porter, for the defence and protection of our commerce against them. Notice was despatched of this movement to Mr. Forsyth, by a special messenger, in January last, with instructions to him to require of the Spanish Government the permission to land in case of necessity in pursuit of the robbers. Copies of the instructions from the Secretary of the Navy are herewith furnished. From this statement of facts it is apparent that the naval officers of the United States who have been instructed to protect our commerce in that quarter have been brought in conflict with two descriptions of *unlawful* captors of our merchant vessels, the acknowledged and disavowed pirates of Cuba, and the ostensibly commissioned privateers from Porto Rico and Porto Cabello; and that in both cases the actual depredators have been of the same class of Spanish subjects and often probably the same persons. The consequence has been that several of the commissioned privateers have been taken by our cruisers; and that in one instance a merchant vessel, belonging to the Havana, but charged upon oath of two persons as having been the vessel from which a vessel of the United States had been robbed, has been brought into port and is now at Norfolk to be tried at the next session of the District Court of the United States. In all these cases the Spanish minister, Anduaga, has addressed to this Department complaints and remonstrances in language so exceptionable that it precluded the possibility of an amicable discussion of the subject with *him*. In some of the cases explanations have been transmitted to Mr. Forsyth to be given in a spirit of amity and conciliation to the Spanish Government. But as your mission affords a favorable opportunity for a full and candid exposition of them all, copies of the correspondence with Mr. Anduaga, relating to them, are annexed to these instructions, to which I add upon each case of complaint the following remarks:

1. The first is the case of a man named Escandell, prize master of a Dutch vessel called the Neptune, taken by a privateer, armed in Porto Cabello, called the Virgin del Carmen, and retaken by the United States armed brig Spark, then commanded by Captain John H. Elton, since deceased. From the report of Captain Elton it appears: 1st. That the Dutch vessel had been taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Dutch island of Curaçoa.

2d. That he, Captain Elton, delivered her up to the Governor of the island of Aruba. 3d. That he retook her as a vessel piratically captured; the prize master, Escandell, having produced to him no papers whatsoever. He therefore brought him and the prize crew to Charleston, South Carolina, where they were prosecuted as pirates.

Mr. Anduaga's first letter to me on this case was dated the 24th of July, 1822,[1] inclosing a copy of a letter from Escandell to the Spanish vice consul at Charleston, invoking his protection; Escandell being then in prison, and under indictment for piracy. He solicits the interposition of the vice consul, that he may obtain, from the Captain General of the Havana and the commanding officer at Porto Cabello, documents to prove that he was lawfully commissioned; and he alleges that the captain of the privateer had furnished him with a *document* to carry the prize into Porto Cabello; that he did deliver this document to Captain Elton, who *concealed* it from the court at Charleston; that Elton and his officers well knew that he, Escandell, was commissioned by the King of Spain, and had assisted at the disembarking of General la Torre with the privateer and the prize, but that Elton had withheld his knowledge of these facts from the grand jury. Mr. Anduaga's letter to me noticed this contradiction between the statement of Captain Elton and the declaration of Escandell, and requested that the trial at Charleston might be postponed till he could receive answers from the Captain General of the Havana and the commandant of Porto Cabello, to whom he had written to obtain the documents necessary to prove the legality of the capture. This was accordingly done.

This letter of Mr. Anduaga was unexceptionable in its purport; but, on the 17th of October,[1] he addressed me a second, inclosing the papers which he had received from Porto Cabello, and assuming a style of vituperation not only against Captain Elton, then very recently dead, but against the Navy in general, the Government, and even the people of the United States, which required the exertion of some forbearance to avoid sending it back to him as unsuitable to be received at this Department from a foreign minister.

It was the more unwarrantable, because, while assuming, as proved, against an officer of the United States, no longer living to justify himself, that he had *concealed* documents furnished him by Escandell, he declares it "evident that not the public service but avarice, and the atrocious desire of sacrificing upon a gibbet the lives of some innocent citizens of a friendly power, were the moving principles of this commander's conduct." To those who personally knew Captain Elton, what language could reply in terms of indignation adequate to the unworthiness of this charge? And how shall I now express a suitable sense of it, when I say that it was advanced without a shadow of proof, upon the mere original assertion of Escandell, made in the most suspicious manner, and which the very documents from Porto Cabello tended rather to disprove than to sustain.

[1] Not printed in this collection.

It was made, I say, in the most suspicious manner; for, in his affidavit before the clerk of the United States court at Charleston, made on the 8th of June, 1822, where he might have been confronted by Captain Elton and the officers of the Spark, Escandell had not even hinted at this concealment of his papers by Captain Elton, or pretended that he had produced any to him. But *after* he had been arraigned upon the indictment, and after the court had, at the motion of his counsel, postponed his trial to the next term, for the express purpose of giving him time to obtain proof that he had been commissioned, in a secret letter to Castro, the owner of the privateer, at Porto Cabello, and in another to the Spanish vice consul at Charleston, he makes these scandalous allegations against Captain Elton at times and places where he could not be present to refute them. That the documents from Porto Cabello, transmitted to Mr. Anduaga, tended rather to disprove than to sustain them, you will perceive by an examination of the translations of them herewith furnished you. The only documents among them showing the authority under which Escandell, when captured by Captain Elton, had possession of the Neptune, is a copy of the commission of the privateer Virgin del Carmen, which had taken the Neptune, and a declaration by the captain of the privateer, Lorenzo Puyol, that, on capturing the Neptune, he had put Escandell, as prize master, and six men, on board of her, ordering her into the port of Cabello, and furnishing Escandell *with the documents necessary for his voyage.* No copy of these documents is produced; and the declaration of this Captain Puyol himself is signed only with a cross, he not knowing how to write his name.

It is conceived that the only admissible evidence of Escandell's regular authority as prize master of a captured vessel would have been an authenticated copy of the document itself, furnished him by Puyol. The extreme ignorance of this man, who appears, on the face of his own declaration, unable to write his own name, raises more than a presumption that he knew as little what could be a regular document for a prize master, and is by no means calculated to give confidence to his declaration as a substitute for the authentic copy of the document itself. The absurdity of the imputation of avaricious motives to Captain Elton is demonstrated by the fact that he delivered up the prize, which was a Dutch vessel, to the Governor of Aruba, and to her original captain; and as to that of his having concealed Escandell's papers to bring him and six innocent seamen to a gibbet, I can even now notice it only to leave to the candor of the Spanish Government whether it ought ever to be answered.

Copies are herewith furnished of Captain Elton's report of this transaction to the Secretary of the Navy; of the agreement by which the Neptune was by him delivered up to the Dutch commandant, at the island of Aruba, Thielen; and of the receipt given by her original captain, Reinar Romer, to whom she was restored. In these documents you will see it expressly

stipulated both by the Dutch commandant and by Captain Romer that the "vessel and cargo, or the value thereof, should be returned to any legal authority of the United States of America, or to the Spanish Government, or prize claimants, *in due course of the laws of nations*." You will find, also, that in the document signed by Captain Romer he expressly declares that the persons by whom he had been captured *purported* to belong to a Spanish felucca privateer, but *not having any credentials or authority* to cruise upon the high seas with them *he supposes them to have been pirates.*

This declaration of Romer himself is directly contradictory to the assertion which Escandell, in his affidavit at Charleston, on the 8th of June, 1822, pretends that Captain Romer made to the boarding officer from the Spark, in answer to his inquiries whether Escandell and his men were pirates. Escandell says that Romer answered they were *not*; Romer himself says that he supposes they were.

You will remark that, in the copy of Escandell's affidavit, transmitted by Mr. Anduaga to the Department of State, the name of the Dutch captain of the Neptune is written Reinas Buman, apparently by mistake in the copy. The name, as signed by himself, is Reinar Romer.

On a review of the whole transaction, as demonstrated by these documents, it will be seen that the conduct of Captain Elton was fair, honorable, cautiously regardful of the possible rights of the captors and Spanish Government, and eminently disinterested. He retook the Neptune, a Dutch vessel, at the request of an officer of the Dutch Government. He had already known and protected her as a neutral before. He restored her to her captain without claiming salvage, and upon the sole condition that the Dutch Governor should restore to their owners, citizens of the United States, the proceeds of a vessel and cargo also wrongfully captured by a Spanish privateer, and which had been brought within his jurisdiction. And he provided that if the capture of the Neptune should eventually prove to have been lawfully made, the Dutch commandant and the captain of the Neptune himself should be responsible to the Spanish and American Governments and to the captors for the result.

I have entered into this detail of the evidence in this case not only to give you the means of satisfying the Spanish Government that the complaints of Mr. Anduaga against Captain Elton were as groundless in substance as they were unjust to him and disrespectful to this Government and nation in form, but to vindicate from unmerited reproach the memory of a gallant officer, of whose faithful and valuable services his country had been deprived by death only twenty days before these dishonorable imputations were cast upon him by Mr. Anduaga.

The harshness and precipitation of that minister's judgment, in preferring this complaint, is the more remarkable, inasmuch as he avows in that very note the opinion that the bare word, without proof, of a *merchant* cap-

tain is not evidence sufficient to furnish even a *pretext* to the naval officers of the United States to attack the armed vessel by which he had been plundered. If the word of the captain of a merchant vessel, supported by his oath, were of such trivial account, of what weight in the scale of testimony is the bare word of a captain of a privateer who cannot write his name, to prove the existence and authority of a written or printed document pretended to have been given by himself?

If the capture of the Neptune by Puyol had been lawful, her owners would at this day possess the means of recovering indemnity for their loss by the recapture, in the written engagements of the Dutch commandant, Thieleman, and of Captain Romer. But it was not lawful. By the documents transmitted by Mr. Anduaga it appears that a part of the cargo of the Neptune, after her capture by the Virgin del Carmen, had been transhipped to another vessel, and that at Porto Cabello it was condemned by Captain Lavorde, commander of the Spanish frigate Ligera, who had issued the privateer's commission, and then sat as judge of the admiralty court upon the prize. And the sole ground of condemnation assigned is the breach of the pretended blockade by the Neptune and her *trading* with the Independent Patriots. You will remark the great irregularity and incompatibility with the principles of general justice as well as of the Spanish Constitution, that one and the same person should be acting at once in the capacity of a naval officer, of a magistrate issuing commissions to privateers, and of a judge to decide upon the prizes taken by them.

But the whole foundation of his decision is a nullity. The blockade was a public wrong. The interdiction of all trade was an outrage upon the rights of *all* neutral nations, and the resort to two expedients bears on its face the demonstration that they who assumed them both had no reliance upon the justice of either; for if the interdiction of *all* neutral trade with the Independents were lawful, there was neither use nor necessity for the blockade; and if the blockade were lawful, there could be as little occasion or pretence for the interdiction of the trade. The correctness of this reasoning can no longer be contested by the Spanish Government itself. The blockade and interdiction of trade have, from the first notice of them, not only been denounced and protested against by the Government and officers of the United States, but by those of Great Britain, even when the ally of Spain, and who has not yet acknowledged the independence of the revolted colonies. The consequences of these pretensions have been still more serious to Spain, since they terminated in a formal notification by the British Government that they had issued orders of reprisal to their squadrons in the West Indies to capture all Spanish vessels until satisfaction should be made for the property of all British subjects taken or detained under color of this preposterous blockade and interdiction. And Spain has formally pledged herself to make this demanded reparation.

2. The second cause of complaint by Mr. Anduaga, upon which I have to animadvert, is that of the capture of the Porto Rico privateer Palmyra by the United States armed schooner Grampus, Lieutenant Gregory, commander.

With his letter of the 11th of October, 1822,[1] Mr. Anduaga transmitted copies of a letter from the captain of the privateer Escurra to the Spanish consul at Charleston, dated the 16th of September, 1822, and of sundry depositions taken at Porto Rico from seamen who had belonged to her relating to the capture. The account of the transaction given by Lieutenant Gregory is among the documents transmitted to Congress with the President's message at the commencement of the last session, pages 62, 63, and 64, to which I refer. The subject is yet before the competent judicial tribunal of this country.

The captain and seamen of the Palmyra, with the exception of those charged with the robbery of the Coquette, were discharged by a decree of the District Court of the United States at Charleston, and the vessel was restored to her captain; but the judge, (Drayton, since deceased,) in giving this decree, declared that Lieutenant Gregory had been fully justified in the capture. By a decree of the Circuit Court of the same district heavy damages were awarded against Lieutenant Gregory from which sentence there is an appeal pending before the Supreme Judicial Court of the United States. Whatever their final decision may be, the character of the court is a sure warrant that it will be given with every regard due to the rights and interests of all the parties concerned, and the most perfect reliance may be placed upon its justice, impartiality, and independence. The decision of the Circuit Court, indeed, would imply some censure upon the conduct of Lieutenant Gregory, and may be represented as giving support to the complaints of the Spanish minister against him. But it is the opinion of a single judge, in direct opposition to that of his colleague on the same bench, and liable to the revisal and correction of the supreme tribunal. It is marked with two principles, upon which it may be fairly presumed the judgment of the Supreme Court will be more in accord with that of the district. The justification of lieutenant Gregory for taking and sending in the Palmyra rests upon two important facts: First, the robbery committed by part of her crew, sworn to by Captain Souther, of the schooner Coquette, and confirmed by the oaths of her mate and two of her seamen; and secondly, that at the time of her capture she had commenced the firing upon the Grampus by a full volley from small arms and cannon. But as the *fact* of the robbery from the Coquette was not in rigorously judicial evidence before the Circuit Court, the judge declared that, although he had no doubt the fact was true, yet, in the absence of the evidence to prove it, he must *officially* decide that it was false; and as to the circumstance of the first fire, as the Spanish and American testimony were in contradiction to each other, he should set them both aside and form his decision upon other principles. If, indeed, Lieutenant Gregory is ulti-

[1] Not printed in this collection.

mately to be deprived of the benefit of these two facts, he will be left *judicially* without justification. But, considered with reference to the discharge of his duty as an officer of the United States, if the declaration of Captain Souther, taken upon oath, confirmed by those of his mate and two of his men, was not competent testimony upon which he was bound to act, upon what evidence could an officer of the Navy ever dare to execute his instructions and the law by rescuing or protecting from the robbers of the sea the property of his fellow-citizens?

The robbery of the Coquette by the boat's crew from the Palmyra is assuredly sufficiently proved for all other than judicial purposes by the fact, which was in evidence before the District Court, that the memorandum book, sworn by John Peabody, junior, mate of the Coquette, to have been taken from him, together with clothing, was actually found in a bag with clothing on board the Palmyra.

In answering Mr. Anduaga's letter of October 11, I transmitted to him a copy of the printed decree of Judge Drayton, in which the most material facts relating to the case, and the principles applicable to it upon which his decision was given, are set forth. Some additional facts are disclosed in a statement published by Lieutenant Gregory, highly important to *this* discussion, inasmuch as they identify a portion of the crew of the Palmyra with a gang of the Cape Antonio pirates, and with an establishment of the same character which had before been broken up by that officer.

In a long and elaborate reply to my letter, dated the 11th of December,[1] 1822, Mr. Anduaga, without contesting the fact that the Coquette had been robbed by the boarding crew from the Palmyra, objects to the decision of Judge Drayton, as if, by detaining for trial the individual seamen belonging to the Palmyra charged with the robbery, it assumed a jurisdiction disclaimed by the very acknowledgment that the privateer was lawfully commissioned, and sanctioned the right of search, so long and so strenuously resisted by the American Government.

In this reply, too, Mr. Anduaga attempts, by laborious argument, to maintain, to the fullest and most unqualified extent, the right of the Spanish privateers to capture, and of the Spanish prize courts to condemn, all vessels of every other nation trading with any of the ports of the Independent Patriots of South America, because, under the old colonial laws of Spain, that trade had been prohibited. And with the consistency of candor, at least, he explicitly says that the decrees issued by the Spanish commanders on the Main, under the name of blockades, were not properly so called, but were mere enforcements of the antediluvian colonial exclusions; and such were the instructions under which the Palmyra, and all the other privateers from Port Rico and Port Cabello, have been cruising. Is it surprising that the final answer of Great Britain to this pretension was an order of *reprisals?* or that, under the laws of the United States, it has brought their naval

[1] Not printed in this collection

officers in conflict of actual hostility with privateers so commissioned and so instructed? The Spanish Government have for many years had notice, both from Great Britain and from the United States, that they considered as rightful the peaceful commerce of their people with the ports in possession of the Independent Patriots. Spain herself has opened most of those of which her forces have been able to retain or to recover the possession. The blockades proclaimed by General Morillo, in 1815, were coupled with this same absurd pretension; they were formally protested against by the Government of the United States; and wherever Morillo obtained possession, he himself immediately opened the port to foreign and neutral commerce.

Mr. Anduaga seems to have had much confidence in the conclusiveness of his reasoning in this letter of December 11; for, without considering the character of our institutions which have committed to the Executive authority all communications with the ministers of foreign powers, he permitted himself the request that the President would communicate it to Congress; without having the apology for this indiscretion, which, on a prior occasion, he had alleged for a like request, namely, that it was in answer to letters from this Department which had been communicated to the Legislature. In the former case he was indulged by compliance with his request. In the latter it was passed over without notice. But Mr. Anduaga was determined that his argument should come before the public, and sent a copy of it to the Havana, where it was published in the newspapers, whence it has been translated, and inserted in some of our public journals.

The British order of reprisals; the appropriation by the Cortes of forty millions of reals for reparation to British subjects of damages sustained by them, in part from capture and condemnation of their property, under this absurd pretension; and the formal revocation by the King of Spain of these unlawful blockades, will, it is presumed, supersede the necessity of a serious argument in reply to that of Mr. Anduaga upon this point. It is in vain for Spain to pretend that, during the existence of a civil war, in which, by the universal law of nations, both parties have equal rights, with reference to foreign nations, she can enforce against all neutrals, by the seizure and condemnation of their property, the laws of colonial monopoly and prohibitions, by which they had been excluded from commercial intercourse with the colonies before the existence of the war, and when her possession and authority were alike undisputed. And if, at any stage of the war, this pretension could have been advanced with any color of reason, it was pre-eminently nugatory on the renewal of the war, after the formal treaty between Morillo and Bolivar, and the express stipulation which it contained, that, if the war should be renewed, it should be conducted on the principles applicable to wars between independent nations, and not on the disgusting and sanguinary doctrine of suppressing rebellion.

As little foundation is there for the inference drawn by Mr. Anduaga from

the decree of the district judge, admitting the Palmyra to have been lawfully commissioned as a privateer, but detaining for trial the portion of her crew charged with the robbery from the Coquette, that it sanctions the right of search, against which the United States have so long and so constantly protested: for, in the first place, the United States have never disputed the belligerent right of search as recognized and universally practiced, conformably to the laws of nations. They have disputed the right of belligerents, under *color* of the right of search for contraband of war, to seize and cary away *men*, at the discretion of the boarding officer, without trial and without appeal; *men*, not as contraband of war, or belonging to the enemy, but as subjects, real or pretended, of the belligerent himself, and to be used by him against his enemy. It is the fraudulent abuse of the right of search, for purposes never recognized or admitted by the laws of nations; purposes, in their practical operation, of the deepest oppression, and most crying injustice, that the United States have resisted and will resist, and which warns them against assenting to the extension, in time of peace, of a right which experience has shown to be liable to such gross perversion in time of war. And secondly, the Palmyra was taken for acts of *piratical* aggression and *depredation* upon a vessel of the United States, and upon the property of their citizens. Acts of *piratical* aggression and depredation may be committed by vessels having lawful commissions as privateers, and many such had been committed by the Palmyra. The act of robbery from the Coquette was, in every respect piratical; for it was committed while the privateer was under the Venezuelan flag, and under that flag she had fired upon the Coquette, and brought her to. It was piratical, therefore, not only as depredation of the property by the boat's crew who took it away, but as aggression under the sanction of the captain of the privateer who was exercising belligerent rights under false colors. To combat under any other flag than that of the nation by which she is commissioned, by the laws of nations subjects a vessel, though lawfully commissioned, to seizure and condemnation as a pirate.—(See Valin's Ordonnance de la Marine, vol. 2., p. 239.) And although the decree of the district judge ordered the restitution of the vessel to her captain, because it held him to have been lawfully commissioned; neither did the law of nations require, nor would the law of the United States permit, that men brought within the jurisdiction of the court, and charged with piratical depredations upon citizens of the United States, should be discharged and turned over to a foreign tribunal for trial, as was demanded by Mr. Anduaga. They had been brought within the jurisdiction of the court, not by the exercise of any right of search, but as part of the crew of a vessel which had committed piratical depredations and aggressions upon vessels and citizens of the United States. The District Court, adjudging the commission of the privateer to have been lawful, and considering the gun fired under the Venezuelan flag, to bring the Coquette to, though wrongful and

unwarrantable, as not amounting rigorously to that *combat*, which would have been complete piracy, discharged the captain and portion of the crew which had not been guilty of the robbery of the Coquette, but reserved for trial the individuals charged with that act.

The conduct of the Palmyra for months before her capture had been notoriously and flagrantly piratical. She had, in company with an other privateer, named the *Boves*, both commanded by the same captain, Pablo Slanger, fired upon the United States schooner Porpoise, Captain Ramage, who abstained from returning the fire. For this act of unequivocal hostility, Captian Slanger's only apology to Captain Ramage was, that he had taken the Porpoise for a Patriot cruiser.—(See documents with the President's message of December, 1822, p. 65.) Numbers of neutral vessels, of different nations, had been plundered by her; and among the affidavits made to Lieutenant Gregory, at St. Thomas, was one of the master and mate of a French schooner, that she had been robbed by a boat's crew from her of a barrel of beef and a barrel of rice. In the letter from Captain Escurra to the Spanish consul at Charleston, he admits the taking of these provisions, alleging that the master of the French vessel gave them to him at his request. The affidavit of the French master and mate shows what sort of a *gift* it was, and is more coincident with all the other transactions of this privateer.

In the same letter of December 11, Mr. Anduaga, with more ingenuity than candor, attempts at once to raise a wall of separation between the pirates of Cuba and the privateersmen of Porto Rico and Porto Cabello, and to identify the pirates, not only with all those who at a prior period had abused the several independent flags of South America, but with the adventurers from the United States who at different times have engaged in the Patriot service; and he endeavors to blend them all with the foolish expedition of last summer against Porto Rico. While indulging his propensity to complain, he revives all the long exploded and groundless charges of his predecessors in former years, and does not scruple to insinuate that the Cuba pirates themselves are North Americans from the United States. It is easy to discern and point out the fallacy of these endeavors to blend together things totally distinct, and to discriminate between things that are identical. It is in proof before our tribunals, in the case of the Palmyra itself, that some of the pirates of Cuba and of the Porto Rico privateersmen are the same. Among the Cuba pirates that have been taken, as well by the vessels of the United States as by British cruisers, *not one* North American has been found. A number of those pirates have been executed at the Bahama islands, and ten from one vessel at the island of Jamaica, all Spanish subjects, and from the Spanish islands. Not a shadow of evidence has been seen that, among the Cuba pirates, a single citizen of the United States was to be found.

As to the complaints of Mr. Anduaga's predecessors, meaning those of Don Luis de Onis, it might have been expected that we should hear no more

of them after the ratification of the treaty of 1819. Whatever had been the merits of those complaints, full satisfaction for them all had been made by that treaty to Spain, and was acknowledged by the ratification of the Spanish Government in October, 1820. Since that time no complaints had been made by Mr. Anduaga's predecessors. It was reserved for him as well to call up those phantoms from the dead, as to conjure new ones from the living. That supplies of every kind, including arms and other implements of war, have been, in the way of lawful commerce, procured within the United States for the account of the South American Independents, and at their expense and hazard exported to them, is doubtless true. And Spain has enjoyed and availed herself of the same advantages.

The neutrality of the United States has, throughout this contest between Spain and South America, been cautiously and faithfully observed by their Government. But the complaints of Mr. Anduaga as well as those of his predecessor, Mr. Onis, are founded upon erroneous views and mistaken principles of neutrality. They assume that all *commerce*, even the most peaceful commerce of other nations, with the South Americans, is a violation of neutrality. And while they assert this in principle, the Spanish commanders, in the few places where they yet hold authority, attempt to carry it into effect in a spirit worthy of itself. The decree of General Morales, of the 15th of September, 1822, is in perfect accord with the argument of Mr. Anduaga, on the 11th of December of the same year. The unconcerted but concurring solemn protests against the former, of the Dutch Governor of Curaçoa, Cantzlaar, of the British Admiral Rowley, and of our own Captain Spence were but the chorus of all human feeling revolting at the acts of which Mr. Anduaga's reasoning was the attempted justification.

3. The next case of complaint by Mr. Anduaga is in a letter of the 23d of February last, against Lieutenant Wilkinson, commander of the United States schooner Spark, for capturing off the Havana a vessel called the Ninfa Catalana or the Santissima Trinidad, Nicholas Garyole master, and sending her into Norfolk. As there are reasons for believing that in this case Lieutenant Wilkinson acted upon erroneous information, a court of inquiry has been ordered upon his conduct, the result of which will be communicated to you. The Ninfa Catalana remains for trial at the District Court to be held in the eastern district of Virginia in the course of the next month. Immediately after receiving Mr. Anduaga's letter on the subject, I wrote to the attorney of the United States for the district, instructing him to obtain, if possible, an extraordinary session of the court, that the cause might be decided without delay; but the judge declined appointing such session unless all the witnesses summoned to the court upon the case could be notified of it, which not being practicable, the short delay till the meeting of the regular session of the court has been unavoidable. You will assure the Spanish Government that the most impartial justice will be rendered to all the

parties concerned, as well by the adjudication of the admiralty court as by the military inquiry on the conduct of Lieutenant Wilkinson. I ought to add, that no evidence hitherto has come to the knowledge of the Government which has implicated the correctness of Lieutenant Wilkinson's intentions, or manifested any other motive than that of discharging his duty and protecting the property of his fellow-citizens.

4. The capture of the Spanish schooner Carmen, alias Gallega the Third, by the United States sloop-of-war Peacock, Captain Cassin, has furnished the fourth occasion for this class of Mr. Anduaga's remonstrances.

There are two declarations, or depositions, made by the captain and persons who were on board of this vessel at the time of her capture: one at Pensacola, and the other at New Orleans. The first, before the notary, José Escaro, by Jacinto Correa, captain of the Gallega, the pilot, Ramon Echavarria, boatswain, Manuel Agacio, three sailors, and Juan Martin Ferreyro, a passenger. All the witnesses, after the first, only confirm, in general and unqualified terms, *all* his statements, although many of the circumstances, asserted by him as facts, could not have been personally known to them, and others could not have been known to himself but by hearing from some of them. The protest, for example, avers that, when first captured by the Peacock, Captain Correa, with his steward and cook, were taken on board that vessel, and, while they were there, he represents various disorders to have been committed on board of his own vessel by the boarding officer from the Peacock, though, by his own showing, he was not present to witness them. His whole narrative is composed of alleged occurrences on board of three vessels, the Peacock, the Louisiana cutter, and the Gallega, and no discrimination is made between those of his own knowledge and those which he had heard from others. The second declaration was made before Antonio Argote Villalobos, Spanish consul at New Orleans, only by Captain Correa and Echavarria, the mate, and gives an account of several *other* Spanish vessels captured by the Peacock while they were on board of that vessel as prisoners. A very inadequate reason is assigned by Captain Correa for not having made it at the same time with the first at Pensacola; and the whole purport of it is, to represent those *other* vessels which he had seen captured as inoffensive, unarmed vessels, and the capture of them by the Peacock as itself piratical.

Copies of the proceedings of the courts at Pensacola and at New Orleans upon these cases are expected at this Department, and the substance of them will be duly communicated to you.

In the meantime, the reports of Captain Cassin, of the Peacock, and of Captain Jackson, commander of the revenue cutter Louisiana, to the Navy Department, will give you a very different and, doubtless, more correct account of these transactions.

There is a strong reason for believing that the Gallega did actually be-

long to the gang of pirates of which those pretended inoffensive and unarmed vessels certainly formed a part; that Correa and Echavarria were testifying in behalf of their accomplices; and their warm sympathy with those convicted pirates is much more indicative of their own guilt than of their belief in the innocence of the others.

That the *other* vessels were piratical is no longer a subject of question or dispute. Two of them were carried by Captain Cassin to the Havana, where one of them, a schooner of nine guns, was claimed by a lady, widow of a merchant in that city, as her property, and, at her application, supported by that of the Captain General, was restored to her upon payment of $1,000 salvage. The part of the cargo which had been saved was sold in like manner with the approbation of the Captain General. The vessel had been taken by the pirates but a few days before, and, in retaking and restoring her to the owner, Captain Cassin had not only rendered an important service to a Spanish Subject, but taken from the pirates the means of committing more extensive and atrocious depredations.

Among the articles found on board of these vessels were some of female apparel, rent and blood-stained; and many other traces to deeds of horror with which these desperate wretches are known to be familiar. The pirates had, when close pursued, abandoned their vessels and escaped to the shore. They were pursued, but not discovered. The coffee was found hidden in the woods, and, with the vessel brought into New Orleans, has been regularly condemned by the sentence of the court. And these are the characters, and this the description of people, whom Captain Correa and his mate, Echavarria, represent, in their declaration before the Spanish consul at New Orleans as innocent Spanish subjects, piratically plundered of their lawful property by Captain Cassin. And upon such testimony as this has Mr. Anduaga suffered himself to be instigated to a style of invective and reproach, not only against that officer, but against the officers of our Navy generally, against the Government and people of this country, upon which, while pointing it out and marking its contrast with the real facts of the case, I forbear all further comment.

Let it be admitted that the Catalan Nymph and the Gallega were lawful traders, and that, in capturing them as pirates, Lieutenant Wilkinson and Captain Cassin have been mistaken; that they had probable cause, sufficient for their justification, I cannot doubt, and am persuaded will, upon a full investigation of the cases, be made apparent.

In the impartial consideration of this subject, it is necessary to advert to the *character* of these pirates, and to the circumstances which have made it so difficult to distinguish between lawfully commissioned and registered Spanish vessels and the pirates.

The first of these has been the unlawful extent given to the commissions and instructions of the privateers, avowed by the Spanish Government—an

authority to take all commercial vessels bound to any of the ports in possession of the Patriots. The very assumption of this principle, and the countenance given to it by the adjudications of the courts, was enough to kindle all the passions of lawless rapine in the maritime population of the islands. It was holding out to them the whole commerce of the neutral world as lawful prey. The next is the impunity with which those robberies have been committed in the very port of the Havana, and under the eye of the local Government. It is represented, and believed to be true, that many inhabitants of the city, merchants of respectable standing in society, are actively concerned in these transactions. That of the village of Regla, opposite the city, almost all the inhabitants are, with public notoriety, concerned in them. That some of the deepest criminals are known and pointed at—while the vigilance or energy of the Government is so deficient that there is an open market for the sale of those fruits of robbery; and that threats of vengeance are heard from the most abandoned of the culprits against all who molest them in their nefarious and bloody career.

The third is, that many of the piracies have been committed by merchant vessels laden with cargoes. The Spanish vessels of that description in the islands are all armed, and when taken by the pirates, are immediately converted to their own purposes. The schooner of nine guns, taken by Captain Cassin, and restored to its owner in the Havana, affords one proof of this fact; and one of the most atrocious piracies committed upon citizens of the United States was that upon the Ladies' Delight, by the Zaragosana, a vessel regularly cleared at the Havana as a merchant vessel.

There are herewith furnished you copies of the general instructions, from the Secretary of the Navy, given to all our naval officers, successively stationed in those seas, for the protection of our commerce and for carrying into effect the laws against piracy and the slave trade, together with printed copies of those laws. They will enable you to present to the Spanish Government the most conclusive proof of the friendly sentiments towards Spain, and of the undeviating regard to her rights which have constantly animated this Government, and effectually to counteract any representations of a different character, which may be made by Mr. Anduaga.

In reflecting upon the conduct of this minister, during his residence in the United States, it has been impossible to avoid the suspicion that it has been instigated by a disposition, not more friendly to the existing liberal institutions of his own country than to the harmonious intercourse, to which they were so well calculated to contribute, between the United States and Spain.

From the time of the re-establishment in Spain of a constitutional Government the sympathies of this country have been warm, earnest, and unanimous in favor of her freedom and independence. The principles which she asserts and maintains are emphatically ours, and, in the conflict with which

she is now threatened for supporting them, a cordial good understanding with us was as obviously the dictate of her policy as it was the leading principle of ours. This national sentiment has not been silent or unobserved. It was embodied and expressed in the most public and solemn manner in the message to Congress at the commencement of their last session, as will be within your recollection. The conduct of the Government has been invariably conformable to it. The recognition of the South American Governments, flowing from the same principle which enlisted all our feelings in the cause of Spain, has been, in its effects, a mere formality. It has in nowise changed our actual relations, either with them or with Spain. All the European powers, even those which have hitherto most strenuously denied the recognition in *form*, have treated and will treat the South Americans as independent in fact. By his protest, against the formal acknowledgment, Mr. Anduaga had fulfilled his duties to his own Government, nor has any one circumstance arisen from that event which could require of him to recur to it, as a subject of difference between us and Spain, again. We have not been disposed to complain of his protest, nor even of his permanent residence at a distance from the seat of Government. But the avidity with which he has seized upon every incident which could cause unpleasant feelings between the two countries; the bitterness with which his continual notes have endeavored to exasperate and envenom; the misrepresentations of others, which he has so precipitously assumed as undeniable facts; and the language in which he has vented his reproaches upon the fair and honorable characters of our naval officers, upon the Government, and even the people of this Union; and, above all, the artifice by which he suffered the absurd and riduculous expedition of De Coudray Holstein to obtain some paltry supplies of men and arms in this country, without giving notice of it to this Government, when they might have effectually broken it up, leaving it unknown to us till after its inevitable failure, when he could trump it up as a premeditated hostility of ours against Spain, and a profligate project of invasion of her possessions, are indications of a temper which we can trace to no source, either of friendly feeling towards our country or of patriotic devotion to his own. It has the aspect of a deliberate purpose to stir up and inflame dissentions between the United States and Spain; to produce and cherish every means of alienation and distrust between them, with ultimate views to the counteraction of these differences, upon the internal administration and Government of his own nation.

It is hoped that he will, in no event, be permitted to return hither; and, in the full and just explanations which you will be enabled to give upon every complaint exhibited by him while here, the Spanish Government will be satisfied with the justice, and convinced of the friendly disposition towards Spain, which have governed all our conduct. With the same spirit, and the just expectation that it will be met with a reciprocal return, you

will represent to them the claim of all the citizens of the United States, whose vessels and other property have been captured by the privateers from Porto Rico and Porto Cabello, and condemned by the courts of those places for supposed breaches of the pretended blockade, or for *trading* with the South American Independents. Restitution or indemnity is due to them all; and is immediately due by the Spanish Government, inasmuch as these injuries, having been sanctioned by the local authorities, military and civil, the sufferers in most of the cases can have no resort to the individuals by whom the captures were made. A list of all the cases which have come yet to the knowledge of this Department is now inclosed. There are probably many others. An agent will be shortly sent to collect, at the respective places, the evidence in all the cases not already known, and to obtain, as far as may be practicable, restitution by the local authorities. Whatever may be restored by them will diminish by so much the amount of claim upon the Spanish Government; which will be the more indisputable, as they have already admitted the justice and made provision for the satisfaction of claims of British subjects which sprung from the same cause.

Of the formal revocation by the Spanish Government of the nominal blockade the Governor of Porto Rico has given express notice to Commodore Porter. As a consequence of this, it is hoped that no commissions for privateers will be issued. The revocation did, indeed, come at a critical time; for it cannot be too strongly impressed upon the Spanish Government that all the causes of complaint, both by Spanish subjects against the Navy officers of the United States, and by the citizens of the United States, with which you are now charged, proceeded directly, or as a consequence, from those spurious blockades. They were in violation of the laws of nations. They were in conflict with the law of Congress for protecting the commerce of the United States. It was impossible that ships-of-war of the United States with commanders instructed to carry that law into execution, and Spanish privateers commissioned and instructed to carry into effect the atrocious decree of General Morales, should meet and fulfil their respective instructions without hostile collision. The decree of General Morales constituted all those Spanish subjects who acted under it in a state of war *de facto* with all neutral nations; and on the sea it was a war of extermination against all neutral commerce. It is to the responsibility of her own officers, therefore, that Spain must look for indemnity to the wrongs endured by her own subjects as necessary consequences of their official acts, as well as for the source of her obligation to indemnify all the innocent sufferers under them who are entitled to the protection of other nations. You will take an immediate opportunity, after your reception, to urge upon the Spanish Government the absolute necessity of a more vigorous and energetic exercise of the local authorities in the island of Cuba for the suppression of the piracies by which it is yet infested. Their profes-

sions of co-operation with the naval force of the United States to this object have not been followed up by corresponding action. As long since as last May Captain Biddle, then commanding the Macedonian frigate, represented to the Captain General, Mahy, the necessity that would frequently arise of pursuing them from their boats to the shores on the desert and uninhabited parts of the island, and requested permission to land for such purpose, which was explicitly refused. Mr. Forsyth has been instructed to renew the demand of this permission to the Spanish Government itself. And, as there are cases in which the necessity will constitute the right of anticipating that permission, Commodore Porter has been instructed accordingly. From a recent debate in the British Parliament it appears that similar instructions have been given to the commanders of the British squadrons despatched for the protection of the commerce of that nation, and that when notified to the Spanish Government, although at first resisted by them, they finally obtained their acquiescence. These circumstances will serve for answer to one of the most aggravated complaints of Mr. Anduaga against Captain Cassin. That officer did land; and although not successful in overtaking the pirates themselves, he did break up one of the deposits of their lawless plunder, burned several of their boats, and took from them two of their armed vessels. Mr. Anduaga sees in all this nothing but *a violation of his Catholic Majesty's territory;* a sentiment, on such an occasion, which would be more suitable for an accessory to the pirates than for the officer of a Government deeply and earnestly intent upon their suppression.

From the highly esteemed and honorable character of General Vives, who has, probably, before this, arrived at the Havana as Governor and Captain General of the island, we hope for more effectual co-operation to this most desirable event. There has been, according to every account, a laxity and remissness on that subject in the Executive authority of that port which we hope will no longer be seen. The boldness and notoriety with which crimes of such desperate die are committed in the very face of authority is, of itself, irrefragable proof of its own imbecility or weakness. Spain must be sensible that she is answerable to the world for the suppression of crimes committed within her jurisdiction, and of which the people of other nations are almost exclusively the victims. The pirates have generally, though not universally, abstained from annoying Spanish subjects and from the robbery of Spanish property. It is surely within the competency of the Government of Cuba to put down that open market of the pirates which has so long been denounced at the Havana. It appears that masters of American vessels which had been robbed have seen their own property openly exposed to sale in that city, but have been dissuaded from reclaiming it by the warning that it would expose them to the danger of assassination. One instance, at least, has occurred of unpunished murder of a citizen of the United States for the indiscreet expression of his expectation that the arri-

val of Commodore Porter's squadron would secure more respect to the persons and property of American citizens; and other cases have happened of outrages upon citizens of the United States in which the protecting power of the Government has been deficient, at least, in promptitude and vigor.

To the irritation between the people of the two nations, produced by the consequences of the abominable decree of General Morales, must be attributed that base and dastardly spirit of revenge which recently actuated a Spanish subaltern officer at Porto Rico, by which Lieutenant Cocke lost his life. Copies of the correspondence between Commodore Porter and the Governor of Porto Rico on that occasion are among the inclosed papers. They will show that the act of firing upon the Fox was utterly wanton and inexcusable; and the President desires that you would expressly demand that the officer, by whom it was ordered, should be brought to trial and punishment for having ordered it.

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John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Thomas Randall, Special Agent of the United States in Cuba[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *April 29, 1823.*

SIR: During your residence in the Island of Cuba, you will from time to time, as *safe* opportunities may occur communicate to this Department, in private and confidential letters, all such information as you may be able to obtain, relating to the political condition of the Island; the views of its Government and the Sentiments of its inhabitants. You will attentively observe all occurrences having relation to their connection with Spain, and to the events which may result from the War between France and Spain, probably now commenced. Should there be French or British Agents residing at the Havanna, you will endeavour to ascertain, without direct inquiries, or apparent curiosity, on the subject, their objects and pursuits; and you will notice whatever Maritime force of either of those Powers, may be stationed in the West Indies, or present themselves in the vicinity of the Island.

You will be mindful of any apparent popular agitation; particularly of such as may have reference either to a transfer of the Island from Spain to any other Power; or to the assumption by the Inhabitants of an Independent Government. If in your intercourse with Society, inquiries should be made of you, with regard to the views of the Government of the United

[1]MS. Dispatches to United States Consuls, II, 283.

States, concerning the political state of Cuba, you will say, that so far as they were known to you, from having resided at the Seat of Government, the first wish of the Government was for the continuance of Cuba in its political connection with Spain; and that it would be altogether averse to the transfer of the Island to any other Power. You will cautiously avoid committing yourself upon any proposals which may be suggested to you, of co-operation in any measure proposing a *change* of the political condition of its People; but will report as above mentioned to me, whatever may in any manner become known to you in this respect, and the communication of which may be useful to the public service. Exercise a discriminating judgment, upon all Evidence of what you shall report as information, so that we may distinguish the degree of credit due to every statement of fact. You will duly distrust mere popular rumours, but neglect no probable source of useful information.

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General instructions of John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Caesar A. Rodney, appointed United States Minister to Buenos Aires[1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *May 17, 1823.*

SIR: The establishment of Independent nations and Governments in South America forms a remarkable era in the History of the world, and the formal interchange of Diplomatic Missions with them is a memorable event in that of our own Country. The interest which you have taken in the progress of the Revolution which has released those extensive regions from their State of Colonial Dependence, and introduced them to their equal station among the nations of the Earth, and the part you have already borne in the preceding public transactions between the United States and the Republic of Buenos Ayres, concurring with the confidence of the President in your long tried abilities, patriotism and integrity has induced your appointment to the Mission upon which you are about to depart.

The circumstances here alluded to, supercede the necessity of reviewing the general course of policy hitherto pursued by the United States with regard to the struggle for South American Independence. It has been fully known to you, and should an occasion arise during the continance of your Mission, in which it may be useful to the public service, that our system of conduct towards South America should be unfolded, you will be amply competent to the task without any need of further special Instructions from this Department.

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, IX, 250.

The relations of the United States, with Buenos Ayres, however, hitherto, so far as they have been sustained by Agents of the respective Governments, have been informal, and disconnected. The appointment of a public Minister to reside at that place, is the proper occasion for recurring to the *Principles* upon which the future and permanent relations between the two Countries should be settled.

Those relations will be either political or commercial.

Of all the Southern Republics, Buenos Ayres has been the longest in possession of Independence uncontested within its own Territory by the Arms of Spain. Its internal convulsions, and revolutions have been many, and are yet far from being at their close. It has on one hand carried the War of Independence into Chili and Peru, but on the other by its vicinity to the Portuguese territory of Brazil it has lost the possession of Monte Video, and of the Banda Oriental, or Eastern shore of La Plata. The first establishment of the Buenos Ayrean Government, was under the ambitious and aspiring title of "the Independent Provinces of South America." It was afterwards changed for that of the Independent provinces of La Plata, which it is believed still to retain. But it is far from embracing within its acknowledged authority, all the Provinces situated on that River: and for the last two or three years its effective Government has been restricted to the single province of Buenos Ayres. It has undergone many changes of Government, violent usurpations of authority, and forcible dispossessions from it; without having so far as we know to this day settled down into any lawful establishment of power by the only mode in which it could be effected — a constitution formed and sanctioned by the voice of the people.

Buenos Ayres also, more than any other of the South American Provinces, has been the Theatre of foreign European intrigues; with Spain itself in a negotiation for receiving a Spanish Prince as their Sovereign; with the Court of Rio-Janeiro for Portuguese princes and princesses, and for cessions of territory as the price of acknowledged Independence; and with France for the acquisition of a *legitimate* Monarch in the person of a Prince of Lucca. A hankering after Monarchy has infected the politics of all the successive governing authorities of Buenos Ayres, and being equally contrary to the true policy of the Country, to the general feeling of all the native Americans, and to the liberal institutions congenial to the spirit of Freedom has produced its natural harvest of unappeasable dissentions, sanguinary civil Wars, and loathsome executions, with their appropriate attendance of arbitrary imprisonments, a subdued and perverted press, and a total annihilation of all civil liberty and personal security. The existing Government of Buenos Ayres by all the accounts received from Mr. Forbes is less tainted with this corruption than most of their predecessors. Mr. Rivadavia, the Minister of Foreign Relations, and most effective member of the Government is represented as a Republican in principle, of solid talents, stern integrity, and

faithfully devoted to the cause of order, as well as of Liberty—It is with infinite difficulty and in conflict with repeated conspiracies that he has been able to maintain himself hitherto, and the hope may be entertained that the principles of which he is the supporter will ultimately surmount all the obstacles with which they are contending, and that a Constitution emanating from the people and deliberately adopted by them will lay the foundations of their happiness, and prosperity on their only possible basis, the enjoyment of equal rights.

To promote this object so far as friendly counsel may be acceptable to the Government existing there, will be among the interesting objects of your Mission. At this time and since October 1820, the Government confined, as is understood to the single province of Buenos Ayres, is administered by a Governor, and Captain General, named Martin Rodriguez: the Legislative authority being exercised by a *Junta* elected by popular suffrage, and a portion of which has been recently chosen. The relations between this province, and the rest of those which heretofore formed the Vice Royalty of La Plata, are altogether unsettled and although repeated efforts have been made to assemble a Congress in which they should be represented, and by which a constitutional Union might be definitively arranged, they have hitherto proved ineffectual.

In the mean time a more extensive Confederation has been projected under the auspices of the new Government of the Republic of Colombia. In the last despatch received from Mr. Forbes dated the 27 January last, he mentions the arrival and reception at Buenos Ayres of Mr. Joaquin Mosquera y Arbolada, senator of the Republic of Colombia. And their Minister Plenipotentiary, and Extraordinary, upon a Mission, the general object of which, he informed Mr. Forbes, was to engage the other Independent Governments of *Spanish* America to unite with Colombia in a Congress to be held at such point as might be agreed on, to settle a general system of *American Policy*, in relation to Europe, leaving to each section of the Country, the perfect liberty of Independent self Government. For this purpose he had already signed a Treaty with Peru, of which he promised Mr. Forbes the perusal: but there were some doubts with regard to the character of his associations, and the personal influence to which he was accessible at Buenos Ayres, and Mr. Forbes, had not much expectation of his success in prevailing on that Government to enter into his project of extensive federation.

By Letters of a previous date, November 1822, received from Mr Prevost, it appears, that the project is yet more extensive than Mr. Mosquera had made known to Mr. Forbes. It embraces North, as well as South America, and a formal proposal to join and take the lead in it is to be made known to the Government of the United States.

Intimations of the same design have been given to Mr. Todd at Bogota.

It will be time for this Government to deliberate concerning it, when it shall be presented in a more definite and specific form. At present it indicates more distinctly a purpose on the part of the Colombian Republic to assume a leading character in this Hemisphere, than any practicable object of utility which can be discerned by us. With relation to *Europe* there is perceived to be only one object, in which the interests and wishes of the United States can be the same as those of the Southern American Nations, and that is that they should all be governed by Republican Institutions, politically and commercially independent of Europe. To any confederation of Spanish American provinces for that end, the United States would yield their approbation, and cordial good wishes. If more should be asked of them, the proposition will be received, and considered in a friendly spirit, and with a due sense of its importance.

The Treaty with Peru is not likely to be attended with much immediate effect. The State of Peru itself has hitherto been, that rather of declared than of established Independence. The temporary Government assumed and administered by General San Martin, has been succeeded by his retirement, and by a signal defeat of the Patriotic forces, which may probably restore all Peru to the Spanish Royalists. Mr. Forbes attributes the retreat of San Martin, and the State of Peru after that event, and preceding this last disaster, to misunderstandings between San Martin, and the President of the Colombian Republic, Bolivar. This is highly probable; at all events it is certain that the concerted project of liberating Peru by the combined forces of Buenos Ayres, Chili and Colombia, has entirely failed; and there is every probability that henceforth the Independence of Peru must be regained by the internal energies of the People, or re-achieved by the Military forces of the Colombian Republic only.

So far as objects of Policy can be distinctly perceived at this distance, with the information which we possess, and upon a subject so complicated in itself, so confused by incidents with which it is surrounded, and so comprehensive in its extent, the political interest of Buenos Ayres, rather points to the settlement of its concerns altogether internal, or in its immediate neighbourhood, than to a confederation embracing the whole American Hemisphere. It is now little more than the government of a single city, with a population less than half, perhaps less than one third that of New York. To form a solid Union with the provinces with which it was heretofore connected in the Vice Royalty; to put down the remnant of ecclesiastical domination, to curb the arbitrary dispositions of Military power, to establish a truly Representative Government, personal security, and the freedom of the press and purposes which the present administration appears to have sincerely at heart, and in the pursuit of which they may without undue interference in their internal concerns to be exhorted to active and inexflexible perseverance.

They will doubtless always understand that to them, Independence of Europe does not merely import Independence of Spain nor political independence alone. The principles of the Government now in power appear in this respect to be sound, although from some late communications of Mr. Forbes, it might be surmised that the dispositions of the Minister of Government, and of foreign affairs himself, are not entirely free from European partialities. The occupation of Montevideo, and of the Banda Oriental by the Portuguese has perhaps been one of the principal causes of the distractions which have marked the Revolutionary movements of Buenos Ayres. While that occupation continues, the interests and commerce of all the Countries watered by the Rivers Uruguay, Parana and Paraguay must be controlled by the power holding that first and principal seaport of the Plate River, Montevideo. The power of Portugal itself has now ceased in Brazil, and an empire probably as ephemeral as that of Mexico, at our doors, has taken its place. Before this last Revolution had been completed, the Portuguese Government of Brazil had acknowledged the Independence of Buenos Ayres; but that acknowledgment was dearly purchased, if paid for by the cession of the Banda Oriental. As yet the possession of Montevideo has been *Military*, by troops chiefly, if not all European Portuguese, under the command of General Le Cor, Baron of Lacuna. These troops have followed the Revolutionary Movement, not of Brazil, but of Portugal. The command of their General, over them, has been for some time little more than nominal, and as they neither recognize the Brazilian Empire, nor are able to maintain themselves by resources from Europe, they must soon evacuate the country and return to Lisbon. From the time of their departure Mr. Forbes appears to expect that the inhabitants of the Oriental Band themselves will prefer their old and natural connection with Buenos Ayres to a forced Union with the Empire of Brazil. It will certainly be the favorable moment for Buenos Ayres to recover the Eastern shore of the River, and with it the means of re-uniting under one free and Republican Government the scattered fragments of the old Vice-royalty of La Plata.

There will be then much less of incentive for a Buenos Ayrean Government to the contamination of dark intrigues with Portuguese Princesses, or to the degrading purchase of a Prince of Lucca to rule over them as a King. The Independence of an American nation can never be completely secured from European sway, while it tampers for authority with the families of European Sovereigns. It is impossible that *any* great American interest should be served by importing a petty prince from Europe to make him a king in America. The absurdity of all such negotiations is so glaring, that nothing but the notorious fact that they have pervaded the whole history of Buenos Ayres from the first assertions of its Independence could excuse this reference to them. The special right that we have to object to them, is, that they are always connected with systems of subserviency to *European*

interests: to projects of political and commercial *preferences*, to that European nation from whose stock of Royalty the precious scion is to be engrafted. The Government of Pueyrredon was deeply implicated in these negotiations; and the consequence was, that in the project of a Treaty drawn up and signed by his authority with Mr. Worthington he refused to insert an article, stipulating for the United States, commercial advantages on equal footing with the most favoured Nation. Dr. Tagle afterwards endeavoring to explain this incident to Mr. Prevost, professed that the object had been to grant special favors to the power *which should first acknowledge their independence.* As if the surrender of the thing was an equivalent for the acquisition of the name; and as if by ratifying that very Treaty the United States would not have been the first to acknowledge the Independence of the Government with which it was formed.

It is hoped that you will find little of this spirit remaining to contend with. The head of the Government is yet a Military officer. But the principles always avowed by Mr. Rivadavia, the Minister and effective Member of the Government are emphatically American. A Government by popular Representation and periodical election. The subordination of the Military to the Civil authority—The suppression of ecclesiastical supremacy—The freedom of the press, and the security of personal liberty, appear to be duly appreciated by him, as the only foundations of a social compact suited to the wants of his Country; and with these fundamental principles, no preference for European connections, much less predilections for European princes can be entertained.

The foundation of our municipal Institutions is equal rights. The basis of all our intercourse with foreign powers is Reciprocity. We have not demanded, nor would we have accepted special priviledges of any kind in return for an acknowledgment of Independence. But that which we have not desired and would not have accepted for ourselves, we have a right to insist ought not to be granted others. Recognition is in its nature, not a subject of equivalent; it is claimable of right or not at all. You will therefore strenuously maintain the right of the United States to be treated in every respect on the footing of the most favoured; or as it is more properly expressed, the most friendly nation—*Gentis amicissima*; and should you negotiate a Treaty of Commerce you will make that principle the foundation of all its provisions. . . .

Heretofore while the Government of Buenos Ayres authorized and encouraged a system of privateering as one of their means of warfare against Spain, among the many complaints which in its consequences it gave us too much reason to make, was that of the seduction of our seamen from our Merchant-vessels frequenting the Port, to man the privateers fitting out under the Buenos Ayrean flag. This mischief was much aggravated by two Articles in their privateering ordinance, substantially violating the Laws of

Nations, and opening the door to the most outrageous abuses. Mr. Forbes was instructed to remonstrate against them; and among the earliest and wisest acts of the present administration after the appointment of Mr. Rivadavia was the renovation of all the privateering Commissions. The right to renew them was reserved, but has not been exercised. Should it be so during your residence there, you will renew the remonstrance particularly against the two Articles; the 3d. and 8th. of the privateering ordinance of 15th May 1817, by the first of which *foreigners* never having even been in the Country may be Captains and Officers of privateers; while by the other they have a discretionary power to send their prizes where they please. These two Articles are little less than licenses of Piracy. They trespassed upon the rights of other nations, and held out the worst of temptations to their seamen. It is sincerely hoped they will never be revived.

The present administration have in other respects manifested a disposition to protect our Merchant-vessels in their ports from the desertion of their seamen, and at the representation of Mr. Forbes, issued on the 14th March 1822, an ordinance of maritime police entirely satisfactory. Since that time it is not known that the Masters of any of our vessels there have had occasion to complain of the loss of their seamen by desertion; and the principle having been thus established, it may be hoped there will be no cause for complaint hereafter. Your attention to the maritime ordinance is invited only as it may point you to the remedy already provided, should there be a necessity for resorting to it. . . .

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John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Richard C. Anderson, appointed United States Minister to Colombia[1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *May 27, 1823.*

The revolution which has severed the colonies of Spanish America from European thraldom, and left them to form self-dependent Governments as members of the society of civilized nations, is among the most important events in modern history. As a general movement in human affairs it is perhaps no more than a development of principles first brought into action

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, IX, 274. In *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 888, will be found extracts from this instruction which contain some paragraphs not included here since they are not pertinent and omit several portions here included which are pertinent. Anderson was commissioned minister to Colombia, January 27, 1823. He took leave, June 7, having been commissioned to go to the Congress of Panama, and died *en route* at Cartagena, July 24, 1826.

by the separation of these States from Great Britain, and by the practical illustration, given in the formation and establishment of our Union, to the doctrine that voluntary agreement is the only legitimate source of authority among men, and that all just Government is a compact. It was impossible that such a system as Spain had established over her colonies should stand before the progressive improvement of the understanding in this age, or that the light shed upon the whole earth by the results of our Revolution should leave in utter darkness the regions immediately adjoining upon ourselves. The independence of the Spanish colonies, however, has proceeded from other causes, and has been achieved upon principles in many respects different from ours. In our Revolution the principle of the social compact was, from the beginning, in immediate issue. It originated in a question of *right* between the Government in Europe and the subject in America. Our *independence* was declared in defence of our *liberties*, and the attempt to make the yoke a yoke of oppression was the cause and the justification for casting it off.

The revolution of the Spanish colonies was not caused by the oppression under which they had been held, however great it had been. Their independence was first forced upon them by the temporary subjugation of Spain herself to a foreign power. They were, by that event, cast upon themselves, and compelled to establish Governments of their own. Spain, through all the vicissitudes of her own revolutions, has clung to the desperate hope of retaining or reclaiming them to her own control, and has waged, to the extent of her power, a disastrous war to that intent. In the mind of every rational man it has been for years apparent that Spain can never succeed to recover her dominion where it has been abjured, nor is it probable that she can long retain the small remnant of her authority yet acknowledged in some spots of the South American continent, and in the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico.

The political course of the United States, from the first dawning of South American independence, has been such as was prescribed by their relative duties to all the parties. Being on terms of peace and amity with Spain through all the changes of her own Government, they have considered the struggles of the colonies for independence as a case of civil war, to which their national obligations prescribed to them to remain neutral. Their policy, their interest, and their feelings, all concurred to favor the cause of the colonies; and the principles upon which the right of independence has been maintained by the South American patriots have been approved, not only as identical with those upon which our own independence was asserted and achieved, but as involving the whole theory of Government on the emphatically American foundation of the sovereignty of the people and the unalienable rights of man. To a cause reposing upon this basis the people of this country never could be indifferent, and their sympathies have accord-

ingly been, with great unanimity and constancy, enlisted in its favor. The sentiments of the Government of the United States have been in perfect harmony with those of their people, and while forbearing, as their duties of neutrality prescribed, from every measure which could justly be construed as hostile to Spain, they have exercised all the moral influence which they possessed to countenance and promote the cause of independence. So long as a contest of arms, with a rational or even remote prospect of eventual success, was maintained by Spain, the United States could not recognise the independence of the colonies as existing *de facto* without trespassing on their duties to Spain by assuming as decided that which was precisely the question of the war. In the history of South American independence there are two periods, clearly distinguishable from each other: the first, that of its origin, when it was rather a war of independence against France than against Spain; and the second, from the restoration of Ferdinand VII, in 1814. Since that period the territories now constituting the Republic of Colombia have been the only theatre upon which Spain has been able to maintain the conflict offensively, with even a probable color of ultimate success. But when, in 1815, she made her greatest effort, in the expedition from Cadiz, commanded by Morillo, Mexico, Peru, and Chile were yet under her authority; and had she succeeded in reducing the coast of Terra Firma and New Granada, the provinces of La Plata, divided among themselves, and weakened by the Portuguese occupation of Montevideo, would probably not have held out against her long. This, at least, was the calculation of her policy; and from the geographical position of those countries, which may be termed the heart of South America, the conclusion might well be drawn that if the power of Spain could not be firmly reseated there, it must be, on her part, a fruitless struggle to maintain her supremacy in any part of the American continent. The expedition of Morillo, on its first arrival, was attended with signal success. Carthagena was taken, the whole coast of Terra Firma was occupied, and New Granada was entirely subdued. A remnant of Patriots in Venezuela, with their leader, Bolivar, returning from expulsion, revived the cause of independence; and after the campaign of 1819, in which they reconquered the whole of New Granada, the demonstration became complete, that every effort of Spain to recover the South American continent must thenceforward be a desperate waste of her own resources, and that the truest friendship of other nations to her would consist in making her sensible that her own interest would be best consulted by the acknowledgment of that independence which she could no longer effectually dispute.

To this conclusion the Government of the United States had at an earlier period arrived. But from that emergency, the President has considered the question of recognition, both in a moral and political view, as merely a question of the proper *time*. While Spain could entertain a reasonable hope of maintaining the war and of recovering her authority, the acknowledgment

of the colonies as independent States would have been a wrong to her; but she had no right, upon the strength of this principle, to maintain the pretension after she was manifestly disabled from maintaining the contest, and, by unreasonably withholding her acknowledgment, to deprive the Independents of their right to demand the acknowledgment of others. To fix upon the precise *time* when the duty to respect the prior sovereign right of Spain should cease, and that of yielding to the claim of acknowledgment would commence, was a subject of great delicacy, and, to the President, of constant and anxious solicitude. It naturally became, in the first instance, a proper subject of consultation with other powers having relations of interest to themselves with the newly opened countries as well as influence in the general affairs of Europe. In August, 1818, a formal proposal was made to the British Government for a concerted and contemporary recognition of the independence of Buenos Ayres, then the only one of the South American States which, having declared independence, had no *Spanish* force contending against it within its borders; and where it therefore most unequivocally existed *in fact.* The British Government declined accepting the proposal themselves, without, however, expressing any disapprobation of it; without discussing it as a question of principle, and without assigning any reason for the refusal, other than that it did not then suit with their policy. It became a subject of consideration at the deliberations of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, in October, 1818. There is reason to believe that it disconcerted projects which were there entertained of engaging the European Alliance in actual operations against the South Americans, as it is well known that a plan for their joint mediation between Spain and her colonies, for restoring them to her authority, was actually matured and finally failed at that place, only by the refusal of Great Britain to accede to the condition of employing *force* eventually against the South Americans for its accomplishment. Some dissatisfaction was manifested by several members of the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle at this avowal on the part of the United States of their readiness to recognize the independence of Buenos Ayres.

The reconquest, in the campaign of 1819, of New Granada to the Patriot cause was immediately followed by the formation of the Republic of Colombia, consisting of three great divisions of the preceding Spanish Government: Venezuela, Cundinamarca, and Quito. It was soon succeeded by the dissolution of the Spanish authority in Mexico; by the revolution in Spain itself; and by the military operations which resulted in the declaration of independence in Peru. In November, 1820, was concluded the armistice between the Generals Morillo and Bolivar, together with a subsequent treaty, stipulating that, in case of the renewal of the war, the parties would abstain from all hostilities and practices not consistent with the modern law of nations and the humane maxims of civilization. In February, 1821, the partial independence of Mexico was proclaimed at Yguala; and in August

of the same year was recognized by the Spanish Viceroy and Captain General O'Donoju, at Cordova.

The formation of the Republic of Colombia, by the fundamental law of the 17th of December, 1819, was notified to this Government by its agent, the late Don Manuel Torres, on the 20th of February, 1821, with a request that it might be recognized by the Government of the United States, and a proposal for the negotiation of treaties of commerce and navigation, *founded upon the bases of reciprocal utility and perfect equality*, as the most efficacious means of strengthening and increasing the relations of amity between the two Republics.

The request and proposal were renewed in a letter from Mr. Torres, of the 30th of November, 1821, and again repeated on the 2d of January, 1822. In the interval since the first demand, the General Congress of the new Republic had assembled, and formed a constitution, founded upon the principles of popular representation, and divided into legislative, executive, and judicial authorities. The Government under this constitution had been organized and was in full operation; while, during the same period, the principal remnant of the Spanish force had been destroyed by the battle of Carabobo, and its last fragments were confined to the two places of Porto Cabello and Panama.

Under these circumstances, a resolution of the House of Representatives of the United States, on the 30th of January, 1822, requested of the President to lay before the House the communications from the agents of the United States with the Governments south of the United States which had declared their independence, and those from the agents of such Governments here with the Secretary of State, tending to show the political condition of their Governments and the state of the war between them and Spain. In transmitting to the House the papers called for by this resolution, the President, by his message of the 8th of March, 1822, declared his own persuasion that the time had arrived when, in strict conformity to the law of nations and in the fulfilment of the duties of equal and impartial justice to all parties, the acknowledgment of the independence declared by the Spanish American colonies could no longer be withheld. Both Houses of Congress having almost unanimously concurred with these views of the President, an appropriation was made by law (4th of May, 1822,) for such missions to the independent nations on the American continent as the President should deem proper.

On the day after the President's message of the 8th of March, the Spanish minister, Anduaga, addressed to this Department a remonstrance against the measure which it recommended, and a solemn protest against the recognition of the Governments mentioned of the insurgent Spanish provinces of America. He was answered on the 6th of April, by a letter recapitulating the circumstances under which the Government of the United States had

"yielded to an obligation of duty of the highest order, by recognizing as independent States nations which, after deliberately asserting their right to that character, had maintained and established it against all the resistance which had been or could be brought to oppose it." On the 24th of April he gave information that the Spanish Government had disavowed the treaty of the 24th of August, 1821, between the Captain General O'Donoju and Colonel Iturbide, and had denied the authority of the former to conclude it.

On the 12th of February, 1822, the Spanish Extraordinary Cortes adopted the report of a committee proposing the appointment of Commissioners to proceed to South America to negotiate with the revolutionary Patriots concerning the relations to be established thereafter in regard to their connexion with Spain. They declared, at the same time, all treaties made with them before that time by Spanish commanders, implying any acknowledgment of their independence, null and void, as not having been authorized by the Cortes; and on the next day they passed three resolutions, the first annulling expressly the treaty between O'Donoju and Iturbide.

The second, "That the Spanish Government, by a declaration to all others with which it has friendly relations, make known to them that the Spanish nation will regard, *at any epoch*, as a violation of the treaties, the recognition, either partial or absolute, of the independence of the Spanish provinces of Ultramer, so long as the dissensions which exist between some of them and the Metropolis *are not terminated*, with whatever else may serve to convince foreign Governments that Spain has not yet renounced any of the rights belonging to it in those countries."

The third resolution recommended to the Government to take all necessary measures, and to apply to the Cortes for the needed resources to preserve and recover the authority of Spain in the ultramarine provinces.

These measures of the Cortes were not known to the President of the United States when he sent to Congress his message of the 8th of March; but information of them was received while the bill making an appropriation for the missions was before Congress, and on the 25th of April a resolution of the Senate requested of the President any information he might have, proper to be disclosed, from our minister at Madrid, or from the Spanish minister resident in this country, concerning the views of Spain relative to the recognition of the independence of the South American colonies and of the dictamen of the Spanish Cortes. In answer to this resolution, the letter from Mr. Anduaga, protesting against the recognition, and one from Mr. Forsyth, inclosing a translation of the dictamen, were transmitted to the Senate, which, with all these documents before them, gave their concurrent sanction, with that of the House of Representatives, to the passage of the bill of appropriation.

This review of the proceedings of the Government of the United States in

relation to the independence of Spanish America has been taken to show the consistency of the principles by which they were uniformly dictated, and that they have been always eminently friendly to the new Republics, and disinterested. While Spain maintained a doubtful contest with arms to recover her dominion it was regarded as a civil war. When that contest became so manifestly desperate that Spanish Viceroys, Governors, and Captain Generals themselves, concluded treaties with the insurgents, virtually acknowledging their independence, the United States frankly and unreservedly recognized the fact, without making their acknowledgment the price of any favor to themselves, and although at the hazard of incurring the displeasure of Spain. In this measure they have taken the lead of the whole civilized world; for, although the Portuguese Brazilian Government had, a few months before, recognized the revolutionary Government of Buenos Ayres, it was at a moment when a projected declaration of their own independence made the question substantially their own cause, and it was presented as an equivalent for a reciprocal recognition of their own much more questionable right to the eastern shore of La Plata.

On the 17th day of June, 1822, Mr. Manuel Torres was received by the President of the United States as the chargé d'affaires from the Republic of Colombia, and the immediate consequence of our recognition was the admission of the vessels of the South American nations, under their own colors, into the ports of the principal maritime nations of Europe.

The European alliance of Emperors and Kings have assumed, as the foundation of human society, the doctrine of unalienable *allegiance*. Our doctrine is founded upon the principle of unalienable *right*. The European allies, therefore, have viewed the *cause* of the South Americans as rebellion against their lawful sovereign. We have considered it as the assertion of natural right. They have invariably shown their disapprobation of the revolution, and their wishes for the restoration of the Spanish power. We have as constantly favored the standard of independence and of America. In contrasting the principles and the motives of the European powers, as manifested in their policy towards South America, with those of the United States, it has not been my intention to boast of our superior purity, or to lay a claim of merit to any extraordinary favor from South America in return. Disinterestedness must be its own reward; but in the establishment of our future political and commercial intercourse with the new Republics it will be necessary to recur often to the principles in which it originated; they will serve to mark the boundaries of the rights which we may justly claim in our future relations with them, and to counteract the efforts which it cannot be doubted European negotiators will continue to make in the furtherance of their monarchical and monopolizing contemplations.

Upon a territory by one-half more extensive than the whole inhabited part of the United States, with a population of less than four millions of

souls, the Republic of Colombia has undertaken to establish a single, and not a confederated Government.

Whether this attempt will be found practicable in execution may be susceptible of doubt; but in the new organization of society upon this hemisphere, even unsuccessful experiments lead to results by which the science of Government is advanced and the happiness of man is promoted. The Republic of Colombia has a constitution deliberately formed and adopted upon principles entirely republican, with an elective Legislature in two branches, a distribution of the powers of Government, with the exception of the federative character, almost identical with our own, and articles declaratory of the natural rights of the citizen to personal security, property, and reputation, and of the inviolable liberty of the press. With such a constitution, in such a country, the modifications which experience may prove to be necessary for rendering the political institutions most effectually competent to the ends of civil Government, will make their own way by peaceable and gradual conquests of public opinion. If a single Government should be found inadequate to secure and protect the rights of the people living under it, a federation of Republics may, without difficulty, be substituted in its place. Practical effect having once been given to the principle that lawful government is a compact and not a grant, the pretences for resorting to force for effecting political revolutions disappear. The subordination of the military to the civil power is the only principle yet remaining to be established in Colombia to insure the liberties of the future generations as well as those of the present age; and that subordination, although not directly guarantied by their present constitution, is altogether conformable to its spirit.

In the letter of February 20, 1821, from the late Mr. Torres, demanding the recognition of the Republic of Colombia, it has been observed that the additional proposal was made of negotiating "*treaties of navigation and commerce*, founded upon the bases of reciprocal utility and perfect equality, as the most efficacious means of strengthening and increasing the relations of amity between the two Republics."

In compliance with this proposal, among the documents furnished you, for proceeding upon the mission to which you have been appointed, of minister plenipotentiary to the Republic of Colombia, is a full power which will authorize you to negotiate with any plenipotentiary or plenipotentiaries of that Government, duly provided with like powers, such a treaty. The President wishes, however, that every step in such negotiation should be taken with full deliberation. The treaty, if concluded, must, as you are aware, be reserved subject to ratification here, with the advice and consent of the Senate, by the constitutional majority of two-thirds, as by the constitution of Colombia (article 120) their treaties, to be valid, must receive the consent and approbation of their Congress.

Our commercial relations with the Colombian territory are of so recent origin, and have depended so much upon the revolutionary condition of that country, under which they have arisen, that our knowledge of their state and character is very imperfect, although we are certain that they are altogether different from those which may be expected to arise from permanent interests, when the independence of the Republic shall be universally recognized, and a free trade shall be opened to its inhabitants with all parts of the world. The only important point now to be settled, as the radical principle of all our future commercial intercourse, is the basis proposed by Mr. Torres, of *reciprocal utility and perfect equality*. As the necessary consequence of which, you will claim that, without waiting for the conclusion of a treaty, the commerce and navigation of the United States, in the ports of the Colombian Republic, should be received on the footing of equality with the most favored nation. It is hoped, indeed, that on your arrival at the place of your destination you will find the principle already settled, assurances to that effect having been given by the Minister of Foreign Relations to Mr. Todd. . . .

The spirit of the Colombian constitution is explicitly that of entire and unqualified independence, and the sentiments expressed by Dr. Gual to Mr. Todd have been altogether conformable to it. He has declared that the intention of the Government is to treat all *foreign* nations upon the footing of equal favor and of perfect reciprocity. This is all that the United States will require, and this, so far as their interests are concerned, they have a right to exact.

It had been, in the first instance, proposed by Mr. Torres that the treaty of commerce and navigation should be negotiated *here*, and he informed me that a minister would be appointed with powers and instructions sufficient for concluding it at this place. Dr. Gual has informed Mr. Todd that the views of the Colombian Government have since undergone a change; and although they have appointed Mr. Salazar as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, and in March last he was under instructions to proceed forthwith upon his mission to this country, they were, nevertheless, exceedingly desirous that the *treaty* should be negotiated there.

The President deems it of no material importance to the United States whether the treaty shall be negotiated at Washington or at Bogota; but the proposal having first been made for concluding it here, it was natural to inquire what it was that produced the change in the wishes of the Colombian Government with regard to the seat of the negotiation. Dr. Gual intimated confidentially to Mr. Todd that it had proceeded from two causes: one, the desire to establish a *precedent* which might prevail upon the great *European* Governments to negotiate likewise with the Republic at its own capital, and thereby hasten them to the recognition of Colombian independence; and the

other, a jealousy of their own negotiators in Europe, who were apt to become themselves entangled with European intrigues, and to involve the Republic in unsuitable and perplexing engagements. With regard to the second of these causes, whatever occasion may have been given to the distrust of their own agents which it avows, it could have no application to their transactions with the United States. By assuming the principles of independence, equality, and reciprocity as the foundations of all our negotiations, we discard all the incentives and all the opportunities for double dealing, overreaching, and corrupt caballing. We shall ask nothing which the Colombian Republic can have any interest to deny. We shall offer nothing for which she may be unwilling to yield the fair equivalent. To the other reason, however, the President the more readily accedes, because, perceiving its full force, it gives him an opportunity of manifesting in action the friendly disposition of the United States towards the Republic, and their readiness to promote by all proper means the recognition of its independence by the great European powers.

In the negotiation of all commercial treaties there is undoubtedly an advantage, at least of convenience, enjoyed by the party which treats *at home;* and this advantage acquires greater importance when, as is now the case with both parties, the treaty, to become valid, must obtain the assent of legislative assemblies. This advantage, in the ordinary course of things, accrues to the party to whom the proposal of negotiation is first made. Independent, then, of all questions of precedence, and without resorting to the example of the first treaties negotiated by the United States, both of which considerations have been mentioned by Mr. Todd to Dr. Gual, the United States might insist upon having the negotiation concluded *here*, not only as the first proposal of it was made to them, but because the proposal itself was that it should be concluded here. The President, however, is well aware of the stimulus which a treaty negotiated, and even a negotiation known to be in progress at Bogota, will apply to the attention of European interests, and has no doubt that it will press them to the recognition more powerfully than they have been urged by the example, or are likely to be by the exhortations of the North American Government. You are accordingly furnished, by his direction, with the full power necessary for the conclusion of the treaty. . . .

Among the usual objects of negotiation in treaties of commerce and navigation are the liberty of conscience and of religious worship. Articles to this effect have been seldom admitted in Roman Catholic countries, and are even interdicted by the present constitution of Spain. The South American Republics have been too much under the influence of the same intolerant spirit; but the Colombian constitution is honorably distinguished by exemption from it. The 10th and 11th articles of our treaty with Prussia, or articles to the like effect, may be proposed for insertion in the projected

treaty; and after setting the first example in South America of a constitution unsullied by prohibitions of religious liberty, Colombia will deserve new honors in the veneration of present and future ages by giving her *positive* sanction to the freedom of conscience, and by stipulating it in her first treaty with these United States. It is, in truth, an essential part of the system of American independence. Civil, political, commercial, and religious liberty, are but various modifications of one great principle, founded in the unalienable rights of human nature, and before the universal application of which the colonial domination of Europe over the American hemisphere has fallen, and is crumbling into dust. *Civil* liberty *can* be established on no foundation of human reason which will not at the same time demonstrate the *right* to religious freedom. The tendency of the spirit of the age is so strong towards religious liberty that we cannot doubt it will soon banish from the constitutions of the southern Republics of this hemisphere all those intolerant religious establishments with which they have hitherto been trammelled. Religious and military coercion will be alike discarded from all the institutions framed for the protection of human rights in civil society of independent nations, and the freedom of opinion and of faith will be guarantied by the same sanction as the rights to personal liberty and security. To promote this event by all the moral influence which we can exercise, whether of example, of friendly counsel, or of persuasion, is among the duties which devolve upon us in the formation of our future relations with our southern neighbors; and in the intercourse which is hereafter to subsist between us, as their citizens who may visit or transiently reside with us will enjoy the benefit of religious freedom in its utmost latitude, we are bound to claim for our countrymen who may occasionally dwell for a time with them the reciprocal exercise of the same natural rights.

In the present imperfect state of our information with regard to the existing commerce between the two countries, and the uncertainty as to what its future and permanent relations may be, it would be useless to enter into any further detail of articles which it may be proper to propose for the intended treaty of commerce. The Republic of Colombia, if permanently organized to embrace the whole territory which it now claims, and blessed with a Government effectually protective of the rights of its people, is undoubtedly destined to become hereafter one of the mightiest nations of the earth. Its central position upon the surface of the globe, directly communicating at once with the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, north and south, with the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, brings it into relations of proximity with every other part of the world; while the number and variety of its ports on every sea by which it is surrounded, the magnitude and extent of its navigable rivers, three of which, the Amazon, the Orinoco, and the Magdalena, are among the largest in the world, intersecting with numberless tributary streams, and in every direction the continent of South America, and furnish-

ing the means of water communication from every point of its circumference to every spot upon its surface; the fertility of its soil; the general healthiness and beauty of its climate; the profusion with which it breeds and bears the precious and the useful metals, present a combination of elements unparalleled in the location of the human race, and relieve, at least from all charge of enthusiasm, the sentiment expressed by the late Mr. Torres, that this republic appeared to have been destined by the Author of Nature "as the centre and the *empire* of the human family."

But it is to *man*, placed in a Paradise like this, that Nature, with her loudest, voice exclaims: "God to *thee* has done his part—do thine;" and the part of man, so gifted and so endowed, is to enjoy and to communicate the bounties of Providence so largely lavished upon him, and not to fancy himself destined to the *empire* of the human family. If the natural advantages bestowed upon the Colombian territory were to be improved by its inhabitants only for purposes of empire, that which nature has bestowed as a blessing upon them would, in its consequences prove a curse inflicted upon the rest of mankind. The territory of Colombia contains, at this moment, little more than three million and a half of souls. Were it only as populous as its late parent country, Spain, it would bear one hundred millions; and if as populous as France, nearly three times that number. At the most rapid rate of increase which human population has ever attained, even a doubling every quarter of a century, the Republic of Colombia, for two hundred years to come, may devote all her exertions to the improvement of her internal means of subsistence for the multiplying myriads of her people, without seeking support from the extension of her empire beyond her own borders. Let her look to *commerce* and *navigation*, and not to empire, as her means of communication with the rest of the human family. These are the principles upon which *our* confederated Republic is founded, and they are those upon which we hope our sisters of the southern continent will ultimately perceive it to be for their own welfare, no less than for that of the world, that they should found themselves.

The *materials* of commercial intercourse between the United States and the Colombian Republic are at present not many. Our exports to it hitherto have been confined to flour, rice, salted provisions, lumber, a few manufactured articles, warlike stores, and arms, and some East India productions, for which we have received cocoa, coffee, indigo, hides, copper, and specie. Much of this trade has originated and has continued only by the war in which that country has been engaged, and will cease with it. As producing and navigating nations, the United States and Colombia will be rather competitors and rivals than customers to each other. But as navigators and manufacturers, *we* are already so far advanced in a career upon which *they* are yet to enter, that we may, for many years after the conclusion of the war, maintain with them a commercial intercourse, highly beneficial to both

parties, as *carriers* to and for them of numerous articles of manufacture and of foreign produce. It is the nature of commerce, when unobstructed by interference of authority, to find its own channels and to make its own way. Let us only not undertake to regulate that which will best regulate itself.

In the conferences between Dr. Gual and Mr. Todd, the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs has spoken of treaties, *almost* treaties of alliance, concluded by the Colombian plenipotentiary, Mosquera, with the Governments of Peru and of Chile, and which he expected would also be shortly concluded with Buenos Ayres. The purport of these treaties was mentioned by Dr. Gual only in general terms, but he said that Mr. Salazar would be authorized to communicate copies of them to this Government, and eventually to propose that the United States should accede to them, or take a part in the system which it was their purpose to originate. In January last, about the same time when Dr. Gual was making this confidential communication to Mr. Todd, we learn, by despatches from Mr. Forbes, that Mr. Mosquera was at Buenos Ayres, and had made his proposals of negotiation to the Government there. Mr. Forbes speaks doubtfully of his prospects of success. The general intention, but not the specific purport of the treaties had also been communicated by Mr. Mosquera to Mr. Forbes. But the Colombian minister had been more confidential with Mr. Prevost, who, in a despatch dated the 14th of December last, states that he had obtained a sight of the original treaty. He describes it in a preceding letter as a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, containing "a pledge from each of the contracting parties to send deputies to the Isthmus, within a limited time, for the double purpose of effecting an union in support of a representative system throughout, and of preventing partial associations with any one of the powers of Europe. An agent (he adds) has gone to Mexico with the same object; and it is in contemplation, as soon as the several treaties shall be ratified by Colombia, to invite a representation from the United States to preside at a meeting intended to assimilate the politics of the south with those of the north;" and in a letter of 14th December, after having seen the treaty, he says: "It embraces in the most express terms the several objects to which I alluded, together with a stipulation not to enter into partial arrangements with Spain, and not to listen to overtures on her part unaccompanied with an acknowledgment of the independence of all."

Mr. Prevost, as well as Dr. Gual, entertains higher expectations of the success of this negotiation at Buenos Ayres than Mr. Forbes. Mr. Prevost thinks that it must succeed, although the Government of Buenos Ayres is secretly averse to it, and implicated in secret intrigues with the Portuguese Government and General Le Cor for a confederacy of a different character. Dr. Gual told Mr. Todd that proposals had been made by the Portuguese Government at Lisbon, to Colombia, for a general confederacy of all America, North and South, together with the Constitutional Governments of *Portugal*

and Spain, as a counterpoise to the European *Holy Alliance;* but he said they had been rejected on account of their *European aspect.* Loose and indefinite projects of the same kind have been presented by the present Portuguese Government to us, but they have never been considered even as objects of deliberation. Brazil has declared its own independence of Portugal, and constituted itself into an Empire, with an Emperor at its head. General Le Cor has lost the real command of his own army, and has been, or cannot fail shortly to be, compelled to embark, with all his European Portuguese troops, for Lisbon. Then will come the question between Buenos Ayres and Brazil, for Montevideo and the Oriental Band of La Plata, and then will soon be seen that the Republican Hemisphere will endure neither Emperor nor King upon its shores.

Of this mighty movement in human affairs, mightier far than that of the downfall of the Roman Empire, the United States may continue to be, as they have been hitherto, the tranquil but deeply attentive spectators. They *may*, also, in the various vicissitudes by which it must be followed, be called to assume a more active and leading part in its progress. Floating, undigested purposes of this great American confederation have been for some time fermenting in the imaginations of many speculative statesmen; nor is the idea to be disdainfully rejected because its magnitude may appal the understanding of politicians accustomed to the more minute but more complicated machinery of a contracted political standard.

So far as the proposed Colombian confederacy has for its object a combined system of total and unqualified *independence* of Europe, to the exclusion of all partial compositions of any one of the emancipated colonies with Spain, it will have the entire approbation and good wishes of the United States, but will require no special agency of theirs to carry it into effect.

So far as its purposes may be to concert a general system of popular representation for the government of the several independent States which are floating from the wreck of the Spanish power in America, the United States will still cheer it with their approbation, and speed with their good wishes its success.

And so far as its objects may be to accomplish a meeting, at which the United States should preside, to assimilate the politics of the south with those of the north, a more particular and definite view of the end proposed by this design, and of the means by which it is to be effected, will be necessary to enable us to determine upon our concurrence with it. An agent from France, named Molien, and Mr. Lorich, the Consul General of Sweden in the United States, arrived at Bogota in January last. Dr. Gual told Mr. Todd that Molien had no letters or avowed powers, though he had intimated he was there by authority; that he was considered as a spy on behalf of a faction in France. "He had insinuated that the United States were *influenced by interested motives* in recognizing the new Governments in South

America; *that our influence in Europe had been impaired* by a measure which *was considered premature;* and that he supposed we were now endeavoring to procure exclusive advantages for having been the first to recognize." And Dr. Gual added, that Mr. Molien undertook "to give him some advice as to our views"—Mr. Lorich came with authority.

The political systems of Europe are all founded upon partial rights and *exclusive* privileges. The colonial system had no other basis; and having no generous or liberal views of their own, it is not surprising that they should entertain and disseminate suspicions of the disinterestedness of others. The French Government sends an agent to Bogota, without daring to trust him with a credential or an avowed power; and he executes his commission by misrepresenting our motives, upon *suspicions* which those to whom he makes the misrepresentation know to be unfounded, and by testifying to those who were benefitted by our recognition that we had made it by the sacrifice of some part of our influence in Europe. It must be admitted that the address of the agent in the performance of his trust was upon a level with the candor and frankness in which it originated. While the French Government pursues its new career in the affairs of the World, with Such designs, it is to be hoped the development of them will be committed to Such performers.

Mr. Lorich's mission was simply to obtain exclusive privileges for Sweden, which as she had nothing of exclusive benefit to offer in return, were of course rejected.

We are well aware that our recognition of South American independence was not palatable to the taste of any of the European Governments. But we felt that it was a subject upon which it became us to take the lead, and as we knew that the European Governments, sooner or later, must and would, whether with good or with bad grace, follow our example, we determined that both Europe and America should have the benefit of it. We hope, also, and this is the only return which we ask, and have a right to ask, from the South Americans for our forwardness in their favor, that Europe will be compelled to follow the whole of our example—that is, to recognize without condition and without equivalent. We claim no exclusive privilege for ourselves. We trust to the sense of justice, as well as to the interest of the South Americans, the denial of all exclusive privileges to others. The Colombian Government, at various times, have manifested a desire that the United States should take some further and active part in obtaining the recognition of their independence by the European Governments, and particularly by Great Britain. This has been done even before it was solicited. All the ministers of the United States in Europe have, for many years, been instructed to promote the cause, by any means consistent with propriety and adapted to their end, at the respective places of their residence. The formal proposal of a concerted recognition was made to Great Britain before the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. At the request of Mr. Torres, on his dying bed, and signified to

us after his decease, Mr. Rush was instructed to give every aid in his power, without offence to the British Government, to obtain the admission of Mr. Ravenga; of which instruction we have recent assurances from Mr. Rush that he is constantly mindful. Our own recognition undoubtedly opened all the ports of Europe to the Colombian flag, and your mission to Colombia, as well as those to Buenos Ayres and Chile, cannot fail to stimulate the cabinets of maritime Europe, if not by the liberal motives which influenced us, at least by selfish impulses, to a direct, simple, and unconditional recognition. We shall pursue this policy steadily through all the changes to be foreseen of European affairs. There is every reason to believe that the preponderating tendency of the war in Spain will be to promote the universal recognition of all the South American Governments; and, at all events, our course will be to promote it by whatever influence we may possess.

Several other subjects have been mentioned in the conferences between Dr. Gual and Mr. Todd, upon which it is proper to apprize you of the President's views.

1st. On the 24 January Dr. Gual stated that the Government of Peru entertained the desire of communicating with the United States, and had requested it to be made through that of Colombia. He afterwards mentioned certain complaints of the Peruvian Government against Captain Stewart of the Franklin, as having given convoy to our vessels, conveying Military stores to the ports of the Royalists, and committed other unfriendly acts on their Shores—and he promised to send Mr Todd the papers relating to these complaints. But on the 28th of February he stated that the papers would be transmitted to Mr. Salazar, to be by him laid before this Government.

The President will readily receive any communication from the Government of Peru which it may be disposed to make through the medium of that of Colombia. With regard to the complaint against Captain Stewart we shall wait for the promised communication from Mr. Salazar to take such measures as the occasion may render proper, and they will be adapted as well to the friendly disposition which we feel towards the Peruvian Patriots as to the justice due to a very distinguished and meritorious officer in the service of our own Country. Thus far it may be proper in the present stage of this concern for you to notice the subject on your earliest intercourse with the Colombian Government. But it may also be advisable for you to suggest the enquiry how far the Colombian Government in assuming the office of a complainant for that of Peru, proposes to make itself responsible for the complaints which we in our turn have to urge, and have hitherto ineffectually urged upon the justice of the Peruvian Patriots themselves! You will state that more than three years since, Lord Cochrane issued a proclamation of Blockade as extensive and as outrageous in its violation of the Laws of Nations as that of General Morales of September 1821. That the property of

many Citizens of the United States has been seized under colour of this Blockade, and of other acts equally unjustifiable of which the United States are still to seek the reparation. That the Colombian Minister if received as the Representative of Peru, to complain, will we trust also be commissioned as the representative of Peru to indemnify: and if we are to answer to Colombia for complaints from Peru, Colombia will hold herself responsible to us for the demands we have upon Peru. To the justice of this principle we have no doubt the Colombian Government will readily accede, and if unwilling to assume the obligation of making satisfaction to us for Peruvian wrongs will excuse us from discussing with them any question of Peruvian Rights. . . .

Our intercourse with the Republic of Colombia, and with the territories of which it is composed, is of recent origin, formed while their own condition was altogether revolutionary and continually changing its aspect. Our information concerning them is imperfect, and among the most important objects of your mission will be that of adding to its stores; of exploring the untrodden ground, and of collecting and transmitting to us the knowledge by which the friendly relations between the two countries may be extended and harmonized to promote the welfare of both, with due regard to the peace and good will of the whole family of civilized man. It is highly important that the first foundations of the permanent future intercourse between the two countries should be laid in principles benevolent and liberal in themselves, congenial to the spirit of our institutions, and consistent with the duties of universal philanthropy.

In all your consultations with the Government to which you will be accredited, bearing upon its political relations with this Union, your unvarying standard will be the spirit of independence and of freedom, as *equality* of rights and favors will be that of its commercial relations. The emancipation of the South American continent opens to the whole race of man prospects of futurity, in which this Union will be called, in the discharge of its duties to itself and to unnumbered ages of posterity, to take a conspicuous and leading part. It involves all that is precious in hope, and all that is desirable in existence, to the countless millions of our fellow creatures which, in the progressive revolution of time, this hemisphere is destined to rear and to maintain.

That the fabric of our social connexions with our southern neighbors may rise, in the lapse of years, with a grandeur and harmony of proportion corresponding with the magnificence of the means placed by Providence in our power, and in that of our descendants, its foundations must be laid in principles of politics and of morals new and distasteful to the thrones and dominations of the elder world, but co-extensive with the surface of the globe, and lasting as the changes of time.

I have the honor [etc.].

120

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to José Maria Salazar (Philadelphia), Colombian Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *August 5, 1823.*

SIR: I have the honour of enclosing herewith, a copy of a Circular Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, to the Collectors of the customs, issued by direction of the President of the United States, and containing the regulations prescribed by this Government in the cases of public and private armed vessels, with their prizes, of the Belligerent parties, in the war between Spain and France, and in that between Spain and the Independent Governments established in Spanish America, which, by stress of weather, pursuit of enemies, or some other urgent necessity, may be forced to enter the ports and harbours of the United States.

These regulations have already been in force for several years in respect to the contest between Spain and her ex-colonies. They are marked, at once, by respect for the rights of the Belligerent parties, for the engagements of the United States, and for the neutrality which they have felt it their duty to observe between the parties.

I pray you, Sir, to accept [etc.].

121

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Baron de Tuyll, Russian Minister to the United States[2]

WASHINGTON, *November 15, 1823.*

SIR: I have had the honour of receiving your note of the 4/16 instant,[3] communicating the information that His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias has determined, in no case, to receive any agent whatsoever, either from the Government of the Republic of Colombia, or from any other of the Governments de facto, which owe their existence to the events of which the new world has, for some years past, been the theatre.

Influenced by the considerations which prescribe it as a duty to independent nations to entertain with each other the friendly relations which sentiments of humanity and their mutual interests require, and satisfied that those of South America had become irrevocably independent of Spain, the Government of the United States thought it proper to acknowledge their independence, in March, 1822, by an Act which was then published to the world.

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 149. José Maria Salazar, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Colombia in the United States: Presented credentials, June 10, 1823. Functions ceased, June 17, 1828. Left about July 18, 1829.

[2] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 158. Baron de Tuyll, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Russia to the United States: Presented credentials to the Secretary of State, April 19, 1823. Took leave, March 14, 1826.

[3] See below, pt. XII, doc. 1019.

This Government has, since, interchanged Ministers with the Republic of Colombia, has appointed Ministers of the same rank, to the Governments of Mexico, Buenos Ayres and Chili, has received a Minister and other Diplomatic Agents from Mexico, and preserved, in other respects, the same intercourse with those new States that they have with other powers.

By a recurrence to the Message of the President, a copy of which is enclosed, you will find that this measure was adopted on great consideration; that the attention of this Government had been called to the contest between the Parent Country and the Colonies, from an early period, that it had marked the course of events with impartiality, and had become perfectly satisfied that Spain could not re-establish her authority over them: that, in fact, the new States were completely independent.

From the information contained in your note, it appears that the political principles maintained by his Imperial Majesty and his Allies, have not led the Imperial Government to the same result. I am instructed by the President to assure you that the Government of the United States, respecting in others the Independence of the Sovereign Authority which they exercise themselves, receive the communication of His Imperial Majesty's determination on that subject, in the spirit of candour, frankness, and of amicable disposition, with which it is made.

I avail myself of the occasion [etc.].

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John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain[1]

WASHINGTON, *November 29, 1823.*

SIR: Your despatches[2] numbered 323–325–326–330–331–332–334 and 336 have been received; containing the reports of your conferences, and copies of your confidential correspondence, with Mr. Secretary Canning, in relation to certain proposals made by him, tending to a concert of principles, with reference to the affairs of South America, between the United States and Great Britain, and a combined manifestation of them to the world.

The whole subject has received the deliberate consideration of the President, under a deep impression of its genial importance, a full conviction of the high interests and sacred principles involved in it, and an anxious solici-

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 120.

[2] See below, pt. VIII, docs. 788, 791, 794, 796, 797, 798 and 800, letters from Rush to Adams between the dates, August 19 and October 10, 1823. The dispatch bearing the official number 332 is not printed in this collection since it deals with another subject, the only pertinent portion being a statement that during a recent conference with Canning their "attention was so exclusively engrossed by the South-American subject" that the other was not mentioned.

tude for the cultivation of that harmony of opinions and unity of object, between the British and American Nations, upon which so much of the peace and happiness and liberty of the world obviously depend.

I am directed to express to you the President's entire approbation of the course which you have pursued in referring to your Government the proposals contained in Mr. Canning's private and confidential letter to you, of 20 August; and I am now to signify the determination of the President concerning them:—a determination which he wishes to be at once candid, explicit and conciliatory; and which being formed by refering each of the proposals to the single and unvarying standard of right and wrong, as understood and maintained by us, will present to the British Government the whole system of opinions and of purposes of the American Government with regard to South America.

The first of the *principles* of the British Government, as set forth by Mr. Canning, is—

1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain, to be hopeless.

In this we concur.

The second is—

2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as independent States, to be one of time and circumstances.

We *did* so conceive it, until with a due regard to all the rights of Spain, and with a due sense of our responsibility to the judgment of mankind, and of posterity, we had come to the conclusion that the recovery of them by Spain *was hopeless*. Having arrived at that conclusion, we considered that the people of these emancipated Colonies, were, *of right* independent of all other nations, and that it was our duty so to acknowledge them. We did so acknowledge them, in March, 1822; from which time the recognition has no longer been a question *to us*. We are aware of considerations, just and proper in themselves, which might deter Great Britain from fixing upon the same *time* for this recognition, with us; but we wish to press it earnestly upon her consideration, whether, after having settled the point that the recovery of the colonies by Spain was *hopeless*, and after maintaining, at the cannon's mouth, commercial relations with them, incompatible with their colonial condition, while subject to Spain, the *moral* obligation does not necessarily result of recognizing them as independent States.

> "3. We are however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by *amiable negociation*."

Nor are we—Recognizing them as independent States, we acknowledge them as possessing full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.—Among these, an arrangement between them and Spain, by amicable negociation is one which far from being disposed to im-

pede, we would earnestly desire, and, by every proper means in our power, endeavour to promote, provided it should be founded on the basis of independence. But recognizing them as independent States, we do, and shall justly and necessarily, claim in our relations political and commercial, to be placed upon a footing of equal favour, with the most favoured nation.

"4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves"

"5. We would not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power, with indifference."

In both these positions we concur,—and we add—

That we could not see with indifference, any attempt by one or more powers of Europe to restore those new states to the crown of Spain, or to deprive them, in any manner, whatever of the freedom and independence which they have acquired.

With a view to this object, it is indispensable that the British Government take like ground with that which is now held by the United States, and that it recognize the independence of the new Governments. That measure being taken, we may then harmonize in all the arrangements and acts which may be necessary for its accomplishment. It is upon this ground alone, as we conceive that a firm and determined stand could now be jointly taken by Great-Britain and the United States, in behalf of the *Independence of Nations:* and never, in the history of mankind, was there a period when a stand so taken and maintained, would exhibit to present and future ages, a more glorious example of power, animated by justice, and devoted to the ends of beneficence. On this basis this Government is willing to move in concert with Great-Britain for the purposes specified.

We believe, however, that for the most effectual accomplishment of the object, common to both Governments, a perfect understanding with regard to it being established between them, it will be most advisable that they should act separately, each making such representations to the Continental European Allies, or either of them, as circumstances may render proper, and mutually communicating to each other, the purport of such representations, and all information respecting the measures and purposes of the Allies, the knowledge of which may enlighten the councils of Great Britain and of the United States, in the course of policy, and towards the honourable end, which will be common to them both. Should an emergency occur, in which a *joint* manifestation of opinion, by the two Governments may tend to influence the Councils of the European Allies, either in the aspect of persuasion or of admonition, you will make it known to us without delay, and we shall according to the principles of our Government, and in the forms prescribed by our Constitution, cheerfully join in any act by which we may contribute to support the cause of human freedom, and the Independence of the South American Nations.

I am [etc.].

123

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Heman Allen, appointed United States Minister to Chile[1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *November 30, 1823.*

SIR: I have the honour of enclosing herewith sundry papers, relating to complaints by citizens of the United States, against the officers, civil and military, of the Governments of Chili and Peru.

The character of these complaints, the evidence by which they are supported, and the proceedings hitherto, concerning them, you will collect from the papers themselves; and upon your arrival in Chili, you will take such measures for renewing and maintaining the claim of reparation and indemnity, which the justice of each case may authorize and require. . . .

It is highly important, with regard to the two essential objects of our intercourse with Chili and Peru, the best understanding should be maintained between the Diplomatic and Naval Officers of the United States, stationed in those regions. Those objects are the establishment of the most friendly relations with the people of those countries, under their new Republican Institutions; the manifestation of a warm and cordial sentiment of favour and sympathy to the cause in which they are engaged, so far as that sentiment can be indulged, consistently with our neutrality, and the firm and fearless support of the rights, and lawful interests of the United States and of their citizens. To this end, a copy of the instructions from the Navy Department to Captain Hull, is herewith furnished you, and it is the President's hope and trust, that there will be, between you and him, and every other officer of the squadron in the Pacific, the most cordial concert and co-operation for the benefit of the public service.

I have the honour [etc.].

124

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Richard Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain[2]

WASHINGTON, *November 30, 1823.*

SIR: The instructions contained in my letter, dated yesterday, were given with a view to enable you to return an explicit answer to the proposals contained in Mr. Secretary Canning's confidential letter to you of the 20th of

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 123. Heman Allen, of Vermont: Commissioned minister plenipotentiary to Chile, January 27, 1823. Took leave, July 31, 1827.

[2] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 125.

August, last. The object of this despatch is to communicate to you, the views of the President with regard to a more general consideration of the affairs of South America, to serve for your government, and to be used according to your discretion in any further intercourse which you may have with the British Cabinet on this subject.

In reviewing the proposals of Mr. Canning, and the discussion of them in your correspondence and conferences, the President has, with great satisfaction, adverted to them in the light of an *overture* from the British Government towards a confidential concert of opinions and of operations between us and them, with reference to the Countries heretofore subject to Spain in this Hemisphere. In the exposition of the *principles* of the British Government, as expressed in the five positions of Mr. Canning's letter, we perceive nothing with which we cannot cheerfully concur, with the exception of that which still considers the recognition of the Independence of the Southern nations as a question of time and circumstances. Confident as we are, that the time is at hand when Great Britain, *to preserve* her own consistency, must come to this acknowledgement, we are aware that she may, perhaps, be desirous of reserving to herself the *whole* merit of it, with the South Americans, and that she may finally yield more readily, to the decisive act of recognition, when appearing to be spontaneous, than when urged upon her by *any* foreign suggestion. The point itself has been so earnestly pressed in your correspondence and conferences with Mr. Canning, and is so explicitly stated in my despatch of yesterday, as *indispensable*, in our view, towards a co-operation of the two Governments, upon this important interest, that the President does not think it necessary that you should dwell upon it with much solicitude. The objections exhibited by Mr. Canning against the measure, as stated particularly in your despatches, are so feeble, and your answers to them so conclusive that, after the distinct avowal of our sentiments, it may, perhaps, best conduce to the ultimate, *entire* coincidence of purposes between the two Governments, to leave the choice of *time* for the recognition which Mr. Canning has reserved, to the exclusive consideration of the British Ministers themselves.

We receive the proposals themselves, and all that has hitherto passed concerning them, according to the request of Mr. Canning, as *confidential*. As a first advance of that character which has ever been made by the British Government, in relation to the *foreign* affairs between the two nations, we would meet it, with cordiality, and with the true spirit of confidence, which is candour. The observations of Mr. Canning in reply to your remark that the policy of the United States has hitherto been entirely distinct and separate from all interference in the complications of European politics, have great weight, and the considerations involved in them had already been subjects of much deliberation among ourselves. As a member of the European community, Great Britain has relations with all the other powers of

Europe, which the United States have not, and with which it is their unaltered determination not to interfere. But American affairs, whether of the Northern or of the Southern Continent, *can*, henceforth, not be excluded from the interference of the United States. All questions of policy relating to them, have a bearing so direct upon the rights and interests of the United States themselves, that they cannot be left at the disposal of European Powers, animated and directed, exclusively, by European principles and interests. Aware of the deep importance of United ends and Councils, with those of Great Britain in this emergency, we see no possible basis on which that harmonious concert of measures can be founded, other than the general principle of South American Independence. So long as Great Britain withholds the recognition of that, we may, as we certainly do, concur with her in the aversion to the transfer to any other power of any of the colonies in this Hemisphere, heretofore or yet, belonging to Spain; but the principles of that aversion, so far as they are common to both parties, resting only upon a casual coincidence of interests, in a national point of view *selfish* on both sides, would be liable to dissolution by every change of phase in the aspects of European politics. So that Great Britain, negociating at once with the European Alliance, and *with us*, concerning America, without being bound by any permanent community of principle, with us would still be free to accommodate her policy to any of those distributions of power, and partitions of territory which have, for the last half century, been the ultima ratio of all European political arrangements; while we, bound to her by engagements, commensurate only with the momentary community of our separate, particular interests, and self-excluded from all negociation with the European Alliance, should still be liable to see European Sovereigns dispose of American interests, without consultation, either with us, or with any of the American nations, over whose destinies they would thus assume an arbitrary superintendence and control.

It was stated to you, by Mr. Canning that, in the event of a proposal for a European Congress to determine upon measures relating to South America, he should propose that you, as the Representative of the United States, should be invited to attend at the same; and that, in the case, either of a refusal to give you that invitation, or of your declining to accept it, if given, Great Britain would reserve to herself the right of declining also, to attend. The President approves your determination not to attend in case the invitation should be given; and we are not aware of any circumstances under which we should deem it expedient that a minister of the United States should be authorised to attend at such a Congress, if the invitation to that effect should be addressed to this Government itself. We should certainly decline attending, unless the South American Governments should also be invited to attend by *their* Representatives, and as the Representatives of Independent nations. We would not sanction by our presence any meeting

of European Potentates to dispose of American Republics. We shall, if such meeting should take place, with a view to any result of hostile action, solemnly protest against it, and against all the melancholy and calamitous consequences which may result from it. We earnestly hope that Great Britain will do the same.

It has been observed that through the whole course of the correspondence, and of the conferences between Mr. Canning and you, he did not disclose the specific information upon which he apprehended so immediate an interposition of the European Allies, in the affairs of South America, as would have warranted or required the measure which he proposed to be taken in concert with you, before this Government could be advised of it. And this remark has drawn the more attention, upon observing the apparent coolness, and comparative indifference with which he treated the subject at your last conferences, after the peculiar earnestness and solemnity of his first advances. It would have been more satisfactory here, and would have afforded more distinct light for deliberation, if the confidence in which his proposals originated had at once been entire. This suggestion is now made with a view to the future, and to manifest the disposition, on our part, to meet and return confidence without reserve.

The circumstances of Mr. Gallatin's private concerns having induced him to decline returning to Europe at this time, and the posture of affairs requiring, in the opinion of the President, the immediate renewal of negociations with France, Mr. James Brown has been appointed to that mission, and is expected very shortly to proceed upon it.

I am [etc.].

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Message of President James Monroe, at the commencement of the first session of the Eighteenth Congress of the United States, communicated to the Senate December 2, 1823[1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *December 2, 1823.*

The ministers who were appointed to the republics of Colombia and Buenos Ayres during the last session of Congress proceeded, shortly afterwards, to their destinations. Of their arrival there official intelligence has not yet been received. The minister appointed to the republic of Chili will sail in a few days. An early appointment will also be made to Mexico. A minister has been received from Colombia, and the other Governments have been informed that ministers, or diplomatic agents of inferior grade,

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 247.

would be received from each accordingly as they might prefer the one or the other. . . .

It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. In the war between these new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed, by force, in the internal concerns of Spain. To

what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose Governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the Government *de facto* as the legitimate Government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power; submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.

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John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to José Maria Salazar, Colombian Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *December 5, 1823.*

SIR: I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 6th of September, with its enclosures and also that of the 4th November, all of which have been submitted to the consideration of the President of the United States.

I am instructed to assure you that the disposition of the Government of the United States towards all the Republics of the South, remains as amicable and as earnestly desirous of maintaining with them the most harmonious intercourse, as it has been constantly manifested by its public Acts; and with none more than with the Republic of Colombia. The instructions heretofore given, and those which will hereafter be given to the Commanders and officers of the naval forces of the United States, have been, and will be, dictated by this spirit, and while directed to the protection of the rights

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 160. The two notes of which the receipt is acknowledged are not printed in this collection.

and lawful interests of the United States and their citizens, have been, and will be, marked by the determination to treat with inviolate respect the rights, national and individual of the Southern Republics and their citizens.

A complaint against the Commander of the United States Ship Franklin for the transactions to which the enclosures in your letter of 6th September relate, has been transmitted *directly* through an Agent of the United States at Lima,[1] the answer to which will *be directly* given.

In receiving from you, the Representative of the Republic of Colombia, complaints against an officer of the United States, alledged by the Government of Peru, I am directed before entering into any discussion of them, to enquire whether the Government of Colombia holds itself responsible to the United States and their Citizens, for complaints which they have to prefer against the officers of Peru,—and for the indemnities and reparations to which they are justly entitled for the same.

I avail myself of this occasion, to observe that I shall be happy to communicate verbally with you, upon this and other subjects, whenever it may suit your convenience; and to offer you the renewed assurance [etc.].

127

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to the Minister of State and Foreign Relations of Peru[2]

WASHINGTON, *December 12, 1823.*

SIR: I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 29th of March last, with its enclosures, complaining of "the introduction of two thousand muskets, arms and amunitions to the Spaniards in the Port of Arica, by the Ship Canton, under the protection of the Guns of the United States Ship Franklin, commanded by Commodore Charles Stewart."

And I have also received from Mr John B. Prevost, a copy of your letter to him of the 18th of May last, containing a repetition of the same complaint, and founding upon the same an express demand that the Government of the United States should remove Commodore Charles Stewart from the command of the Naval forces of this Republic, in the South Sea.

These documents have received from the President of the United States, the most deliberate consideration; and I am directed by him to assure your Excellency that, as he has nothing more at heart than to maintain with the Government of Peru the most friendly Relations and intercourse, he would not fail to mark with strong disapprobation any act of an officer in the serv-

[1] See below, pt. 1, doc. 127, Adams to Minister of Foreign Relations of Peru, December 12, 1823.

[2] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 162. The two communications acknowledged herein are not printed in this collection. Their contents are sufficiently revealed in this reply.

ice of the United States, incompatible with their neutrality and unfriendly to the Peruvian Nation, or the cause which they sustain.

The instructions given to Captain Stewart, and to all the Commanders of the Naval forces of the United States, in the Pacific, have been dictated by the Spirit of the most cordial friendship towards the Independent Nations of the South, and of sympathy to the Patriotic cause. The distinguished merit of that officer whose services to the United States have been at once a title to the highest consideration of his fellow citizens, and a pledge of good conduct under every circumstance that might arise countenances the hope and expectation that he could not be unmindful of those instructions, or of the well known dispositions of this Government, and that the charges against him before the Government of Peru have been raised upon erroneous impressions.

This hope and expectation are strengthened by the decisive proof, furnished in documents which have been transmitted to this country, that no muskets, arms or ammunitions were introduced or landed at Arica by, or from, the Ship Canton, the vessel which, at that place, received the protection of Captain Stewart. This fact is so fully established and was so well known to Mr. Prevost, that had the correspondence enclosed in your letter of the 29th March, been communicated to him, it is not doubted that he would have satisfied your Excellency that the charge against Captain Stewart in relation to the Ship Canton was altogether without foundation.

It is also my duty to observe to your Excellency that in the letter of Captain Prunier, Commander of the Brig Belgrano, to Captain Stewart, dated 11th July, 1822, the only ground alledged of the intention of Captain Prunier to take the Ship Canton, then under the Protection of Captain Stewart, was the *suspicion* that the Canton had broken a blockade, declared by the Government of Peru, from the 15th to the 22d degree of South latitude—which the Government of the United States cannot, consistently with the principles which it has invariably maintained, acknowledge as a lawful blockade—and no part of which the naval officers of the United States were, conformably to the Laws of Nations, bound to observe.

With the reiterated assurance of the deep interest which the United States take in the welfare, prosperity and Independence of the people of Peru, and of the determination of this Government to maintain with yours the most friendly and harmonious intercourse, I pray your Excellency to accept [etc.].

128

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to James Brown, appointed United States Minister to France[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *December 23, 1823.*

The Government of the United States is not desirous of being admitted as a party to the counsels of the European Alliance; nor is it their intention to interfere in the arrangement of the affairs of Europe. But their interest in those of America, cannot escape the observation of any part of Europe, nor their own attention. The sentiments expressed in the message of the President of the United States, to Congress, at the commencement of their present session, will serve as guides to your conduct on this subject. It is hoped that the European Continental Alliance will ultimately perceive the inexpediency of their interference in the contest between Spain and South America; but, while manifesting, on proper occasions, the dispositions of this Country concerning it, you will avoid any measure by which the Government might be prematurely implicated in it, and observing with vigilant attention, the progress of the Allies, with regard to their general policy, and all its applications, will report as frequently as may be convenient, the result of your observations.

I have the honour [etc.].

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President James Monroe to the United States House of Representatives[2]

WASHINGTON, *January 12, 1824.*

TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES:

In answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives of December 24, requesting the President of the United States to lay before the House such information as he may possess, and which may be disclosed without injury to the public good, relative to the determination of any sovereign, or combination of sovereigns, to assist Spain in the subjugation of her late colonies on the American continent, and whether any Government of Europe is disposed or determined to oppose any aid or assistance which such sovereign or combination of sovereigns may afford to Spain for the subjugation of her late colonies above mentioned, I have to state that I possess no information on that subject not known to Congress which can be disclosed without injury to the public good.

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 151. James Brown, of Louisiana: Commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to France, December 9, 1823. Took leave, June 28, 1829.

[2] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 263.

130

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Joaquin Barrozo Pereira, Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *June 9, 1824.*

SIR: Your letter of the 31st Ultimo has been laid before the President of the United States, by whose direction I have the honour of informing you that the reception of Mr. Rebello in the character of Chargé d'Affaires from the Emperor of Brazil, was, in no wise intended as an act unfriendly to the Government or people of Portugal. It was the recognition of a Government existing in fact, and ruling in a Country which his Majesty the King of Portugal had several years since, proclaimed as an Independent Kingdom, and thereby absolved from all dependence upon Portugal.

The United States have never encouraged and supported the differences between the European Powers and their possessions in America, nor have they availed themselves of any such differences to take by force to themselves, any part of those possessions. In recognizing as independent States, some of the Countries which had been Spanish Colonies, they have done no more than has been done by His Majesty the King of Portugal, himself. The recognition of the Independence of those States was, in no wise, induced by any existing differences between the United States and Spain; nor was it deemed, in any manner incompatible with her sovereign rights. Such was the opinion of the Portuguese Government itself, with reference to the Ex-Colonies of Spain; and such, by an application of the same principles, must it ultimately be, as is presumed, with regard to its own relations with Brazil.

The negotiations between the United States and the Portuguese Government at Lisbon, having for their object the commercial relations between the United States and Portugal, cannot be unfavourably affected by the recognition of the Independence of Brazil. Nor is it expected that the Allies of His Majesty, the King of Portugal, any more than the United States, will pretend to the right which *they* explicitly disclaim, or to exercise the power of fixing, irrevocably the term when the legitimate rights of Sovereigns should be abandoned without appeal, or asserted in defiance of the fact.

As little are the United States disposed to interfere in the affairs either of Portugal or Brazil, in such sort as to prescribe the rights or duties of the presumptive heir to the throne of Portugal, or to scrutinize the franchise of those respective Nations. Faithful to the principle that every Independent people have the right to form, and to organize their Government as to them shall seem best, in the pursuit of their own happiness, and without encroaching upon the rights of others, they have recognized the Brazilian Govern-

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 173. Joaquin Barrozo Pereira, consul general of Portugal to the United States: Acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from about June 25 to about November 12, 1822, and from January 9, 1824, to October 2, 1829. The note acknowledged is not printed in this collection. Its nature is clear from this reply.

ment, as existing in fact, and exercising all the authorities essential to the maintenance of the usual relations between the United States and other foreign Independent Powers.

I have the honour of enclosing herwith, a Packet just received from England, addressed to you; and tender you the assurance [etc.].

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John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to Richard C. Anderson, United States Minister to Colombia[1]

WASHINGTON, *July —, 1824.*

SIR: Your despatches to No. 10. inclusive, dated the first of April last, have been received—Those which relate to the political condition of the Republic of Colombia, and to the incidents connected therewith, which have occurred since your arrival at Bogota, have attracted particularly the attention of the President.

The papers, transmitted with your despatch No. 7. of 19. January,[2] are important as disclosing, rather by implication, than distinctly, the objects of France in the Mission of Count Lerndos, Mr. Mollien, and others who visited the South American Countries and Mexico, at the close of the year 1822 and in 1823. That they were missions of enquiry to ascertain what might be done with those Countries, and that the purposes in contemplation were of a character altogether inadmissible.

The communications received at a later date from the British Commissioners, approach more to the nature of proposals to which nations really Independent may listen; but notwithstanding the intimation of Mr. Hamilton respecting an alliance between Great Britain and the Republic of Colombia, it is now certain that the British Commissioners were not authorized to perform any act which would have imported the formal acknowledgment by Great Britain of the Independence of the Colombian Republic.

The papers presented in March last to the British Parliament, of the then recent communications between the British Government and France and Spain, in relation to South America, have shewn the views at that time both of Great Britain and of France—From them it appears—

1. That both those Powers considered the Spanish Supremacy in South America, as irretrievably lost.

2. That they were both willing that by *amicable negotiation*, Spain should have *greater* advantages secured to her than any other Country, even including themselves.

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 199. The day of the month is omitted in the record copy.

[2] See below, pt. VI, doc. 641.

3. That France was very desirous, and Britain not unwilling, to concert measures for the establishment of Monarchical or Aristocratical forms of Government in those Countries.

It further appears that Spain, after issuing a grave decree opening the Ports of South America to the commerce of other Nations, solicited the interposition of her august allies to bring back her revolted subjects in America to their allegiance—a proposal which Great Britain did not approve, and France did not think proper to accede to—But France was willing to meet the other allies in conference upon the expediency of giving instructions of Monarchy and Aristocracy, as well as of special favours for Spain to the South Americans.

The determinations of the other allies have not yet been made known, but the danger of the interference of any of them by force in the affairs of South America may be considered as past—How long the British acknowledgment of the Independence of the Republic of Colombia will yet be delayed, depends more upon the internal state of the Republic itself, than upon any external circumstances.

We have very earnestly urged Great Britain to this recognition. But we trust that whenever it shall take place, the Government of the Colombian Republic will listen to no persuasions, either for any grant of special favours to Spain, or to any political lectures upon the superior excellence of Monarchical or Aristocratic Governments, over that of the existing *Constitution* of the Republic of Colombia—We can scarcely credit that either Great Britain, or any other European Power, will *presume* to give advice upon this subject to a Republic having an established Constitution; and if they should, we wish you distinctly, though informally, to say to the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that we expect the very first intimation of such advice will be met by an explicit assertion of the principle, that it is out of the circle of admissible diplomatic communications, admitting no answer, and not even susceptible of being received.

I am [etc.].

132

John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, to José Maria Salazar, Colombian Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *August 6, 1824.*

SIR: I have laid before the President of the United States, your confidential Note of the 2d. ultimo,[2] and it has received his deliberate & full consideration.

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 184.
[2] See below, pt. VI, doc. 645.

He is disposed to hope, that some misunderstanding may have been occasioned by the language attributed to Mr. Chasserieux at Caraccas—Being unwilling to believe that France or any other European Power, will make its acknowledgment of the political Independence of the Republic of Colombia, dependent in any manner upon the form of Government, which the People of Colombia, are alone competent to determine for themselves, and which they have accordingly determined—Were it possible to believe that France should found upon such a principle her conduct towards the Republic of Colombia, the President learns with satisfaction from your Note, that which his respect for your Nation would not otherwise permit him to doubt, that they will maintain at every hazard their real Independence and accept no recognition of it upon conditions incompatible with it—Such a recognition, carrying self contradiction and absurdity upon its face.

From various recent Acts and Declarations of the French Government, and of Officers acting under it, France appears explicitly to disclaim any design of aiding Spain by any application of Force, for the recovery of her antient dominion in this Hemisphere—The absurdity of such an attempt becoming from day to day more manifest, leads to the conclusion that France having already assumed this principle, will by the course of time and events be constantly more confirmed in her adhesion to it—Should even the proposals of her Agents, in the first instance present the establishment of a Monarchical or Aristocratic Government, as the price of her recognition, and should such proposals be met, by a firm and unequivocal refusal, the only consequence to be expected will be the postponement of the recognition, and that, as may be readily foreseen only for a short time—With regard to the language of certain political Journals, at Paris in the months of October and November last, it has been since amply ascertained, that the sentiments avowed by them were not such as the French Government has since been willing to support.

With respect to the question "in what manner the Government of the United States intends to resist on its part any interference of the Holy alliance for the purpose of subjugating the new Republics or interfering in their political forms" you understand that by the constitution of the United States, the ultimate decision of this question belongs to the Legislative Department of the Government. The probability of such interference of the Holy alliance, having in a great measure disappeared, the occasion for recurring to the dispositions of the Legislature did not occur during the late Session of Congress.

The Sentiments of the President remain as they were expressed in his last annual message to Congress—Should the crisis which appeared then to be approaching, and which gave rise to the remarks then made, hereafter recur, he will be ready to give them effect by recommending to the Legislature the adoption of the measures exclusively of their resort, and by which the princi-

ples asserted by him, would with the concurrence if given, be on the part of the United States, efficaciously manintained.

As however the occasion for this resort could arise only by a deliberate and concerted system of the allied Powers to exercise force against the freedom and Independence of your Republic; so it is obvious that the United States could not undertake resistance to them by force of Arms, without a previous understanding with those European Powers, whose Interests and whose principles would secure from them an active and efficient co-operation in the cause—This there is no reason to doubt could be obtained, but it could only be effected by a negotiation preliminary to that of any alliance between the United States and the Colombian Republic, or in any event coeval with it.

The employment of Spanish force in America, while Spain is occupied by a French army and its Government under the influence of France and her allies, does not constitute a case upon which the United States would feel themselves justified in departing from the neutrality which they have hitherto observed—The force itself being necessarily small; and in no wise changing the nature of the contest in the American Hemisphere.

I pray you, Sir, to accept [etc.].

133

Daniel Brent, Secretary of State ad interim, to Hilario de Rivas y Salmon, Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *September 22, 1824.*

SIR: I was directed by the Secretary of State, before his late departure from this city, to furnish the Attorney of the United States for the Eastern district of Pennsylvania with an extract from your Letter to him of the 16th.[2] of August, and, at the same time, to request that officer to adopt such measures as might be deemed advisable for the preservation of the neutrality of the United States and the vindication of their Laws, in reference to certain armaments which you state to have been already prepared, and to others which are now preparing, in the Port of Philadelphia, for the use and on account of some of the South American states in the contest in which they are engaged with Spain; and I lost no time in complying with the Secretary's Instructions.

I have the honour now, Sir, to transmit to you a copy of Mr. Ingersole, the District Attorney's Letter, in answer to the one which I addressed to him in pursuance of the Secretary's instructions, including a short correspondence

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 191. Francisco Hilario Rivas y Salmon, secretary of legation of Spain in the United States: Acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from September 30 to October 31, 1821, and from March 15, 1823, to July 25, 1827.

[2] Not printed in this collection. Its purport is clear from this reply. The enclosed mentioned below is not with the record copy.

between himself and the Collector of the Customs at Philadelphia, which I flatter myself, will prove abundantly satisfactory as to the armaments in question, already sent forth from the Port of Philadelphia, and entirely remove any apprehensions which you may entertain, with regard to those which are in a train of preparation at the same port.

I pray you, Sir, to accept [etc.].

134

Message of President James Monroe, at the commencement of the second session of the Eighteenth Congress of the United States[1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *December 7, 1824.*

The great and extraordinary changes which have happened in the Governments of Spain and Portugal within the last two years, without seriously affecting the friendly relations which, under all of them, have been maintained with those powers by the United States, have been obstacles to the adjustment of the particular subjects of discussion which have arisen with each. A resolution of the Senate, adopted at their last session, called for information as to the effect produced upon our relations with Spain by the recognition, on the part of the United States, of the independent South American Governments. The papers containing that information are now communicated to Congress.

A chargé d'affaires has been received from the independent Government of Brazil. That country heretofore a colonial possession of Portugal, had, some years since, been proclaimed by the sovereign of Portugal himself an independent kingdom. Since his return to Lisbon a revolution in Brazil has established a new Government there, with an Imperial title, at the head of which is placed the prince, in whom the Regency had been vested by the King at the time of his departure. There is reason to expect that, by amicable negotiation, the independence of Brazil will ere long be recognized by Portugal herself.

With the remaining powers of Europe, with those on the coast of Barbary, and with all the new South American States, our relations are of a friendly character. We have ministers plenipotentiary residing with the Republics of Colombia and Chili, and have received ministers of the same rank from Colombia, Guatemala, Buenos Ayres, and Mexico. Our commercial relations with all those States are mutually beneficial and increasing. With the Republic of Colombia a treaty of commerce has been formed,

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 354.

of which a copy is received, and the original daily expected. A negotiation for a like treaty would have been commenced with Buenos Ayres, had it not been prevented by the indisposition and lamented decease of Mr. Rodney, our minister there, and to whose memory the most respectful attention has been shown by the Government of that Republic. . . .

With respect to the contest to which our neighbors are a party, it is evident that Spain, as a power, is scarcely felt in it. These new States had completely achieved their independence before it was acknowledged by the United States, and they have since maintained it with little foreign pressure. The disturbances which have appeared in certain portions of that vast territory have proceeded from internal causes, which had their origin in their former Governments, and have not yet been thoroughly removed. It is manifest that these causes are daily losing their effect, and that these new States are settling down under Governments elective and representative in every branch similar to our own. In this course we ardently wish them to persevere, under a firm conviction that it will promote their happiness. In this their career, however, we have not interfered, believing that every people have a right to institute for themselves the Government which, in their judgment, may suit them best. Our example is before them, of the good effect of which, being our neighbors, they are competent judges, and to their judgment we leave it, in the expectation that other powers will pursue the same policy. The deep interest which we take in their independence, which we have acknowledged, and in their enjoyment of all the rights incident thereto, especially in the very important one of instituting their own Governments, has been declared and is known to the world. Separated, as we are, from Europe by the great Atlantic Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European Governments, nor in the causes which produce them. The balance of power between them, into which ever scale it may turn, in its various vibrations, cannot affect us. It is the interest of the United States to preserve the most friendly relations with every power, and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to all. But in regard to our neighbors our situation is different. It is impossible for the European Governments to interfere in their concerns, especially in those alluded to, which are vital, without affecting us; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in the present state of the war between the parties, if a war it may be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us. It is gratifying to know that some of the powers with whom we enjoy a very friendly intercourse, and to whom these views have been communicated, have appeared to acquiesce in them.

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Joel R. Poinsett, appointed United States Minister to Mexico[1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *March 26, 1825.*

SIR: The mission on which the President wishes you, with all practicable despatch, to depart, would, at any time, be highly important, but possesses, at this moment, a peculiar interest. Every where, on this continent, but on the side of the United Mexican States, the United States are touched by the Colonial Territories of some Sovereign Authority, fixed in Europe. You are the first Minister actually leaving the United States, to reside near a Sovereign Power established and exerted on this continent, whose territories are coterminous with our own. You will probably be the first Minister received by that Power from any foreign State, except from those which have recently sprung out of Spanish America. The United Mexican States, whether we regard their present posture, or recall to our recollection their ancient history, and fortunes, are entitled to high consideration. In point of population, position and resources, they must be allowed to rank among the first powers of America. In contemplating the progress in them, towards civilization, which the Aborigines had made at the Epoch of the Spanish invasion, and the incidents connected with the Spanish conquest which ensued, an irresistible interest is excited, which is not surpassed, if it be equalled, by that which is awakened in perusing the early history of any other part of America. But what gives, with the President, to your Mission, peculiar importance, at this time, is that it has, for its principal object, to lay, for the first time, the foundations of an intercourse of amity commerce, navigation and neighbourhood, which may exert a powerful influence, for a long period upon the prosperity of both States.

In more particularly inviting your attention to the objects which should engage it on your mission, I will, in the first place, refer you to the general instructions which were given by my predecessor, on the 27th May, 1823, to Mr. Anderson, the minister of the United States at Colombia, of which a copy is annexed, and which are to be considered as incorporated in these. So far as they are applicable alike to the condition of Colombia and of Mexico, and shall not be varied in this or subsequent letters, you will view them as forming a guide for your conduct. In that letter of the 27th of May, the principles which have regulated the course of this Government in respect to the contest between Spanish America and Spain, from its

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 225. Henry Clay, of Kentucky: Commissioned Secretary of State by President John Quincy Adams, March 7, 1825; resigned, March 3, 1829.

origin, are clearly stated, explained and vindicated; and the basis of those upon which it is desirable to place the future intercourse between the United States and the several Governments which have been established in Spanish America, are laid down;—so that, although that Letter was intended to furnish instructions for the American Minister deputed to one of those Governments only, it should be contemplated as unfolding a system of relations which it is expedient to establish with all of them.

From that letter, as well as from notorious public facts, it clearly appears that the people and the Government of the United States have alike, throughout all the stages of the struggle between Spain and her former Colonies, cherished the warmest feelings and the strongest sympathies towards the latter; that the establishment of their Independence and freedom has been anxiously desired; that the recognition of that Independence was made as early as it was possible, consistently with those just considerations of policy and duty which this Government felt itself bound to entertain towards both parties; and that, in point of fact, with the exception of the act of the Portuguese Brazilian Government, to which it was prompted by self interest, and which preceded that of the United States only a few months, this Government has been the first to assume the responsibility and encounter the hazard of recognizing the Governments which have been formed out of Spanish America. If there ever were any ground for imputing tardiness to the United States in making that recognition, as it respects other parts of what was formerly, Spanish America, there is not the slightest pretext for such a suggestion in relation to Mexico. For within a little more than a year after its independence was proclaimed, the United States hastened to acknowledge it. They have never claimed, and do not now claim, any peculiar favour or concession to their commerce or navigation, as the consideration of the liberal policy which they have observed towards those Governments. But the President does confidently expect that the priority of movement on our part which has disconcerted plans which the European Allies were contemplating against the independent Governments, and which has no doubt, tended to accelerate similar acts of recognition by the European Powers, and especially that of Great Britain, will form a powerful motive with our southern neighbours, and particularly with Mexico, for denying to the commerce and navigation of those European States, any favours or privileges which shall not be equally extended to us. . . .

The victorious termination to which Genl. Bolivar has recently brought the war in Peru, liberates the Colombian arms from any further employment against the forces of Spain in South America. Those of Mexico have no Spanish force to encounter in North America. In this state of the contest, it is to be hoped that Spain, listening to wiser and better councils, and at last being made sensible of what all America and Europe have long

since seen, that her dominion on this Continent is lost, will hasten, by a formal pacification with the Southern Nations, to put an end to a war which she has not the ability any longer to wage. Such a pacific disposition, it is presumed, will be cordially met by the Government of the United Mexican States, and you will avail yourself of every fit occasion to strengthen it by friendly and frank representations of the desire of the President to see an honourable close of the war. Nevertheless, peace may not be established, and the pride of Spain may dissuade her from acceding to terms which a prudent regard of her actual comparative weakness should render acceptable. If the war be indefinitely protracted, to what object will the arms of the new Governments be directed? It is not unlikely that they may be turned upon the conquest of Cuba and Porto Rico, and that, with that view, a combined operation will be concerted between those of Colombia and Mexico. The United States cannot remain indifferent to such a movement. Their commerce, their peace and their safety are too intimately connected with the fortunes and fate of the Island of Cuba to allow them to behold any change in its condition and political relations without deep solicitude. They are not disposed, themselves, to interfere with its present actual state; but they could not see, with indifference, any change that may be attempted in it. It commands, from its position, the Gulf of Mexico, and the valuable commerce of the United States, which must necessarily pass near its shores. In the hands of Spain, its ports are open, its cannon silent and harmless, and its possession guaranteed by the mutual jealousies and interests of the maritime powers of Europe. Under the dominion of any one of those powers other than Spain, and especially under that of Great Britain, the United States would have just cause of serious alarm. Nor could they see that dominion passing either to Mexico or Colombia without some apprehensions of the future. Neither of those two states has, or is likely shortly to acquire, the naval ability to maintain and protect Cuba, if its conquest could be achieved. The United States have no desire to aggrandize themselves by the acquisition of Cuba. And yet if that Island is to be made a dependence of any one of the American States, it is impossible not to allow that the law of its position proclaims that it should be attached to the United States. Abounding in those productions to which the soil and climate, both of Mexico and Colombia are best adapted, neither of them can want it: whilst, in that view of the subject, if the United States were to lend themselves to the suggestions of interest, it would, to them, be particularly desirable. If the population of Cuba were capable of maintaining, and should make an unprompted declaration of, its independence, perhaps it would be the real interest of all parties that it should possess an independent self Government. And then it would be worthy of serious consideration whether the powers of the American Continent would not do well to guarantee that independence

against all European attacks upon its existence. What the President, however, directs you to do is to keep a vigilant attention upon every movement towards Cuba, to ascertain the designs of Mexico in regard to it, and to put him, early, in full possession of every purpose of the Mexican Government relative to it. And you are authorized, if, in the progress of events it should become necessary, to disclose frankly the feelings and the interests as here developed, which the people of the United States cherish in respect to that Island. . . .

You will bring to the notice of the Mexican Government the message of the late President of the United States to their Congress, on the 2d December, 1823, asserting certain important principles of inter-continental law, in the relations of Europe and America. The first principle asserted in that message is, that the American continents are not henceforth to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. In the maintenance of that principle all the independent Governments of America have an interest; but that of the United States has probably the least. Whatever foundation may have existed three centuries ago, or even at a later period, when all this continent was under European subjection, for the establishment of a rule, founded on priority of discovery and occupation, for apportioning among the powers of Europe parts of this continent, none can be now admitted as applicable to its present condition. There is no disposition to disturb the colonial possessions, as they may now exist, of any of the European powers; but it is against the establishment of new European colonies upon this continent that the principle is directed. The countries in which any such new establishments might be attempted are now open to the enterprise and commerce of all Americans. And the justice or propriety cannot be recognized, of arbitrarily limiting and circumscribing that enterprise and commerce, by the act of voluntarily planting a new colony, without the consent of America, under the auspices of foreign powers, belonging to another and a distant continent. Europe would be indignant at any American attempt to plant a colony on any part of her shores, and her justice must perceive, in the rule contended for, only perfect reciprocity.

The other principle asserted in the message is, that whilst we do not desire to interfere in Europe with the political system of the allied powers, we should regard as dangerous to our peace and safety any attempt, on their part, to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere. The political systems of the two continents are essentially different. Each has an exclusive right to judge for itself what is best suited to its own condition and most likely to promote its happiness; but neither has a right to enforce upon the other the establishment of its peculiar system. This principle was declared in the face of the world, at a moment when there was reason to apprehend that the allied powers were entertaining designs inimical to

the freedom if not the independence of the new Governments. There is ground for believing that the declaration of it had considerable effect in preventing the maturity, if not in producing the abandonment, of all such designs. Both principles were laid down, after much and anxious deliberation, on the part of the late administration. The President, who then formed a part of it, continues entirely to coincide in both. And you will urge upon the Government of Mexico the utility and expediency of asserting the same principles on all proper occasions.

I have the honour [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to José Silvestre Rebello, Brazilian Chargé d'Affaires in the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *April 13, 1825.*

SIR: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt, at this Department, of your two Notes, the one under date the 28th. January, and the other the 6th. day of April 1825. The delay, in transmitting an answer to the former, has arisen from arrangements incident to the formation of a new Administration, and not from any insensibility to the important propositions which it announces, or disrespect to the Government of Brazil or its Respectable Representative here. To those propositions, the President has given the most attentive Consideration. They are 1st. that the United-States shall enter into a Convention with your Government to maintain its independence, in the event of Portugal being assisted by any foreign power to reestablish its former sway; and secondly, that a treaty of alliance and defence be formed between the United-States and the Government of Brazil to expel the arms of Portugal from any portion of the Brazilian territory of which they might happen, in the progress of the war, to take possession.

The President of the United States adheres to the principles of his Predecessor, as set forth in his message of the 2d. December 1823 to the American Congress. But with respect to your first proposition, as there does not appear, at present, any likelihood of Portugal being able to draw to her aid other powers to assist her in resubjugating the Brazils, there would not seem to be any occasion for a Convention founded upon that improbable contingency. The President on the contrary, sees with satisfaction that there is a reasonable probability of a speedy peace between Portugal and the Government of Brazil, founded upon that Independence of which the

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 212. For the two notes acknowledged, see below, pt. III, docs. 400 and 403, José Silvestre Rebello, chargé d'affaires of Brazil to the United States: Presented credentials, May 26, 1824. Took leave by letter, September 1, 1829.

United-States were the first to acknowledge. In declining, therefore, to enter into the proposed Convention, you will be pleased to assure your Government, that the determination of the President does not proceed from any abatement of the interest which the United States have constantly felt in the establishment of the Independence of Brazil, but is dictated solely by the want of those circumstances which would appear to be necessary to justify the formation of such a Convention. If in the progress of events there should be a renewal of demonstrations on the part of the European Allies to attack the Independence of the American States, the President will give to that new state of things, should it arise, every consideration, which its importance would undoubtedly demand.

With respect to your second proposition of a Treaty of alliance offensive and defensive to repel any invasion of the Brazilian Territories by the forces of Portugal, if the expected Peace should take place, that also would be unnecessary. But such a treaty would be inconsistent with the policy which the United-States have heretofore prescribed to themselves, that policy is, that whilst the war is confined to the parent Country and its former Colony, the United-States remain neutral, extending their friendship and doing equal justice to both parties. From that policy they did not deviate during the whole of the long contest between Spain, and the several Independent Governments which have been erected on her former American Territories. If an exception to it were now for the first time made, the justice of your Sovereign will admit that the other new Governments might have some cause to complain of the United-States.

Whilst I regret that these considerations of policy which the United States feel themselves bound to respect, will not allow them to enter at this time into either of the two compacts suggested by you, I have much satisfaction in concurring with you in the expediency of permanently uniting our two Nations in the ties of Friendship, Peace and Commerce—With that view I am instructed to say to you, that the United States are disposed to conclude a Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce with the Government of Brazil, and that they are willing to adopt, as the basis of the mutual regulations of the Commerce and Navigation of the two Countries, a principle of equity and perfect reciprocity. If you should be empowered to negotiate such a Treaty, I shall take great pleasure in entering upon the discussion and consideration of its terms at such time as may be mutually convenient

I pray you, Sir, to accept [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to John M. Forbes, United States Chargé d'Affaires at Buenos Aires[1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *April 14, 1825.*

No one knows better than yourself what a deep interest has been taken by the people and Government of the United States in the success of the Patriot cause of Spanish America throughout all its fortunes and struggles. The recognition of the Independence of the new Governments was made as early as it was possible, consistently with all those considerations of policy and duty which this Government felt itself bound to entertain towards both parties. In point of fact, with the exception of the Act of the Portuguese Brazilian Government, to which it was prompted by self interest, and which preceded that of the United States only a few months, this Government was the first to assume the responsibility, and to risque the consequences of acknowledging the new Governments formed out of Spanish America. The United States have never claimed, and do not now desire, any particular favour or concession to their commerce or navigation, as the consideration of the liberal policy which they have observed towards those Governments. But the President does confidently expect that the priority of movement on our part, which disconcerted schemes meditated by the European Allies against the Independent Governments, and has tended to accelerate similar acts of recognition by the European Powers, and especially by Great Britain, will form a powerful motive with the Government of Buenos Ayres, for denying to the commerce and navigation of any of those European States any favours or privileges which shall not be equally extended to us. . . .

You will bring to the notice of the Government of Buenos Ayres, the message of the late President of the United States to their Congress, on the 2nd December, 1823, asserting certain important principles of intercontinental law in the relations of Europe and America. The first principle asserted in that message is that the American Continents are not, henceforth, to be considered as subjects for future Colonization by any European Powers. In the maintenance of that principle, all the Independent Governments of America have an interest, but that of the United States has probably the least. Whatever foundation may have existed three centuries ago, or even at a later period, when all this continent was under European subjection, for the establishment of a rule, founded on priority of discovery and occupation, for apportioning among the Powers of Europe, parts of this Continent, none can be now admitted as applicable to its present condition.

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 259.

There is no disposition to disturb the Colonial possessions, as they may now exist, of any of the European Powers; but it is against the establishment of new European Colonies upon this continent, that the principle is directed. The countries in which any such new establishments might be attempted, are now open to the Enterprise and Commerce of all Americans. And the justice and propriety cannot be recognized, of arbitrarily limiting and circumscribing that enterprise and commerce, by the act of voluntarily planting a new Colony without the consent of America, under the auspices of foreign Powers belonging to another and a distant Continent. Europe would be indignant at any American attempt to plant a Colony on any part of her shores. And her justice must perceive, in the rule contended for, only a perfect reciprocity.

The other principle asserted in the message is, that whilst we do not desire to interfere, in Europe, with the political system of the allied Powers, we should regard as dangerous to our peace and safety, any attempt on their part, to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere. The political systems of the two Continents are essentially different. Each has an exclusive right to judge for itself what is best suited to its own condition, and most likely to promote its happiness; but neither has a right to enforce upon the other, the establishment of its own peculiar system. This principle was declared in the face of the world, at a moment when there was reason to apprehend that the allied Powers were entertaining designs inimical to the freedom, if not the Independence, of the new Governments. There is ground for believing that the declaration of it had considerable effect in preventing the maturity, if not in producing the abandonment, of all such designs. Both principles were laid down after much and anxious deliberation on the part of the late Administration. The President who then formed a part of it, continues entirely to coincide in both. And you will urge upon the Government of Buenos Ayres, the utility and expediency of asserting the same principles on all proper occasions.

The series of your despatches from No. 6. to No. 12, inclusive, has been received. The President has been gratified with the funeral honours awarded by the Government of Buenos Ayres, to the late Minister of the United States, Mr. Rodney, and the respectful attention subsequently shown to his memory. You will communicate to that Government the grateful sensibility which is entertained to their delicate and friendly testimonies on that melancholy occasion.

The Government of the United States is sincerely desirous to cultivate and maintain the most friendly relations with all the new States formed out of what was Spanish America. It is expected that every Representative of this Government near those States will constantly bear in mind, and seize every fit occasion to give effect to, this friendly policy. If amicable explana-

tions are sought, of the nature of our institutions, and their social operation, they should be cheerfully and frankly rendered; whilst all improper interference in their public councils, all expressions of contempt for their habits, civil or religious, all intimations of incompetency on the part of their population, for self Government, should be sedulously avoided. Entertaining these views, the President saw with approbation, the discountenance you gave to the proposed meeting of Super-cargoes and Captains to remonstrate against the passage of the Law prohibiting the importation of flour, exceptionable as that Law is deemed. Such a meeting of foreigners would not have been tolerated in our own Country, and we could not expect that what we should be the first to condemn in respect to ourselves, would be agreeable to others. If our citizens have complaints to make, they must not take justice into their own hands, but prefer all such complaints through the regular and accredited organs.

You will communicate to the Government of Buenos Ayres the pleasure which the President derives from beholding the prospect of a speedy conclusion of the war between Spain and her late Colonies. The recent decisive events in Peru have terminated it on the Continent in fact; and there wants now only a Treaty which the interests of Spain would seem to recommend, that she should not longer delay negociating, to put an end to it in form. If you should find that you can impart any strength to the dispositions for so happy an event in the Government of La Plata, you will not fail to impress upon it, how very agreeable it will be to the United States to see the People of La Plata in the full enjoyment of all the blessings of Peace, Independence, and Free Government.

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Condy Raguet, appointed United States Chargé d'Affaires in Brazil[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *April 14, 1825.*

SIR: The President having, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, at its late session, appointed you Chargé d'Affaires of the United States to the Brazilian Government, I transmit, herewith, your commission, and also a letter of credence to be presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, when you communicate to him your appointment. In the discharge of the duties of the honourable station to which you have been pro-

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 266. Condy Raguet, of Pennsylvania: Commissioned chargé d'affaires to Brazil, March 9, 1825. Because of delay in the receipt of his credentials he did not assume his new dignity until October. See below, pt. III, doc. 412 note. He had been consul at the same place. Left, April 7, 1827, having previously demanded his passports.

moted, it is requested that you will continue to manifest the same zealous attention to the interests of the United States that you have heretofore displayed in that of their Consul at Rio Janeiro. The commerce of the United States, already considerable with the Brazilian territories, is susceptible of great augmentation, and you will, therefore, lose no opportunity to advance its interests, and increase its facilities. Both France and Great Britain will probably strive to obtain for themselves peculiar privileges in the trade with Brazil. Great Britain will, no doubt, seek to secure with the new Government, the same extraordinary advantages as those which her Commerce has so long enjoyed with Portugal—advantages which have placed Portugal almost in the condition of a colony or dependence of Great Britain. You will resist, firmly, and constantly, any concessions to the Commerce or Navigation of either of those two powers, which are not equally extended to the Commerce and Navigation of the United States. They neither claim nor desire, for themselves, any peculiar commercial privileges. But they are entitled confidently to expect, if not to demand, from all the circumstances by which they stand connected with the Government of Brazil, that no such peculiar commercial privileges be granted to others. The United States were the first to acknowledge that Government, disregarding all the risks incident to the fact, and to the nature of its recent establishment, and overlooking the anomaly of its political form in the great family of American Powers. The United States do not claim, from this prompt and friendly measure, favour; but they insist upon equal justice to their commerce and navigation. And the President is altogether unprepared to see any European State, which has come tardily and warily to the acknowledgment of Brazil, running off with commercial advantages which shall be denied to an earlier and more uncalculating friend.

Mr. Rebello, the Brazilian Minister here, addressed a note to this Department on the 28th day of January last, and another on the 6th instant, proposing, in substance, a Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance between the two Countries, against the European alliance; and also a similar Treaty against Portugal, if she should invade the Brazilian territories. He was answered on the 11th Instant, and copies of his notes, and of the answer accompany this Despatch. You will observe that the President declines entering into either of the proposed Treaties, but the answer contains a proposition to conclude a commercial Convention, regulating the commerce and navigation of the two Countries. No reply to this proposal has been yet received; but should one reach the Department before this Despatch leaves it, a copy of it will be sent to you. The decision upon Mr. Rebello's overtures has been made in conformity with that neutral policy which the United States have prescribed for themselves. It has not proceeded from any diversity of views between the late, and present, Administration, as to the principles announced in the President's message to Congress of 2nd

December, 1823. To those principles the President adheres; and you will embrace every proper opportunity to impress upon the Brazilian Government, the advantage which accrued to America from their promulgation at that epoch. There can be but little doubt that the ground then taken contributed to dissuade the European Allies from embarking in the cause of Spain, and, consequently, from uniting with Portugal, against their respective Colonies. You will also inculcate the utility of the Brazilian Government maintaining, in its correspondence and intercourse with the European Powers, the same principle which has been proclaimed here against the establishment, on this Continent, of new European Colonies.

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to William Miller, appointed United States Chargé d'Affaires to the United Provinces of the Centre of America [1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *April 22, 1825.*

SIR: The President having, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointed you Chargé d'Affaires to the Government of the Federal States of the Centre of America, I have the honour to transmit, herewith, your Commission, and also a letter of credence which you will present to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at your first interview with him.

The Republic of Guatemala is of more recent formation than those, the Independence of which was recognized by the Government of the United States, in March 1822. But there are circumstances in its origin and subsequent conduct, which give it a claim to the interest and regard of the United States, perhaps even superior to that which they have ever felt in any of the other Southern Republics.

The Province of St. Salvador, one of the constituent states of the Republic of Guatemala, by a solemn Decree of its congress, freely chosen by the people, did, on the 5th day of December, 1822, propose its annexation to our own Union, as one of these United States. This measure was adopted as an expedient for escaping from the oppression with which they were menaced, of being annexed, by force, to the Mexican Empire, while under the Government of Yturbide. For the purposes of carrying it into effect,

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 285. William Miller: Commissioned as chargé d'affaires to Federation of Central America, March 7, 1825. Died September 10 at Key West on his way to his post. An instruction practically identical with this extract was on February 10, 1826, addressed to John Williams. See MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, XI, 5. John Williams, of Tennessee: Commissioned chargé d'affaires to Federation of Central America, December 29, 1825. Took leave, December 1, 1826.

three Commissioners were despatched, with full powers, who came to the United States, and, in the beginning of September, 1823, repaired to the City of Washington. In the interval between the time of their appointment and that of their arrival, here, a Revolution in Mexico had overthrown the Government of Yturbide, and the Republican Rulers who succeeded to his power, acknowledged the right of the people of Guatemala to institute a Government for themselves, and withdrew all claim of supremacy over them. This course of events superseded the determination which the Congress of St. Salvador had formed, of offering to unite their fortunes with our Confederation: but in announcing this new direction given to their affairs, the Commissioners Messrs. Manuel J. Arce, and Juan M. Rodriguez declared that the people, their constituents, were animated with the sincerest sentiments of attachment to the Government of the United States; that there was a great similitude of principles between them and the people of this Union, and that, in every emergency, which might befall them, they would place great reliance upon our friendship to support them against the oppression of Tyranny.

Whatever obstacle there might have been in physical relations, or in the Constitutional arrangements of our own Government, to the proposed Union, the proposal itself, and the spirit in which it was made, were eminently adapted to inspire the warmest sentiments of regard and attachment towards a foreign People, speaking a different language, who thus confided in our honour and justice, and thus gave, in the face of all mankind, the most glorious of testimonials to the wisdom of our Institutions, and to their sense of their tendency to promote the happiness of those who live under them.

On the 8th of February last, Mr. Cañaz, the Minister of the Republic of the Centre, addressed a Note to this Department, which affords a new, and highly interesting proof of the friendly sentiments entertained by his Government towards the United States. In that Note, after calling the attention of this Government to the important object of uniting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by a Canal navigation, through the Province of Nicaraguay, by the direction of his Government, he offers to that of the United States to share in that great enterprise, and, by means of a Treaty, perpetually to secure the advantages of it to the two Nations. To that note, an answer was transmitted on the ——— day of this month, and copies of them, both, accompany these instructions. From the perusal of the answer, without declining the friendly proposal, you will perceive that a decision upon it is postponed to the acquisition of further information; and you are desired to direct your attention particularly to that object. It will, at once, occur to you to ascertain if surveys have been made of the proposed route of the Canal, and if entire confidence may be placed in their accuracy;—what is its length; what the nature of the Country, and of the

ground through which it is to pass;—can the supply of water for feeders be drawn from the Lake Nicarauguay or other adequate sources;—in short, what facilities do the Country and the state of its population afford, for making the Canal, and what are the estimates of its cost? It is not intended that you should inspire the Government of the Republic of Gautemala with any confident expectation that the United States will contribute, by pecuniary or other means, to the execution of the work, because it is not yet known what view Congress might take of it. What the President desires is to be put in possession of such full information as will serve to guide the judgment of the Constituted Authorities of the United States in determining in regard to it, what belongs to their interests and duties.

The Republic of the Centre of America being situated precisely at the Isthmus which forms the connexion between the two American Continents, and at the seat of Commerce carried on by the Bay of Honduras and the Musquito Shore, between the Gulph of Mexico, and the Southern Ocean, here drawn in their closest proximity to each other, the relations both political and commercial, between that Country and the United States, must acquire, from year to year, magnitude and importance. But of all the Countries of the Southern Continent, it is that with which we have hitherto had the fewest relations, and concerning which we have the latest information. To obtain that information is one of the objects of your mission, as well as to give proof to the worthy Republicans of those regions that the Government of the United States has felt, with great sensibility, the signal marks of confidence and friendship already received from them.

It will be a leading and constant object of your attention, then, to obtain, and to communicate to this Department, by every opportunity of conveyance, that may occur, information, as well respecting the physical condition of the Country, as the moral and political character of the inhabitants. The Geographical boundaries of the Republic, its standing with the neighbouring Countries of Mexico, Colombia and Peru; the present state of its Government; its prospect of forming a permanent Republican Constitution, and the State of its relations with European Powers will all form important subjects of enquiry. You will, especially, observe the Country, with reference to its future capabilities of a Commerce, mutually advantageous, with the United States, and communicate the result of your observations. You will avail yourself of every occasion to impress the Government of the Republic of Guatemala with the friendly dispositions towards it, of that of the United States. You will answer, in the most frank and full manner, all enquiries from that Government, having for their object information as to the practical operation of our own, or any of our, Institutions. And whatever is peculiar in their own habits, religious or civil, should be treated with great indulgence.

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *April 27, 1825.*

Besides the preceding objects to which your attention will be directed, others of great interest will also claim it. Of these, that of the highest importance is the present war between Spain and her former Colonies, on this Continent. The President wishes you to bring this subject, in the most conciliatory manner possible, before the Spanish Government. It would be as unnecessary, as unprofitable to look to the past, except for the purpose of guiding future conduct. True wisdom dictates that Spain, without indulging in unavailing regrets on account of what she has irretrievably lost, should employ the means of retaining what she may yet preserve from the wreck of her former possessions. The war upon the Continent, is, in fact, at an end. Not a solitary foot of land from the western limit of the United States to Cape Horn owns her sway; not a bayonet in all that vast extent, remains to sustain her cause. And the Peninsula is utterly incompetent to replace those armies which have been vanquished and annihilated by the victorious forces of the new Republics. What possible object, then, can remain to Spain to protract a war which she can no longer maintain, and to the conclusion of which, in form, there is only wanting the recognition of the new Governments by Treaties of peace. If there were left the most distant prospect of her reconquering her Continental Provinces, which have achieved their independence, there might be a motive for her perseverance. But every expectation of such re-conquest, it is manifest, must be perfectly chimerical. If she can entertain no rational hope to recover what has been forced from her grasp, is there not great danger of her losing what she yet but feebly holds? It should be borne in mind that the armies of the new States, flushed with victory, have no longer employment on the Continent: and yet whilst the war continues, if it be only in name, they cannot be disbanded, without a disregard of all the maxims of just precaution. To what object, then, will the new Republics direct their powerful and victorious armies? They have a common interest, and a common enemy; and let it be supposed that that enemy, weak and exhausted as he is, refuses to make peace; will they not strike wherever they can reach? And from the proximity and great value of Cuba and Porto Rico, is it not to be anticipated that they will aim, and aim a successful blow too, at those Spanish Islands?

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 302. Alexander H. Everett of Massachusetts: Commissioned secretary of legation to the Netherlands, January 24, 1815. Acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from May 1 to July 15, 1815. Commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain, March 9, 1825. Took leave, July 27, 1829.

Whilst they would operate from without, means would, doubtless, be, at the same time, employed to stimulate the population within to a revolt. And that the disposition exists among the inhabitants to a considerable extent, to throw off the Spanish authority, is well known. It is due to the United States to declare that they have constantly declined to give any countenance to that disposition.

It is not, then, for the new Republics that the President wishes you to urge upon Spain the expediency of concluding the war. Their interest is probably on the side of its continuance, if any nation can ever have an interest in a state of war. But it is for Spain herself, for the cause of humanity, for the general repose of the world, that you are required, with all the delicacy which belongs to the subject, to use every topic of persuasion to impress upon the Councils of Spain, the propriety, by a formal pacification, of terminating the war. And, as the views and policy of the United States, in regard to those Islands may possibly have some influence, you are authorized, frankly and fully to disclose them. The United States are satisfied with the present condition of those Islands, in the hands of Spain, and with their Ports open to our commerce, as they are now open. This Government desires no political change of that condition. The population itself, of the Islands is incompetent, at present, from its composition and its amount, to maintain self government. The maritime force of the neighbouring Republics of Mexico and Colombia is not now, nor is it likely shortly to be, adequate to the protection of those Islands, if the conquest of them were effected. The United States would entertain constant apprehensions of their passing from their possession to that of some less friendly sovereignty. And of all the European Powers, this Country prefers that Cuba and Porto Rico should remain dependent on Spain. If the war should continue between Spain and the new Republics, and those Islands should become the object and the theatre of it, their fortunes have such a connexion with the prosperity of the United States that they could not be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies of such a protracted war might bring upon the Government of the United States duties and obligations, the performance of which, however painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline. A subsidiary consideration in favour of peace, deserving some weight, is, that as the war has been the parent cause of the shocking piracies in the west Indies, its termination would be probably followed by their cessation. And thus the Government of Spain, by one act, would fulfil the double obligation under which it lies, to foreign Governments, of repressing enormities, the perpetrators of which find refuge, if not succour, in Spanish territory, and that to the Spanish Nation itself, of promoting its real interests.

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia[1]

WASHINGTON, *May 10, 1825.*

SIR: I am directed by the President to instruct you to endeavor to engage the Russian Government to contribute its best exertions towards terminating the existing contest between Spain and her colonies.

Among the interests which, at this period, should most command the serious attention of the nations of the Old and New World, no one is believed to have a claim so paramount as that of the present war. It has existed, in greater or less extent, seventeen years. Its earlier stages were marked by the most shocking excesses, and, throughout, it has been attended by an almost incalculable waste of blood and treasure. During its continuance whole generations have passed away without living to see its close, while others have succeeded them, growing up from infancy to majority without ever tasting the blessings of peace. The conclusion of that war, whatever and whenever it may be, must have a great effect upon Europe and America. Russia is so situated, as that, while she will be less directly affected than other parts of Christendom, her weight and her councils must have a controlling influence on its useless protraction or its happy termination. If this peculiar attitude secures her impartiality, it draws to it great responsibility in the decision which she may feel it proper to make. The predominance of the power of the Emperor is everywhere felt. Europe, America, and Asia, all own it. It is with a perfect knowledge of its vast extent, and the profoundest respect for the wisdom and the justice of the august personage who wields it, that his enlightened and humane councils are now invoked.

In considering that war, as in considering all others, we should look back upon the past, deliberately survey its present condition, and endeavor, if possible, to catch a view of what is to come. With respect to the first branch of the subject, it is, perhaps, of the least practical importance. No statesman can have contemplated the colonial relations of Europe and Continental America without foreseeing that the time must come when they would cease. That time might have been retarded or accelerated, but come it must, in the great march of human events. An attempt of the British Parliament to tax, without their consent, the former British colonies, now these United States, produced the war of our Revolution, and led to the establishment of that independence and freedom which we now

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 846. Henry Middleton, of South Carolina: Commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Russia, April 6, 1820. Left post about August 3, 1830. His letter of recall was presented by Mr. Clay, chargé d'affaires *ad interim*, January 12, 1831. Empowered, July 29, 1823, to negotiate with Great Britain and Russia, jointly, concerning commerce and navigation, fisheries, abolition of the African slave-trade, and concerning the principles of maritime war and neutrality.

so justly prize. Moderation and forbearance on the part of Great Britain might have postponed, but could not have prevented our ultimate separation. The attempt of Bonaparte to subvert the ancient dynasty of Spain, and to place on its throne a member of his own family, no doubt, hastened the independence of the Spanish colonies. If he had not been urged, by his ambition, to the conquest of the Peninsula, those colonies, for a long time to come, might have continued quietly to submit to the parental sway. But they must have inevitably thrown it off, sooner or later. We may imagine that a vast continent, uninhabited, or thinly peopled by a savage and untutored race, may be governed by a remote country, blessed with the lights and possessed of the power of civilization; but it is absurd to suppose that this same continent, in extent twenty times greater than that of the parent country, and doubling it in a population equally civilized, should not be able, when it chooses to make the effort, to cast off the distant authority. When the epoch of separation between a parent State and its colony, from whatever cause, arrives, the struggle for self-government on the one hand, and for the preservation of power on the other, produces mutual exasperation, and leads to a most embittered and ferocious war. It is then that it becomes the duty of third powers to interpose their humane offices, and calm the passions and enlighten the councils of the parties. And the necessity of their efforts is greatest with the parent country, whose pride, and whose wealth and power, swelled by the colonial contributions, create the most repugnance to an acquiescence in a severance which has been ordained by Providence.

In the war which has been so long raging between Spain and her colonies the United States have taken no part, either to produce or to sustain it. They have been inactive and neutral spectators of the passing scenes. Their frankness forbids, however, that they should say that they have beheld those scenes with feelings of indifference. They have, on the contrary, anxiously desired that other parts of this continent should acquire and enjoy that independence with which, by the valor and the patriotism of the founders of their liberty, they have been, under the smiles of Heaven, so greatly blessed.

But, in the indulgence of this sympathetic feeling, they have not for one moment been unmindful of the duties of that neutrality which they had deliberately announced. And the best proof of the fidelity with which they have strictly fulfilled its obligations is furnished in the fact that, during the progress of the war, they have been unjustly accused, by both parties, of violating their declared neutrality. But it is now of little consequence to retrace the causes, remote or proximate, of the revolt of the Spanish colonies. The great and much more important consideration which will, no doubt, attract the attention of his Imperial Majesty is the present state of the contest. The principles which produced the war, and those which may be

incorporated in the institutions of the new States, may divide the opinions of men. Principles, unhappily, are too often the subject of controversy; but notorious facts are incontestible. They speak a language which silences all speculation, and should determine the judgment and the conduct of States, whatever may be the school in which their rulers are brought up or practiced, and whatever the social forms which they would desire to see established. And it is to the voice of such facts that Europe and America are now called upon patiently to listen.

And in contemplating the present state of the war, what are the circumstances which must forcibly strike every reflecting observer? Throughout both continents, from the western limits of the United States to Cape Horn, the Spanish power is subdued. The recent decisive victory of Ayacucho has annihilated the last remains of the Spanish force. Not a foot of territory in all that vast extent owns the dominion, not a bayonet sustains the cause of Spain. The war, in truth, has ended. It has been a war between a contracted corner of Europe and an entire continent; between ten millions of people, amidst their own extraordinary convulsions, fighting, at a distance across an ocean of three thousand miles in extent, against twenty millions contending at home for their lives, their liberty, and their property. Henceforward it will present only the image of a war between an exhausted dwarf struggling for power and empire, against a refreshed giant combating for freedom and existence. Too much confidence is reposed in the enlightened judgment of his Imperial Majesty to allow of the belief that he will permit any abatement of his desire to see such a war formally terminated, and the blessings of peace restored, from sympathies which he may feel, however strong, for the unhappy condition of Spain. These very sympathies will naturally lead his Imperial Majesty to give her the best and most friendly advice in her actual posture. And in what does that consist? His Imperial Majesty must be the exclusive, as he is the most competent judge. But it will not be deemed inconsistent with respect to inquire if it be possible to believe that Spain can bring the new States again under her dominion. Where does the remotest prospect of her success break out? In Colombia, Mexico, or Peru? The reconquest of the United States by Great Britain would not be a more mad and hopeless enterprise than that of the restoration of the Spanish power on these continents. Some of the most considerable of the new States have established Governments, which are in full and successful operation, regularly collecting large revenues, levying and maintaining numerous and well appointed armies, and already laying the foundations of respectable marines. Whilst they are consolidating their institutions at home, they are strengthening themselves abroad by treaties of alliance among themselves, and of amity and commerce with foreign States. Is the vain hope indulged that intestine divisions within the new States will arise, which may lead to the recall of the Spanish power, as the Stuarts were

recalled in England, and the Bourbons in France, at the close of their respective revolutions?

We should not deceive ourselves. Amidst all the political changes of which the new States are destined to be the theatre, whatever party or power may be uppermost, one spirit will animate them all, and that is, an invincible aversion from all political connexion with Spain, and an unconquerable desire of independence. It could not be otherwise. They have already tasted the fruits of independence. And the contrast between what their condition now is in the possession of free commerce, liberal institutions, and all the faculties of their country, and its population allowed full physical and moral development, and what it was under Spain, cramped, debased, and degraded, must be fatal to the chimerical hope of that monarchy, if it be cherished, by any means whatever to re-establish her power. The cord which binds a colony to its parent country being broken is never repaired. A recollection of what was inflicted and what was borne during the existence of that relation, the pride of the former governing power, and the sacrifices of the interests of the colony to those of the parent, widen and render the breach between them, whenever it occurs, perpetual. And if, as we may justly suppose, the embittered feelings excited by an experience of that unequal connexion are in proportion to the severity of the parental rule, they must operate with irresistible force on the rupture which has taken place between Spain and her colonies, since in no other instance has it been exerted with such unmitigated rigor.

Viewing the war as practically terminated, so far at least as relates to Spanish exertion on the continent, in considering the third branch of the inquiry which I proposed, let us endeavor to anticipate what may be expected to happen if Spain obstinately perseveres in the refusal to conclude a peace. If the war has only a nominal continuance, the new Republics cannot disband their victorious armies without culpable neglect of all the maxims of prudence and precaution. And the first observation that occurs is, that this protracted war must totally change its character and its objects. Instead of being a war of offensive operations, in which Spain has been carrying on hostilities in the bosom of the new States, it will become one to her of a defensive nature, in which all her future exertions must be directed to the protection and defence of her remaining insular possessions. And thus the Peninsula, instead of deriving the revenue and the aid so necessary to the revival of its prosperity from Cuba and Porto Rico, must be further drained to succor those islands. For it cannot be doubted that the new States will direct their combined and unemployed forces to the reduction of those valuable islands. They will naturally strike their enemy wherever they can reach him. And they will be stimulated to the attack by the double motive arising from the richness of the prize, and from the fact that those islands constitute the rendezvous of Spain, where are concentrated

and from which issue all the means of annoying them which remain to her. The success of the enterprise is by no means improbable. Their proximity to the islands, and their armies being perfectly acclimated, will give to the united efforts of the Republics great advantages. And if with these be taken into the estimate the important and well known fact that a large portion of the inhabitants of the islands is predisposed to a separation from Spain, and would therefore form a powerful auxiliary to the republican arms, their success becomes almost certain. But even if they should prove incompetent to the reduction of the islands, there can be but little doubt that the shattered remains of Spanish commerce would be swept from the ocean. The advantages of the positions of Colombia and Mexico for annoying that commerce in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean sea must be evident from the slightest observation. In fact, Cuba is in the mouth of a sack, which is held by Colombia and the United Mexican States. And if, unhappily for the repose of the world, the war should be continued, the coasts of the Peninsula itself may be expected soon to swarm with the privateers of the Republics. If, on the contrary, Spain should consent to put an end to the war, she might yet preserve what remains of her former American possessions. And surely the retention of such islands as Cuba and Porto Rico is eminently worthy of serious consideration, and should satisfy a reasonable ambition. The possessions of Spain in the West Indies would be still more valuable than those of any other power. The war ended, her commerce would revive, and there is every reason to anticipate, from the habits, prejudices, and tastes of the new Republics, that she would find, in the consumption of their population, a constantly augmenting demand for the produce of her industry, now excluded from its best markets. And her experience, like that of Great Britain with the United States, would demonstrate that the value of the commercial intercourse would more than indemnify the loss, while it is unburdened with the expense incident to political connexion.

A subordinate consideration, which should not be overlooked, is, that large estates are owned by Spanish subjects, resident in Spain, which may possibly be confiscated if the war be wantonly continued. If that measure of rigor shall not be adopted, their incomes must be greatly diminished during a state of war. These incomes, upon the restoration of peace, or the proceeds of the sales of the estates themselves, might be drawn to Spain, and would greatly contribute towards raising her from her present condition of embarrassment and languishment. If peace should be longer deferred, and the war should take the probable direction which has been supposed, during its further progress other powers not now parties may be collaterally drawn into it. From much less considerable causes the peace of the world has been often disturbed. From the vicinity of Cuba to the United States, its valuable commerce and the nature of its population, their Government cannot

be indifferent to any political change to which that island may be destined. Great Britain and France also have deep interests in its fortunes, which must keep them wide awake to all those changes. In short, what European State has not much at stake, direct or indirect, in the destiny, be it what it may, of that most valuable of all the West India islands? The reflections and the experience of the Emperor on the vicissitudes of war must have impressed him with the solemn duty of all Governments to guard against even the distant approach of that most terrible of all scourges by every precaution with which human prudence and foresight can surround the repose and safety of States.

Such is the view of the war between Spain and the new Republics which the President desires you most earnestly, but respectfully, to present to his Imperial Majesty. From this view it is evident that it is not so much for the new States themselves as for Spain that peace has become absolutely necessary. Their independence of her, whatever intestine divisions may, if intestine divisions shall, yet unhappily await them, is fixed and irrevocable. She may, indeed, by a blind and fatal protraction of the war, yet lose more: gain, for her, is impossible. In becoming the advocate for peace, one is the true advocate of Spain. If the Emperor shall, by his wisdom, enlighten the councils of Spain, and bring home to them a conviction of her real interests, there can be no fears of the success of his powerful interposition. You are authorized, in that spirit of the most perfect frankness and friendship which have ever characterized all the relations between Russia and the United States, to disclose, without reserve, the feelings and the wishes of the United States in respect to Cuba and Porto Rico. They are satisfied with the present condition of those islands, now open to the commerce and enterprise of their citizens. They desire for themselves no political change in them. If Cuba were to declare itself independent, the amount and the character of its population render it improbable that it could maintain its independence.

Such a premature declaration might bring about a renewal of those shocking scenes of which a neighboring island was the afflicting theatre. There could be no effectual preventive of those scenes, but in the guaranty, and in a large resident force of foreign powers. The terms of such a guaranty, and the quotas which each should contribute of such a force, would create perplexing questions of very difficult adjustment, to say nothing of the continual jealousies which would be in operation. In the state of possession which Spain has, there would be a ready acquiescence of those very foreign powers, all of whom would be put into angry activity upon the smallest prospect of a transfer of those islands. The United States could not, with indifference, see such a transfer to any European power. And if the new Republics, or either of them, were to conquer them, their maritime force as it now is, or for a long time to come is likely to be, would keep up constant apprehensions of their safety. Nor is it believed that the new States desire, or will attempt,

the acquisition, unless they shall be compelled, in their own defence, to make it, by the unnecessary prolongation of the war. Acting on the policy which is here unfolded, the Government of the United States, although they would have been justified to have seized Cuba and Porto Rico, in the just protection of the lives and the commerce of their citizens, which have been a prey to infamous pirates finding succor and refuge in Spanish territory, have signally displayed their patience and moderation by a scrupulous respect of the sovereignty of Spain, who was herself bound, but has utterly failed, to repress those enormities.

Finally, the President cherishes the hope that the Emperor's devotion to peace, no less than his friendship for Spain, will induce him to lend the high authority of his name to the conclusion of a war the further prosecution of which must have the certain effect of an useless waste of human life. No power has displayed more solicitude for the repose of the world than Russia, who has recently given the strongest evidence of her unwillingness to disturb it, in the East, by unexampled moderation and forbearance. By extending to America the blessings of that peace which, under the auspices of his Imperial Majesty, Europe now enjoys, all parts of this continent will have grateful occasion for regarding him, as the United States ever have done, as their most potent and faithful friend.

This despatch is confided to your discretion, to be communicated *in extenso*, or its contents disclosed in such other manner to the Government of Russia as shall appear to you most likely to accomplish its object.

I have the honor [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Rufus King, appointed United States Minister to Great Britain[1]

WASHINGTON, *May 11, 1825.*

SIR: The coincidence in the policy of the United States and Great Britain, and the friendly communications which the British Government has made to this, in regard to the war between Spain and the new States on this Continent, require that there should be observed the utmost frankness in the intercourse between the two Countries. It is in this spirit that you are requested to make known to the Government of Great Britain, the desire which animates the President, to see that War honourably terminated. Its further prosecution can be attended with no beneficial effect to Spain herself, and if she is made sensible of her true interests, and the dangers to which her insular

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 345. Rufus King, of New York: Commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary May 5, 1825, to Great Britain. Retired June 16, 1826.

possessions are now exposed, it is believed that she would consent to put an end to it. Instructions have been given to Mr. Poinsett, and will be given to others of our Ministers near the new States, to strengthen in them, if necessary, a disposition to peace. Mr. Everett is charged with similar instructions to operate at Madrid. The same object will be confided to our Ministers at Paris and St. Petersburg. I transmit you, herewith, a copy of my official note, addressed to Mr. Middleton,[1] as best explaining the views which are entertained by the President. You are authorized to make such use of it with the British Government as your judgment shall approve. It is understood that the local Government of Cuba has petitioned the King of Spain to make peace, by acknowledging the Independence of the new States. If Great Britain, and the other principal European Powers, would heartily unite with the United States in these pacific endeavours, the President entertains the confident hope that a stop would be put to the further, and unnecessary effusion of human blood.

I am [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to James Brown, United States Minister to France[2]

WASHINGTON, *May 13, 1825.*

SIR: The President entertains a strong desire to see the war between Spain and her former Colonies terminated. Besides the considerations of humanity which, alone, would be quite sufficient to create such a desire, the danger to the peace of other States, and of the United States especially, gives much additional strength to the sentiment. With the view to promote that interesting object, Mr. Poinsett has been, and others of our Ministers to the new States will be, instructed to use their best exertions. But it is in Europe more than in America that our efforts must be directed. And the strong ground to take is that peace is more necessary to Spain than to the new Republics. Accordingly, Mr. Everett has been instructed to endeavour to make Spain sensible of the advantages to her of putting an end to the war, and the dangers which hang over her by its further useless prosecution. I have also, by the directions of the President, addressed a note to Mr. Middleton, to enlist the Government of Russia in the cause of peace. Mr. King has received similar instructions, in reference to Great Britain. And you are requested to open the matter to the French Government, in the hope that they may co-operate in the great object. To enable you to lay before that Government our views, I transmit you, herewith, a copy of the despatch to Mr.

[1] See above, doc. 141, Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825.
[2] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 356.

Middleton,[1] the use of which is committed to your discretion. A like copy has been put into the possession of Mr. King. Information has reached us, that the local Authorities of Cuba have petitioned the King of Spain to acknowledge the new Republics, and close the war. By a concerted system of action, direct and collateral, on Spain, it is hoped that she may be made to see the necessity of peace. And great confidence would be placed in this hope, if Russia and France, the Powers most likely to influence the Councils of Spain, would lend their hearty co-operation.

I am [etc.].

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Daniel Brent, Acting Secretary of State, to Baron de Tuyll, Russian Minister to the United States[2]

WASHINGTON, *May 23, 1825.*

Mr. Daniel Brent presents his compliments to the Baron de Tuyll, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from Russia, and has the honour to return to him the project of a Despatch which the Baron lately prepared for Count Lieven, His Imperial Majesty's ambassador in London, and which Mr. Brent submitted to the perusal of the President of the United States on Saturday last, agreeably to the wish of the Baron. Mr. Brent takes great pleasure in adding that the President sees in the project referred to a just interpretation of the tenor and purpose of the instructions which he had recently caused to be given to the representative of the United States at the court of H. I. M. in relation to South American affairs.

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Richard C. Anderson, United States Minister to Colombia[3]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *September 16, 1825.*

During the last spring, the Ministers of Colombia and Mexico near this Government, made separate, but nearly simultaneous, communications to this Department, in relation to the contemplated Congress at Panama. Each of them stated that he was instructed by his Government to say, that

[1] See above, doc. 141, Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825.
[2] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 222.
[3] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 383.

it would be very agreeable to it that the United States should be represented at that Congress; that it was not expected that they would take any part in its deliberations, or measures of concert, in respect to the existing war with Spain, but that other great interests affecting the Continent of America, and the friendly intercourse between the Independent Nations which are established on it, might be considered and regulated at the Congress; and that, not knowing what might be the views of the United States, a previous enquiry was directed to be made, whether they would, if invited by Colombia or Mexico, be represented at Panama; and if an affirmative answer were given, each of those Ministers stated that the United States would be accordingly invited by his Government to be represented there. The President instructed me to say, and I accordingly replied, that the communication was received with great sensibility to the friendly consideration of the United States, by which it had been dictated; that, of course, they could not make themselves any party to the existing war with Spain, or to councils for deliberating on the means of its further prosecution; that he believed such a Congress as was proposed, might be highly useful in settling several important disputed questions of public Law, and in arranging other matters of deep interest to the American Continent, and to the friendly intercourse between the American Powers; that before such a Congress, however, assembled, it appeared to him to be necessary to arrange between the different Powers to be represented, several preliminary points, such as, the subjects to which the attention of the Congress was to be directed; the nature, and the form, of the Powers to be given to the Ministers, and the mode of organizing the Congress. If these preliminary points could be adjusted, in a manner satisfactory to the United States, the Ministers from Colombia and Mexico were informed that the United States would be represented at the Congress. Upon enquiry, if these preliminary points had yet engaged the attention of the Government either of Colombia or Mexico, they were unable to inform me that they had, whilst both appeared to admit the expediency of their being settled. Each of them undertook to communicate to his Government the answer which I had been instructed by the President to make; and nothing further has since passed. It has been deemed proper that you should be made acquainted with what has occurred here on this matter, in order that, if it should be touched upon by the Colombian Government, you may, if necessary, be able to communicate what happened. Should the President ultimately determine that the United States shall be represented at Panama you will be designated for that service, either alone, or associated with others, and you will hold yourself in readiness accordingly. We shall make no further movement, until we hear from the Government of Colombia or Mexico. . . .

On the 10th day of May last, I addressed an official note by the direction of the President, to the Minister of the United States at St. Petersburg,

(of which a copy is herewith transmitted to you) having for its object to engage the friendly offices of Russia, to hasten a peace between Spain and the new American States. The same note, or the substance of it, has been communicated through the Ministers of the United States, to the Courts of Paris and London, with the same purpose of peace. The hope has been indulged that, by a common exertion, and especially by the interposition of the Emperor of Russia, Spain may be made sensible of her true interests, and consent to terminate a war which she has no longer the ability to prosecute. No information has been yet obtained from Russia, of the manner in which the Emperor has received this appeal to his humanity and his power. From the reception given to the application, by France, we are confirmed in the previous impression of the importance of the movement of Russia, and new efforts, if they shall be considered likely to be useful, will be employed to urge her to the great work of pacification. In the meantime, it is deemed proper to put you in possession of what has been done, and of the copy of the note itself, which you are authorised to communicate to the Government of Colombia, or such parts of it as may appear to you to be expedient.

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain[1]

WASHINGTON, *October 17, 1825.*

SIR: Your despatch under date, the 11th August,[2] at Cheltenham with Mr. Canning's communication of the 7th of the same month, has been duly received; as also that of the 21st of August,[3] at London, transmitting his note, with the Tripartite instrument which he proposes to be signed by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France. These several papers have been laid before the President, and been deliberately considered.

He sees, with much satisfaction, the entire coincidence which exists between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, as to the expediency of terminating the war between Spain and her former Colonies, and their concurrence also, in the fitness of the Island of Cuba continuing to abide in the possession of Spain. Agreeing, as the two Powers do, in those two important objects, the hope is indulged that they may ultimately be induced to think alike as to the means best adapted to their accomplishment.

The great object—that which is recommended alike by the interests of all

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 394.
[2] See below, pt. VIII, doc. 833.
[3] See below, pt. VIII, doc. 835.

parties, and of humanity—is the termination of the war. Whatever dangers threaten Cuba, within, or from without, are to be traced to the war. That ceasing, they will quickly disappear. And they will equally vanish, whether peace is concluded by recognizing the new States, or a simple suspension of hostilities takes place without such recognition. With this view of the matter, the President, shortly after the commencement of the present administration, thought it advisable to direct the efforts of this Government towards bringing about a peace. Aware of the hopelessness of a direct appeal to Spain herself, it was thought best to invoke the interposition of the great Powers of Europe, and especially of Russia, believed to have a preponderating influence in the councils of Spain. Accordingly, a Note was transmitted to the American Minister at St. Petersburg, to be communicated to the Government of Russia, and a copy of it was also forwarded to you, and to Mr. Brown at Paris, to be used in communications with the respective Governments of Great Britain and France. In that note, it was attempted to be shewn that, if it were the true interest of both belligerents, it was evidently still more that of Spain, to put an end to the war; that, so far as respected the object of the recovery of her dominion over the Colonies, the war was concluded; and that its further prosecution could only be attended with an useless waste of human blood, and the probable loss of Cuba and Porto Rico, with the danger of involving in its calamities, other Powers, not now parties to it. It was also distinctly stated in that note, that the United States, for themselves, desired no change in the political condition of Cuba; that they were satisfied it should remain, open as it now is, to their commerce, in the hands of Spain; and that they could not, with indifference, see it passing from Spain to any European Power.

Absolute confidence in the success of these pacific exertions, however it might have been warranted by the actual state of the war, has never been cherished. They were justified by the purity of the motives which dictated them, and whatever may be their result, no regret can ever be felt on account of their having been made. Mr. Canning is greatly mistaken in supposing us to have counted upon the impression, to be made, by the employment of the blandishments of flattery with Russia; nor can it, for a moment, be admitted that the Emperor would be susceptible to their influence. They are instruments foreign to our habits, to our principles, and to our institutions, which we have practiced neither on that, nor on any previous occasion. If it were possible for us to employ such auxiliaries, we should have to resort to other climes and to other schools to qualify ourselves for their use. Our relations with Russia have been generally satisfactory, and characterized by mutual amity; but we have every reason to believe that this happy result has proceeded from a sense of the justice of the two Powers to what was due to the interests of each, and not to attainments, of the possession of which we are altogether unconscious. If, in the note to Mr. Middleton, the power

and preponderating influence of Russia are dwelt upon, they are notorious facts, and we have the authority of Mr. Canning himself for considering her as the "moving soul of the continental alliance."

We have heard from France, and although the answer given by Count de Damas to Mr. Brown is not so encouraging as could have been wished, it has not yet divested us altogether of hope. He thinks the present period not favourable to peace; but he, at the same time, admits the correctness of the views presented by this Government as to the state of the war, and in regard to the real interests of Spain. The difficulties, he believes, which lie in the way of peace, grow out of the personal character of the Monarch, and the mortified pride of Spain. Mr. Brown inferred, from what occurred at his interview with the French Secretary, that which we, before, well knew, that the first movement on Spain, must come from Russia, and that France would follow, rather than lead. From Russia we have not yet heard. Mr. Canning may be right in predicting a failure of the attempt; but we would not willingly believe in such a discouraging issue, for the reasons which he assigns. It is possible that the principles and prejudices of the Emperor of Russia may be opposed to the establishment, in Spanish America, of free Governments springing out of a revolution. But, if they be, in fact, established; if the power of Spain is altogether incompetent to their overthrow, and the recovery of her former dominion, it is difficult to conceive that he should dissuade her from yielding to a necessity absolutely incontrollable. We know that the Emperor of Russia does maintain the most perfectly friendly relations with a State whose social forms are directly opposite to those of Russia. If the Emperor of Russia advised Spain to refuse an acknowledgement of the Independence of the former Colonies, and to persevere in the war, that advice must have been given when a gleam of hope remained. Now that it is forever obscured, to suppose that he would persist in that advice after subsequent events, and especially after the decisive battle of Ayacucho, would be to attribute a degree of perverse obstinacy to the Emperor, utterly incompatible with the fidelity of the friendship which he entertains for Spain, and which should be very reluctantly credited. If he has lost the opportunity of taking the lead in that line of policy which the United States and Great Britain have wisely adopted, that remains to him, of being the great Pacificator between the Continent of America and Spain. And, bearing in mind that principle of our nature which impels us anxiously to hope for the possession of a desired object, not yet within our grasp, and even to exaggerate its importance beyond that which we attach to acquisitions already made, there is reason to believe that, by now becoming the successful agent of peace, the Emperor may regain, in the view and affections of the new States, and in the consideration of the world, even more than he has yet lost by any tardiness in his acknowledgement of their Independence. Mr. Canning supposes Spain to be ruined,

and that the Emperor has pushed her on in her blind folly. Her condition is indeed bad enough, whether viewed at home or abroad. But the Nation remains, and yet presents elements which, if wisely combined, and directed, would make it a powerful and respectable State. With a population not much short of ten millions, at home, a fine country, genial climate, and the ample Colonial possessions of Cuba and Porto Rico, to say nothing of other insular domains, Spain wants only wise Government, and peace. If, as is alleged, by pursuing the advice of the Emperor, she has lost, or has been unable to reconquer, her American Continental possessions; and if, by continuing in a state of hostilities, she puts in eminent peril what remains to her in this hemisphere, we must be disposed to believe that he will inculcate upon her, other councils, unless, (which cannot be believed) he has not the intelligence to comprehend, or the sincerity to recommend, that, which, in the present state of things, is the obvious interest of Spain. These are some of the views which lead us yet to cling to the hope that Russia may interpose her good offices to produce peace, notwithstanding the contrary predictions so confidently put forth by Mr. Secretary Canning. That object is, however, in itself so desirable, that all fair and practicable means of bringing it about should be considered with the utmost candour and deliberation. It is in this state of feeling that Mr. Canning's proposal has been taken up, and attentively and respectfully examined.

That proposal is, the signature by the United States, Great Britain and France, either of three ministerial notes—one between Great Britain and the United States,—one between the United States and France, and one between France and Great Britain;—or one Tripartite note, signed by all, disclaiming, each for himself, any intention to occupy Cuba, and protesting against such an occupation by either of the others. And the draft of such a paper as is contemplated by the latter alternative, accompanies Mr. Canning's note of the 7th of August. He thinks that Spain apprehends danger to Cuba from the suspected ambition of the old Powers (Great Britain, France and the United States) whilst she thinks comparatively but little of that which impends over it from the new; and he cherishes the belief that, when we jointly go to Spain with this disclaimer of all designs upon Cuba, in our hands, she will be soothed, and disposed to listen to our united Councils, which, otherwise, would be heard with suspicion, and repelled with resentment.

Considered as a measure of peace, I am not satisfied that Mr. Canning's estimate of the value of his proposal, is not too high. Whatever follies the King of Spain may have committed, we must still treat of him as a rational being, operated upon by similar motives to those which generally influence the conduct of Rulers. His fears now are, that, taking advantage of his weakness, and of vicissitudes in the existing war, one of the great maritime Powers of Europe or America may wrest Cuba from him; and his interests

require security for that important Island. Whilst the danger continues, both his fears and his interests would seem to unite on peace, by which it may be effectually removed. But if he is quieted as to the greatest source of his apprehensions, and thus made secure in his possessions, a powerful motive of peace would be withdrawn. And he might then, with perfect composure, calculate the cost, and the comparatively little danger to Cuba from the new States, arising out of the protraction of the war. If, as is quite likely, Spain entertains the alleged suspicions of the old Powers, she ought to suppress them, the moment they advise the conclusion of peace, a state unpropitious to their realization, being founded altogether on the contingency of the continuance of the war. And I confess, I am not sure that Spain, tranquilized in all her apprehensions about further colonial losses, would not find herself strengthened in her resolution to prolong the war, in the hope of re-establishing her antient power on some part of this Continent. After all that has happened, it would be too sanguine to believe that the United States and Great Britain can place themselves in any attitude that would induce Spain to take counsel from them, as from sincere, disinterested, and acceptable advocates of peace. And it may be doubted whether it would not be better, in aid of the cause of peace, to leave her to the operation of the full force of all her apprehensions about the possible contingencies which may assail her West India possessions in the further progress of the war, rather than give her the proposed security against those which she now most dreads.

We cannot, then, in the proposal of the British Government, discern the tendency towards peace which they believe it to possess. On the contrary, it is to be feared that, instead of its hastening the termination of the war, the sanction of the three Powers being known by Spain to be given to it, may retard the arrival of peace. If, instead of approaching Spain, with a diplomatic instrument, lulling her most serious apprehensions about Cuba, she were left to speculate upon all the possible dangers, from every quarter, which may assail her most important Colonial possession; and if, moreover, she were told by the three Powers, or by Great Britain and the United States, that, in the event of the people of Cuba declaring their independence, those Powers would guarantee it, she would be much more effectually awakened to a true sense of the perils to which perseverance in her present misguided policy might expose her. But if we are mistaken,—if the proposal of Mr. Canning would conduce to peace, by a suspension of hostilities, at least, as he supposes, there is no incompatibility between it and the previous attempt, on the part of this Government, to bring it about through the instrumentality of Russia, and the great maritime Powers of Europe, acting in concert with the United States. That attempt was founded on the belief that the existing inducements of Spain to terminate the war, are of themselves abundantly sufficient, if the naked truth should be exposed to her under such united,

and distinguished auspices. Mr. Canning's proposal proceeds upon the idea of the utility of qualifying some of the parties in this common exertion, more effectually to espouse the cause of peace, by so manifesting their forbearance and disinterestedness as to lead Spain to listen, without suspicion, to their councils. If it were deemed expedient to accede to his proposal, and he is right in believing it to possess any peace virtue, it may well stand along side of the measure of this Government, to which, in that view of it, it would prove auxiliary.

There is another aspect of the British proposal in which it is viewed more favourably. The British Minister truly says that the United States cannot allow the occupation of Cuba by either Great Britain or France, and neither of those Powers would acquiesce in the occupation of it by the United States. If the acceptance of it would not, (and so we are inclined to think) operate as a new inducement to Spain to put an end to the war, it might have a quieting effect among the great maritime powers themselves, by removing all causes of suspicion on the only subject which, in the existing state of the world, is likely to engage, materially, their solicitude, in regard to their own security. This is what is here understood to be the real object of the proposal. A declaration on the part of the Government of the United States that it will abstain from taking advantage of any of the incidents which may grow out of the present war, to wrest Cuba from Spain, is unnecessary, because their pacific policy, their known moderation, and the very measure which they have, already, voluntarily adopted, to bring about peace, are sufficient guaranties of their forbearance. From the amicable relations which, happily, exist between Great Britain and the United States, and the perfect union in their policy, in respect to the war between Spain and the new States, no apprehension can be felt that Great Britain will entertain views of aggrandizement in regard to Cuba, which could not fail to lead to a rupture with the United States. With respect to France, aware as her ministers must be that neither Great Britain nor the United States could allow her to take possession of Cuba, under any pretext, the hope is indulged that she will equally abstain from a measure, fraught with such serious consequences. Considering, however, the distracted condition of Spain, every day becoming worse and worse, and the intimate relations which subsist between the two branches of the House of Bourbon, it must be admitted that there is some cause of apprehension on the side of France. The fact of having given instructions to the Captain General of the French forces in the West Indies, to aid the Governor of Havanna to quell internal disturbance, proves that the French Government has deliberated on a contingent occupation of Cuba; and possession once gained, under one pretext, would probably be retained under the same pretext or some other. With the view, therefore, of binding France, by some solemn and authentic act, to the same course of forbearance which the United States and Great Britain have

mutually prescribed to themselves, the President sees no great objection, at present, to acceding to one, or other, of the two alternatives contained in Mr. Canning's proposal. As information, however, is shortly expected from Russia, as to the manner in which the Emperor has received the invitation to employ his friendly offices to bring about a peace, no instruction will now be given you, as to the definitive answer to be communicated to the British Government. In the mean time, you are authorized to disclose to it the sentiments and views contained in this despatch.

I am [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to James Brown, United States Minister to France[1]

WASHINGTON, *October 25, 1825.*

SIR: During the last summer a large French fleet visited the American seas and the coast of the United States. Its object naturally gave rise to much speculation. Neither here nor through you at Paris was the Government of the United States made acquainted with the views of that of France in sending out so considerable an armament. The President conceives it due to the friendly relations which happily subsist between the two nations, and to the frankness by which he wishes all their intercourse to be characterized, that the purpose of any similar movement hereafter, made in a season of peace, should be communicated to this Government. You will therefore inform the French Government of his expectation that such a communication will, in future, be accordingly made. The reasonableness of it, in a time of peace, of which France shall enjoy the blessings, must be quite apparent. The United States having, at the present period, constantly to maintain, in the Gulf of Mexico and on the coasts of Cuba and Porto Rico, a naval force on a service beneficial to all commercial nations, it would appear to be quite reasonable that, if the commanders of any American squadron, charged with the duty of suppressing piracy, should meet with those of a French squadron, the respective objects of both should be known to each. Another consideration to which you will advert, in a friendly manner, is the present condition of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. The views of the Executive of the United States in regard to them have been already disclosed to France by you on the occasion of inviting its co-operation to bring about peace between Spain and her former colonies in a spirit of great frankness. It was stated to the French Government that the United States could not see, with indifference, those islands passing from Spain to any other European power; and that,

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 855.

for ourselves, no change was desired in their present political and commercial condition, nor in the possession which Spain has of them. In the same spirit, and with the hope of guarding beforehand against any possible difficulties on that subject that may arise, you will now add that we could not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever. Cherishing no designs on them ourselves, we have a fair claim to an unreserved knowledge of the views of other great maritime powers in respect to them. If any sensibility should be manifested to what the French minister may choose to regard as suspicions entertained here of a disposition on the part of France to indulge a passion of aggrandisement, you may disavow any such suspicions, and say that the President cannot suppose a state of things in which either of the great maritime powers of Europe, with or without the consent of Spain, would feel itself justified to occupy or attempt the occupation of Cuba or Porto Rico without the concurrence or, at least, the knowledge of the United States. You may add, if the tenor of your communications with the French minister should seem to make it necessary, that, in the course of the past summer, rumors reached this country, not merely of its being the design of the French fleet to take possession of the island of Cuba, but that it had, in fact, taken possession of that island. If the confidence in the Government of France, entertained by that of the United States, could not allow it to credit these rumors, it must be admitted that they derived some countenance from the weakness of Spain, the intimate connexion between that monarchy and France, and the general ignorance that prevailed as to the ultimate destination and object of a fleet greatly disproportionate, in the extent of its armament, to any of the ordinary purposes of a peaceful commerce.

You are at liberty to communicate the subject of this note to the French Government, in conference or in writing, as you may think most proper; but in either case it is the President's wish that it should be done in the most conciliatory and friendly manner.

I am [etc.].

148

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Rufus King, United States Minister to Great Britain[1]

WASHINGTON, *October 26, 1825.*

SIR: Since the date of my note to you of the 17th[2] of the current month, your despatch No. 5, under date at London, on the 13th[3] of September,

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, X, 405.
[2] See above, doc. 146.
[3] See below, pt. VIII, doc. 839.

has been received, with the accompanying Note of Mr. Canning, under date at Stons, on the 8th of the same month. It appears from his statement that the French Minister, after having encouraged the overture of the British Ambassador, in a manner which led him to believe that France would willingly concur in the proposed declaration respecting the Spanish Islands, has suddenly changed his language, and formally declined to accede to the proposal. Under these circumstances, and without waiting for the desired information from Russia, which is not yet received, it seems to the President to be altogether useless and improper for the Government of the United States to unite with that of Great Britain in repeating the proposal to France. With respect to the signature of such a declaration by the United States and Great Britain alone, for the reasons which are stated in my note of the 17th instant, it cannot be necessary. After the friendly and unreserved communications which have passed between the two Governments, on this subject, each must now be considered as much bound to a course of forbearance and abstinence, in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico, as if they had pledged themselves to it by a solemn Act.

But, supposing the British Ambassador at Paris to have laboured under no misconception as to the encouragement which he supposes Count de Damas to have given, prior to his having formally declined to accede to the British proposal, the motives for obtaining from France some security for the observance of the same course of moderation which the United States and Great Britain have respectively prescribed to themselves, instead of losing any of their original force, have acquired additional strength. I have, therefore, by direction of the President, prepared an instruction for Mr. Brown, of which a copy is herewith transmitted, to inform the French Government, that, under no contingency, with, or without the consent of Spain, can the United States agree to the occupation of the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, by France. You are authorized to communicate its contents, by reading it, to Mr. Canning. If the British Government should direct its Ambassador at Paris, in like manner, to protest against France, under any circumstances, taking possession of those Islands, it can hardly be doubted that if she really has entertained any designs upon them, they will be abandoned. And the substantial object of the British Government will have been attained, and by means but little variant from those which it had devised. In coming to the determination to cause the above communication to be made to France, through the American Minister, the President has been influenced in a considerable degree, by a desire to correspond to the wishes of the British Government, which cannot fail to recognize, in that measure, a signal proof of the confidence and friendship of the Government of the United States.

I have the honour [etc.].

149

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Hilario de Rivas y Salmon, Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *December 15, 1825.*

SIR: Shortly after the receipt of the letter which, on the 22d. September[2] last, you did me the honor to address to me, instructions were transmitted to the respective law officers of this Government at Philadelphia and New York, to examine into the facts stated by you, and if they should find any of the acts to which they related were contrary to law or to the obligations of our neutrality, to institute the necessary legal proceedings to prevent or punish them. The answer from both those officers is in substance, that the circumstances detailed by you, if established by competent proof, would not be contrary to law, and therefore that the parties concerned would not be amenable to the tribunals of the country. The President might have been contented with this answer, and refrained from giving any further orders in regard to the vessels alleged by you to be ultimately destined to be employed against Spain, in the existing war. But anxious to afford to the Government of that country a new proof of the earnest desire of this, scrupulously to fulfil all of its neutral duties, before I had the honor of receiving your note of the 29th. ulto. the President had caused the proper instructions to be transmitted to New York to require of the owners of the vessels which are said to be fitting out there for belligerent purposes to give bond with sufficient sureties that they shall not be employed to cruise or commit hostilities against any power with which the United States are at peace.

I pray you to accept [etc.].

150

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to José Maria Salazar, Colombian Minister to the United States[3]

WASHINGTON, *December 20, 1825.*

SIR: During the last Spring I had the honor to state to you that the Government of the United States had addressed that of Russia[4] with the view of engaging the employment of its friendly offices to bring about a peace, if possible, between Spain and the new American Republics, founded upon the basis of their independence; and the despatch from this Department to the American Minister at St. Petersburg, having that object, was read to you. I have now the satisfaction to state that it appears, by late advices just

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 243.
[2] Not included since its purport is clear from this reply.
[3] *Ibid.*, 245. Virtually the same was addressed on the same day to the Mexican Minister.
[4] See above, doc. 141, Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825.

received from St. Petersburg that this appeal to the Emperor of Russia has not been without good effect; and that there is reason to believe that he is now exerting his friendly endeavours to put an end to the war. The first would be naturally directed to his Allies, between whom and His Imperial Majesty it was desirable that there should be, on that interesting subject, concurrence of opinion and concert in action. Our information from Europe authorizes the belief that all the great powers are now favourably inclined towards peace, and that separately or conjointly, they will give pacific counsels to Spain. When all the difficulties exterior to Spain, in the way of peace, are overcome, the hope is confidently indulged that those within the Peninsula cannot long withstand the general wish. But some time is necessary for the operation of these exertions to terminate the war, and to ascertain their effect upon the Spanish Government. Under these circumstances the President believes that a suspension, for a limited time, of the sailing of the Expedition against Cuba or Porto Rico, which is understood to be fitting out at Carthagena, or of any other expedition which may be contemplated against either of those Islands by Colombia or Mexico, would have a salutary influence on the great work of peace. Such a suspension would afford time to ascertain if Spain, resisting the powerful motives which unite themselves on the side of peace, obstinately resolves upon a protraction of the war. The suspension is due to the enlightened intentions of the Emperor of Russia, upon whom it could not fail to have the happiest effect. It would also postpone, if not forever render unnecessary, all consideration which other powers may, by an irresistible sense of their essential interests, be called upon to entertain of their duties, in the event of the contemplated invasion of those islands, and of other contingencies which may accompany or follow it. I am directed, therefore, by the President to request that you will forthwith communicate the views here disclosed to the Government of the Republic of Colombia, which he hopes will see the expediency, in the actual posture of affairs, of forbearing to attack those islands until a sufficient time has elapsed to ascertain the result of the pacific efforts which the great powers are believed to be now making on Spain.

I seize, with pleasure [etc.].

151

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Baron de Tuyll, Russian Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *December 26, 1825.*

According to my promise made to you on Saturday last, I have the honor to transmit herewith an extract from an official note which on the 20th

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 247.

instant[1] I addressed, by the direction of the President, to the Colombian Minister. A similar note was, at the same time addressed to the Mexican Minister.

I avail myself [etc.].

152

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia[2]

WASHINGTON, *December 26, 1825.*

SIR: Your despatches[3] (Nos. 48 and 49) have been duly received and submitted to the President. He sees with much satisfaction that the appeal which has been made through you to the Emperor of Russia, to employ his friendly offices in the endeavor to bring about a peace between Spain and the new American Republics, has not been without favorable effect. Considering the intimate and friendly relations which exist between the Emperor and his allies, it was perhaps not to be expected that, previous to a consultation with them, language more explicit should be held than that which is contained in Count Nesselrode's note. Although very guarded, it authorizes the belief that the preponderating influence of Russia has been thrown into the scale of peace. Notwithstanding the predictions of a contrary result, confidently made by Mr. Secretary Canning, this decision of the Emperor corresponds with the anticipations which have been constantly entertained here ever since the President resolved to invoke his intervention. It affords strong evidence both of his humanity and his enlightened judgment. All events out of Spain seem now to unite in their tendency towards peace; and the fall of the Castle of St. Juan d'Ulloa, which capitulated on the eighteenth day of last month, cannot fail to have a powerful effect within that Kingdom. We are informed that when information of it reached the Havana it produced great and general sensation; and that the local Government immediately despatched a fast sailing vessel to Cadiz to communicate the event, and, in its name, to implore the King immediately to terminate the war and acknowledge the new Republics, as the only means left of preserving Cuba to the Monarchy.

In considering what further measures could be adopted by this Government to second the pacific exertions which, it is not doubted, the Emperor is now employing, it has appeared to the President that a suspension of any military expedition which both or either of the Republics of Colombia and Mexico may be preparing against Cuba and Porto Rico might have a good auxiliary influence. Such a suspension, indeed, seemed to be due to the friendly purposes of the Emperor. I have accordingly addressed official

[1] See above, doc. 150.
[2] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 850.
[3] See below, pt. XII, docs. 1024 and 1026.

notes to the ministers of those Republics accredited here, recommending it to their Governments, an extract from one of which (the other being substantially the same) is herewith transmitted. You will observe it intimated in those notes that other Governments may feel themselves urged, by a sense of their interests and duties, to interpose in the event of an invasion of the islands, or of contingencies which may accompany or follow it. On this subject it is proper that we should be perfectly understood by Russia. For ourselves, we desire no change in the possession of Cuba, as has been heretofore stated. We cannot allow a transfer of the island to any European Power. But if Spain should refuse to conclude a peace, and obstinately resolve on continuing the war, although we do not desire that either Colombia or Mexico should acquire the island of Cuba, the President cannot see any justifiable ground on which we can forcibly interfere. Upon the hypothesis of an unnecessary protraction of the war, imputable to Spain, it is evident that Cuba will be her only *point d'appui* in this hemisphere. How can we interpose, on that supposition, against the party clearly having right on his side, in order to restrain or defeat a lawful operation of war? If the war against the islands should be conducted by those Republics in a desolating manner; if, contrary to all expectation, they should put arms into the hands of one race of the inhabitants to destroy the lives of another; if, in short, they should countenance and encourage excesses and examples, the contagion of which, from our neighborhood, would be dangerous to our quiet and safety, the Government of the United States might feel itself called upon to interpose its power. But it is not apprehended that any of those contingencies will arise, and, consequently, it is most probable that the United States, should the war continue, will remain hereafter, as they have been heretofore, neutral observers of the progress of its events.

You will be pleased to communicate the contents of this despatch to the Russian Government. And as, from the very nature of the object which has induced the President to recommend to the Governments of Colombia and Mexico a suspension of their expeditions against the Spanish islands, no definite time could be suggested for the duration of that suspension, if it should be acceded to, it must be allowed, on all hands, that it ought not to be unnecessarily protracted. Therefore, you will represent to the Government of Russia the expediency of obtaining a decision from Spain as early as possible in respect to its disposition to conclude a peace.

I am [etc.].

153

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to John M. Forbes, United States Chargé d'Affaires at Buenos Aires[1]

WASHINGTON, *January 9, 1826.*

SIR: Your dispatches to No. 26, inclusively, with their several inclosures, have been safely received at this office. As it is not recollected that they call for any special instructions, I will only add, with respect to them, that, while they exhibit proof of great zeal on your part, in collecting interesting information, in reference to the Political condition of Buenos Ayres, the diligence and manner employed in presenting it to this Department give great satisfaction.

During the last spring, Mr. Middleton, our Minister at St. Petersburg, was instructed[2] by this Department, by direction of the President, to endeavour to engage the Russian Government, to contribute its best exertions towards terminating the existing contest between Spain and the new American Republics, upon the basis of their Independence; and I have the satisfaction to state to you that it appears by late advices from that Minister that the appeal which he had, accordingly, made to the Emperor of Russia, was received with much favour; and there is reason to believe that the Emperor is now exerting his friendly efforts to put an end to the war. Our information, moreover, authorizes the belief that all the great Powers of Europe [between whom of his allies, and the Emperor of Russia, there must be concurrence of opinion and concert in action, to effectuate this object] are disposed, separately, or conjointly, to give pacific counsels to Spain. Some time, however, is necessary for those exertions and sentiments to accomplish their desired effect; and in the mean while, the Ministers of Colombia[3] and Mexico at this place, have been severally requested, by direction of the President, to procure, if possible, a suspension of any attack which may be meditated by either, or both, of their Governments upon the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, there appearing some reason to apprehend that a considerable naval Armament, collected at Carthagena, was destined for that service. This suspension seemed due to the enlightened intentions of the Emperor of Russia, whose mediation had been invoked by this Government, as well as to the circumstance that it would render unnecessary to other nations, and particularly to the United States, the delicate consideration which they might be otherwise called upon to entertain in reference to their essential interests, in the event of the attack or invasion in question. These gentlemen could do no more than answer that they would refer the matter to their respective Governments for their decision upon it. We owe it to the friendly relations between the United States and Buenos Ayres, and to the immediate

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers XI, 1. The number 26 here acknowledged is not printed in this collection, since it is not sufficiently pertinent. The documents which are pertinent will be found in pt. II, below.

[2] See above, doc. 141, Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825.

[3] See above, doc. 150, Clay to Salazar, December 20, 1825.

interests of that State which they involve, that its Government should be made acquainted with these circumstances; and you will take an early opportunity, therefore, of communicating them to it.

I am [etc.].

154

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to the United States House of Representatives[1]

WASHINGTON, *March 29, 1826.*

The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred, by the President, the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 27th March, 1826, requesting him to transmit to that House certain parts of the correspondence between the Department of State and the minister of the United States at Mexico, and to communicate certain information therein mentioned, has the honor to report:

That no answer was transmitted from this Department to the letter of Mr. Poinsett, No. 22, under date at Mexico, of the 28th September, 1825;[2] that No. 18, from Mr. Poinsett, under date of the 13th of the same month, and No. 22, relate to the same subject; the first stating the obstacle which had occurred to the conclusion of the commercial treaty in the pretension brought forward by Mexico to grant to the American nations of Spanish origin special privileges which were not to be enjoyed by other nations; and the second narrating the arguments which were urged for and against it in the conferences between Mr. Poinsett and the Mexican ministers; that No. 22 was received on the 9th of December last, and the answer, of the 9th of November, 1825, from this Department to No. 18, having been prepared and transmitted, superseded the necessity, as was believed, of any more particular reply to No. 22.

That extracts from the general instructions to Mr. Poinsett, under date the 25th March, 1825,[3] are herewith reported, marked A; that the United States have contracted no engagement, nor made any pledge to the Governments of Mexico and South America, or to either of them, that the United States would not permit the interference of any foreign power with the independence or form of government of those nations, nor have any instructions been issued authorizing any such engagement or pledge. It will be seen that the message of the late President of the United States of the 2d of December, 1823,[4] is adverted to in the extracts now furnished from the instructions to Mr. Poinsett, and that he is directed to impress its principles

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 908.

[2] None of the communications mentioned in this paragraph are printed in this collection, since they relate, as here appears, to commercial matters.

[3] For the portions of these instructions pertinent to the present collection, see above, doc. 135. Their date, according to the record copy in the archives of the Department of State, and also the original in the archives of the Embassy in Mexico City, is March 26.

[4] See above, doc. 125.

upon the Government of the United Mexican States. All apprehensions of the danger to which Mr. Monroe alludes, of an interference by the allied powers of Europe to introduce their political systems into this hemisphere, have ceased. If, indeed, an attempt by force had been made by allied Europe to subvert the liberties of the southern nations on this continent, and to erect upon the ruins of their free institutions monarchical systems, the people of the United States would have stood pledged, in the opinion of their Executive, not to any foreign State, but to themselves and to their posterity, by their dearest interests and highest duties, to resist to the utmost such attempt; and it is to a pledge of that character that Mr. Poinsett alone refers.

That extracts from a despatch of Mr. Poinsett, under date the 21st August, 1825, marked B, are also herewith reported, relating to the movements of the French fleet in the West India seas during the last summer; that his previous letter, to which he refers, on the same subject, with the accompanying papers, is accidentally mislaid, and cannot, therefore, now be communicated, which is less regretted because the information contained in that now reported, it is presumed, will be entirely satisfactory.

All which is respectfully submitted.

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President John Quincy Adams to the United States House of Representatives, relative to instructions to Ministers of the United States and concerning any pledge given on the part of the Government to Mexico and South America[1]

WASHINGTON, *March 30, 1826.*

TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES:

In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 27th instant, requesting a copy of such parts of the answer of the Secretary of State to Mr. Poinsett's letter to Mr. Clay, dated Mexico, September 28, 1825, No. 22, as relates to the pledge of the United States therein mentioned; and also requesting me to inform the House whether the United States have, in any manner, made any pledge to the Governments of Mexico and South America; that the United States would not permit the interference of any foreign power with the independence or form of government of those nations; and, if so, when, in what manner, and to what effect; and also to communicate to the House a copy of the communication from our minister at Mexico, in which he informed the Government of the United States that the Mexican Government called upon this Government to fulfil the memorable pledge of the President of the United States, in his message to Congress of December, 1823, I transmit to the House a report[2] from the Secretary of State, with documents containing the information desired by the resolution.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 907.
[2] See above, doc. 154.

156

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to José María Salazar, Colombian Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *April 11, 1826.*

SIR: I have received and submitted to the President the official note which you addressed to me on the 19th ultimo,[2] and by his direction I have now the honor to transmit this answer.

You have been already apprized, and Mr. Anderson has also communicated at Bogota to your Government, that a negotiation was, in May last, authorized to be opened with Russia, having for its object the termination of the existing war between the new American Republics and Spain, upon the basis of an acknowledgment of their Independence. About the same time instructions were given to the Ministers of the United States at the courts of London and Paris to engage them to co-operate in the accomplishment of the same object: And Mr. Everett, our Minister at Madrid, was also directed to lose no suitable occasion to inculcate on the Councils of Spain the utility of formally concluding a war, which had substantially come to an end, in consequence of the entire inability of Spain to prosecute it any longer, with the smallest prospect of success. The overture to Russia was well received; and there is reason to believe that the European alliance has become satisfied, and through the interposition of the late Emperor Alexander, will advise Spain that her true interest, under actual circumstances, as well as that of humanity, calls aloud for peace—Great Britain entirely concurs in the necessity of it—Spain alone, it is believed, of all the Powers, at the date of our last despatches from Madrid, had not yet yielded to the force of events, which have forever separated her from her former colonies.

In employing the good offices of the United States in the endeavour to prevail upon Spain to agree to a suspension of hostilities, for a limited term, according to the request contained in your note, the President sees only a continuation, in effect, of the negotiations already commenced—An armistice for ten or twenty years would, in fact, be one of the modes of effectuating the purpose of those negotiations. I am therefore directed by the President to say, that instructions shall be given to the Minister of the United States at Madrid to endeavour to prevail upon the Government of Spain to agree to a suspension of hostilities for a limited time, and upon the conditions, as stated in your note. Viewing the relative means on the part of Spain to defend, and those of Colombia, Mexico and the Central Republic, to attack the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, and the Marianos, and, moreover, that during the operation of the proposed armistice, if it shall be concluded, the power of the Republics will increase in a ratio probably much greater than that of Spain, it may be well for Colombia to consider whether the condition ought to be in-

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 258.
[2] See below, pt. VI, doc. 654.

sisted upon, that Spain shall not, whilst the armistice continues, augment her forces in those islands—On whatever terms it may be found practicable to put an end to hostilities, it will be a source of satisfaction, if Spain, declining to assent to peace, as heretofore recommended by the President, should even listen to that modification of it, which is now proposed by your Government; and the gratification of the United States will be greater, if their Government shall be in any way instrumental in bringing about an event so desirable.

Accept [etc.].

157

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Alexander H. Everett, United States Minister to Spain[1]

WASHINGTON, *April 13, 1826.*

SIR: I transmit, herewith, a copy of the answer of Count Nesselrode[2] to the overture through Mr. Middleton which was authorized by my despatch of the 10th day of May 1825,[3] of which you are in possession of a copy. From a copy of Mr. Middleton's Letter to me, now also forwarded, you will perceive that he thinks a more favourable effect was produced by that overture on the Russian Government than the terms of Count Nesselrode's answer would strictly import. Mr. Middleton's interpretation, in that respect, of the views of Russia has been sustained and strengthened by the Russian Minister, the Baron de Tuyll, in several interviews which I have had with him. As we have not heard through you, or from any other source, of any attempt at Madrid, on the part of the Russian Government, to enforce on Spain pacific counsels, we should be disposed to question the correctness of the opinion of Mr. Middleton, but from considerations arising out of the journey commenced during last summer, by the late Emperor, and his subsequent death. That unexpected and lamented event has produced, at St. Petersburg a state of things, to an account of which Mr. Middleton's late despatches have been exclusively confined. As the Emperor Nicholas has announced his intentions to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, we may conclude that he will co-operate in bringing about a peace, if possible, between Spain and the new Republics, unless we have been misinformed by Mr. Middleton and Baron Tuyll.

On the 20th day of last December,[4] I addressed a note to each of the ministers from Colombia and Mexico, a copy of which is now forwarded, for the purpose of prevailing upon their respective Governments to suspend any expedition which both or either of them might be fitting out against

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, XI, 21.
[2] See below, pt. XII, doc. 1025, Nesselrode to Middleton, Aug. 20, 1825.
[3] See above, doc. 141.
[4] See above, doc. 150.

the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. The President considered the suspension might have a favourable effect upon the cause of peace, and it was also recommended by other considerations. We have not yet been officially informed of the result of the application, but it was made under auspicious circumstances, and there is reason to believe that it will be attended with the desired effect. You will avail yourself of this measure to impress upon Spain the propriety of putting an end to the war, and urge it as a new proof of the friendly dispositions of this Government.

In respect to Cuba and Porto Rico, there can be little doubt, if the war were once ended, that they would be safe in the possession of Spain. They would, at least, be secure from foreign attacks and all ideas of Independence which the inhabitants may entertain, would cease with the cessation of the state of war which has excited them. Great Britain is fully aware that the United States could not consent to her occupation of those Islands, under any contingencies whatever. France, as you will perceive by the annexed correspondence with Mr. Brown and with the French Government, also well knows that we could not see, with indifference, her acquisition of those Islands. And the forbearance of the United States in regard to them, may be fully relied on, from their known justice, from their patience and moderation heretofore exhibited, and from their established pacific policy. If the acquisition of Cuba were desirable to the United States, there is believed to be no reasonable prospect of effecting, at this conjuncture, that object. And if there were any, the frankness of their diplomacy, which has induced the President freely and fully to disclose our views both to Great Britain and France, forbids, absolutely, any movement whatever, at this time, with such a purpose. This condition of the great maritime Powers (the United States, Great Britain and France) is almost equivalent to an actual guaranty of the Islands to Spain. But we can enter into no stipulations, by Treaty, to guaranty them. And the President, therefore, approves your having explicitly communicated to Spain that we could contract no engagement to guaranty them. You will continue to decline any proposal to that effect, should any such, hereafter, be made.

I received a note from Mr. Salazar the Colombian Minister, under date the 19th ulto.,[1] to which an answer was returned on the 11th instant,[2] of both of which, copies are herewith transmitted. The purport of his note was to engage the good offices of this Government in the endeavour to prevail upon Spain to agree to an armistice, on the terms specified, with the new Republics. The President has acceded to the wishes of Colombia as you will observe in my reply. And I am directed by him to instruct you, if peace be unattainable, to press on Spain the expediency of consenting to a suspension of hostilities. The circumstances enumerated by Mr. Salazar clearly indicate the necessity of peace itself, and, of course, comprehend the

[1] See below, pt. VI, doc. 654. [2] See above, doc. 156.

weaker measure of an armistice. To that enumeration may be added the fact of the intelligence just received here in apparently an official form, of the fall of the Castle of Callao; and the information which we have also received that Chili has sent forth a powerful expedition under the command of her President in person, against the Archipelago of Chiloe, which has probably, before this time, been reduced by the arms of that Republic.

I shall address a Letter to you, in a short time, pointing out several objections to the project of a convention which you have submitted to the Duke del Infantado. In the mean time,

I am [etc.].

158

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Henry Middleton, United States Minister to Russia[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *April 21, 1826.*

We have not yet heard of the definitive decision of the Republics of Colombia and Mexico, on the application made to them, respectively, by this Government, to suspend any expedition meditated against the Spanish Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. A principal object of that suspension, you will recollect, was to afford time to ascertain the effect produced on Spain, of the operation of those pacific Counsels which we were led to believe the late Emperor would give at the instance of this Government. The necessary time for that purpose, has been in fact gained, whatever their decision may be, and no expedition is yet understood to have sailed from the Ports of either of them, against those Islands. You will, therefore, represent to the Russian Government the just expectation which, after all that has happened, is entertained by the President, that they will use their best exertions to hasten the conclusion of peace. We have not been informed, from Madrid, of any efforts on the part of Russia to that end. In truth, the tenour of Mr. Everett's despatches is, that the Russian Minister accredited to Spain, has employed no activity in the cause of peace, if he has not lent his countenance to the further prosecution of the war. Whatever, in that respect may have been his conduct, no favourable change has yet been wrought on the Spanish Government, which, at our last dates from Madrid, does not appear to have been prepared to resolve on peace. You will ascertain from the Russian Government what has been done by it on that subject, if any thing, and what it conceives to be the prospects in future. You will have received information of the surrender to the Mexican Republic of the

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, XI, 24.

Castle of St. Juan de Ulloa. I have now to add that of the fall of the Castle of Callao, which capitulated to the arms of Colombia and Peru, and the reduction, by those of Chili, of the Archipelago of Chiloe, of which intelligence has just reached us. Thus the predictions contained in my note of the 10th of May last, continue to be progressively verified, and the war is every day more and more changing its character, and becoming, as to Spain, altogether defensive. That with respect to Cuba and Porto Rico remains to be fulfilled, but its ultimate accomplishment, and that at no very distant day, is inevitable, in the course of events, if the war is not ended.

The new Republics, far from being intoxicated by their signal successes, appear to desire peace more and more, as they multiply. I received from the Colombian Minister an official Note, under date the 19th Ultimo,[1] requesting the good offices of this Government to procure a suspension of hostilities for a term of ten or twenty years. By the direction of the President, I returned an answer, acceding to the request, if peace should be unattainable in a more acceptable form; and on the 13th day of this month,[2] I addressed a Note to Mr. Everett instructing him to urge Spain to agree to the proposed armistice, if she were not prepared to subscribe to a general peace on the basis of acknowledging the Independence of the new Republics. I now transmit you copies of these three several notes, with the direction of the President that you will invite the co-operation of Russia to put an end to hostilities, in this limited form, if the object shall have been found, in the mean time, unpracticable on that more extensive basis.

159

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Baron de Maltitz, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in the United States[3]

WASHINGTON, *May 26, 1826.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you enclosed, to be forwarded to your Government, a copy of an official note addressed by Mr. Ravenga,[4] the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia to Mr. Anderson, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States near that Republic. From the perusal of that note, it will be seen that the Government of Colombia accedes to the request, made by this Government, in the note addressed to Mr. Salazar under date the 20th day of December

[1] See below, pt. VI, doc. 654.
[2] See above, doc. 157.
[3] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 270. Baron de Maltitz, secretary of legation of Russia in the United States: Acted as chargé d'affaires *ad interim* from March 14, 1826, to December 20, 1827.
[4] See below, pt. VI, docs. 655 and 653, Anderson to Clay, March 19, 1826, and its enclosure, Ravenga to Anderson, March 17, 1826.

last,[1] of which an extract was furnished by me to the late Baron de Tuyll, that any expedition destined against the Spanish Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico might be suspended to afford time to ascertain the result of the pacific counsels which the Russian Government was expected to employ with Spain. The Republic of Colombia has given, in this instance, fresh proof of its desire of peace, and of the respectful consideration which it entertains for the friendly intentions of Russia.

I profit of this occasion [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to José Maria Salazar, Colombian Minister to the United States[2]

WASHINGTON, *October 25, 1826.*

SIR: I have the honour to acknowledge the due receipt of your Note under date the 29th. Ulto.[3] at New York, communicating to the Government of the United States information, and certain acts of the Executive Government of Colombia, in regard to the painful events which occurred in the Department of Venezuela in the month of April of the present year.

The Government of the U. States takes the most sincere and lively interest in all that concerns the repose and prosperity of the Republic of Colombia. The President heard therefore of those events with deep and unaffected regret. And he anxiously hopes that the measures which have been adopted by the Government of Colombia to repress the Military insurrection, which you describe, may be attended with the happy effect of preserving the authority of the Constitution and Laws, and at the same time, of averting the Calamity of a Civil War.

With respect to the particular object of your Note that of communicating the fifth Article of the decree of the 8th. of July last, promulgated by your Government, by which it declares the irresponsibility of the Republic of Colombia for losses and damages which may be sustained by citizens of Foreign Nations, in consequence of the disorders which unhappily prevail in Venezuela, the President hopes that no loss or damage to any Citizen of the United States will accrue from those disorders. But if any such loss or damage has accrued or should arise, he cannot admit that the Government of Colombia would not be responsible for it. And the right is, therefore, expressly reserved to prefer any claim to which those disorders may give birth. As the discussion of such a claim at this time might be of an abstract question, it is postponed until the necessity for entering upon it shall be known.

I pray you to accept [etc.].

[1] See above, doc. 150.
[2] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 298.
[3] Not printed in this collection.

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Don José Maria Salazar, Colombian Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *October 31, 1826.*

SIR: I regret that circumstances of which you are well apprized, have prevented an earlier acknowledgment of the Note which you did me the honour to address to me on the 10th. of July last.[2] The delay has, however, afforded to the President an opportunity of more deliberately considering its interesting contents, and forming that decision on the proposal of your Government which I have now to communicate.

The interest which the Republic of Colombia takes in the termination of the war between the Brazils and Buenos Ayres is honourable to her humanity. The Government of the United States has seen, with regret, the commencement, and would behold, with great satisfaction, the conclusion of that war. The differences between the Belligerents were not of a nature to justify the wasting, in a premature and useless war, those exertions and resources which would be better employed in establishing and strengthening their respective infant institutions. But the war, in fact, exists, and the question is, what are the best means to put an end to it? The proposal of your Government is, that a joint mediation should be offered by the United States, Colombia and Great Britain. The formal offer of such a mediation, without having any intimation from either belligerent that it would be acceptable, might not conduce to the object desired, unless the mediating powers were prepared, which they are supposed not to be, to coerce by force of arms compliance with the conditions which they might agree to prescribe. We have no communication, from either of the parties to the war, that our interposition to bring about a peace would be agreeable. Without, therefore, deciding how far it might, at any time, be expedient to offer, on an American subject and to American powers, a joint mediation composed partly of an European State and partly of American Nations, the President thinks that, under present circumstances, such a mediation as is supposed to be contemplated is of too doubtful advantage to warrant the United States to become a party to it. But you will assure the Government of Colombia that the respective Ministers of the United States, at Buenos Ayres and Rio Janeiro, will be instructed to afford their good offices, and to offer those of the United States, in putting an end to a war so injurious in its example and so pernicious in its consequences to the American hemisphere.

I avail myself of this occasion [etc.].

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 304.
[2] Not printed in this collection.

162

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to James Cooley, appointed United States Chargé d'Affaires in Peru[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *November 6, 1826.*

It should be a leading and constant object of your attention to obtain, and communicate to this Department, by every opportunity of conveyance, that may occur, information as well respecting the physical condition of the Country, as the political and moral character of its institutions and inhabitants. The geographical boundaries of the Republic, its connexions with Mexico, Colombia, the Republic of Bolivia, and Chili; the present state of its Government, Revenue, Army and Navy; its prospect of forming a permanent Republican Constitution; the produce of its mines now and formerly; and the state of its relations with European Powers, will all form important matters of enquiry and investigation. You will especially observe the Country with reference to its present or future capabilities of a commerce mutually advantageous to the United States and to Peru, and communicate the result of your observations. We should like, also, to possess accurate information as to the actual condition of the Aborigines within the limits of the Republic. Have they made any, and what, advances in civilization? Are they governed by their own laws, or by those of the Vice Royalty, formerly, and of the Republic, now? Or partly by one code and partly by the other? Have they any civil rights or privileges secured to them, and do they take any, and what part in the government of the Republic? Have they a taste for, and a sense of, the value of, property? Has any progress been made in their conversion to the Christian Religion? What have been, and now are, the means employed to civilize them?

You will avail yourself of every suitable occasion to impress the Government of the Republic of Peru with the friendly dispositions entertained towards it by that of the United States. You will answer in the most frank and full manner, all enquiries touching the practical operation of our Confederacy, or any of our institutions. And you should cautiously abstain from treating with disrespect whatever you may remark to be peculiar in the habits of the people of Peru, civil or religious.

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, XI, 180. James Cooley, of Pennsylvania: Commissioned chargé d'affaires to Peru, May 2, 1826. Died at his post, February 24, 1828.

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Baron de Maltitz, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *December 23, 1826.*

The Undersigned, Secretary of State of the United-States, in acknowledging the receipt of the Note of Baron de Maltitz, Chargé d'Affaires of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, under date the 30th. day of November last,[2] cannot deny to himself the pleasure of repeating, in writing, the expression which he has already had the honour to make verbally, in an interview with the Baron, of the high satisfaction which the President has derived from a perusal of the above Note and of the late despatches, relating to the subject matter of it, received from the Minister of the United States at the Court of St. Petersburg. It is peculiarly gratifying to the Government of the United States to find that the Successor of their illustrious and lamented Friend cherishes towards them the same sentiments of respect and esteem which he ever entertained, and of which he gave many signal proofs, and that he concurs in his enlightened views on the great question of pacification between Spain and her former American Colonies. Such an unbroken continuity of the policy adopted by the Emperor Alexander greatly abates the force of the shock which the recent dispensation of Providence otherwise would have inflicted.

The President never, from the moment of the receipt of the Note of Count Nesselrode under date the 20th. day of August in the last year,[3] permitted himself to doubt the sincerity of the late Emperor's desire that peace should be concluded between Spain and the new American States, nor that he would employ, in such manner as might appear to him most proper, his best endeavours to bring about that happy event. Information from Madrid did, at one time, create some apprehensions that the humane intentions of the Emperor Alexander were not seconded with sufficient zeal by his Minister at that Capital; but these apprehensions have been dissipated by the assurances which have been received from Baron de Maltitz.

The wishes of the United States in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico remain unchanged. They desire no disturbance of the possession of Spain, believing it most compatible with the interests and harmony of all the great powers. They would see any such disturbance, at the instance and by the arms of any power, with great regret. The new States have hitherto forborne, and that principally in deference to the declared desire of the United-States and Russia, to attack those islands. Whilst, on the other hand, Spain, instead of listening to the councils of peace and moderation which the hopelessness alone of the War ought to have inspired, has sent forth, from the post of

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 316.
[2] See below, pt. XII, doc. 1035.
[3] See below, pt. XII, doc. 1025, enclosed with Middleton to Clay, August 27, 1825.

Havanna, a formidable fleet for the manifest purpose of invasion or other hostile operation against the territories of some of the new States. It was dispersed and disabled in a storm; but neither the frowns of Providence, the distractions at home, nor the disasters which await her, in a further prosecution of the war, appear yet to have awakened that unfortunate Monarchy to a sense of the absolute necessity of terminating the existing hostilities.

Although the Government of the United-States is extremely unwilling to see any attempt made, from any quarter, to wrest from Spain the possession of those islands, and may yet continue to employ their exertions to prevent it, the Undersigned is constrained, in frankness, to repeat what has been already communicated to the Government of Russia, that if Spain shall still unnecessarily prolong the war, and drive the new States to the necessity of conquering peace in Cuba and Porto Rico, the Government of the United States could not justly interpose, unless a character should be given to the war of invasion which would render it, in reference to their own duties and interests, improper that they should remain neutral spectators.

But the President sees with great pleasure the determination of the Emperor Nicholas, as announced by Baron de Maltitz, to persevere in his efforts to prevail upon Spain to comprehend, in the actual posture of affairs, that her true interests are on the side of peace. And he cannot but persuade himself that those efforts will be crowned with complete success, and that the answer required by His Imperial Majesty from the Court of Madrid to the overtures for the conclusion of the war, either in the form of a treaty of peace or an Armistice—an answer which the President will continue most anxiously to expect—will be auspicious to the friends and hopes of humanity.

The Undersigned seizes this occasion [etc.].

164

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to José Maria Salazar, Colombian Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *January 9, 1827.*

SIR: I have the honour to transmit to you for the information of your Government, Extracts from despatches which have been received at this Department from the Ministers of the United States at the Courts of St. Petersburg and Madrid, a copy of a Note from Mr. Middleton to Count Nesselrode, a copy of a note from the Duke del Infantado to Mr. Everett and copies of two notes which have passed between the Baron de Maltitz, the

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 321. The record does not enable one to identify exactly these extracts; but see above, Clay's notes to the Russian chargé and below, pts. XII and XIII.

Russian Chargé des Affaires and myself, all relating to the subject of Peace or an Armistice between the new American Republics and Spain. If we are not authorised to conclude, from these documents, that there will be a speedy termination of the existing hostilities, they at least justify a strong hope that an event so desirable can not be much longer delayed. And they prove that the reigning Emperor of Russia has succeded to the enlightened views which his illustrious predecessor entertained on that important question. These documents further substantiate the friendly interest which the United States have never ceased to take and the happy results of their interposition with European Powers, in the cause of pacification. The Government of the United States will continue to employ to that end their good offices. And the President indulges the anxious wish that Spain will finally at some early day yield to the united cooperation, and the combined motives which press upon her to put an end to the further unnecessary continuation of the War.

I pray you [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to José Maria Salazar, Colombian Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *January 15, 1827.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 10th. instant,[2] stating the capture of the Colombian privateer, the Zulme, by the Spanish Vessel the Mars, and another Spanish Brig, within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, and claiming the restoration of the Privateer and her crew. No other information of the capture has been received at this Department; but that which you have communicated has been deemed sufficient to lay the foundation of a demand upon the Spanish Government[3] for the restoration of the Privateer and her crew. And I have accordingly, by the directions of the President, instructed Mr. Everett, the Minister of the United States, at the Court of Madrid, formally to make that demand. You must, however, be sensible, Sir, that the proof of the alleged facts, resting as it now does solely upon the ex-parte statement of the Captain of the Privateer, which is not even verified by oath, will not be deemed sufficient to make out the case, I have therefore to request that you will furnish authentic and complete evidence verifying the illegality of the Capture. I avail myself of this occasion to tender you assurances [etc.].

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 324.
[2] Not printed in this collection.
[3] See below, pt. 1, doc. 166, Clay to Vives, February 12, 1827.

166

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Francisco Dionisio Vives, Governor and Captain General of Cuba[1]

WASHINGTON, *February 12, 1827.*

SIR: A complaint has been received at this Department from the Minister of the Republic of Colombia, of the capture of the Colombian Schooner Zulme, within the jurisdictional limits of the United States. The capture is alleged to have been made on the 30th day of May of the last year by two Spanish armed Brigs, between Logger Head Key and, Newfound Harbour, five miles to the South East of Key Lobo, on the Coast of Florida, the Schooner being at anchor within the reef in about three fathoms water. The Captors are stated afterwards to have carried their prize to the Havanna, where she yet is, and where the Crew is kept in confinement. Upon this state of the case the Colombian Minister accredited to this Government has demanded, in the name of his own, the restitution of the Zulme and her Crew, together with damages for the capture and detention. The United States being desirous to maintain, with perfect impartiality, the state of neutrality in which they stand to the belligerents, feel themselves called upon by all the obligations which it imposes, as well as by the duty of vindicating their own violated territory, to cause full reparation to be made, should the facts as stated turn out to be true. Mr. Everett has been accordingly instructed to make the proper representations at Madrid. In the mean time, much delay may be avoided, if your Excellency should see fit to interpose your authority to cause the restoration and indemnity due to the occasion to be at once made. The repeated manifestations which you have given of your desire to preserve the amicable relations between the United States and Spain, have induced the President to direct that this application should be addressed directly to you, in the hope that, being enabled to satisfy yourself on the spot of the irregularity of the capture, you will forthwith direct the Schooner and her Crew to be restored, with such damages as belong to the justice of the case.

I avail myself of this occasion [etc.].

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 326.

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Daniel P. Cook, United States Confidential Agent to Cuba[1]

WASHINGTON, *March 12, 1827.*

SIR: The very great interest which the United States have in the future fortunes of Cuba, and the present dangers to which that Island is exposed from foreign attack, as well as from internal commotion, render it expedient that this Government should have some confidential agent on the spot, who can communicate from time to time whatever may be likely to affect its condition. The President entertaining a high opinion of your prudence, patriotism and ability, was desirous to avail the public of your services on this occasion, and therefore directed me to propose the commission to you. Having determined to accept it, you will be pleased to proceed without unnecessary delay, to the Havana, from such port of the United States as may appear to you most convenient and agreeable. It is deemed best that your agency should not be publicly known, as by keeping it secret, you will be more able to penetrate the views and designs of parties and persons, and collect that information which we desire to possess. But a commission is, nevertheless, herewith, transmitted to be used, if necessary, for the protection or safety of your person, or in any emergency in which it may appear to you to be proper to exhibit it; and a cypher is, likewise, sent, with directions for its use, to be employed in your despatches whenever you may deem it advisable.

The objects to which you will particularly direct your attention, and on which it is desirable to obtain all the information that may be practicable, are:

1st. The state of the population of the Island, exhibiting the relative members of the various Castes, their dispositions towards each other, education, intelligence etc.

2nd. The condition of its agriculture, extent of foreign commerce, and proportion of good land yet waste and in cultivation.

3d. The state of political parties in the Island, their views with regard to a continuation of their existing connexion with Spain, or in favor of Independence, or towards the new American Republics; and, especially, whether a preference exists, and on what account, for one of those Republics, and an aversion towards another of them. We have understood here, that a party in the Island is anxious that it should be connected with Mexico, and that a great repugnance exists among the inhabitants to any connection with Colombia.

4th What are the Spanish means of resisting an attack, should one be made, by the combined or separate forces of Colombia and the United

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, XI, 267.

Mexican States? Would they find any succour or co-operation in the Island, and to what probable extent?

5th What are the Spanish means of resistance, naval and military, if war should be the issue of her present relations with Great Britain; and the latter should attack Havana? And what are the dispositions of the inhabitants towards a colonial connexion with Great Britain?

In particularizing these objects, it is not intended to exclude others which may present themselves to you. On the contrary, the President desires any sort of information which may tend to the formation of a correct estimate of the value of the Island, its resources, natural and artificial, its capacity to maintain its independence, or to resist any foreign attack with which it may be menaced, and the dispositions and wishes of its inhabitants in respect of the continuance of its colonial condition, to independence, or to a connexion with any, and which, of the new Republics.

The design of your agency being exclusively that of collecting and transmitting information to this Government, you will keep yourself aloof from, and entirely unconnected with, any of the parties within the Island. It does not enter into the policy or views of the Government of the United States, to give any stimulus or countenance to insurrectionary movements, if such be contemplated by any portion of its inhabitants—Our position being that of peace with Spain, and neutrality in the existing war between her and the new American Republics, fixes our duties in reference to any commotions which may be either meditated, or, in fact, may arise in the Island. And if they should happen to be of a character, or to take a turn, which would require of the United States, from the relations in which they stand to the Island, to interpose their power, it will be time enough for the Government here, to consider and decide the nature of their intervention, when the exigency arises.

Your allowance will be at the rate of four thousand five hundred Dollars per annum, to commence from the time of your departure from this city, to proceed to a port of embarkation. As to the duration of the service, no time can be prescribed for it, at present, It will last until the occasion which has suggested it shall cease.

In addition to the above, an allowance will be made to you of a sum equal to your travelling expenses hence to the port of embarkation, of your passage thence to the Havana, of your passage back to the United States from Cuba, and of your expenses from the port of your debarkation in the United States, to your home. The sum of one thousand Dollars is advanced to you upon account.

I am [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Francisco Dionisio Vives, Governor and Captain General of Cuba[1]

WASHINGTON, *March 14, 1827.*

SIR: The Honble Daniel P. Cook, late a Member of the House of Representatives of the United States from the State of Illinois who will deliver you this Letter, being advised by his Physicians to try the effect of a sea voyage and the climate of Cuba upon the very delicate state of his health, I beg leave to recommend him to your kindness and hospitality during his abode on the island of Cuba. The President has thought it expedient, to avail himself of the opportunity of Mr. Cook's visit to the Havannah to charge him confidentially with a commission,[2] in the execution of which I have also to request such aid as Your Excellency may think proper to give. Your Excellency need not now be told of the frankness and impartiality which have constantly characterized the Government of the United States, during the whole of the war between Spain and her late Colonies; nor is it necessary to remind you of the explicit and repeated declarations of the wishes of the Executive of the United States that the actual posture of things in regard to Cuba should not be disturbed. The solicitude which the United States naturally feel in the preservation of the present condition of that island is greatly increased by the doubtful aspect of the relations between Spain and Great Britain. And it would tend to quiet our apprehensions if we were assured that the means of defense which the island of Cuba possesses are adequate to repel any attack that may possibly be made either by any European power or by the new States of America. The object therefore of the commission with which Mr. Cook is charged is to ascertain as far as it may be deemed proper the capabilities of the island to resist any such attack, and also information on any collateral points which may assist us in forming an accurate judgment on the degree of safety and security which the island actually enjoys. Your Excellency will fully appreciate the motives which influence the President in instituting this enquiry, and I hope will feel yourself authorized to cause any facilities in your power to be afforded to Mr. Cook in the accomplishment of the above commission.

I seize with pleasure, this occasion [etc.].

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 330.
[2] See above, doc. 167.

169

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to José Maria Salazar, Colombian Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *March 20, 1827.*

SIR: I have the Honor, in reference to the subject of the Note which I received from you, under date the 5th. of January last,[2] which contained a complaint of the capture of the Colombian Schooner Zulme within the territorial limits of the United States by two Spanish armed Brigs, which sent the captured Vessel into the port of Havanna, to transmit to you, herewith, the Copy of a Letter which I wrote to General Vives, Governor and Captain General of the Island of Cuba on the 12th. of last month,[3] requesting him, if he should see fit, to cause the schooner in question and her Crew to be restored, with such damages as might be found to belong to the justice of the case, to avoid the delay which would necessarily attend the application for the same purpose which Mr. Everett is instructed to make directly to the Spanish Government.

Whilst I pray you to excuse the accidental delay which has occurred in answering your Note, you will readily perceive, in the steps which have been taken in the matter to which it relates, a new proof of the friendly solicitude of this Government, to maintain and cherish the amicable relations subsisting between it and the Republic of Colombia.

I offer anew, Sir [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Pablo Obregon, Mexican Minister to the United States[4]

WASHINGTON, *May 21, 1827.*

SIR: Commodore Porter, in the service of the United Mexican States, with the Mexican Squadron under his command, has been, as you are no doubt aware, some time in the port of Key West, an appendage of East Florida. From the remote situation of that port, and the almost uninhabited condition of the Island, the Government here has not been always regularly advised of the movements of Commodore Porter's Squadron. His entry into the port was supposed to be for the purpose of that hospitality, which the United States are ever ready to dispense alike to the public Vessels of all friendly foreign Countries; and his subsequent detention in it was supposed to be in

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 335.
[2] Not printed in this collection.
[3] See above, doc. 166.
[4] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 357.

consequence of the presence of a superior Spanish force, which rendered his egress hazardous. But information has recently reached this Department, that Commodore Porter is availing himself of his position to increase his force, and to send out cruizers to annoy the Spanish Commerce. Such a belligerent use of a port of the United States is contrary to that state of known neutrality in which they stand in respect to the existing war between Mexico and Spain. Whilst the Government of the United States is ever ready and anxious to fulfil all the obligations of the most liberal hospitality, they cannot allow any departure within their jurisdiction from the line of a strict and impartial neutrality.

I am directed therefore by the President to request that you will adopt such measures as may appear to you proper to prevent any act or proceeding on the part of Commodore Porter, in violation of the neutrality of the United States.

I pray you to accept [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Hilario de Rivas y Salmon, Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *June 9, 1827.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of the 31st. ultimo, which I have submitted to the President of the United States.

Without entering into the general discussion of the principles which should regulate the conduct of a neutral Nation, during a state of war, which may unhappily exist between other Nations—a discussion which does not appear to me to be necessary at this time, I will limit myself to a few general observations.

The United States have been most anxious, during the whole course of the war between Spain, and the Southern Republics, strictly to perform towards each party all the duties of an impartial neutrality. The Government of this Union has never willingly permitted a violation of any of those duties. If there has been any such violation, it has not been with the consent or knowledge of the Government. Should any instances have nevertheless happened, it ought to be recollected, on the other hand, that the United States have had much cause to complain of injuries inflicted by the Belligerents on their lawful commerce; and sometimes of violation of their territorial jurisdiction. A recent instance of want of respect to that jurisdiction occurred on the same Coast of Florida to which you refer, in the capture of the Colombian Schooner the Zulme by two armed vessels in the service of the King of Spain. And to this day we have no information that

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 365.

any punishment has been inflicted by Spain on the persons thus invading our territorial rights, or any indemnity awarded to the parties who suffered in consequence thereof.

With respect to the vessels, built within the United States, which are referred to in your two notes of the 22d. September and 29th. November 1825, they did not leave our ports armed and equipt for hostile action. And it is remarkable that at the very moment when the precautionary measure was adopted in the United States of placing those vessels under bond, that very measure was suggested by the Duke del Infantado the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of the United States at the Court of Madrid, as one that would be proper, and satisfactory to the Government of Spain.

If vessels have been built in the United States and afterwards sold to one of the belligerents and converted into Vessels of War, our Citizens engaged in that species of manufacture have been equally ready to build and sell Vessels to the other belligerent. In point of fact both belligerents have occasionally supplied themselves with Vessels of War from Citizens of the United States. And the very singular case has occurred of the same Shipbuilder having sold two Vessels, one to the King of Spain, and the other to one of the Southern Republics, which Vessels afterwards met and encountered each other at Sea.

During a state of war between two Nations the Commercial industry and pursuits of a Neutral Nation are often materially injured. If the neutral finds some compensation in a new species of industry which the necessities of the belligerents stimulate or bring into activity it cannot be deemed very unreasonable that he should avail himself of that compensation, provided he confines himself within the line of entire impartiality, and violates no rule of public law.

The article in the treaty of 1795, between the United States and His Catholic Majesty cited by you does not apply to such a service as that in which Commodore David Porter has engaged under the Government of the United Mexican States. That article prohibits any Citizen Subject or inhabitant of the United States to apply for or take any Commission or Letters of Marque for arming any Ship or Ships to act *as privateers* against the subjects of His Catholic Majesty "or the property of any of them, from any Prince or State with which the said King shall be at War". Commodore Porter is not known to have applied for or taken any Commission or Letter of Marque from the Government of Mexico, for arming any Ship or Ships to act as privateers against the subjects of his Catholic Majesty, or their property. He is understood to have entered the public Naval Service of that Government, and that is not prohibited by the treaty. But even if he had incurred the penalty of piracy, which is denounced by the same article of the treaty, it cannot be admitted that the United States are bound to seize and

punish him. Should he be taken a captive by Spain, it will belong to her to consider whether he is comprehended or not in that provision of the treaty.

The refuge which Commodore Porter has taken in the port of Key West was not desired by the Government of the United States. He sought it to escape from the danger of a Superior force, and to enjoy that hospitality which the United States dispense equally to all friends and which would be satisfactorily rendered to a Squadron of his Catholic Majesty, under analogous circumstances. The fact of his long continuance there the Government of the United States supposed attributable to the presence of that Superior force, which if it has as you state, proceded to Blockade the port of Key west, has undertaken what it had no right to do by the public law.

Key west as you well know, is one of the remotest points of our Southern frontier. It is but thinly peopled. This Government has no force there. Information from it is not very regularly received. Reports having however reached Washington that some of the proceedings of Commodore Porter at Key West might not be considered as strictly compatible with the neutrality of the United States, prior to the receipt of your note, a representation to that effect was made from this Department to the Mexican Minister who, in answer, gave the strongest assurances that due respect should be paid to the neutrality of the United States. I have the honor to transmit to you herewith a Copy of a Letter from the Collector of that port addressed to Commodore Laborde, from a perusal of which you will perceive that nothing has been done within the knowledge of that officer by Commodore Porter, contrary to our neutral obligations. And this statement of the Collector is corroberated by the testimony of Lieut. Thompson furnished by yourself, in which he states that the authorities at Key West were ignorant of the expedition which was placed under his command.

If the force of Commodore Porter, while his Squadron has been at Key West, has been augmented, if he has availed himself of that position to send out Cruizers for the purpose of annoying the Spanish Commerce, and capturing Spanish Vessels, and returning into port with them, and if he has undertaken to sell his prizes in that port, he has abused the hospitality of the United States.

Assuming the accuracy of the documents transmitted by you to this Department, which we have no reason to doubt, Commodore Porter has made a belligerent use of that station, which he ought not to have done. This being the first authentic information which we have received of his illegal conduct, I have the satisfaction to inform you that prompt and efficient measures will be taken to cause the neutrality of the United States to be duly respected by Commodore Porter's squadron in the port of Key West.

We have no information whatever of 160 Seamen having been sent from the port of New York to strengthen the force of Commodore Porter, other than that which is contained in your Note; and we cannot but believe that

there is some mistake, in that respect, on the part of the Spanish Consul who communicated the statement to you.

With respect to the demand which you make that the Bonds which have been taken from the Owners of Vessels, that they should not employ them against any power with which the United States are at peace, the President would direct the necessary prosecutions to be instituted against the obligors, if we possessed any evidence of the breach, of their obligations; and if you will furnish such evidence, or inform us where it can be procured by reasonable efforts, the prosecutions will be accordingly ordered. But the mere fact of the employment of any such Vessels by the Enemies of Spain, in belligerent operations, would not of itself be sufficient to subject the obligors to a forfeiture of their bonds. They did not bind themselves that, at no future time indefinitely, after they had, by a bona fide transfer, of their Vessels, lost all control over them, should they be employed, in the possession of others, against a friend of the United States. They were bound for their own good conduct, not for the acts of others.

I pray you to accept [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Chevalier Francisco Tacon, Spanish Minister Resident to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, D. C. *October 31, 1827.*

SIR: I have submitted to the President of the United States the Letter which you did me the honor to address to me on the 5th. instant. Having conveyed the first information which was received at this Department of the equipping of the Corvette Kensington, in the port of Philadelphia, shortly after the receipt of it, an inquiry was directed into the condition and circumstances of that Vessel, and the proper Law Officer of the Government was instructed, if they were found to be such as were prohibited by Law, to institute the requisite prosecutions. An order has been issued from the proper Department to the Collector of the Port of Philadelphia, to require of her owner or Consignees, if necessary, bond, with sufficient sureties, in conformity with the provisions of the Act of Congress of the 20th. April, 1818, that the Vessel shall not be employed by the Owners to cruize or commit hostilities against any Nation with which the United-States are in peace.

Perhaps I ought to content myself with the above statement, as presenting a sufficient answer to your Note. But the Government of the United States,

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 396. Francisco Tacon, minister resident of Spain in the United States: Presented credentials, July 25, 1827. Presented credentials as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, November 11, 1833. Died in Philadelphia, June 22, 1835.

participating most sincerely in the desire expressed by you, that all causes of complaint which might impair the friendly relations happily subsisting between the two countries, should be removed, or satisfactorily explained, I will add a few general observations.

It is certain that the United States from their proximity to the theatre of the existing war between Spain and the Southern Republics, offer in their commerce, their manufactures, and their navigation, greater facilities to its prosecution than any other nation. This Government has nevertheless, been most anxious that neither party should draw from the United States any resources contrary to the public Law, and to the duties of an impartial neutrality. Nor can it be admitted that the efforts of the Federal Government, to prevent the violation of neutral obligations, have been ineffectual. Of the aids which the fair commerce of the United States supplies, both belligerents have occasionally taken free advantage. If the Citizens of the United States had sold objects of their legitimate commerce and industry to one party, and refused a sale of similar objects to the other party, there would have existed just ground of complaint. But no such partiality has been practised.

With respect to the particular article of Ships, as stated in the Letter which I had the honor of addressing to your predecessor, under date the 3d. day of June last, both Spain and some of the Southern Republics are believed to have freely availed themselves of the industry and commerce of the people of the United States in the procurement of them. Nor is it believed that the public Law or usuage among Nations is opposed to the sale of ships, as an object of commerce to either belligerent.

Ship Building is a great branch of American Manufactures, in which the Citizens of the United States may lawfully employ their capital and industry. When built, they may seek a market for the article in foreign ports as well as their own. The Government adopts the necessary precaution to prevent any private American Vessel from leaving our ports equipped and prepared for hostile action; or, if it allow, in any instance, a partial or imperfect armament, it subjects the owner of the vessel to the performance of the duty of giving bond, with adequate security, that she shall not be employed to cruize or commit hostilities against a friend of the United States.

It may possibly be deemed a violation of strict neutrality to sell to a belligerent, vessels of war completely equipped and armed for battle: and yet the late Emperor of Russia could not have entertained that opinion, or he would not have sold to Spain during the present war, to which he was a neutral, a whole fleet of Ships of War, including some of the line.

But if it be forbidden by the Law of neutrality to sell to a belligerent an armed vessel completely equipped and ready for action, it is believed not to be contrary to that Law to sell to a belligerent a vessel in any other state, although it may be convertible into a ship of war.

To require the Citizens of a neutral power to abstain from the exercise of

their incontestable right to dispose of the property which they may have in an unarmed ship to a belligerent, would, in effect be, to demand that they should cease to have any commerce, or to employ any navigation, in their intercourse with the belligerent. It would require more—it would be necessary to lay a general embargo, and to put an entire stop to the total commerce of the neutral with all nations. For if a ship, or any other article of manufacture, or commerce, applicable to the purpose of war, went to sea at all, it might, directly or indirectly, find its way into the ports, and subsequently become the property, of a belligerent.

The neutral is always seriously affected in the pursuit of his Lawful commerce by a state of war between other powers. It can hardly be expected that he shall submit to a universal cessation of his trade, because, by possibility some of the subjects of it may be acquired in a regular course of business by a belligerent, and may aid him in his efforts against an enemy. If the neutral show no partiality; if he is as ready to sell to one belligerant as the other; and if he take, himself, no part in the war, he cannot be justly accused of any violation of his neutral obligations.

So far as an investigation has been yet made, it has not resulted in the ascertainment of the fact stated by you, that the Kensington belongs to the Mexican Government. On the contrary, it appears that she is the property of American Citizens, built with their capital, and by their industry. They affirm that they neither have engaged, nor intend engaging, a single sailor to man her for any other purpose than that of peaceful commerce.

The alleged inefficiency of the bonds which have been exacted of the Owners or Consignees of vessels, according to the enactment of the act of Congress of the 20th. April, 1818, to accomplish the purpose for which they were executed, cannot be admitted. If in any instance, those bonds have been violated, it is unknown to the Government of the United States. And if you will communicate any evidence, or information by which evidence may be acquired to establish the fact that the obligors have deviated from their obligation, in any case, a prompt enforcement of it will be ordered.

Such, Sir, is a candid exposition of the views and principles which have guided the Government of the United States, I cannot doubt that it will be received by His Catholic Majesty as a further evidence of the fairness and justice which the United States have uniformly observed throughout the whole progress of the present unhappy War.

I avail myself of this occasion [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to John M. Forbes, United States Chargé d'Affaires at Buenos Aires[1]

WASHINGTON, *January 3, 1828.*

SIR: I should have, long since, noticed the subject which formed the principal topic of your conference with the President of the Argentine Republic, in August of the year before last (a minute of which, together with your correspondence on the same subject, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of that Republic is transmitted with your despatch No 40[2]) if the arrival of a Minister from Buenos Ayres had not been expected. In both the minute and the correspondence above referred to, it is stated that such a minister was about to be sent to the United States; but as he has not arrived, and as we have heard nothing, of late, about him, I will not longer delay communicating to you the views which are entertained by the President of the United States, on the two enquiries with which Mr. de la Cruz concludes his note to you. Those enquiries relate to the declaration of the late President of the United States, contained in his message to Congress, of the 2d. December 1823, against the interference of Europe with the affairs of America. At the period of that declaration, apprehensions were entertained of designs, on the part of the Allied Powers of Europe to interfere, in behalf of Spain, to reduce again to subjection, those parts of the Continent of America which had thrown off the Spanish yoke. The declaration of the late President was that of the head of the Executive Government of the United States. Although there is every reason to believe that the policy which it announced was in conformity with the opinion both of the nation and of Congress, the declaration must be regarded as having been voluntarily made, and not as conveying any pledge or obligation, the performance of which foreign nations have a right to demand. When the case shall arrive, if it should ever occur, of such an European interference as the message supposes, and it becomes consequently necessary to decide whether this country will or will not engage in war, Congress alone, you well know, is competent, by our Constitution, to decide that question. In the event of such an interference, there can be but little doubt that the sentiment contained in President Monroe's message, would be still that of the People and Government of the United States.

We have much reason to believe that the declaration of Mr. Monroe had great, if not decisive, influence, in preventing all interference, on the part of the Allied Powers of Europe to the prejudice of the new Republics of America. From that period down to the present time, the efforts of the Government of the United States have been unremitted to accomplish the same object. It was one of the first acts of the present administration to engage the head of

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, XII, 49.
[2] See below, pt. II, doc. 312, Forbes to Clay, September 5, 1826.

the European Alliance, the late Emperor Alexander, to employ his good offices to put a stop to the further effusion of human blood, by the establishment of a peace between Spain and those new Republics. Entering fully into the views of the United States, he did give his advice, to that effect, to the Spanish Government. His successor, the Emperor Nicholas, is known to march in the same line of policy which was marked out by his illustrious brother.

Not long after President Monroe's declaration, Great Britain took the decided step of acknowledging the independence of several of the new Republics. More recently France, and other European Powers, have given indications of their intention to follow the example of the United States.

It may then be confidently affirmed that there is no longer any danger whatever of the contingency happening, which is supposed by Mr. Monroe's message, of such an interference, on the part of Europe, with the concerns of America, as would make it expedient for the Government of the United States to interpose.

In respect to the war which has unhappily been raging between the Argentine Republic, and the Emperor of Brazil, the President has seen it with great regret, and would be very glad to hear of its honorable conclusion. But that war cannot be conceived as presenting a state of things bearing the remotest analogy to the case which President Monroe's message deprecates. It is a war strictly American in its origin and its object. It is a war in which the Allies of Europe have taken no part. Even if Portugal and the Brazils had remained united, and the war had been carried on by their joint arms, against the Argentine Republic, that would have been far from presenting the case which the message contemplated. But, by the death of the late King of Portugal, there has been a virtual separation between the Brazils and Portugal, and during the greater part, if not the whole, of the period of the war, the condition of Portugal has been such as to need succor, rather than be capable of affording it to the Brazils.

The general policy of the United States is that of strict and impartial neutrality in reference to all wars of other Powers. It would be only in an extreme case that they would deviate from that policy. Such a case is not presented by the present war.

You will communicate in the most friendly manner, the substance of this despatch to the Government near which you reside.

I am [etc.].

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Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to J. Rafael Revenga, Colombian Secretary of State for Foreign Relations[1]

WASHINGTON, *January 30, 1828.*

SIR: I have received the Letter which your Excellency did me the honor to address to me, on the 25th. of September of the last year,[2] by the directions of the Liberator President on his assumption of the exercise of the National Executive power of the Republic of Colombia. The object of your Excellency's letter is to explain to the satisfaction of the Government of the United States the reasons which induced the publication at Caracas of a communication from Mr. Watts, Chargé d'Affaires of the United-States near the Republic of Colombia.

There is no one point in the foreign relations of the United States about which their Government has ever been more solicitous, than that of scrupulously avoiding all interference in the internal affairs of another nation. This rule of conduct, which has been invariably observed by the Government of the United States, is founded upon the double motive of self respect, and respect for foreign powers. As we could ourselves tolerate no interference in our affairs by any foreign power, we suppose no foreign power would admit of any interference, on our part, in its affairs.

The communication of Mr. Watts, to which Your Excellency refers, was made without instruction; and the first information of it which reached the Government of the United States, was received through the channel of the public prints. In making that communication Mr. Watts was no doubt actuated by a zealous interest which he took in the affairs of Colombia, and he was probably also influenced by the laudable object of healing, rather than exciting, intestine divisions. Your Excellency does the Government of the United States no more than justice in supposing that it takes a deep concern in whatever relates to the prosperity of the Republic of Colombia. It has, consequently, seen, with regret, late events occurring within the bosom of that Republic, whose tendency appeared to be to impair its happiness; and it hails with joy the restoration of a more auspicious state of things. Although the Government of the United States cherishes these sentiments, it could not have allowed itself to take any part in the internal transactions of Colombia the proper estimate of which belongs exclusively to her own Government and people.

Whilst I feel that the occasion calls for these explanations, I take great pleasure in being the organ of expressing the satisfaction of the President of the United States with the reasons assigned in Your Excellency's Letter for the publication of Mr. Watts' communication. One half of the objection to that communication is removed by the ascertainment of the fact that

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, III, 421.
[2] Not printed in this collection.

it gave no dissatisfaction to the Government of the Republic of Colombia, and with respect to the other half relating entirely to the United States, the President is disposed to overlook it, under all the circumstances of the case.

With assurances of the most sincere and undiminished friendship, on the part of the United States, for the Republic of Colombia, I beg leave [etc.].

175

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Francisco Tacon, Spanish Minister Resident to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *April 11, 1828.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of the 26th. ultimo,[2] transmitting a copy of the representation addressed to you by the Captain General of the Island of Cuba, in relation to the capture of the Spanish hermaphrodite brig Reyna Amelia, off the port of Matanzas, by a Mexican vessel of war, and subsequently brought into the port of Keywest. You demand a surrender of the prize, as having been illegally captured, and you allege that the shelter which has been afforded her in an American port is an additional proof that the neutrality of the United-States is not such as is defined by the Law of Nations, nor that which is required by treaties: and that all its advantages as practised in the United States, are in favor of the enemies of the King of Spain.

If the prize in question had been captured within the jurisdiction of the United-States, the President would not hesitate to direct its restoration to its lawful Spanish owners: but it appears to have been taken on the high seas, or, at least, without the jurisdiction of the United States. In entering the port of Keywest nothing more has been done, or will be permitted, in relation to this prize, than, under analogous circumstances, would be allowed in regard to a prize taken by a Spanish vessel, and brought into the same port. Neither the Reyna Amelia, nor any of the prize goods which she may have on board, will be permitted to be sold or otherwise disposed of, in the United States: but the departure of both will be required. It is very possible that some irregularities may have been committed on the Coast of Florida by both belligerents. The Government of the United States has given no sanction to any such irregularities; and whenever they have occurred, has seen them with regret. It has had occasion, recently, to demand of the Government of Spain, a surrender of the Colombian private armed schooner Zulme, captured by Spanish Cruisers on the same Coast of Florida, within the jurisdiction of the United States, and I am sorry to be obliged to inform

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, IV, 8.
[2] Not printed in this collection.

you that that demand remains yet to be complied with. You must be sensible that the best title which His Majesty, the King of Spain, can have to an enforcement, in his behalf, of the neutrality of the United States, would be derived from the respect to the same neutrality which he may exact from those acting in authority under him.

In the instance of the Reyna Amelia, as she has merely sought that asylum which is equally granted to both parties, and as no sale or disposition of the Vessel or Cargo will be allowed, no violation of the public law, nor of the obligation of existing treaties, can be admitted.

I avail myself [etc.].

176

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Pablo Obregon, Mexican Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *May 1, 1828.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of the 18th. ultimo,[2] in relation to the Mexican brig of War Hermon, and her prize, the Spanish privateer brig Reyna Amelia, in the port of Key West. You state that the Mexican brig captured her prize off Matanzas, and that being at the time in sight of the Enemy's Cruisers, and his prize being in the impossibility of proceeding further, in consequence of the results of the engagement, he had towed her into the port of Key West: that Captain Hawkins applied to the Collector of that port, representing the impossibility of the prize proceeding to a Mexican port without the necessary repairs, and asking permission to make them, and for that purpose, to sell a part of the Cargo to defray expenses: That the Collector refused permission to make the repairs, on the ground that the Mexican brig had violated the neutrality of the United-States, and stated that if the prize remained in port she would be placed in the custody of the customhouse officers, at the disposition of the President of the United States: That Captain Hawkins proceeded, notwithstanding, to repair his prize, which was opposed by the Collector upon the same ground of violation of the neutrality of the United-States, and for the further reason that Captain Hawkins had disobeyed the verbal and written orders which he had received not to dispose of the prize: And that the Collector subsequently directed the seizure of the prize, ordered her sails to be unbent, and the Mexican flag to be taken down, and Captain Hawkins to leave the port with the Brig Hermon. Against this conduct of the Collector, it appears that Captain Hawkins protested.

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, IV, 22. Pablo Obregon, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Mexico to the United States: Presented credentials, November 18, 1824. Died at Legation, September 10, 1828, having committed suicide.

[2] Not printed in this collection.

From information received from the Collector it appears that Captain Hawkins had previously made a use of the hospitality granted him and the brig Hermon in the port of Key West, inconsistent with the neutrality of the United States: that he had appeared to regard it for all the purposes of belligerent operations against the commerce of Spain, as a Mexican port, issuing out of it for the purpose of annoying that commerce, and returning to it at pleasure: that he had brought prizes into it, taken from Spain, and had ransomed some of them within the port; and that he had supplied himself prior to the cruize which terminated in the capture of the Reyna Amelia, with Cannon shot procured in the port of Key West.

This is not the first instance of an abuse of the privileges of the hospitality of the United States by Mexican armed Vessels in the same port. Its situation is such as to afford great facilities to the Mexican armed vessels in committing depredations upon Spanish Commerce without offering corresponding advantages to the other belligerent. Without regard to that inequality the Government of the United States has been sincerely disposed to perform, towards both belligerents, all the offices of hospitality enjoined by humanity and the public law, and consistent with their friendship to both. But it can permit neither, under allegations of distress, whether feigned or real, to perform acts incompatible with a strict and impartial neutrality. It may become the Government of the United States seriously to consider whether it ought not to apply the only effectual remedy for preventing irregularities by excluding the armed vessels of both belligerents and their prizes from the port of Key-West, which offers so many temptations to the violation of the neutrality of the United States. It appears from the statement which you have yourself presented, that Captain Hawkins in defiance of the authority of the Collector, proceeded to repair his prize and remained in port with the brig Hermon, after he had been required to depart.

Under all the circumstances of the case, the President does not feel it incumbent upon him to direct the delivery of the prize to Captain Hawkins. But deems it proper to leave the question to be settled by the proper judicial tribunals, which are competent to afford adequate redress to Captain Hawkins if he has been really injured. Those tribunals will decide whether there has been any such violation of the laws and neutrality of the United States as to make it the duty of their Government to withhold the surrender of the prize.

With respect to the lowering of the Mexican flag, that was the mere consequence of the forfeiture and seizure of the prize. It was not intended, and ought not to be regarded as manifesting any disrespect or indignity to the flag or Government of the United Mexican States.

The laws of the United States do not admit of the sale, within their jurisdiction, for any purpose, of prize goods taken by one belligerent from another and brought into their ports. This Government does not take jurisdiction

at all upon the question of prize or no prize, but leaves that question, exclusively to the cognizance of the tribunals of the respective belligerents. Whether, therefore, the capture of the Reyna Amelia was complete or not when she entered the port of Key West, there was no right to sell any portion of her cargo, at least prior to a regular condemnation.

I have the honor to transmit you, herewith, a copy of a Treasury Circular long since issued and published—in which the course of policy pursued towards belligerents is distinctly announced.

I avail myself [etc.].

177

Daniel Brent, Chief Clerk of the Department of State, to Francisco Tacon, Spanish Minister Resident to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *August 2, 1828.*

SIR: I duly received your Letter of the 28th. of June,[2] addressed to the Secretary, stating that it had come to the knowledge of your Government that Commodore Porter, of the Mexican Navy, had published a decree, commanding that all neutral vessels, having on board Spanish property, or articles contraband of war, should be detained, and the said property, or articles confiscated; and that you had received instructions from your Government to represent to this, that His Catholic Majesty would be compelled to adopt reciprocal measures with regard to the vessels of this Union, if this Government did not cause its flag to be respected in the matter referred to; and in the absence of Mr. Clay, I submitted your Letter to the President, I am directed by him now to inform you, as I have the Honor of doing, that no time was lost on the part of this Government, after the appearance of the decree in question, in remonstrating with that of Mexico, against its principles and legality, and that there is reason to believe that the Government of Mexico will not enforce it, with regard to vessels of the United States.

I pray you, Sir, [etc.].

178

Daniel Brent, Chief Clerk of the Department of State, to Francisco Tacon, Spanish Minister Resident to the United States[3]

WASHINGTON, *September 20, 1828.*

SIR: In the continued absence of the Secretary of State, I had the honor to receive the Note which you addressed to him, under date the 15th. in-

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, IV, 46.
[2] Not printed in this collection.
[3] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, IV, 61.

stant,[1] stating that Captain Fournier in command of the Corvette Bolivar and of several other Vessels under Buenos Ayrean Colours, had anchored in Long Pond near New York, where he was engaged in recruiting seamen;—and that you had been moreover informed that a Vessel was fitting out at Baltimore under the direction of Captain Cotherell, to be employed as a privateer against the subjects of His Catholic Majesty,—and requesting that proper measures might be adopted to prevent and punish these infractions of the neutrality of the United States.

I will lose no time, upon Mr. Clay's return to the Seat of Government, in laying your Note before him; and in the mean-while, I take great pleasure in stating for your information, that I have submitted it to the President, who has caused such orders to be given, as, it is hoped, will prove effectual in arresting the proceedings complained of against Captain Fournier, if these proceedings shall have been correctly reported to you, and in stopping, likewise the armament of the Vessel of War at Baltimore, to which you refer, if that armament shall also prove to be of the character imputed to it.

I take advantage of this occasion [etc.].

179

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Alejandro Valez, Colombian Chargé d'Affaires in the United States[2]

WASHINGTON, *October 14, 1828.*

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of yesterday. I participate the regret which you express on account of our not having a personal interview, when you were last in this City. Having always derived from our official intercourse a high degree of satisfaction, I should have been happy, if it had been conformable with the views of your Government and with your own wishes that you should have continued to represent it. I hope, in the different disposition which has been made, that you will find your interests and prosperity promoted, and that your Successor may be animated by the same frank and friendly sentiments which I have always found in you:

It is very gratifying to me to know that my efforts to produce the recognition of Colombia, as an Independent State, are justly appreciated by you. They proceeded from a conviction that it was an act of justice, and from a lively interest which I felt in the welfare of that Republic. That interest is unabated, and I shall continue to cherish it, under all vicissitudes.

[1] Not printed in this collection.

[2] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, IV, 76. Alejandro Velez, chargé d'affaires of Colombia to the United States: Placed in charge of legation, June 17, 1828. Department informed, by note of August 11, 1828, of the withdrawal of legation. Transmitted his letter of recall to Department, August 17.

I thank you for your obliging offer to execute any Commands I might have for Colombia. I have none at this time. I beg you to carry with you my anxious wishes for the happiness, and prosperity of your Country and for your own.

I am [etc.].

180

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to F. I. Mariategui, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru[1]

WASHINGTON, *December 30, 1828.*

MOST EXCT. SIR: I had the honor of receiving, several months ago, an official Letter under date the 16th of November of the last year, from Mr. F. I. Mariategui, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Peru, recounting the events which led to the present Constitution of that Republic, communicating apprehensions that General Bolivar meditated war upon it, and inviting the Government of the United States to interpose its mediation in defence of the peace and freedom of Peru. The Letter is presumed to have been addressed directly to the Secretary of State of the United-States, because the Republic of Peru had no diplomatic Representation accredited near them. The death of Mr. Cooley, the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Peru, and the delay incident to the designation of his successor, have hitherto prevented the return of such an answer as was due to the important character of that Letter. Mr. Larned, our Chargé d'Affaires at Chile, having been appointed to replace Mr. Cooley, is charged to communicate[2] the views of the President which I hope will prove entirely satisfactory to Your Excellency, and to your Government.

I avail myself [etc.].

181

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Samuel Larned, United States Chargé d'Affaires in Peru[3]

WASHINGTON, *January 1, 1829.*

SIR: I received an official letter from the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Peru, under date the 16th. November, of the last year,

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, IV, 131. The letter of which the receipt is here acknowledged is not printed in this collection. Its contents are evident from doc. 181, below.

[2] See below, pt. 1, doc. 181, Clay to Larned, January 1, 1829.

[3] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, XII, 177. Samuel Larned, of Rhode Island: Commissioned secretary of legation in Chile, November 18, 1823. Left in charge, July 31, 1827. Commissioned as chargé d'affaires, February 29, 1828. Left, October 14, 1829. Commissioned chargé d'affaires in Peru, December 29, 1828. Mr. West having been appointed chargé d'affaires, and having died on the way to his post, Mr. Larned was recommissioned, May 15, 1830. Left, March 2, 1837.

communicating the events which preceded and led to the formation of the present Constitution of Peru, imputing to General Bolivar vast designs of Ambition, and expressing apprehensions that he entertained hostile designs against Peru, and that an attempt would be made to conquer it by the combined forces of Colombia and Bolivia. The letter, of which a copy is herewith transmitted, concluded by inviting the Government of the United States to interpose its mediation in defence of the peace and freedom of Peru. Several causes, among which may be mentioned the death of Mr Cooley, and unavoidable delay in the designation of his successor, have hitherto postponed the return of such an answer as was due to the important nature of that communication. The Government of the United States has ever taken, and continues to feel, the deepest interest in the success and prosperity of the southern Republics of the Continent of America. It is sensible that peace is required by their condition, to enable them to repair the ravages of war; to establish and consolidate their free institutions, and to take that respectable stand among the nations of the earth, which, it is sincerely hoped, they will occupy. It would be just cause of deep and universal regret if at the moment when one war is extinguished on the Atlantic side of South America, another should be lighted up on that of the Pacific. Although other information had reached us, corroborating that which is contained in the letter of the Minister of Foreign Relations of Peru, of the inimical designs upon that Republic of General Bolivar, the President, reluctant to credit them, had entertained a hope that the distracted condition of Colombia, and the disorder of her finances, if not a proper sense of his true glory, would have dissuaded him from rashly engaging in foreign war. Recent intelligence received here, however, seems to render too probable such an event.

General Harrison, the Minister of the United States near the Republic of Colombia, has recently taken his departure to proceed to the discharge of the duties of his mission. In consequence of the anxiety which the President feels that the menaced war should not be kindled, that Minister has been charged among the first duties which he performs, upon his arrival at Bogota, to communicate to the Government of Colombia, the President's "anxious wish that the war may be averted if it has not broken out, or may be honorably terminated, if it has commenced." And he was directed to embrace some suitable occasion "to communicate this sentiment to the Colombian Government, and to express the gratification which the President will derive from the existence of peace and a good understanding between two countries in whose prosperity and happiness the United States must ever feel a lively interest."

You will assure the Government of Peru that it does not too highly estimate the solicitude which that of the United States feels for its welfare, and that it will be ever ready to manifest this solicitude in any manner in its

power, not inconsistent with the paramount duties which it owes to the People of the United States. And you will communicate to it the substance of this despatch with the purport of the instruction given to General Harrison.

The policy of the United States is that of peace and friendship with all nations, always regretting, but carefully avoiding taking any part in, their wars, and abstaining, with the utmost caution and delicacy from all interference in their internal concerns. Hitherto the United States have never assumed the office of Mediator. It is one which draws after it high duties and great responsibility, and it ought never to be undertaken but upon full consideration of his own condition, and that of both of the States between which it is proposed he should mediate. It ought not to be undertaken without the consent of both those States. As the Government of Colombia has not requested the mediation of the United States, and has given no intimation of its wishes upon that subject, it is deemed proper to wait until an answer shall be received to the communication which General Harrison has been instructed to make. Without intending now to pledge the Government of the United States to assume the office, whatever may be the nature of that answer, you will inform the Government of Peru, that, when it is received, this Government will be able to decide how far it will be compatible with its own interest and its friendly relations with its two sister Republics to interpose between them.

I transmit, herewith, a letter addressed to the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Peru, which you will deliver to that officer. On perusing it, you will perceive that he is referred to you for the views of the President in regard to the proposed mediation.

I am [etc.].

182

Henry Clay, Secretary of State, to Xavier de Medina, Colombian Consul General at New York[1]

WASHINGTON, *February 9, 1829.*

SIR: I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of your Government, that in compliance with its wish, as signified by Don Alexandro Velez, late Chargé d'Affaires, to the United States, Instructions were given. by this Department to the Minister of the United-States at Madrid, on the 21st. of June last,[2] to endeavour to procure the exchange of a number of Prisoners, belonging to the Colombian Privateer, General Armoria, captured, with that vessel, off the Coast of Spain, and detained in prison, at

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, IV, 142.
[2] Not printed in this collection.

Carraca, near Cadiz; and that in consequence of the interposition of that Minister's good offices in the case, the Prisoners twenty one in number, have been set at liberty, without exchange, upon an engagement on their part not to serve against Spain—as is stated in a despatch from him, under date the 16th. of December, just received at this Department.

It gives me great pleasure to communicate this agreeable intelligence to you, and to offer you assurances [etc.].

183

Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State, to Xavier de Medina, Colombian Consul General at New York[1]

WASHINGTON, *May 6, 1829.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 18th.[2] instant, containing an interesting exposition of occurrences which had lately taken place in Colombia, and had reduced that Nation to the necessity of temporarily assuming a form of Government, best calculated, in its judgment to rescue it from an accumulation of evils which had been brought upon it by a long train of unfortunate circumstances; and I pray you to accept the assurance of my full appreciation of the very friendly motive, on the part of your Government, which has led to this communication, and you will be pleased at the same time to receive with kindness the expression of my best wishes, that the difficulties and struggles in which your Nation has been so long involved may be happily surmounted and removed, by the Convention which is to meet in the next year, under the order of President Bolivar, of whose past services in the cause of freedom and his Country the history of Colombia affords so many striking proofs and whose continued attachment to the principles of free Government will I trust be made equally manifest by future events.

I am moreover authorised and directed by the President to inform you, that the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, recently appointed by him, who will forthwith proceed on his Mission to the Republic of Colombia, will be fully instructed to express the views and feelings of the President upon all the points in which the two Governments have a common interest, and to request you to make his sentiments known to your Government, that he, likewise, takes a sincere interest in the good fortunes, prosperity and happiness of the people of Colombia, that he deeply sympathises with them in the sufferings and privations which they have so long undergone, and that his best wishes also will attend the proceedings of the Assem-

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, IV, 175. Martin Van Buren, of New York: Commissioned Secretary of State by President Jackson, March 6, 1829; resigned April 7, 1831.

[2] Not printed in this collection.

bly referred to, that they may result in a Government eminently and entirely adapted to secure the permanent Independence, Happiness and Prosperity of its Constituents, and particularly to express the strong desire he feels that the war which now unhappily rages between the two Republics of Colombia and Peru, should be speedily terminated in a manner consistent with the honor and interest of both.

I have the honor [etc.].

184

Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State, to Joaquin Campino, Chilean Minister to the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *May 26, 1829.*

The Undersigned, Secretary of State of the United States, has received the Note which Mr. Joaquin Campino, Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Chile, addressed to him on the 1st. of this month,[2] accompanied by translations of certain Notes from the Governments of Chile and the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, respecting the institution of a Mediation between those of Peru and Colombia, with a view to avert the impending contest between the two last mentioned States: to which scheme Mr. Campino by direction of his Government, invites that of the United States to become a Party;—and he has, likewise, received the Note which Mr. Campino addressed to him, on the 7th. instant, upon the same subject.

Having submitted both these Notes to the consideration of the President, the Undersigned has the honor, by his direction, to state to Mr. Campino, that the Government of Chile does full justice to that of the United States, in the estimate which it has been pleased to form of the deep interest which the latter has always felt, and continues to feel, in the prosperity and happiness of the two Republics referred to; and of the pleasure which the re-establishment of amity and good understanding between them, is so well calculated to afford to the Government of the United States.

In accordance with this sentiment, common to the late and present Administration, measures were seasonably taken by both, for making known to the Governments of Colombia and Peru, respectively, the earnest desire entertained by the Government of the United States, for the restoration of peace and amity between them.

The Undersigned is peculiarly happy in being able now to inform Mr. Campino, that he has just received from an authentic quarter, the gratifying

[1] MS. Notes to Foreign Legations, IV, 187. Joaquin Campino, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Chile to the United States: Presented credentials, March 6, 1828. Took leave, June 3, 1829.

[2] See below, pt. v, doc. 547.

intelligence of the actual conclusion of priliminary articles of Peace between Colombia and Peru; and it gives him very great satisfaction to furnish Mr. Campino, with the enclosed number of the Gazette Extraordinary of Bogota, containing a copy of the Treaty.

The Undersigned takes advantage of the occasion [etc.].

185

Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State, to Cornelius P. Van Ness, appointed United States Minister to Spain[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *October 2, 1829.*

Among the events which have affected the condition of Spain, that which has wrought the greatest change in her political institutions, is the revolution by which her possessions on the Continent of America have, after a protracted and severe contest, been separated from the mother country. Situated, as we were, with territories adjoining those possessions, and viewing in the progress of that revolution the extension over a vast portion of the new World of the blessings of independence, and of our own principles of free government, the United States could not remain unconcerned spectators of a struggle whose probable result was to afford a new field for the commercial enterprise of their citizens, and to unfold new and unknown resources to the commerce of the world. Yet, true to the long established policy which forbade their interfering in the internal concerns of other nations, the Government of the United States continued scrupulously to observe the principles of the strictest neutrality, until, impelled by the inevitable course of events and by the unanimous voice of the nation, it yielded its acknowledgment of the independence of the new States, with most of whom we are now pursuing and realizing the advantages of a free trade, equally beneficial to all the parties concerned.

The contest between Spain and her former colonies must now be considered as at end; yet, still entertaining vain hopes of reconquering them, she withholds her acknowledgment of an independence which has long since been recognized by the most powerful and influential Governments of Europe, who acting in the general interest of mankind, and for the advancement of the prosperity as well of Spain herself as of her former colonies, have endeavored, by the interposition of their friendly advice, to put an end to a contest which

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, XIII, 21. Cornelius P. Van Ness, of Vermont: Commissioned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Spain, June 1, 1829. Took leave, December 21, 1836.

afflicts humanity, and never can lead to any decisive result. Your predecessors were instructed to seize every opportunity of aiding in the restoration of peace by holding up to the view of His Catholic Majesty's Government the advantages which might still be secured by a timely acknowledgment of the independence of the Spanish American States; and it is the wish of the President, should any fit occasion present itself of conveying to the Spanish Government his views on the subject, that you should express his earnest desire for the restoration of peace in America.

Full reliance is placed on your discretion that the manner and occasion adopted for this communication, will be such as to avoid unprofitable irritation, the effect of which might tend to defeat the object in view.

One of the considerations which the Ministers of the United States who preceded you at the court of His Catholic Majesty were advised to press upon his Government as an inducement for him to terminate the contest with his late Colonies, is the preservation of his insular possessions in the West Indies, which still constitute a part of the Spanish Monarchy. Cuba and Porto Rico, occupying, as they do, a most important geographical position, have been viewed by the neighboring States of Mexico and Colombia, as military and naval arsenals which would at all times furnish Spain with the means of threatening their commerce, and even of endangering their political existence. Looking with a jealous eye upon these last remnants of Spanish power in America, these two States had once united their forces, and their arm, raised to strike a blow which, if successful, would for ever have extinguished Spanish influence in that quarter of the globe, was arrested chiefly by the timely interposition of this Government, who, in a friendly spirit towards Spain, and for the interest of general commerce thus assisted in preserving to his Catholic Majesty these invaluable portions of his Colonial possessions.

The Government of the United States has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba—Its geographical position which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico, and the West Indian seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the exchange of which for our surplus agricultural products and manufactures, constitutes one of the most extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that quarter. Other considerations connected with a certain class of our population, make it the interest of the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population whose result could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States.

On the other hand, the wisdom which induced the Spanish Government to

relax in its colonial system, and to adopt with regard to those Islands, a more liberal policy which opened their ports to general commerce, has been so far satisfactory in the view of the United States, as in addition to other considerations, to induce this Government to desire that their possession should not be transferred from the Spanish crown to any other Power. In conformity with this desire, the ministers of the United States at Madrid have, from time to time, been instructed attentively to watch the course of events, and the secret springs of European diplomacy, which, from information received from various quarters this Government had reason to suspect had been put in motion to effect the transfer of the possession of Cuba to the powerful allies of Spain. It had been intimated at one time that the armed interference of France in the affairs of that country would extend over her insular possessions, and that a military occupation of Cuba was to take place for the alleged purpose of protecting it against foreign invasion, or internal revolutionary movements. A similar design was imputed to the Government of Great Britain; and it was stated that, in both cases, a continuance of the occupation of the Island, was to constitute in the hands of either of those Powers, a guaranty for the payment of heavy indemnities claimed, by France, on the one hand, to cover the expenses of her armies of occupation; and by Great Britain, on the other, to compensate her subjects for spoliations alleged to have been committed upon their commerce. The arrangements entered into by Spain with those two Powers, by means of treaties of a recent date, and providing for the payment of those indemnities, although removing the pretext upon which the occupation of Cuba would have been justified, are not believed entirely to obviate the possibility of its eventually being effected. The Government of the United States considers as a much stronger pledge of its continuance under the dominion of Spain, the considerable military and naval armaments which have recently been added to the ordinary means of defence in that Island, and which are supposed fully adequate for its protection against any attempt on the part of Foreign Powers, and for the suppression of any insurrectionary movement on that of its inhabitants.

Notwithstanding these apparent securities for the maintenance of the Spanish authority in the Island of Cuba, as it is not impossible that Spain, in her present embarrassed and dependent situation might be induced to yield her assent to a temporary occupation of it as a pledge for the fulfilment of her engagements, or to part with her right of property in it, for other considerations affording immediate relief in the hour of her distress, it is the wish of the President that the same watchfulness which had engaged the attention of your predecessors in relation to this subject, should be continued during your administration of the affairs of the Legation of the United States at Madrid; and that you should take especial care to keep this Department informed of every occurrence whose tendency, either direct or indirect,

might, in your judgment, bring about any change in the present condition of the Island of Cuba.

Your predecessors, who had been repeatedly instructed to that effect, have availed themselves of every fit opportunity to make the wishes and policy of the United States, with regard to the Spanish Islands fully known to the Government of His Catholic Majesty, whom you will find already possessed of every information which you will have it in your power to communicate upon this head. But it is not improbable that the same inquisitiveness which has hitherto been manifested on the part of that Government in relation to it, may again be evinced by the Spanish Ministers, who, affecting to construe the avowed anxiousness of the United States into a determination not to suffer the possession of Cuba to pass into the hands of other Powers, have inquired how far this Government would go in sustaining that determination: Should similar inquiries be made of you by the Ministers of His Catholic Majesty, you are authorized to say, that the long established and well known policy of the United States which forbids their entangling themselves in the concerns of other nations, and which permits their physical force to be used only for the defence of their political rights and the protection of the persons and property of their citizens, equally forbids their public agents to enter into positive engagements, the performance of which would require the employment of means which the people have retained in their own hands: But that this Government has every reason to believe that the same influence which once averted the blow ready to fall upon the Spanish Islands, would again be found effectual, on the recurrence of similar events, and that the high preponderance in American affairs of the United States as a great naval power, the influence which they must at all times command as a great commercial nation in all questions involving the interests of the general commerce of this hemisphere, would render their consent an essential preliminary to the execution of any project calculated so vitally to affect the general concerns of all the nations in any degree engaged in the commerce of America. The knowledge you possess of the public sentiment of this country in regard to Cuba, will enable you to speak with confidence and effect of the probable consequences that might be expected from the communication of that sentiment to Congress in the event of any contemplated change in the present political condition of that Island.

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Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State, to Anthony Butler, appointed United States Chargé d'Affaires in Mexico[1]

[EXTRACTS]

WASHINGTON, *October 16, 1829.*

The views and wishes of the President, both personal and official, are directed to the success and permanent prosperity of the Republic of Mexico. He asks at her hands nothing but justice, and would not accept from her any advantage for the United States which would not be reciprocal, entirely satisfied as he is, that, in the prosperity and glory of the Republic of Mexico, the true interests of his own country would be better promoted than by her depression and disgrace. He sees with regret the attempt of Spain to reëstablish her dominion over her, and sincerely wishes Mexico a safe deliverance from the attacks which are made and threatened upon her liberties. This is not, therefore, the moment which he would have selected for remonstrance against the policy of Mexico towards this country, if the imperious obligations of duty would allow of its postponement; but notorious facts, the nature of which is too well understood to require explanation, leave him no choice in the matter. Longer silence on his part might work injustice to the United States, and prove injurious to Mexico.

A brief recapitulation of the leading circumstances, in our intercourse with that nation, is sufficient to show that her conduct has not been of that open and friendly character which it was our hope to find, as it had been our endeavor to inspire, in the people of that country, by the liberal and magnanimous bearing of the Government and people of the United States towards them.

From the earliest dawn of the Mexican Revolution, the friendly disposition of this whole nation began to manifest itself in a manner which could not have escaped the notice of the Mexican people, which drew from the mother-country frequent animadversions upon our partiality towards her revolted colonies; and was, in no small degree, productive of a coolness in our intercourse with her, highly prejudicial to the interests of our citizens. Yet the United States, drawn by a community of views and feelings towards a young nation, engaged, as they once had been, in a struggle of life and death for independence and freedom, continued to sympathize with Mexico; and nothing but their immutable principles of non-interference in the domestic concerns of other Nations, and of inviolable neutrality towards belligerents, prevented them from extending a helping hand to the young Republics of America. So long as these principles required it, the United

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, American States, XIV, 150. Anthony Butler, of Mississippi: Commissioned chargé d'affaires to Mexico, October 12, 1829. The credentials of his successor were presented, May 11, 1836.

States remained inactive, though not unconcerned, spectators of the contest; while many of their citizens, voluntary exiles in the cause of American liberty, fought by the side of their Mexican friends, to expel from the continent the last remnants of Colonial oppression. But, from the moment, that, consistently with their rule of conduct, and the established principles of public law, they could consider Mexico and Spain as two distinct Nations, which fate had, for ever separated, the United States pronounced the freedom of America; and their Congress, with an unanimity of which the history of legislation affords no example, invited Mexico and her sister Republics to take their rank among the Independent Nations of the earth. The influence which this important event had upon the conduct of the European Powers, is too well known to require elucidation. The example of the United States was followed almost immediately; and Mexico, a little more than one year after she had proclaimed her independence, was represented at Washington by a Minister invested with all the prerogatives of the Ambassador of a free State, and diplomatic and commercial relations were, soon after, established between her and the most influential Powers of the Old World. The time has been when Mexico was not disposed to deny in how great a degree those proud and auspicious results were justly attributable to the prudent, yet bold and friendly policy of this Government towards the New States of America. The people of this country had a right to expect, in return for their magnanimous and disinterested conduct, the manifestation, at least, of such a sentiment on the part of the people of Mexico, which neighboring States should cherish, as it is their interest to cultivate and improve them.

Every step which has since that period been taken by the United States, in their advance to meet Mexico upon terms of mutual good will, has been marked by a character of benevolence and disinterestedness whose object could not be mistaken. A minister of the highest rank, and invested with the most unlimited powers, was despatched to the metropolis of the Mexican Confederacy, provided with instructions whose every word breathes a spirit of philanthropy and disinterested concern for the welfare of Mexico, which ought to have disarmed every feeling of jealousy and enmity, if, indeed, after what had passed, it could have been imagined that any such were entertained by the Government or people of that country. . . .

Whilst this Government was thus endeavoring at home to promote the true interests of the two countries, and to show, by acts of the most unequivocal character, its desire to lay the foundation of a close and lasting union between them, the same friendly spirit was displaying itself abroad, in their diplomatic intercourse with the most powerful and influential among the European Nations.

Early in 1825, the Minister of the United States at the Court of the Emperor of Russia, then standing at the head of an European Alliance which seemed to hold the scale that weighed the destinies of Empires and States

in the Old World, and exercised a powerful influence over those of America, was instructed to use every effort to induce that monarch to take into his serious consideration the then relative condition of Spain and her Ancient Colonies, and to prevail upon the former to terminate a contest as unavailing for her, as it had proved wasteful of blood and treasure to both parties. Similar instructions[1] were, at the same time, given to the diplomatic Representatives of the United States at Paris and London; and thus a simultaneous effort was made, at the court the three greatest potentates of the world, to bring the united weight of their influence to bear upon the councils of the King of Spain, and to infuse into them a spirit more favorable to the cause of exhausted America. This friendly interference on the part of the United States, was received in a spirit corresponding with that by which the measure had been dictated; and this Government has every reason to believe that the three Sovereigns to whom it was addressed were well inclined to the great object in view, and in which this Government was the first to act. If their efforts proved as unavailing as the repeated and urgent representations which were made at the same time, and with the same view by our Minister at the Court of His Catholic Majesty, it was because of the uncompromising passions and unbending obstinacy which smothered the voice of reason in the councils of an unfortunate Sovereign, soured by adversity and blind to the true interests of his kingdom. Far from our being discouraged by the failure of this expedient, and still animated by a desire for the restoration of peace in America, it has, down to the present period, been made a standing instruction to the Ministers of the United States at the Court of His Catholic Majesty to avail themselves of every fit occasion to induce his Government to give permanent tranquility to Spanish America by the recognition of its independence, and thereby to confer a signal blessing on the civilized world, and on no part of it more than Spain herself.

[1] See above, doc. 141, Clay's instruction to Middleton at St. Petersburg, May 10, 1825, and his instructions within the next few days to the United States Ministers at London, Paris, and Madrid.

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Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State, to Cornelius P. Van Ness, United States Minister to Spain [1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *October 13, 1830.*

SIR: I am directed by the President to call your attention to that part of your general instructions[2] which contains an expression of his solicitude that Spain should recognise the independence of her former American Colonies, and of his wish that you should pursue the course which had been pointed out to several of your predecessors, by availing yourself of every fit opportunity to make an impression upon the Spanish Government favorable to that step, as far as that could be done without exciting jealousies and irritation on their part, which might affect injuriously the interests of this country, without promoting the object in view. The present is deemed an auspicious moment to press the subject on account of general causes as well as of some considerations of a special character which it is made my duty to bring to your view. Your private letter has confirmed our anticipations as to the effect which the French Revolution was likely to produce upon the policy of the existing authorities in Spain. It is not, one would suppose, possible, that with the example of Charles X. before his eyes, the present King of Spain can be so blind to his own interests and safety, as not to see and feel that his only hope to escape a similar fate consists in pursuing a course opposite to that which was adopted by his infatuated and unfortunate relative. Should it be his good fortune to embrace views of duty and policy so obvious and so just it must readily occur to him that there is no step that he could take, short of the direct concession of a free constitution to his subjects, which would inspire more confidence in the liberality of his views throughout the world than the prompt recognition of the independence of Spanish America.

Of the hopelessness of all attempts on the part of the crown of Spain to reconquer those States—of the interest which the world, and no part of it more than Spain, herself, has in the final settlement of that question, and the consequent folly of keeping it on foot, it is not necessary now to speak. These considerations are fully discussed in your instructions, and cannot fail to be duly appreciated by you, and must, also, be confirmed by your personal observations. If the Spanish Cabinet are yet inaccessible to their influence, there is, perhaps, too much reason to believe that nothing short of the scenes which have recently been witnessed in France, can raise their views of human rights and human happiness to a level with those which we cherish, and which, without in the slightest degree interfering in the internal concerns of other nations, we desire to see universally approved.

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, XIII, 184.
[2] See above, doc. 185, Van Buren to Van Ness, October 2, 1829.

The particular circumstances to which I have referred consist in an official communication which has this week been made to this Government by Colonel Tornel, the representative of that of Mexico in the United States. From that communication it appears that the Government of Great Britain has informed that of Mexico that it had taken measures to induce the Spanish Government, by friendly advice and remonstrance, to consent to the recognition of the Independence of the South American States. Colonel Tornel, in behalf of Mexico, invited a similar movement on the part of this Government. The general interest which the United States have always taken in whatever concerns the welfare of those of their Southern neighbors, would, of itself, be sufficient to induce the President to do all that can be done consistently with our established foreign policy, to effect the object so justly desired by those States. The past and present relations between us and our immediate neighbor, Mexico, furnish an additional motive for such a course, on his part. Of the unfounded jealousies in respect to the views of the United States towards that Republic which were heretofore entertained, you cannot be ignorant, nor of the embarrassments in the relations of the two countries which have resulted therefrom. I am happy to be able to inform you, that, through the exercise of suitable means, those jealousies have been substantially removed, and that although the principal men who now influence the Government of that country did not belong to the party heretofore supposed most favorable to the United States, they have, nevertheless, been impressed with just views of us, and of our wishes, and are well disposed to cherish and maintain such relations between the two countries as will best comport with the character, and most effectually subserve the true interests of each. It would, therefore, be at this time more particularly acceptable to the President to render himself useful to that Republic. This Government has, also, been given to understand that if Spain should persevere in the assertion of a hopeless claim to dominion over her former Colonies, they will feel it to be their duty as well as their interest to attack her colonial possessions in our vicinity—Cuba and Porto Rico. Your general instructions are full upon the subject of the interest which the United States take in the fate of those Islands, and particularly of the latter. They inform you that we are content that Cuba should remain as it now is, but could not consent to its transfer to any European power. Motives of reasonable state policy render it more desirable to us that it should remain subject to Spain rather than to either of the South American States. Those motives will readily present themselves to your mind. They are principally founded upon an apprehension that, if possessed by the latter, it would, in the present state of things be in greater danger of becoming subject to some European Power than in its present condition. Although such are our own wishes and true interests the President does not see on what ground he would be justified in interfering with any attempts which the South American States might think it for their interest in the prosecution of a defensive war to make

upon the Islands in question. If, indeed, an attempt should be made to disturb them by putting arms in the hands of one portion of their population to destroy another, and which, in its influence, would endanger the peace of a portion of the United States, the case might be different. Against such an attempt the United States, being informed that it was in contemplation, have already protested, and warmly remonstrated in their communications, last summer, with the Government of Mexico. But the information lately communicated to us, in this regard, was accompanied by a solemn assurance that no such measures will, in any event, be resorted to; and that the contest, if forced upon them, will be carried on, on their part, with strict reference to the established rules of civilized warfare.

The President finds in this consideration, an additional motive to desire that Spain should no longer withhold her recognition of the Independence of the New American States, and he cannot but hope that the matter, when well understood and fully considered, will be viewed in the same light by Spain herself. No objections are perceived against a frank communication of the substance of your instructions in this regard to the British Minister at the Court of Spain, nor to a coöperation with him (if the information given to this Government prove correct,) in effecting the desired result. The President, however, always relies upon your discretion that nothing shall be done, or attempted by you, which can, to any extent, impair the friendly relations between the United States and Spain, or which would, in substance, conflict with the well known policy of the United States in regard to its interference in the internal concerns of other countries.

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Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State, to John Hamm, appointed United States Chargé d'Affaires in Chile[1]

[EXTRACT]

WASHINGTON, *October 15, 1830.*

SIR: You are already informed of your appointment as Chargé d'Affaires of the United States near the Republic of Chile, and of the President's desire that you should repair to Santiago, to enter upon the duties of your mission. I now proceed to furnish you with the instructions of this Department for your guidance in conducting the diplomatic relations of the United States with that Republic.

Shortly after the recognition by this Government of the independence of

[1] MS. Instructions to United States Ministers, American States, XIV, 83. John Hamm, of Ohio: Commissioned chargé d'affaires to Chile May 26, 1830. Left October 19, 1833.

the Spanish American States, those relations were opened on our part, by the appointment of Mr. Heman Allen as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of this Government near that of Chile, who, in November of 1823, proceeded to Santiago. This first movement towards the establishment of regular intercourse was, in 1827, reciprocated by Chile, by the appointment, in the person of Mr. Joaquin Campino, of a minister of the same rank, who continued to reside in the United States, in his public capacity, until May, 1829, when he took his leave of this Government, near which that of Chile has remained unrepresented ever since.

The principal objects of Mr. Allen's mission, besides apprizing the Government near which he was accredited, of its recognition by this, were to arrange our commercial relations with that country upon a permanent and advantageous footing of reciprocity.

PART II

COMMUNICATIONS FROM ARGENTINA

189

The Governing Junta of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata to James Madison, President of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

BUENOS AIRES, *February 11, 1811.*

The marked proofs which your Excellency has given of your Beneficence and magnanimity towards the Province of Caracas are irrefragable testimonies of the lively Interest which your Excy takes in the Rights of Humanity. In truth, none are more likely to respect them in others than those who have had the misfortune to see them outraged towards themselves. The perfect conformity of our Political Situation, and of the causes of it, with that of the Noble Caraquans, gives us an equal Right to hope that it will be agreeable to your Excellency, that the United States should tighten with the Provinces on the Rio la Plata the common chain of Nations, by a Cordiality more firm and expressive.

The Inhabitants of these Provinces, for a long time past, altho' much oppressed under the yoke of an arbitrary authority, fulfilled their Duties, with all the fidelity of subjects and all the Honor of Citizens. They were persuaded that the Reunion of the whole Spanish Monarchy was the only thing that could save it from Ruin. To secure this Union there could have been no Sacrifice that could have appeared too great for a People, who had at the price of their Blood succeeded in redeeming these Dominions. In effect, to Save the Kingdom from this assassinating orde [*sic*] which now crams itself with the carcass of Europe, every thing was put in contribution, and so long as our Hopes lasted, we considered it our Duty not to think of ourselves. The Theatre changed its scene—almost the whole of the Peninsula fell under the Dominion of the common oppressor and that Body of Ambitious Egotists, of which was composed the Central Junta, was dissolved and dispersed. This was precisely the case, in which the same Principles of Loyalty which had until then retained us in Union with Spain authorised our separation.

[1] MS. Papers relative to the Revolted Spanish Provinces. The document of which this is a translation reached the Department as an enclosure to the following letter from Taleifero de Orea to Secretary of State, Monroe:

[TRANSLATION]

PHILADELPHIA, *June 18, 1811.*

EXCELLENT SIR: A gentleman who has arrived in this City from Buenos Ayres has charged me to send to the His Excy the President the two inclosed official letters from the Supreme Junta at that Place—desiring an answer for that government or some other Document to prove that these letters were delivered—

Your Excy being the only channel (for such communications) and being satisfied of your goodness, I take the Liberty and the Honor of directing them to you—

I am with the greatest Respect [etc.].

Our Security being threatened, there was no obligation to prostitute ourselves to the ephemeral authorities which had lost the Character of Dignity & Independence.

Moreover, a Club of proud oligarchists composing this "audiencia", over whom presided a Vice-Roy as avaricious as ambitious, in place of softening the evils of the Country and of gaining our Confidence, endeavor'd to keep us in a torpid State, and thro' our negligence to confirm their Tyranny. Their re-iterated attempts to subvert the State, and their suspicious measures obliged us to depose them.

Such are the Reasons which have induced the Capital of the kingdom of La Plata to instal the governing Junta, which happily rules over these Provinces. The towns in the Interior, now freed from their ancient Tyrants, do not cease to bless the moment in which they saw re-established the imprescriptible Rights with which nature endowed them. The Junta, to comply with the general wish of the Provinces for a national Congress, redoubles its labors and activity in the midst of dangers no less worthy of greatness of Soul than the labor of SeSafanes (Cecephus). This august assembly will meet in a short time, and will have the sweet consolation of seeing the poisonous Hydra of fealty destroyed.

There will be some who will give an odious interpretation to these Proceedings. There will be many who will blacken with the mark of perfidy actions that have Truth for their basis. For the purity of our Intentions we appeal to the Tribunal of Reason: we appeal to the Nations now existing, and to Posterity— In short, we appeal to the Consciences of the very Persons who calumniate us.

This Junta has too exalted an Idea of the high Character which distinguishes the United States of America to doubt for a moment the Equity of its decisions— It does your Excellency the Justice to believe that you are friendly to its cause, and that you will receive with Pleasure the grateful Impressions of its friendship.

God preserve your Excy many years.

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The Governing Junta of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata to James Madison, President of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

BUENOS AIRES, *February 13, 1811.*

Don Josef R Poinsetts has just presented himself to this Junta with a credential signed by the Secy (of State) to be accredited as commercial agent of the U States in this America and this government conformably to

[1] MS. Papers relative to the Revolted Spanish Provinces.

the cordial and friendly intentions which it made known to Y E in its official Letter dated yesterday has decreed his admission to the full exercise of his agency, which it considers as a preliminary to the Treaties between Nation and Nation which will be formed to point out the Rules of a permanent Commerce and of the greatest amity and Union between the two States.

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Cornelio de Saavedra, President of the Governing Junta of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, Domingo Matheu, and eleven others, to James Madison, President of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *June 6, 1811.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: This Government, desirous of securing the fullest safety for these countries from the attacks from abroad of other peoples who either are its enemies or assault its liberty, entertains the just wish to secure the adequate force to enforce respect for itself and maintain its rights. Since it needs arms for that purpose, which it believes it could not obtain better than from your generous nation which appreciates in the most noble manner the just liberty of men, it has decided to send with its powers and appropriate instructions citizens Don Diego de Saavedra and Don Juan Pedro de Aguirre, in order that they can purchase these in the United States and forward them with all the safety and caution that they can command: and it also hopes that your Government will be generous enough to deign to assist and protect its envoys in the achievement of the purpose of their mission; but, considering also that the better success of that mission and the safety of the undertaking of so much importance to us essentially depends on the greatest and most solemn secrecy, it has also decided that in carrying out their mission the above named gentlemen will keep from the public their true names, which are as above stated, and go under those of Pedro Lopez and Jose Cabrera, and will carry two passports to that effect and also to avoid compromising in any way your nation in the eyes of England or any other, which, although without ground, might imagine they were offended. In the understanding that this measure is taken for the precise intent of communicating frankly with your Government through your Excellency's respected medium as is done, and recommending to the effective protection of your Excellency the persons of its commissioners and the purpose of their commission; without a doubt that your Excellency's kindness will generously lend itself to the views and desires of this Government, which will be extremely pleased to comply with what it may have the honor to be asked at any time by your nation.

May God guard your Excellency many years.

[1] MS. Papers relative to the Revolted Spanish Provinces.

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Cornelio de Saavedra, President of the Governing Junta of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, to James Madison, President of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

BUENOS AIRES, *June 26, 1811.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: My son Don Diego de Saavedra will have the honour of placing in Your Excellency's hands this Letter, and of paying his compliments to Y. E^{cy}. in my name.— He goes from this Court in company with Don Juan Pedro Aguirre, both commissioned by this Superior Government, for the purposes which Y^{r}. E^{xy}. will perceive by the credentials authorizing their Mission. To procure the necessary aid of arms against every European, who is opposed to the cause of that Liberty which the People of America have recovered, is the interesting object of their Mission. We can look to no other Power better enabled to aid us than our Brethern of North-America, over whom Y^{r}. Ex^{cy}. so worthily presides— I take the liberty of recommending these Gentlemen to Your Excellency, to forward the objects explained by their instructions which will be shewn to you. It is important that they should conceal from the Public, their real names, the former being a Captain of Dragoons, and the latter, the actual Secretary of this Most Excellent Cabildo. (Court of Justice)

I can assure Y^{r}. Ex^{y}. that this frank and liberal Government will take particular pleasure in establishing with their Fellow-Countrymen of N. America, all kinds of mercantile relations, and that it desires to preserve the strictest friendship towards Y^{r}. Ex^{cy}. of whom, I have the honor to be [etc.].

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W. G. Miller, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[2]

BUENOS AIRES, *April 30, 1812.*

SIR: I had the honor to address you on the 25 Ul^{o}. and to inform you the intended meeting of the assembly for the purpose of electing a new member for the Executive: Agreably to the decree of Gov: the assembly met on Sunday: its opening was announced to the public by the discharge of the Fort Guns &c: this formality and compliment on the part of Gov^{t}. induced the people generally to suppose the Executive were inclined to permit them to Enjoy their rights as representatives of the people: after a due consideration Juan Martyn Puereydon late Comm^{r} in chief of the army in Peru was

[1] MS. Notes from Argentine Legation, I. [2] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

elected as the new member: the Gov. thro' their partisans 3 of the Cabildo & three of the members, endeavored to obtain the election of another person, but finding the opposition too great, they assented imm^{y}. to the choice of the candidate submitted to their approbation.

A discussion then took place respecting the supliente until the arrival of Puereydon: the Executive, insisted on their right to name, whom they might think proper, as having the supremacy over the assembly, and named "Rivadavia", urging, the inconvenience, of a stranger, being admitted into the Executive, and thus becoming possessed of the Secrets of State; to this nomination, the assembly would not assent: but insisted on the right of electing a supliente as inherent in them: A warm discussion then took place: it will elucidate the subject, if the reserved object of the well meaning members, of the assembly be stated, & which had been arranged by several of the members that were actually elected & those who had expected to be elected: the first was, the declaration of Independence.

An Enquiry into the state of the negociations with the U S. the correspondence that had passed and what had been done to conciliate them in their favor, the powers of the deputies sent the state of the negociations with Caraccas, & Condinamarca: the recognition of their independence these objects were gradually to have been brot on the Tapis but it was necessary to establish the supremacy of the Assembly ere it could be done with propriety: The Gov^{t}. on their part brot forward three other resolutions to which they wished the acknowledg^{t}. of the Assembly that they were the Executive of an independent people—

Reply: we have not declared independence we therefore cannot recognize you as an Executive of an Ind^{t}. Government.

That a tax must be levied by the Assembly, on the people and provinces to amount to 2 millions dollars annually,—

Reply. We cannot grant you any such power or can we tax the provinces & people: We have no such powers. Let the people from the interior send us the powers or let them send other deputies.

(It must be observed that the members representing the interior towns were all citizens of B^{s} A^{s}. chosen by the people above from the impossibility of their being chosen am^{gst}. themselves in time for the Assembly: they were the ablest men.) the acknowledg^{t} of the independence of Carraccas & Condinarmarca.

Reply; This, the assembly of a colony, cannot do: Under what character can we treat with them: let us declare our own independence & then we can acknowledge theirs:

The chagrin of the Executive was considerable at this unexpected denial of their propositions: their object in obtaining the consent of the Assembly to the taxation was to render them hated by the people All the intentions of the Assembly were however frustrated by the imprudence of some of the

young members, who on the heat of discussion discovered at too early a moment their views: one of the members of the assembly a decided partizan of the Gov. whether right or wrong as he declared in y^{e} room, instantly escaped privately and informed the Gov: of the subject in discussion.

The assembly finding their privildges thus invaded, voted the arrest of the member which was immediately carried into effect: the president of the assembly (alcalde the first vote in the Cabildo) which formed 12 members in the meeting wrote with the approbation of the Assembly, a letter to the Exec^{e} unfolding their objects & inviting the members to a friendly Conference: to this the executive replied directing the assembly to act in conformity to the Cons^{n} and not interfere in matters not relating to their dep^{t}. a warm discussion took place: one of the members, who had been one, of the 13 who composed the first assembly, which had elected the Executive said, there are five Citizens present who were my associates: I call on them to say whether when they gave their assent to the act of installation they considered they were signing an act & naming an executive to be superior in power to the assembly: Let the orig^{l}. document or record be produced: it is in the archives of Gov^{t}. Let it be examined & inform yourselves whether any such power as is now claimed by the executive was then granted them. I deny it: my associates deny it: surely six out of 13 are entitled to some credit: the Executive urge that they have formed a constitution and that as it had been sworn to by the people it must be considered the guide of the assembly in their proceedings, was that constitution ever approved or submitted to the consideration even of any regular representation of the people: it was formed by the Executive in direct opposition to the tenor of the powers invested in them, & sworn to by a small number of the people, under the point of the bayonet, for the troops had sworn to defend it first.

A note was then passed requesting the inspection of the document alluded to: the Executive returned for answer that it was not to be found:

The Executive then finding, that in the Event of the supremacy of the assembly being establish^{d}, and, that one of the members had moved that the people be called together, there would be an end of their power: and their measures strictly examined, determined to do away [with] the assembly without delay: three days previous to its meeting, it had been declared by public Bands death for any 3 persons to be found in the streets together during the scene of its sitting: availing themselves of this Law & perceiving the assembly which had opened at 8^{am} & con^{d}. in session until 7^{pm}, had still the same objects in view, they sent an officer with the Copy of the Law & dissolved the assembly desiring the members to return to their houses under pain of incurring its penalties: also suspending the functions of the Cabildo!!!! this was an act of violence unknown to the people: unprecedented and created such general irritation that it was current that the members of the assembly would have been poignarded could they have been met with: the members separated, and tranquillity has since prevailed—

Puereydon was imm^{y}. written to by his friends, We hear he is now on the way down: Letters recvd a few days since from him stated that he had some hope of coming to an arrangement with Goyonche: & making peace the sudden retreat of the latter from Suypacha in consequence of another revolution of the Cochabambi means who had it is said attacked a division of his army (500) & routed them, had put an end to the discussions.

Belgrano is now Comm^{r} in chief in peru he is at 10 leagues from Jujui, his force is small, the hatred of the people of Peru to the Gov. of B As^{s} is almost as great as it was to that of the Old Sp^{s}. and it will be difficult to appease their resentment: originating in the impolitic conduct of Castelli & the Governm^{t}.

Paraguay continues tranquil: the people are very happy under the change: the Gov^{t}. is very popular, and affairs are approaching the crisis: independence will be declared by them ere long: a copy of the constitution of the United States translated by the consul General whilst here: has been requested of me by the president of the Junta:

The President of the Executive of this Gov: Don Manuel de Sarratea left B^{s} A^{s}. this morning to join the army on the other side and direct its operations, he precedes the Etat majeur: the chief of which will proceed from hence on Saturday: 600 Cavalry & 300 infantry regulars uniformed &c: left this with Sarratea, French's & Terrada's divisions have not yet joined Artigas: who has thought it prudent to retreat across the Uruguay. as the Portuguese had advanced rapidly: Several Garrisons have been left on the road, hence his whole regular force will hardly exceed: 4800 to 5500 men:

The British Cons: General M. Staples has not been received by this Gov. he presented his patents which were returned to him with a letter stating that the B. Gov^{t}. had not addressed them an introductory letter or taken any notice of the many letters written to them: a long time since: The prejudice ag^{t}. the English is consequently very strong and has evinced itself in many acts of disgust & neglect:

I had the honor of a letter from the Consul Gen^{l}. under date 10 Ap. he mentions that the Troops of Conception were at the River Maule, but that there was reason to suppose an accommodation would take place as the president had left S. Iago for that purpose:

I have the honor [etc.].

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W. G. Miller, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *July 16, 1812.*

SIR: I had the honor to address you on the 30 Ap.[2] per the Aligator via Boston advising the meeting of the assembly and its dissolution by order of the Executive:

On the 15 May the emergencies of Gover[t]. compelled the Executive to resort to a contribution to be levied on the different classes. Gazette May 15 Ult is as heavy as the city can possibly bear & evinces the scanty resources (exclusive of foreign duties) of the country: a national lottery has contributed 10,000 $ more.

On the 19 May the deputies Saavedra & Aguirre arrived in the Liberty with a small supply of arms, magnified by the Agents of Gov[t]. the friendly reception given to these gentlemen the general interest in the success and enthusiasm in favor of the Liberty of this country shewn by all classes, in the U S and the partial attainment of their object, has produced the effect expected: the U. S. are looked up to as the only sincere friends of their cause not only by the Government but by the people: The deputies brot no packet for the Consul General.

On the 22 May Puereydon took his seat in the Executive he appears to possess liberal sentiments, has frequently visited Europe, & has been a personal sufferer for defending the cause of his country: having been imprisoned by the V. King Liniers & threatened with the scaffold in Spain: of his party are the most respectable & influential Creoles in the plan; Several of the members of the assembly are his particular associates: he could not consequently be ignorant of the conduct of the Executive: It was natural for him to recur to what had been done previous to his Election: he expressed his surprize at the measures that had been adopted, which did not appear to him calculated to advance the interest of the cause, he had personally witnessed the just resentment of the people in the Interior he enquired what steps had been taken to soothe the public mind & questioned the right of the Executive to dissolve the Assembly: that it was his own opinion and that of every well wisher of the cause that the proceeding was arbitrary unjust & subversive of the principles on which they had founded their system and tending to suffocate the little remaining enthusiasm of the people: that he would never submit to sanction by his name acts, (That tyrannized the will of the people & suffocated their rights) that it was his opinion, that an assembly should be immediately formed: the deputies to have full powers for whatever might occur: and that the first step of the assembly should be to decide on a suitable plan for the meeting of a general Congress. that it

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I. [2] See above, pt. II, doc. 193.

should not be B^s A^s but one of the Interior towns: that the instant the Assembly should meet, he would resign his functions, & submit his conduct to an examination: that no sincere patriot could wish to maintain an office ag^t. the will of the people: Chiclana and Rivadavia immediately rejected this proposal, considering it as a personal attack on them to bring forwd. an enquiry into their conduct in respect to the first assembly: Puereydon tho warmly opposed by C & R^a. effected his purpose: and Chiclana under plea of illness retired for a few days, from the presidency which he had reasumed tho by the Constitution it devolved on Puereydon: Letters were dispatched to the Cabildos of the Chief towns direct them to elect dep^s. for the assembly, & that the most ample powers should be given to them: there is but little doubt that if the Civil Corps had not exceeded the troops an attm^t would have been made to remove Puereydon from above Executive:

On the 26^h May a Lieutenant Colonel Don John Rademaker arrived as Envoy Extraordinary from the P. Regent of Brazil to this Government—he was received by an aide de Camp: of the Executive: the debout of this personage his having left Rio immediately after the arrival of M^r. Staples who had sailed from hence via Rio for England some time previous much irritated at not being received as the Consul General of his B.M. in consequence of an informality in his Credentials, and the want of an introductory letter to the Government gave rise to many conjectures, and it was generally considered as the prelude of an intrigue between the B. Minister & Carlotta: the Gazette of the 10. July explains the object of his mission: the due fulfillment of the armistice on the part of the P. Regent was guarantied by the B. Minister. A copy thereof *with an order to retreat* was immediately sent to the *General* of the *Portuguese.*

On the night of the 29 June information was communicated to the Executive of the existence of a horrible conspiracy to upset the government massacre all the Chiefs of the revolution and all persons any way connected with the patriots: the conspirators were headed by Dn Juan Martyn Alsega a man of the first respectability, but turbulent & ambitious, noted for his cruelty & marked detestation of the Creoles: he was to have been the V.K.: a slave indirectly heard the substance of the plot and disclosed it to his master: the same day, Rademaker called on one of the members of the Gov^t. and stated to him, that it would be prudent in the Executive to be on the alert, that they were in a critical situation and surrounded by enemies: It appears that Alsega called on him & presented a paper signed by 48 individuals offering him 1 million dollars to restrain by a countermanding order the retreat of the Portuguese troops: to this proposition, he made no other reply than burning the paper and dismissing him: the necessary precautions were taken by the Government who doubted the truth of the communications: but on the accusation of the slave arrested several persons: of these, there were two who instantly confessed the conspiracy:

the one a confidential agent of Alsegas & the other a son in law as they would not disclose the place of concealment of Alsegas (who had fled on hearing of their arrest): they were shot: their dying confession fully developed the plan for a particular detail of which I beg leave to refer you to the Gazette: On them were found papers which implicated many persons of respectability & wealth, who were also arrested: from the declaration of one of the condemned Alsegas' retreat was discovered and capture effected: he acknowledged his signature to a paper binding himself & others to secresy &c: he died with the firmness & heroism becoming the Chief of a conspiracy as bloody and as horrible as could possibly have been formed by man:

Alsega was by birth a Biscayan, arrived in this country at an early age where he has acquired a large fortune: in the year 93 [?] he was instrumental in seizing a number of frenchmen resident in B^{s} A^{s} & subjecting them to the torture: Antoneius an Italian now resident in Philad was also a victim: his energy originated the vigorous measures adopted by the Cabildo in [blank] for repelling the attack of the B. Troops under Whitelocke: On the 1 Jan'y 1809 (Liniers being then V.K.) he headed a conspiracy of European Spaniards to expell the V.K. and declare independence: he escaped. His partizans say accomplices, were imprisoned: It is little doubted but that he would have been a strenuous supporter of the *independence* of *this Country* if it could have been effected by *European Sp^{n}*. the idea of subjection to Creole Gov. few old Spaniards could or can yet brook:

17 persons have been executed amongst others the second in command a Bethlemite monk: to have been a Colonel of Cavalry: Santhonac: a *Catalan*: who gave the plan of attack and was have been Commandante of arms, & General: formally a colonel of artillery *imprisoned* by Liniers as an accomplice of Alsega's in the revolution before mentioned: released by the *Junta* & appointed principal of the Mathematical School with a salary of 2000$ 500$ more than any of the Members of Gov. receive: Tellichea a wealthy merchant & of respectability: returned 5 mo^{s}. since from Banishment by permission of the Executive.

There can be but little doubt that the conspiracy would have succeeded for the time: the plan was admirably well laid: the confession of the monk in reply to the question "who are immediately interested" was from N to S. from E to W not an Old Sp^{d}. would have been wanting: that there was force sufficient for the Enterprize: that all were armed in one way or other.

Exclusive of the assistance of the MVideans it appears they were well assured of the ultimate success of the Portuguese troops, the correspondence of the minister of the United S. at Rio J^{o} will have communicated the dissensions and oppositions of the interests of the P. & Princess: Rademaker was the agent of the Prince & Souza the partizan of the princess & disposed to meet her views That Carlotta was the prime mover of the Conspiracy is the general opinion, and as she had hitherto directed the movements of the

army, had availed herself of this power to influence plot: Rademaker had directed three different letters to the general Sousa ordering the retreat of army: to the last he received the reply of the general that he dare not move: who also enclosed copy of an order from Carlotta forbidding him to retreat but remain and in the event of being called on by *Alsega* to *give every aid* in his power:

The extreme moderation of the Creoles who notwithstanding the ferment the bloody intentions of the Spaniards had given rise to, have not committed a single excess. the vigor of government in arresting all persons denounced & punishing on conviction only the heads of the conspiracy & permitting the families of the convicted to enjoy in peace the property will tend to gain the cause many friends & establish the system.

The gazettes give a correct statement of the situation of affairs in Peru: the defeat of the cochabambinos is not likely to produce any effect of consequence.

Paraguay has been invited to send deputies to the assembly: in which B^s A^s will have five members:

The Naval force of this government is now much reduc'd, by the capture of the Ketch in a bay on the coast of Patagonia, thro' y^e treachery of the Governor of a settlement to whom the Commandante was directed to deliver in person a packet he fell into the snare and the crew were gradually seduc'd on shore until there remained only twenty on board when she was carried by two boats, & sent to MV. the addition of this vessel to the MV^n, Squadron makes their force fully competent to annoy the trade of this river, any moment they feel so disposed:

There are now 1800 musquets in town, & the gov^t. has not the funds to send and purchase more: the creoles are generally of very moderate fortune: there are not ten creoles in B^s A^s. who are worth 80000$ each: how they are to obtain arms is a query: there are only five vessels in this place owned by Creoles: Silver has become very scarce as the mines of Potosi are no longer worked: the only supply that can be expected must come from Chili in which kingdom it seems they have lately discovered and are working with activity two very rich mines.

The commerce of the US. to this port for the last six months has been very trifling seven vessels with cargoes consisting $\frac{3}{5}$ of German goods $\frac{2}{5}$ of native articles such as lumber, fish, rice, cordage, butter sperm: candles, boots shoes, saddlery, furniture, hats windsor chairs, porter cider rum, gin, paper, & naval stores the unsettled state of the country intimidates speculators: the presence of a national ship would give security to the American trade in the River which would immediately encrease: a considerably greater respect & security to our Citizens and be highly flattering to the government & people: as it would have the appearance of protection and attention to their interests tho in fact be protecting our own: had the threatened revolu-

tion succeeded not an *american* in the *place would have escaped* the fear of immediate retaliation would have impeded any attempt on them, if a frigate had been in the river.

I have the honor [etc.].

P.S. The assembly will meet in August and it is generally said Puereydon will be elected president and form an executive with three secretaries: the continual divisions of a multiplied executive have disgusted the true friends of the cause: Independence will not be declared, as far as it is in my power to judge from the ideas expressed by the various members of gover^{t}. & the assembly untill the fall of MV. which is rendered problematical by the vigorous exertions made for a determined resis^{e}. or unless an unexpected supply of arms should arrive in which case the congress (the members from which are to be elected the ensuing month) will immediately throw off the mask: the hastiness of some of the patriots of B^{s} A^{s}. may however force a declaration from the executive, by the people of B^{s} A^{s}. alone under the impression that it will be followed by the other provinces.

With Consideration [etc.].

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W. G. Miller, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *August 10, 1812.*

SIR: On the 6 [16?] Ultimo[2] I had the honor to address you advising the happy escape of the patriots from a diabolical conspiracy fomented by the Intrigues of Carlotta: as my letter was duplicated I do not deem the contents of the letter of sufficient moment to forw^{d}. a third per dubious conveyance: Much less so when the gazettes which contain a very fair statement of the facts accompany the present.

The idea expressed in the last paragraph of the letter alluded to respecting the probable hastiness of some of the patriots to force a declaration from the Gov. of Independence had nearly been realized Several of the Coffee house politicians endeavored to inflame the minds of the Citizens, against the Gov. for issuing a general amnesty to all who would come forward and deliver up any arms that might be held by them: Gov. issued the second proclamation: (See gazettes) this did not suffice to allay the ferment: an immediate declaration of indep^{e} was insisted on and the banishment of all the Euro-

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

[2] See above, pt. II, doc. 194.

peans: the windows of Chiclana's house were broken: at night the disturbers of the public peace retired to their houses: they were immediately arrested by the Secretary of Gov and sent off to the army the ensuing morning in number about 20: tranquillity has since reigned: The executions have not yet stopt: 29 have been shot: 4 others are under sentence of death as accomplices in the consp of 4 July.

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W. G. Miller, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States

BUENOS AIRES, *August 18, 1812.*[1]

SIR: I have the honor to forward you a packet from the Consul General,— The ideas expressed in my P.S.[2] had nearly been realised: Several hot headed patriots attempted to force the Gov^{t}. into a declaration of Independence and the further punishment of the persons compromised in the Conspiracy: the proclamation issued on the 26 July explanatory of that of the 24 will evince, the indisposition of the Gov. to meet the bill of the People: it did not satisfy the hotheaded: they were permitted to rave until night and were then arrested & banished in number 22 to the army the ens^{g} morning.

The assembly it is said will meet on the 27^{h}. Ins: It is feared that Chiclana & Rivadavia will attempt to impede the meeting, and that a disturbance will be the consequence.

Goyonchi has again reassembled his troops at Suypacha, with the intention of coming on to Salta. The Com. in Chief Belgranno has issued a proclamation for all persons to remove from Jujui: he writes in very flattering terms of the State of his little army: the Baron Hollenbrugh writes that they can make a good resistance: they have only two thousand men to oppose 4 or 5000—The Intelligence from the army on the opposite shore is not very flatt^{g}. Divisions between the Chiefs threaten a sad disappointment of the hopes enter^{d} by the patriots Artigas it is currently reported had withdrawn from the army.

Should Goyonchi advance rapidly and be successful & not declare for the Independence of the Country the situation of things will become very critical. It is to be hoped his views are personal:—

I am [etc.].

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

[2] See above, pt. II, doc. 194, Miller to the Secretary of State, July 16, 1812.

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The Constituted Assembly of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata to James Madison, President of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

FORTRESS OF BUENOS AIRES, *July 21, 1813.*

SIR: Since the voice of Liberty has resounded throughout the extensive Territories of Rio de la Plata, men accustomed to calculate events, justly flattered themselves, that the great People of the United States of America, would never be indifferent to the emancipation and prosperity of these Colonies. Engaged in the same career which was so gloriously terminated by yourselves, the identity of interests and reciprocity of relations being naturally cemented, give grounds to hope for your early protection, more especially as the other powers are almost exclusively occupied in the ruinous Continental War, each of which supports in its turn, and under distinct forms, European tyranny and ambitions.

Unfortunately the vacillations and uncertainty, the unavoidable accompaniment of a transition from one form of government to another, in a People who have been for a long time enslaved, have equally operated in these Provinces and prevented them from pursuing the proper course for the establishment of direct relations with Your Government, to which a new obstacle has been added, by the recent rupture between the U. States and England, which may embarrass and frustrate the best intentions.

But at length the Love of Liberty, surmounting all obstacles, has triumphed over its Enemies, and after a constant series of victories, has substituted good order, which will ensure the result of our glorious Revolution. The constituted assembly of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, and the Executive Power being founded on a basis no less firm than liberal, and every thing conspiring to the maintenance of the great cause, which duty supports against the impious doctrine of those who advocate a submission to the prescription and exclusive interests of Kings, will finish their great work by a Declaration of the Independence of this Hemisphere.

Under such fortunate circumstances this Government has the Honour to felicitate Your Excellency on your installation, and to tender thro' Your Ex^{cy}., to The Honourable The American Congress, its most high respect and sentiments of friendship.

The dispositions arising from an analogy of political principles, and the indubitable characters of a National sympathy, ought to open the road to a fraternal alliance, which should unite forever the North and South Americans, by adopting in the Congress of the United States and the Constituted Assembly of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, the basis of social benefi-

[1] MS. Notes from Argentine Legation, I.

cence in all its extent, in order to demonstrate by its effects, that between the Governments of the two Americas, there does not exist those fatal distinctions which separate political morality, nor those artificial manoeuvres which deform the Cabinets of the Old World.

I pray Your Excellency to accept [etc.].

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W. G. Miller, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *August 1, 1813.*

SIR: I have since writing the preceding with a view to correct any false impressions its perusal might give rise started the question with several of the members of the Executive & Assembly: respecting their intentions:

I am positively assured Sir, that on the estb^{t} of a cons^{n}. it will (*sic*) formed on the base of one Indivisible Republic of which B^{s} A^{s}. will be the Capital "Sooner death than a Confederation for this Country in its present state of ignorance & barbarism: said one the most influential members: Our provinces are extended: our people poor: our ignorance great and hence it is that B^{s}. A^{s}. & her Capitalists only have hitherto borne all the expense of this Revolution: which has now cost her $16,500,000 d^{rs}. Can the people of the Interior say we have as yet received from them any thing like a *tenth part* of their proportion of this enormous expense— The Troops are fed by us: the powder balls cloathing found by us: what have they hitherto furnished us more than *cattle* & *recruits*. Such Sir are the arg^{t}. in favor of an Ind. Republic. 2 centuries to come our descendents will talk of a Confederation: Until then we must content ourselves preparing the minds of our people & leave it to our posterity to profit by the example Your Country has given us. The Confederation destroy'd Carraccas and tho so *near Your Country* her *Independence* is gone.

I have Sir given you the ideas as they were commun^{d}. to me this morning & without any comment, have the honor to renew [etc.].

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

199

Gervasio Antonio de Posadas, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, to James Madison, President of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 9, 1814.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: The Supreme Assembly of the United Provinces has conferred on me the Supreme Direction of the State; and I do myself an honor in communicating it[2] to you, together with the public papers which contain the decree of the Sovereign body. The United Provinces of Rio de la Plata aspire to a close and intimate relation with the United States; and it would give me a pleasure if you, according to the known generosity of your character, would permit me to communicate to them the wishes of my countrymen. It gives me great pleasure to have the present opportunity of communicating to you my respects, and most anxious solicitude for a friendly alliance.

God keep your Excellency many years.

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Gervasio Antonio de Posadas, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, to James Madison, President of the United States[3]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 9, 1814.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: Ever since Spanish America began to struggle for their independence, the Republic of the United States has manifested a desire to favor their glorious enterprize; and it may be that distance has prevented them from giving us such succor as would ere now have ended our fatigues. But left to ourselves, we have made every exertion that honor and patriotism command; and notwithstanding the indefatigable & oppressive conduct of our enemies, this precious part of the New World still retains its freedom. At the period when our independence was about to be confirmed, the extraordinary victories of the Allied Powers of Europe again deranged our affairs. The victories of the North, which obliged France to cease oppressing Spain, may enable our enemies, with the assistance of Great Britain, to injure our cause, if some powerful arm does not volunteer her aid. Though humanity and justice are interested in the sacred cause defended by South America, four years of experience have taught this people, that it is not for the interest of the Potentates of Europe to favor the independence of the

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.
[2] See the following document, which bears this same date, address, and signature.
[3] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I. A copy of the same is also found in Notes from the Argentine Legation.

colonies. Hitherto the greatness of the powers of Europe has been founded on our degradation. Perhaps the preponderance we should give to your influence in the commercial world has not a little influence. It is on you we place our present hopes, who have the happiness to govern the only free people in the world, whose philosophic & patriotic sentiments we are ambitious to imitate. I am sensible the war, in which you are at present engaged, will prevent your giving us that immediate aid that would end our troubles. The people of this country can as yet support their cause with dignity, could they procure a supply of arms & ammunitions. Your Excellency cannot fail of being able to afford us these supplies; and our prompt and ready payment cannot be doubted. Your Excellency may be assured that the Provinces of Rio de la Plata will not be ungrateful for such a relief, and will be ready to engage in any treaties of commerce that will be advantageous to the United States. The interest that the inhabitants of said States have generally felt for the success of our cause, convinces me of the happy result of this request. And I will thank your Excellency to take the first opportunity to honor me with an answer.

God keep your Excellency many years.

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Joel Roberts Poinsett, United States Consul General at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *June 14, 1814.*

SIR: By the cartel Essex Junior I had the honor to inform you of the state of Chile, and of the negotiations then pending, thro' the mediation of the British Commander, between the royal and patriot armies; the enclosed monitor contains the result: provided no revolution interrupts the course of the capitulations, the priveleges granted the patriots will be but temporary; but it is probable, that the aspect of affairs here will determine, as it has hitherto, the conduct of Chile; the fall of Montevideo would occasion an immediate counter-revolution in that Kingdom.

Notwithstanding the determination expressed in my last not to oppose the capitulation, especially as it was assured me, that the ports would remain open to the American commerce, the government of Chile fearful of opposition, and instigated by a violent letter from Lord Strangford, and by the british Commander, insisted upon my making immediate use of the passport which I had solicited a few days before, I enclose their note with a copy of my answer.

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

The government of Buenos Ayres has a respectable squadron in the river, which has already obtained a considerable advantage over that of Monte Video; that place blockaded by a superior force both by land and water must shortly fall, if indeed the differences which exist among the patriots & which divide their councils and their armies, do not again prevent it. D^{n}. Manuel Saratea a former member of the government has been sent to England; a mission which has originated from the prevailing opinion of a rupture between G Britain & Spain the present Government of this Country will endeavour to obtain the protection of the latter at any price such is however the disposition of the people that the English never can gain a permanent footing in these countries.

The English have here in two instances carried into effect the distinguishing principle of their maritime right to respect only such neutral ports as have a sufficient force to cause their neutral rights to be respected. You are already informed of the attack on the Essex within a cable length of the Shore; and a few days since the Hope a ship from New York on a voyage of discovery was seized in the outer roads of this port and sent a prize to Rio de Janeiro. Their trade is exposed to a just retaliation of this principle with seldom more than single Frigate to protect it, two sloops of war better than Frigate eighteen feet being the utmost ship should draw.

I have the honor [etc.].

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *February 11, 1815.*

. . . The state of the political affairs of these Provinces is at its Crisis. The army of Peru which is near 6500 strong & within a few leagues of Suipacha where the Limianian Army under Gen^{l}. Pezuela is fortified, remains in inactivity leaving the latter to consume the produce of the mines of Potosi, & the resources of that Province and effectually preventing any trade & communication with it.—Artigas a chief of intelligence in the kind of warfare in which he is engaged, has complete possession of the other side of the River la Plata above Montevideo & what is called the *entre Rios* as far as Corrientes & altho' this Government has made considerable exertions to reduce him, they have proved ineffectual; the Secy of State, Herrera, has gone to Montevideo to propose a reconciliation to confirm his command

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

of that part of the territory, reserving Montevideo and Maldoñado to this Government—the success of which mission is not yet known.—In consequence of this state of things the intercourse with Paraguay (one of the important trades with this Capital) is much curtailed, & the Subjugation of Chili has cut off all communication with that Province.—Preparations greater than the reduced means of this Government will admit of are making, to repell the long talked of expedition from Cadiz; it will be able to bring 7000 men into the field, 4000 of which are old troops, perhaps as good as those that may come from Spain; The Country people in this vicinity are very active in the employment that will be assigned them principally, that of driving back the cattle & depriving the enemy of subsistence; from these different resources of defence reasonable hopes are entertained that if the expedition from Cadiz came with no more than 8000 troops this Government will be able to repel it. There was in the early part of January a change in the head of the Government, Gen[l]. Carlos Albiar [Alvear?] was chosen by the assembly supreme Director, and is now filling that office, he is a young Gentleman of talents and promise, and altho' the election did not seem to give general satisfaction, his firmness, activity & zeal in the cause in which the Country is engaged will command respect. The Government of these provinces looks forward with much anxiety to a peace between the United States and Great Britain, both for the commerce that will naturally follow, as also with expectations that the President of the U. S. will facilitate to it some muskets, sabres, powder, and other munitions of war, of which it is in great necessity.—Should this Country succeed (which it can with difficulty effect without some assistance) in establishing a Government independent of Spain, the trade of the United States here will be lucrative and important, but should it for the want of assistance succumb, the ports will be shut against foreign trade, more particularly against the flag of the United States.

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *May 5, 1815.*

I have now to inform you of a new change in the Government of these provinces, which took place on the 16[th] ult[o].—The discontent had become general, the army in Peru that had refused to receive Gen[l] Alvear as their

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

Commander were disgusted to learn he had been chosen Supreme Director; The chief Artigas, who breathed revenge against him and the other leaders of the Government, had so increased his popularity and strengthened his party on the Eastern Side of the River la Plata, that the desertion of the troops sent by this Government against him was so great, that the officer commanding at Montevideo, with about 800 Men in the garrison, were obliged hastily to abandon the important fortress of Montevideo and the town, to Artigas, who soon after crossed the river at S^{ta} Feé, marching upon B^{s} Ayres.

A corps of troops under the command of the Secy of War Viana was sent to oppose Artigas' progress, the first division of this Corp under the Command of Colonel Alvarez seized on the person of Viana & the other principal officers who would not join him in opposing the Existing Gov^{t}. on the receipt of which information at Buenos Ayres the murmers of the people could not longer be stifled, the Cavildo took upon itself the administration, sent a deputation to the Director Gen^{l} Alvear (who was encamped three leagues from the city with 3500 troops) who after two days demur was induced to give up the command & embark on board the British frigate; during this period the city was in commotion and the civic troops under arms, for the defence of it; the citizens behaved very well and seemed determined that if Alvear enterd the city, to defend it to last extremity, their conduct gave me good grounds to hope that united with the veteran troops they will be able to repel any force from Spain that does not exceed 8000 men.

Electors were chosen in the town for the appointment of a provisional Gov^{t}., until a general Congress can be called to form a constitution the result of the united deliberations of the representatives of the different provinces freely elected.—It is proposed to adopt that of the United States as nearly as possible. General Rondeo commanding the army of Peru was chosen Director pro tempore, Colonel Alvarez fills the place till he shall arrive and was this day installed.—I deferred writing this dispatch till the last moment allowed me, with the hopes of being able to communicate more particularly the several members that compose the new Government, it will make a part of my next respects.—All the leaders of the former Government are imprisoned and are proceeded against with much severity.—I have the honor to accompany for your inspection the most important papers that have appeared in *this* revolution.

The Patria colours have since been waving and the Independence of this Province will be proclaimed on the 29th Inst.—

The Expedition of 10,000 men from Cadiz to invade this Country, is stated to have been seen at Teneriff the latter end of february; every preparation the little means of this people permit of, will be made to defend it.—Unofficially some of the numbers of the Cavildo have expressed to me the

ardent desire of the existing Government to continue the most amica[1] relations & intercourse with the United States that it is to His Excellency the President of the United States and the Americans, they look for support in this struggle.

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Ignacio Alvarez, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, to Thomas Lloyd Halsey, Consul of the United States at Buenos Aires[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *May 10, 1815.*

On the sixth day of this month, I have taken possession of the Government to which I was elected by the votes of this worthy people in the capacity of Deputy: The administration of the State is given to other hands to end the calamities which were experienced at the hands of the former administration, without, however, this making any change for the worse in the consideration of esteem and regard which the country bears to the persons vested with the public character as delegates of the foreign Powers. In addition, there is an especial reason for distinguishing you on account of the origin of your representative office. While on account of the obstacles found in the distance and lack of communication we have been unable to tighten our relations with the United States of the North, we know none the less that a reciprocal interest and analogous sentiments invite us to bind our fate with the virtuous sons of Washington. In presenting myself to you in this new office, with all the testimonials of regard which belong to you, I believe it my duty to beg you to bring to bear the whole influence of your relations with your court to the effect that circumstances so permitting, we may receive the aid that would be within your reach and especially war implements, under the assurance that the amount will be fully satisfactory to this capital and that you let me know the opportunity for sending of communications to the Honorable President of the United States, to whom I shall have the pleasure of sending in the name of our Provinces, the sentiments of respect and high consideration which are borne him by his brothers in the South.

May God Guard you many years.

[1] MS. Papers relative to the Revolted Spanish Provinces.

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *July 17, 1815.*

SIR: With the copy of my dispatch of the 5th. May, I have [*sic*] the honor to accompany a copy of the Note No. 4 of His Excellency Dn. Ignacio Alvarez, announcing his accession to the Governmt. in quality of Director del Estado Suplente, & copy of my Reply No. 5. to that note; since which no official communication has been received. The Limenian Army under the command of General Pezuela, after meeting with some partial defeats, abandoned its strong position of Cotagaita, & retreated towards the Desaguadero, leaving Potosi on its' right, which was taken possession of by the advanced Corps of the Army of Genl. Rondeau on the 5th. May. And a division of the Army left that City a few days after to pursue the retreating army.—No further information has been received from it since that period.—

The possession of Potosi & the adjacent Country will be of the greatest importance to this Governmt. as it will afford the means of paying the troops in Peru, long in arrears, it may in a short time send pecuniary assistance to Buenos Ayres, & certainly will open an advantageous Channel of Commerce.

The Chief Artigas who had masked his hostility against this part of the Country with the insidious pretext, that it was solely to displace the leaders of the then Governmt. has continued to pursue measures of restriction, & non intercourse, & recently when, the Expedition was daily expected made the most unwarrantable & insulting demands of this Governmt. such as he knew it could not (compatible with its dignity) accede to; This demand made at a time when all local bickerings should have been forgot, or at least deferred, to unite in defending the Country against the Cruel Invaders has persuaded every mind of his ambitious or treacherous views, long since has the Governmt. received information meriting consideration, that Artigas accepted & holds a Commission of Brigadier in the Spanish service, his general conduct induces a belief of the fact.—

Deputies from him have been here some days to treat on a pacification & intercourse, but his demands are still too extravagant to accept of.—

Should they persevere it is the determination of the Governmt. of Bs. Ayrs. to send a vessel of War in front of Maldoñado, one before Montevideo, another to the Colonia, & two to the pass of Sta. Fee.

Those vessels will compleatly cut off the Communication between the different places of the other side, & will add to their present distress; you will judge of the extent of it when I tell you that all articles of produce there, have triple value here.—

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

The honorable peace (which American valor & talents have commanded, which have given to the U.S. a distinguished rank & importance with all foreign nations & which are a presage of its high destiny) will lead many of our Enterprizing Countrymen to adventure their ships & property to this profitable market. . . .

P. S. July 19th. The Deputies sent here by Artigas have been dismissed without having effected the object of their mission; the demands were so unreasonable & insulting that this Govt. could not accede to them without great humiliation, incompatible with its dignity.—The demands were:

1st Montevideo to be put in the state it was when taken from the Crown of Spain.—with all is Cannon, military stores, &c, &c

2d. 1,500 muskets for Artigas, & 300 for Cordova.—

3d. A large sum of money. (the amt. am not informed of).—

This Govt. conducted the conferences with great moderation; it wished to know under what pretext, they could make such demands, & for what object they wanted these arms, when no hostilities existed in this part of the Country but which Artigas had made & was making against this Govt.; that if they should be attacked by the Portuguese, it would furnish not only arms, but soldiers; that Montevideo was taken from the Crown of Spain, by their valor & perseverance, after a most protracted siege, made at an enormous expense, & what it contained this Govt. was justly entitled to by right of conquest.—& that by giving up the important fortress to them was more than they had a right to expect.—

Measures of defence & precaution will be immediately taken; 1500 will march in two days to Sta. Fee, & four or five vessels of war put in active service.

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Ignacio Alvarez, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, to James Madison, President of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

BUENOS AIRES, *January 16, 1816.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: The circumstances are well known, which have heretofore prevented these Provinces from establishing with the United States of America, the relations of amity and strict correspondence, which reciprocal interest and a common Glory ought to have inspired— At length the obstacles which were opposed to our desires, have been overcome and we have the fortune to be able to send near Your Excellcy a Deputy to

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

implore from Y.E., the protection and assistance we require for the defence of a just cause and sacred in its principles,—and which is moreover ennobled by the heroic example of the United States over whom Y.E. has the Glory to preside.

A series of extraordinary Events and unexpected changes, which have taken place in our antient Mother-Country, have constrained us not to make a formal Declaration of National Independence: nevertheless our conduct and our Public Papers have sufficiently expressed our Resolution. When this Letter reaches Your Excellency, The General Congress of our Representatives will have met, and I can assure you, without fear of being mistaken, that one of its first acts, will be a solemn Declaration of the Independence of these Provinces of the Spanish Monarchy and of all other Foreign Sovereigns or Powers.

In the mean time our Deputy near Your Excell^{cy} will not be invested with a Public character, nor will he be disposed to exceed the object of his Mission, without an understanding with Y.E. and your Ministers. That these views may be exactly fulfilled, I have selected a Gentleman who from his personal qualities, will not excite a suspicion that he is sent by the Government invested with so serious and important a Commission— He is Colonel Martin Tompson who independently of this Credential, has the Title, which we are accustomed to give to our Deputies— I hope that Your Ex^{cy} will be pleased to give him full credit and secure for him all the consideration which in a like case, we would give and secure to the Ministers whom Your Ex^{cy} may think proper to send to these Provinces.

The said Deputy has it specially in charge to offer to Your Ex^{cy} in my Name and in that of the Provinces under my direction the profound respect and particular estimation with which we view the very Illustrious Chief of so powerful a Republick— May Your Excell^{cy} deign to receive these Expressions and to give us an occasion to accredit them.

God preserve your Life many Years!

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *April 20, 1816.*

The year for which Don Ignacio Alvarez was elected, having expired & the Congress assembled at Tucuman not having elected a successor, the

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

Cabildo & Junta of Observation on the 17th Instant chose the Brigadier Gen[l]. Don Antonio Belcareel [Balcarce?] Director Interino until the Election by the Congress is known.

The Army of Buenos Ayres near Jujui has been much reinforced, it is considered now to amount to 4000 Men. The parties or *Factions* are injuring the cause of Freedom & Independance in this Country & if continued, will assuredly ruin it.

No man has risen among them of sufficient merit to direct with Wisdom either the affairs of Government or their Armies, no man who carries with him the public esteem, none of those able & disinterested patriots who led & pushed on the people of the United States to the happy Independence they acquired.—

I have the Honor [etc.].

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *July 3, 1816.*

SIR: With the Copy of my note to this Gov'mt N° 16, I have the honor to accompany the Copy of its answer N° 17 by which you will observe the friendly disposition towards the United States.

The situation of this Country is extremely critical, its resources are much diminished, Factions and divisions prevail, & no person of talents & energy appears to take the lead & carry forward the cause of Independance, & unless the United States lends some speedy assistance, it will soon be obliged to submit to its old Master.

This Gov'mt would listen to almost any proposition of the United States, to give it advantages in trade, or perhaps place itself more immediately under the direction of North America, if the United States would afford assistance necessary to accomplish their Independance.

Sensible of the Justice & prudence of the Councils of the Government of the United States, I would not hint at any interference under other circumstances than the present. Spain has been unprovokedly guilty of great depredations on the Commerce of the United States during the War in which she was engaged against Great Britain, as also of indirect hostility during the war between the United States & England, without appearing inclined to make proper compensation for her injustice.

The cause of the people of this Country, to free itself from an odious

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I. The enclosures mentioned in the first paragraph are not printed in the present collection.

tyranny is a just & sacred one, & one in which every native of North America must feel an interest.

It would appear to be the Policy of the United States that the whole Continent of America should be united, at least in friendly intercourse & commercial relations, and these encouraged & strongly cemented, that at some future period, United they may be able in a measure to resist the preponderating influence of Europe. Spain must from the proximity of her most important Colonies to the United States sooner or later be at War with us, this will take place the first moment she feels herself sufficiently strong for the contest; why then it might be asked, suffer this favourable opportunity to pass, by seizing on the Floridas indemnify the Citizens of the United States for their heavy losses; & by assisting the inhabitants of these provinces in a righteous cause, which must have the wishes of all good men, would gain to the Government of the United States, the Glory of giving Freedom to a part of their Species & the applause of the liberal part of the Civilized World.— I hope you will not think I have taken upon myself an improper latitude in my observations & that you will be pleased to attribute them, to the same generous feelings which animated you in the cause of the liberty of our beloved Country.

The Congress is still in Session at Tucuman, Don Martin Puyridon has been elected by that assembly Supreme Director & General of the Army in Peru, it consists of about 2500 Men & has its head Quarters in advance of Salta. The Corps of troops under S^{t}. Martin at Mendoza is about 3000 Strong, that under Diaz Vales near S^{t} Fee about 1500 Strong, & in Buenos Ayres there may be 1500 regular Troops, besides the Corps of Civicos about 3000 & the Militia Cavalry about 2000; these compose the whole military force of these provinces.

It is believed here that a Portuguese Expedition, consisting of 2 Ships of the Line, 2 Frigates, & several smaller vessels of War with 8000 troops, is preparing at Rio Janeiro, with the intention to attack & possess itself of Monte Video & the Territory on the other side the River La Plata— As far as I can learn, it is not the intention of this Government to interfere unless the Portuguese commit some act of Hostility against this province.

My friend M^{r} Devereux who will be the bearer of this will inform you more particularly of the state of this Country than I can possibly do in a dispatch; to him I beg to refer you.

I have the honor [etc.].

P.S. One or two frigates in this river would be very advantageous to the Commerce of the U S. at this port.

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *July 24, 1816.*

. . . And you will also find herewith a Note of this Gov'mt N° 20 announcing the declaration by the Congress assembled at Tucuman, of the Independence of the Provincias Unidas del Rio de la Plata on the 19th Instant.

[ENCLOSURE; TRANSLATION]

Miguel Yrigoyen, Francisco Antonio a Escalada, and Manuel Obligado, to Thomas Lloyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires[2]

The Government has just received official notice that the Sovereign Congress of these Provinces meeting in the city of Tucuman has declared the independence of this part of South America from the domination of the Kings of Spain and its Metropolis.

By this step the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata have been raised to the rank of Nation[1] and have cast the die that decides their destiny. Conquest and might have put these Countries under the domination of Spain in the time of its weakness: its actual strength separated them on the day of that ominous dependency.

It can not be forgotten that in this heroic revolution the people of the Union have had their eyes fixed in advance upon that great Republic that exists in North America. The United States since their Glorious liberty have been as a luminous constellation pointing the way opened by Providence to the other people of this part of the Globe.

Please then hear from the voice of the Government these sincere sentiments on the present occasion, the President of the United States translating them for you, with the object that this respectable Magistrate of the first free nation of America draws your attention to the state in which we find ourselves, and wishes you to accept the congratulations of his Government on the close union of Relations between the people that are in charge of it and that of ours, since the latter no longer belongs to Spain, but to ourselves.

Indeed this is the precious moment to advance the commercial relations that have already been begun, with the profit that two Governments alike in their natural importance should await from each other; by which you

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

[2] On July 9, 1816, the Congress of Tucuman declared the independence of the "United Provinces of South America". Although in practice the name generally applied to the new state was the "United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata", the official title as given in the Declaration of Independence is consistently used in the headings to documents in this print bearing a subsequent date.

will oblige greatly the government of my country and you will lend assistance to the aforesaid President to whom you will also express our constant inclination toward everything that may lead to the prosperity of the United States.

At the Mercy of God, Buenos Aires, July 19, 1816.

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *August 20, 1816.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose you duplicate[2] of the Note of this Government N° 20 announcing to me the Declaration of the Independence of these Provinces—

The Portuguese Expedition that sailed from Rio Janeiro put into S^{t} Catharines whether intentionally or by stress of weather is unknown here; so secret has been the Portuguese Gov'mt as to the object of the Expedition, that altho there is every probability that its destination is Monte Video and altho' no other one is imagined still there exist many doubts of it,

I have the Honor [etc.].

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Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America, to James Madison, President of the United States[3]

[TRANSLATION]

BUENOS AIRES, *January 1, 1817.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: Being placed at the head of these provinces by the suffrage of the Congress of its representatives, and having had the honor, on a former occasion, of offering to your excellency the tribute of my respects, and at the same time of transmitting the act of the declaration of our independence of the ancient Government of the King of Spain and his successors, I profit of the present occasion to notify your excellency that I have ordered Colonel Don Martin Thompson, the agent of this Government near the Government of your excellency, to cease to exercise the functions appertaining to

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.
[2] See above, pt. II, doc. 209, enclosure from Halsey to Secretary of State, July 24, 1816.
[3] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 174.

his character as such. When first sent to the United States, he went in the character of agent; and of this your excellency was apprized by despatches of the 16th of January of the last year, in which was assigned, as the reason for not having appointed to so important a mission a person of greater consideration and weight, the necessity of obviating all suspicion that might otherwise have arisen concerning its object. It is with much concern that I have learned, by the communications themselves of our said agent, that he has arbitrarily departed from the line of the duties marked out for him, and that, without having duly estimated the honor of conferring with you, he has granted licenses which are in direct contradiction with the said principles. My predecessor rested all his hopes of a favorable issue to the commission given to Mr. Thompson on the generosity and magnanimity of your excellency; and I, who entertain the same sentiments, venture to hope that, suspending for the present the appointment of an agent, we shall receive proofs of your friendly dispositions towards these people; but if your excellency should deem it necessary that a formal agent should be appointed, I shall, upon the first intimation, take a particular pleasure in making choice of a person who may be worthy of the consideration of the illustrious chief to whom he will be sent.

I have the honor to avail myself of this occasion to renew to your excellency the sentiments of respect and high esteem, which it is the boast of the people over whom I preside to entertain for you, and to offer you the like homage in my own name.

May God preserve you many years.

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *January 30, 1817.*

SIR: When Col[1] Devereux was in this Country the last year he seemed to take a lively interest in the cause of its Independence and sensibly felt the inadequate means of this Government when threatened by an additional and neighbouring enemy and grieved that no friendly power should have stept forward to lend assistance to a people struggling (with immense sacrifices) in the sacred cause of Liberty and Independence.—

Those feelings led this Generous friend to mankind and to freedom to revert to the similarity of the situation of North and South America; that North America; without half the causes of complaint or half the servitude

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

the former became restless in its shackles, that it had found many Generous *European* Nations to assist her in the Contest for Freedom, but that this unhappy People should not as yet have found a Single Friend to aid them and that even the *Free* Sons of Columbia inhabiting the Northern Sphere should be insensible and indifferent to the sacred Cause of the Independence of the whole of the inhabitants of the Continent of America. Inspired by these reflections and knowing the Sentiments of many of the leading members of the Government of the United States and also the general impulse of the Inhabitants, this Worthy Citizen of the United States determined to make an effort in favour of this Country.— He presented a memorial to this Government offering his Services to procure a Loan in the United States under the Guarantee of the Government persuaded that the Government of the United States impressed with the justice of the cause and the Policy of the measure will do so.— The proposition was sent to the Congress at Tucuman and received its sanction & it has been accepted and agreed to by the Supreme Director and the assisting Members of the Congress here, on the terms of the proposition directed to His Excellency the President of the United States and forwarded by this opportunity, to which I take the liberty to refer you.—

This Country composing the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata is in a perilous situation, surrounded by enemies with considerable internal desentions, the Treasury and means exhausted, the Portuguese in possession of a considerable part of the *Banda Oriental* (altho it is thought that much time will pass before they get quiet possession of the Country).— In fact I consider the subjugation of these provinces as the death blow to the last efforts of the Spanish Americas for Independence, but that timely Succour being given, together with their determination to resist and the new impulse which the assistance of the United States will insure, reasonable hopes may be entertained of their ultimate success.—

I have the honor to transmit a dispatch of this Government to His Excellency the President of the United States enclosing the terms that the loan is to be contracted for, after receiving the Guarantee of the Government.— The Portuguese took possession of Monte Video on the 19th Instant, the troops of Artigas having previously evacuated the place, not considering themselves sufficiently provided to stand a Siege.—

I have the Honor [etc.].

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Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America, to James Madison, President of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *January 31, 1817.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: This Government being more than ever engaged in the pending struggle to bring to an end the happy independence that has been sworn and proclaimed by the peoples, every means has been tried to ward off the risks, achieve results and seal the character of honor that is already ours. In spite of such plausible plans, our cause was not given the impulse that could bring the enemy to earth by making known to him the weakness of his undertaking, because the lack of funds at times paralyzed the measure of hostilities and at other times failed of the strength which our sacred endeavor called for. In so hard a conflict providence has extended to me aid through Don Juan Devereux, to whom I was invited [*invitado*] by the Consul of the United States, Mr. Thomas Lloyd Halsey, in the sum of $2,000,000, which under certain conditions may be lent to my Government. I have not hesitated in accepting both for the end which urges its acceptance and also the features of the contract: It has been approved by the proper authorities and in accord with the above named Consul, the articles it constituted and which are herewith enclosed, were approved. There only remains for your Government to extend the protection needed to carry it into effect and that is mainly what our people ask of Your Excellency through me.

Convinced as they are that the liberty enjoyed by your States is the same as that which they proclaim, they have full confidence in the guaranty of Your Government for that loan and now indulge the great pleasure of a friendly correspondence between brothers and tender even now the most sincere cordiality and reciprocal union in honor of the just cause which they champion.

May God guard Your Excellency many years.

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to James Monroe, Secretary of State of the United States[2]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 3, 1817.*

SIR: The accompanying is Copy of the last dispatch that I had the honor to address forwarded by the Brig Elizabeth for New York.

[1] MS. Papers relative to the Revolted Spanish Provinces.
[2] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

Since that period the political situation of these provinces is much improved by the success of their arms in Chili, which has produced its entire liberation, the Gazettes I have the honor to send will give you every information known to the public— In consequence of these successes in Chili the Government has thought proper to prohibit the departure of M[r] Carreras who arrived here from the United States a few days previous, with two vessels having on board many French and American Officers & Artizans— The Officers it is said will be employed by the Government, and the Artizans with liberty to remain in the Country or return to the U.S.

The divisions between O'Higgins & Carreras was the cause of the late subjugation of Chili and as this Government sided with the party of O'Higgins who accompanied the army to Chili, it doubtless conceived that the return of Carreras to his Country might produce new factions & disorders and similar consequences.

The Division of the Portuguese Army at Montevideo remains in that vicinity hemmed in by the light Corps of D[n] Fructos Rivero, who has distroyed most of the Grain, and much harrasses the Army.— The Division of the Portuguese in the interior are however gaining some advantages, they have Corps in the vicinity of Goya & Carricutes.

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Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America, to James Monroe, President of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 5, 1817.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: The liberal and benevolent principles which distinguish your Government induce me to believe that the recent triumphs of liberty in these United Provinces of South America will be heard with pleasure by your excellency and the happy citizens of your republic. This confidence, and the conformity of the principles which actuate the inhabitants of this hemisphere with those that stimulated the heroic efforts of the United States of the north in the achievement of their independence, encourage me to make known to your excellency the restoration of the opulent kingdom of Chili, by the patriot forces of my Government.

The printed documents which I have the honor to enclose contain accounts of the most memorable events of the last campaign. It was opened by the passage of the formidable mountains of the Andes; and, through the interposition of Providence, our victorious arms have given liberty to a million and a half of the inhabitants of the new world.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 175.

I pray your excellency to accept the assurance of my respectful consideration, and my desire to strengthen the bonds of union and mutual interest between the two nations.

God preserve you many years.

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, United States Consul at Buenos Aires, to the Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 26, 1817.*

The tide of Fortune has changed surprizingly of late in favour of the liberty of these Countries. Chili is completely in possession of the Patriot Army and an army of 6,000 Men is organizing there with the intention of making a descent on the Coast of Limanian Peru the latter part of this year.

Advices of new successes in upper Peru were received two days since a party of Guemes troops attacked a small Fort in the rear of the Spanish Army, took Seven pieces of Artillery a quantity of Military Stores & Cattle one Standard & put to the sword Eighty men.

The Portuguese on the other side of this River made a movement lately towards the river S^{t} Lucia a few leagues from Monte Video immediately after which D^{n} Fructos Rivero's troops appeared in the vicinity of the Town and threatened it.

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Commission to Manuel Hermenegildo de Aguirre, granted by Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America[2]

[TRANSLATION]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 28, 1817.*

The Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America.

Inasmuch as it is necessary to appoint a person who, in the character of agent of this Government near that of the United States of North America, may promote whatever conduces to the progress of the cause in which these provinces are engaged, to their honor, and the consolidation of the great work of our liberty: therefore, the necessary qualities of probity, capacity,

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.
[2] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 175.

and patriotism, uniting in the Commissary General of War, citizen Don Manuel Hermenegildo de Aguirre, I have appointed him agent of this Government near that of the United States of North America, granting to him the privileges, pre-eminences, and prerogatives which belong to the said title.

In pursuance whereof, I have given the present, signed by me, countersigned by my Secretary of State for the Department of the Government and Foreign Affairs, and sealed with the seal of the national arms. Given at Buenos Ayres, the 28th day of March, 1817.

[Arms] JUAN MARTÍN DE PUEYRREDÓN.
GREGORIO TAGLE, *Minister of State.*

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Don José Francisco de San Martín, General of the Army of the Andes, to James Monroe, President of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

SANTIAGO, CHILE, *April 1, 1817.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: Charged by the Supreme Director of the provinces of South America with the command of the army of the Andes, Heaven crowned my forces with a victory on the 12th of February over the oppressors of the beautiful kingdom of Chili. The sacred rights of nature being restored to the inhabitants of this country by the influence of the national arms and the efficacious impulse of my Government, fortune has opened a favorable field to new enterprises, which secure the power of liberty and the ruin of the enemies of America. Towards securing and consolidating this object, the Supreme Director of the Government of Chili has considered, as a principal instrument, the armament in these States of a squadron destined to the Pacific ocean, which, united to the forces that are preparing in the river La Plata, may co-operate in sustaining the ulterior military operations of the army under my command in South America; and, convinced of the advantages which our actual political situation promises, I have crossed the Andes in order to concert in that capital, among other things, the guaranty of my Government, and, in compliance with the stipulations between the Supreme Director of Chili and its intimate ally, to carry into effect the plan which has been confided to Don Manuel Aguirre. Your excellency, who enjoys the honor of presiding over a free people, who contended and shed their blood in a similar cause to that in which the inhabitants of South America are now engaged, will, I hope, deign to extend to the above-named person such protec-

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 176.

tion as is compatible with the actual relations of your Government; and I have the high satisfaction of assuring your excellency that the arms of the country under my orders will not fail to give consistency and respect to the promises of both Governments.

I am happy in having this agreeable occasion [etc.].

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Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America, to James Monroe, President of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

April 28, 1817.

When the interests of sound policy are in accord with the principles of justice, nothing is more easy or more pleasing than the maintenance of harmony and good understanding between Powers which are connected by close relations. This seems to be exactly the case in which the United States and these provinces stand with respect to each other; a flattering situation, which gives the signal of our success, and forms our best apology.

It is on this occasion that citizen Don Manuel Hermenegildo de Aguirre, Commissary General of War, is deputed towards you in the character of the agent of this Government. If his recommendable qualities are the best pledge of the faithful discharge of his commission and of its favorable issue, the upright and generous sentiments of your excellency are not less auspicious to it. The concurrence of these circumstances induces me to hope the most favorable results.

I trust, therefore, that your excellency will be pleased to grant to the said citizen Aguirre all the protection and consideration required by his diplomatic rank and the actual state of our relations. This will be a new tie, by which the United States of the north will more effectually secure the gratitude and affection of the free provinces of the south.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 176.

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W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *October 1, 1817.*

On the 22nd. Ulto. I waited on his Excellency the Supreme Director, & think I had the good fortune, to make a satisfactory explanation to him respecting the non compliance of the Government of the United States with the memorial of Col. Devereux heretofore offering the guarantee of a Loan.

I had a tedious voyage, not arriving here till the 5th Ulto.— As soon as it was deemed proper by me, I paid my respects to the existing authorities, and was introduced by the Secretary of State to the Supreme Director, on the 13th, purposely, without any publicity or form— As he speaks french I found no difficulty in conversing freely with him, and immediately frankly explained my views in coming hither, agreeably to my instructions.

The Director received & treated me with candor & friendship, who together with the People in general in this place, appear to have a partiality for the Citizens of the United States— Moreover I determined to have nothing to do with the little political intrigues here, & told the Director on my introduction, that it was the Character of my Government to be without mystery & that I should always act in a plain & open manner. Altho' it appeared to disappoint expectations, yet I told him very emphatically, that the crisis had not arrived when it might be deemed expedient for the United States to espouse the Cause of the South American Patriots; and such were our political relations with old Spain that we were bound by honor & integrity not to meddle in the contest, which would have been the case, had the United States, have lent its aid to the Loan of money as proposed by Col. Devereux; And therefore, when they took a part, they would do it openly, not indirectly— The Director observed that the proposition for the Loan did not come from them, but from Col. Devereux— I told him, that the Col. had in his own personal zeal, I was led to believe, from the positive assurance of the President, thro' the Department of State, acted beyond his authority— I concluded the interview by telling the Director, that if he deemed it necessary I would make a formal official communication on the subject, which he might lay before the members who composed the Congress of Tacuman & that of Buenos Ayres, but I believe this will not be required—

I could say many things respecting the state of this Country, Chili &c &c, but as I was informed a cypher would be furnished me, I shall reserve many opinions till I receive it should it still be thought necessary.

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, I.

I shall postpone crossing the Andes as late as the season will permit, then proceed on for Santiago—

With distinguished consideration [etc.].

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W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *October 4, 1817.*

SIR: Since my despatch of the 1st. Inst.[2] I last night received an official letter from Mr. Tagle, Secretary of State here, dated the 3rd, a translation & copy of which I have the honor to enclose.

The two papers mentioned by Mr. Tagle were my Passport & Credential Letter of the 23rd of January last, which I presented on the 13th. Ulto.— And were retained under *consideration*, I presume, till yesterday.

The expressions in Mr. Tagle's letter seem to confirm the opinions I had expressed to you— The expectations were so high & the feelings so strong, in favour of receiving a Minister from the United States, acknowledging their Independence, that notwithstanding I took great care to impress it before I landed & afterwards that I was only a Special Agent for Commerce &c, they seemed a long time loth to relinquish their anticipations of my being a much more important character than I was in reality—

Aware, that when this extraordinary current began to ebb, the public mind might assume, if not repulsive, at least lukewarm impressions towards me, I adopted the course with the Government stated in my letter of the 1st, which has I trust fully succeeded.

Unless the same overwhelming powers which put Lewis the 18th twice on the Throne of France, be employed to replace this Country under the Spanish Branch of the Bourbons, it is, & ever will remain independant of Spain— And if the United States be the first to acknowledge them Free, they will be in every respect the most favoured Nation—

I do not obtrude my opinion, that they should make such acknowledgment; I only say what effect it would have here; for in all my acts, I shall maintain my character, of a rigid Neutrality, both as it regards myself personally & the Government for which I have the honor to be Agent—

If it comported with the views of the President I should think it would add to the safety of our own citizens, & familiarize our Naval Character to the People of this part of the world, to have a vessel of war always sta-

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, I.

[2] See above, pt. II, doc. 220.

tioned in these waters— The British never have less than one or two laying in the Roads of this city— I shall now apply myself to the statistical and other enquiries which grow out of my official duties, and at all times pay attention to any subject concerning the United States, of which, I may deem it not improper for me to take notice—

I enclose a letter addressed to me by William G. Miller, Esquire, respecting the Consulate of Monte Video—he gives his reasons for declining the appointment,—I thought it necessary to make enquiries on this head, as I find on the 16 of March last, this place had attracted the attention of the Ministers of the Mediating Courts at Paris; and the President might wish to nominate some person to that situation.

With distinguished consideration [etc.].

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W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to Gregorio Tagle, Secretary of State of the United Provinces of South America[1]

JESUITS' COLLEGE SQUARE, *October 6, 1817.*

The Undersigned Special Agent of the U. S. for Buenos Ayres Chili & Peru, had the honor to receive the official letter with its accompanyments, addressed to him on the 3 Inst. by the Honorable Mr. Tagle Secretary of State.

He has transmitted a copy of that communication to Washington and feels confident that the President will duly appreciate the motives which have dictated the friendly & delicate manner, in which the undersigned has been recognized here, and will fully reciprocate those sentiments of liberality and national predilection which his Exy. the Supreme Director has been pleased to express towards that Chief Magistrate and the republic over which he presides. When the undersigned had the honor of being introduced to his Excellency the Sup. Director Shortly after his arrival, he unfolded without reserve the Spirit of amity and purely neutral character in which he had been directed by the President to conduct the present mission and that his functions were of a commercial nature.

Altho the President as well as the people of the United States may regard with the most generous Sympathy the Lofty destinies to which this portion of the great american family is rapidly progressing, yet such is at present, the State of the political world that it has been deemed best, both for this country and the U. States, that in this great contest they should remain, per-

[1] Dispatches from Argentina, I.

fectly neutral: For if the United States were to throw their resources, into the Scale of the Provinces, the Mother Country might then enlist on her Side, *other Powers* who would be more than equivalent.

It was therefore the Soundest policy and the most honest part to Stand aloof at least while the other powers did so, and contemplate the Struggle as a civil war impartially extending, to the Combatants all the aid and benefit which they are enabled to receive according to the Law of nations.

His Excellency the Director appeared to view this Subject in a fair and candid light and no doubt saw the true reason why the Credential letter presented was as stated by your Honor deficient in the Customary formalities.

The Undersigned will avail himself of an early opportunity to obtain by permission official information on the inquiries with which he had the honor of informing his Excellency the Supr. Direc. he should wish to be furnished and takes this occasion to offer to Mr. Tagle The assurance [etc.].

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Manuel H. de Aguirre, Agent of the United Provinces of South America to the United States, to James Monroe, President of the United States[1]

WASHINGTON, *October 29, 1817.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: Three centuries of colonial oppression by a corrupt, superstitious, and ignorant nation, whose obstinate and iniquitous policy ever has been to vilify the inhabitants of South America, *as being destined to vegetate in obscurity and debasement;* (such are the expressions of the viceroy Albancos;) the violent system of keeping them in ignorance of all information incompatible with its principles of colonial dependence; the perverse policy of denying to the children of the mother country, and their lawful descendants on the American continent, the rights of citizens in the exercise of a practical equality; the exclusive monopoly of commerce despotically exercised, regulated by the laws solely in favor of the mother country, and maintained by force at the price of the blood of innocent victims, natives of the country; the black ingratitude with which it has conducted itself towards the capital of Buenos Ayres, after having so gallantly and energetically defended the Spanish dominion against the English army under General Beresford in 1806, and the army of 12,000 men of the same nation, commanded by General Whitelock in 1807; finally, the infamous engagement to force them against their consent, to submit to the yoke which the Emperor Napoleon (an instrument, as it were, of divine justice for the chastisement of thrones)

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 179.

imposed upon Spain, to avenge the bloody usurpations of the empires of Mexico and Peru, prepared these people, on the 25th of May, 1810, for their separation from the Spanish nation, already conquered by the French, not to admit the additional circumstance that the inhabitants of these provinces preserved them for the captive King Don Ferdinand VII. and his lawful successors.

On the restoration of the King of Spain to his throne, a sufficient time was afforded to give him the opportunity of correcting his counsels, stating the grievances and injuries he complained of, and finally of proposing an honorable termination of these differences. Although the deputy had not yet arrived at the court of Madrid, the King had already despatched his inexorable and bloody decrees; and the expedition under General Morillo crossed the seas to wage a war of devastation on these countries. The natural right of self-defence imposed the necessity of taking measures to repel force by force. Hostile armies were the worst means which could be employed to bring about an accommodation.

When the deputy of the court of Madrid informed this Government that the King of Spain insisted on leaving no other alternative than the most abject submission, and that he claimed these provinces as the property of his crown, (doubtless to make them victims to Spanish vengeance,) then it was that the sovereign Congress of these provinces having assembled did, in imitation of the example of their brethren and natural friends of North America, unanimously proclaim, in the city of Tucuman, on the 9th day of July, 1816, the solemn act of their civil independence of the Spanish nation, of the King of Spain, his heirs and successors, and did swear, together with the people represented by them, to support their political emancipation at the risk of their lives, fortunes, and honor.

God preserve your excellency many years.

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W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to Gregorio Tagle, Secretary of State of the United Provinces of South America[1]

[EXTRACTS]

Private. JESUITS' COLLEGE SQUARE, *October 30, 1817.*

SIR: At the conclusion of the letter which I had the honor to address to you on the 6th Inst.[2] I alluded to certain enquiries which I should wish to make of the officers of this Government in preference to seeking information else-

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, I. [2] See above, pt. II, doc. 222.

where— My reasons for adopting this course, are, 1st because it will be more correctly furnished me—2ndly, because I have no inclination to do any act while I remain here, which I should not desire, rather that it be known to the Government than kept secret from them—3rdly, because I am of opinion that the Congress of the United States, at their Session in December next (which will most likely continue till March or April following) may call upon the President for such information as he may have in his possession concerning South American Affairs, and I feel anxious that he should be enabled to lay before the American Nation a full view of the subject: And as I hope to draw my information from official sources, I offer you an opportunity of placing the situation of this Country in the most flattering light, having a regard however as you no doubt will, that the statements tho' put in the most favourable manner, will be in the main supported by the facts—lastly because I wish to make no enquiries of this Government which I am not willing to answer if asked of me respecting my own— Therefore I will anticipate your reviewing those questions, by answering them in advance (they are enclosed on a separate piece of paper).

1st The United States entertain the most liberal principles & most friendly disposition towards the Provinces of South America, as his Excellency the Supreme Director was *particularly* informed by me, on the day I was presented to him—

2nd The United States are [*sic*] at peace & on friendly terms with all the great nations, of Europe & has [*sic*] Ministers at Petersburg, London, Paris, The Hague, Stockholm & at Madrid— I think I may safely say that our Foreign Relations are on a worse footing with Spain than with any of those Powers. 1st in consequence of her delay to settle our claim for indemnity under the Treaty of San Lorenzo el Real of the 27. October 1795, in her suppressing our right of Deposits at New Orleans—2nd. The non adjustment of our claims against her for spoliations on our Commerce previous to the year 1802.—3rd The difference respecting our territorial limits on the East & West side of the Mississippi. 4th. The aid given by her Authorities in East Florida, to the hostile Indian Savages on our Georgian frontier to make war against us. 5th. Permitting England to send supplies to those tribes thro' East Florida & allowing her to establish a military Depot in the Province with a view of supporting them against the United States. And 6th. The imprisonment of American citizens & the Seizure of their property under divers pretences both in her European & American Possessions contrary to Amity & the Law of Nations— Those grievances were all unredressed when I left Washington. I have heard it said here that Spain has lately ceded East Florida to the United States—but I know of nothing official to that effect— As to the other great Powers of Europe, it is perhaps the better policy of the United States to cultivate the particular friendship of Russia, thereby to counterpoise, the maritime pretensions of England, as it

has been conceived, that the policy of the two nations ought to be the same in that respect ever since the armed Neutrality of the North in which the late empress of Russia took so conspicuous a part— But it is my opinion that the Emperor Alexander is too much governed by his Nobles; and if California has been lately ceded to him, as is rumoured here, it behooves the United States to regard that cession with considerable attention— For it appears to me that the English having possession of Nova Scotia, the Canadas &c and endeavouring to force into consequence an establishment at the mouth of Columbia river (a vessel, the "Colonel Allen" now lying in these roads with supplies &c for the Letters found from London to that place) The Russians now getting the Californias & we already having the Spanish territories on our South & West— It would seem that they intend to attempt to revive, enlarge & carry into operation, the long exploded project which the French formerly had, (before the death of Montcalm on the Heights of Abraham) of forming a complete line of offensive military Posts drawn around the old United States from Quebec to the mouth of the Mississippi— These maneuvres may possibly change our relations materially with those powers—but what effect they will have either immediately or remotely on these Provinces of Spanish America it is perhaps not becoming me even to surmise—

3rd In addition to the Ministers Plenipotentiary which we have in Europe, we have one at the Court of Rio de Janeiro—our relations with the Brazilian Government have always been of a character so little interesting that I can only say we are on friendly terms with them, & I believe mutually respected.

4th Our Commercial & other Connections with the aforementioned powers are governed by public Treaties, of which it would be both too tedious either to recapitulate the substance or to enumerate them: But having all those Treaties with me, they will be furnished you with great pleasure should you feel a disposition to peruse any of them. . . .

I trust Sir—you will receive these remarks on my own Country its men & purposes, as they were intended, merely to bring the two nations better acquainted with each other; that when the period may arrive in which their interests & affections shall unite them in habits of real friendship & free social intercourse, they may have learnt in advance duly to appreciate each other & not be brought together, as perfect strangers, solely by diplomatic legerdemain— Let the new World in all its transactions, endeavour to avoid degenerating into that political hocus pocus, by which we have seen nations disposed of & portioned out, as if they were mere matters of personal property— If I have sometimes wandered into an expression too warm or too flattering when speaking of my native land, I know you will make all due allowance, for tho' heaven have shed on your States its choicest blessings of climate & of soil where animal and vegetable life unfolds itself in the greatest vigour & luxuriance, & where the human intellect may be cultivated

to the highest perfection; yet we cannot in truth complain that the bounties of a gracious Providence have been withholden from us: And I have always found that the man whose heart beats so strongly in favor of his own country, as does that of a South American, can freely forgive the throbbings, tho' a little too extravagant, of his Brother of the North—for to the Love of Country, we owe, not only some of our finest sensibilities but some of the noblest actions of our Nation. I renew to you the assurance of my profound respect [etc.].

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Manuel H. de Aguirre, Agent of the United Provinces of South America to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *December 16, 1817.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: Having had the honor to inform you, in October last, that the United Provinces in South America had declared themselves free and independent states, and to lay before you the reasons which supported that declaration, together with the object and credentials of my mission to the Government of the United States, the respect I owe to the instructions of my constituents, and the due discharge of the trust with which they have honored me, now induce me to demand of this Government the acknowledgment of those provinces as such free and independent states.

By my previous communications, you will have perceived that this declaration was not premature, and that the provinces of Rio de la Plata abstained from making it whilst it could have been attributed to the effect of the difficulties of the mother country. They held so lofty a conception to be among the obligations which they were about to contract on placing themselves in the rank of nations; and, before they cut short the interminable catalogue of vexations and patient sufferings of which Spanish America offers so striking an example, they preferred exhausting all the means of conciliation which prudence could suggest, and proving whether their own conviction of their rights, and of the injuries they had suffered, would rise superior to their ancient habit of submission and obedience, and whether they were able to surmount the obstacles and embarrassments inseparable from their new situation. It was after repeated proofs of this kind, and after uniform results, that the Congress of those provinces declared them sovereign states, on the 9th of July, 1816.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 180.

Notwithstanding all these proofs and precautions, the respect due to foreign nations made my Government anxious farther to obtain an attitude which might inspire greater confidence before it asked of them to acknowledge her as worthy of the high rank to which she had raised herself. During the space of six years previous to their declaration of independence, the forces of these provinces had obtained signal successes on the eastern border, having captured the whole of the royal squadron which attacked them; reduced one of the strongest places in our hemisphere, after a memorable siege, and made prisoners of war the strong garrison which defended it; and if victory was not always the inseparable companion of our arms in Peru, it was often so, and enabled us to drive back the satellites of tyranny to a greater distance from our territories.

Almost eighteen months have passed since this declaration; eighteen months, during which the King's forces have had no other object in view than to rivet anew the chains which Spanish America had burst asunder and shaken off! If such an undertaking had been within the power of Spain, she never could have had a more favorable opportunity than at present, when she has had at her disposal, disengaged from any other calls of service, an army numerous and warlike, and the aids of all who interest themselves in perpetuating the monopoly and subjection of our country. It is true that Spain proceeded to fit out an expedition the most brilliant that was ever employed in the subjugation of our continent; but this expedition, although repeatedly reinforced, has scarcely been able to maintain its ground with honor in a single province; consumed as it has been by the dreadful phenomena of nature, and, above all, by a six years' war of the most sanguinary and exasperated character; while the provinces of Rio de la Plata have not only been able, during all that time, to preserve the precious treasure of their liberty, but to bestow it, without foreign aid, on their brethren of Chili, and to force the King's troops to retire towards Peru, which, having been reinforced by fresh detachments, had ventured to show themselves on our territory. It is under such circumstances, it is after having shown and proven the grounds and motives of its declaration, and the means it possesses to support it, that my Government has thought it conformable to the respect due to nations to make it known to them, and to solicit their acknowledgment of its sovereignty.

My Government, considering that of the United States as one of the first of whom it ought to solicit this acknowledgment, believed that the identity of political principles, the consideration of their inhabiting the same hemisphere, and the sympathy so natural to those who have experienced similar evils, would be so many additional reasons in support of its anxiety. There still exist, there still preside over the councils of the nation, many of those who supported and sealed here with their blood the rights of man; their wounds, permit me to say so, are so many powerful advocates here for the

Spanish Americans. The recollection that it was these States which first pointed out to us the path of glory, and the evidence that they are enjoying most fully the blessed effects of liberty, inspire me with the conviction that it is for them also to show that they know how to appreciate our efforts, and thereby animate the other provinces which, less fortunate, have not yet been able to put an end to the sanguinary struggle.

I cannot close this communication without requesting you to make known to the President the wishes of the United Provinces in South America; and, also, to represent to him their earnest desire to see firmly established, between these States and those Provinces, relations mutually beneficial, suited to Governments and people whose institutions are so analogous, and all whose interests invite them to promote and maintain a close and permanent friendship.

God preserve you many years.

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Manuel H. de Aguirre, Agent of the United Provinces of South America to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *December 26, 1817.*

SIR: I had the honor to inform you, on the 16th of this month, that the United Provinces of South America, having declared themselves free and independent, had made a request to be considered as such by these United States; and, as you expressed a desire, in the conference with which you honored me the day before yesterday, to be more fully informed of the grounds on which those provinces formed their request, I now comply with your desire.

In my said note I particularly stated the circumspection with which my Government had proceeded, and the precautions it had taken from a sense of its own honor, and the respect due to other nations, before it required to be considered by them as a sovereign Power. You were pleased to remark on the uncertainty of establishing a new Government, and the hesitation naturally produced by such a request; and you preferred that it should be delayed, or not made until all doubt was removed of the real existence and duration of their sovereignty, and they had given a pledge to foreign nations that there existed no intention to commit them by making this request.

For more than seven years have these provinces carried on, alone, an active and successful war. The evidences of their successes have been

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 181.

witnessed in the capture of the royal squadron, the occupation of Montevideo, the numerous prisoners of war who fertilize our fields, the chastisement of the King's forces in Peru, and the recovery of the provinces of Chili. Meanwhile, our interior organization has been progressively improving. Our people have made an essay in the science of government, and have appointed a congress of representatives, which is engaged in promoting the general weal. A plan of military defence has been formed, in which we were before deficient, and a system of revenue organized that has hitherto been competent to provide for our numerous wants; finally, public opinion is daily gaining ground, unsupported by which the Government would have been unable to undertake the enterprises which have distinguished it.

The strength of our oppressors diminishing with the increase of our means of defence, their hopes declining of longer tyrannizing over us, a regular system of government, the decision of our citizens, a competent revenue, an organized force sufficiently strong for the defence of the country, a squadron afloat, a disposable army in Chili, and a second operating in Peru—all this must surely undeceive our enemies, even if the habit of authority should still flatter them with hopes.

Notwithstanding the professions of neutrality, on the part of the United States, towards the contending parties in Spanish America; notwithstanding the indifference, if I may say so, with which the United States have looked on a country deluged with blood by its tyrants, I would not offend you, sir, by the idea that you consider it necessary that we should offer proofs of the justice of our cause. The few of our sufferings that have come to the knowledge of foreign nations have filled them with horror and indignation; never was the human race so debased elsewhere as we have been; never did men draw their swords in a more sacred cause. But the provinces of Rio de la Plata mean not to exite the sensibility of the United States. They only call upon their justice. The contest in South America can be viewed in no other light than as a civil war; and I have proven to you, sir, the prosperous and respectable attitude of those provinces. Are they, then, to be thought worthy of being ranked among nations? Do their full enjoyment of all the rights of sovereignty for more than seven years, their successes, and present position, give them a right to become one?

The apprehension that this acknowledgment might involve the United States in a war with the chief of the adverse party could not be justly considered by my Government as a sufficient motive to prevent their soliciting it; since, however little of justice or prudence may be found in the councils of the King of Spain, even that would suffice to prove that other nations have distinct and fixed rules whereby to estimate political successes; that, practically, they acknowledge no other sovereign power than that which is so *de facto;* that they can inquire no further without interfering with the internal concerns of other nations; and that, when a nation is divided into

two parties, or the bonds of the political compact between the monarch and the people happen to be otherwise broken, they both have equal rights, and owe the same obligations to neutral nations. It follows, therefore, that the contending parties in Spanish America are not subjected to different rules.

If these rules may sometimes be varied, or admit of any alteration, the exception should always be in favor of the oppressed against the oppressor. It is therefore strongly contended by many of the most celebrated civilians, "that in all revolutions produced by the tyranny of the prince, foreign nations have a right to assist an oppressed people;" a right dictated by justice and generosity. Now it cannot be supposed that the observance of justice ever gave a pretext for war to the party or nation most interested in a different conduct. Since, therefore, my Government has limited its pretensions to the acknowledgment of its real and effective sovereignty, which even our adversary himself would not call in question, it considers itself authorized to take this step, by the practice of nations, by public opinion, and the sanction of eternal justice.

In our late conference, you appeared to find an objection in the occupation of Montevideo by the Portuguese troops. But if credit is to be given to the correspondence between my Government and that of Brazil, the principal motive for this war is the ancient pretension of the King of Brazil to more extensive limits. It will probably be impossible for him to obtain them, as one of our most distinguished commanders, supported by the most ample resources, is now engaged in repelling them; and notwithstanding the double family ties which now connect that sovereign with the King of Spain, our national existence, so far from being seriously threatened by the war in that quarter, [La Banda Oriental,] is strengthened by it. You also remarked, that similar pretensions had been formed by other provinces of Spanish America now contending for their liberties. Would to Heaven that they all could now offer to this Government the same proofs of their effective sovereignty, and equal pledges of their respective preponderating power! Humanity would then have much fewer evils to deplore, and all America would exhibit a united people, only rivalling with each other in the art of improving their civil institutions, and extending the blessings and enjoyment of social order.

When I contemplate the distinguished part the United States may take in realizing this grand enterprise, and consider how much it is in their power to hasten this happy period, only by giving an example of national justice, in acknowledging the independence of those Governments who so gloriously and by so many sacrifices have known how to obtain it, my reason persuades me that the wishes of the United Provinces cannot fail to be speedily accomplished.

I have the honor [etc.].

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Manuel H. de Aguirre, Agent of the United Provinces of South America to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *December 29, 1817.*

SIR: It is painful to me to trespass on your attention with complaints; but I should be wanting both to the trust committed to me by my Government, and my duty to my country, if, after being informed of the purport and effect of the law passed on the 3d of March last, for the more effectual preservation of the neutral relations of the United States, I did not represent to you that its effects bear hard only on those who are struggling for the independence of Spanish America.

By the law and usages of nations, neutrals are forbidden, if I am not mistaken, to afford any active aid to any of the contending parties; to sanction any law granting or refusing privileges to one, which are not at the same time effectually granted or refused to the other; and, in fine, to change their commercial or other regulations, so as to improve the condition of the one, to the exclusion of the other.

If, on comparing the above-mentioned law with this doctrine, and observing that whether we look to the time of its enactment or the period of its duration, it could only be applicable to the contest now carrying on in South America, we cannot but be surprised that it tends so directly to injure those who are defending themselves against the most horrible tyranny; and not only prohibits the irregularities arising from the deficiency of measures to preserve a strict neutrality, but also prohibits or subjects to bonds, amounting to a prohibition, the exportation of arms and ammunition, or any other mercantile operation which may be considered as calculated to aid, or in any manner to co-operate in, any measure of hostility.

If you permit me, sir, to point out the effect of that law upon those provinces which, although engaged in the same cause with those of the Rio de la Plata, are, notwithstanding, under distinct Governments, I would observe that their state of defence is much inferior to that of the enemy; that some of them, perhaps, have not the means of increasing it, if the nearest neutral nation shuts their markets against them; and that the law which subjects them to the impossibility, or increases the difficulty, of augmenting their means of defence, has a direct tendency to promote their subjugation. The unequal effects of this law are still more evident, if we consider that, while it immediately deprives several of those provinces of the most essential supplies, it allows their enemies to draw supplies from hence, without which their troops could not move a step. It cannot be

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 182.

possible that, in refusing all manner of aid to those who are engaged in our bloody struggle, the United States should so far restrict their commerce as to prohibit the exportation of provisions.

I shall abstain from calling your attention to consequences still more injurious, resulting from such a precedent; but I cannot avoid observing that the fourth section of the law in question is evidently favorable to the King of Spain exclusively, if we attend to the time and circumstances when it passed.

I confidently rely, sir, on your laying before the President the subject of the present complaint, which nothing but the necessity of the case has compelled me to make; and also on your submitting to him, that, in our present struggle, we not only defend the rights of mankind and the best interests of civilized society, but that we are contending for the preservation of our families and for our existence.

God preserve you many years.

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Manuel H. de Aguirre, Agent of the United Provinces of South America to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *January 6, 1818.*

SIR: In the last interview with which you honored me a few days ago, you were pleased to state that the act of the acknowledgment of the independence of the United Provinces in South America ought to be reduced to a formal treaty between the two independent Governments, as was practised in the case of the treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and His Most Christian Majesty, in 1778.

Not considering myself, in truth, sufficiently authorized by my Government to treat with that of the United States, in special terms, I then had the honor to explain to you that my powers did not extend so far; but, keeping in view the spirit and object of my commission, (as appear by the credentials now in your possession,) namely, "to promote as far as may be the honor and consolidation of the cause in which these provinces are now engaged;" and, it appearing evident, on the other hand, to be the intention and desire of the said sovereign congress closely to connect themselves by direct relations of mutual friendship and commerce with these United States, I have not the least hesitation to assure you that I consider myself

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 182.

fully authorized by my Government to enter into a negotiation with that of the United States, on the general basis of a reciprocal amity and commerce.

I have the honor to renew [etc.].

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W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *January 10, 1818.*

SIR: On the 7th instant in the morning I was sent for by the Secretary of State, Mr. Tagle, the Messenger saying that he wished to see me immediately. I went, and he observed that the Supreme Director had thought proper to pass an order, that Mr. Halsey, the United States Consul, should leave this City in a short time, to go on board a vessel lying in the Roads. I observed that it was hoped no violence was to be offered him; he said no. I asked him particularly if the order had been already taken, he said yes. I told him I regretted it, as perhaps it had been better to have suspended his functions till the President had been informed of the matter. He said that the Government had a right to send a Consul out of a country. I replied there was no doubt of that if it had good reasons for so doing. He then communicated various Charges against Mr. Halsey, respecting his having some five or six months ago visited Genl. Artigas, an enemy of this place, and I think of his lately having been the medium through which seditious and inflammatory papers &c. had been received here from Baltimore, and of his meddling in the Privateering System &c. &c, for I really cannot relate the conversation minutely or with positive assurance that my relation is correct, as the Secretary speaks only Spanish, and tho' I confer with him always without an interpreter, I am very deficient in the language as yet. However I can understand him as well as he can me, so that in this respect we are on a par.

Conceiving that I could not with decorum interfere further in this business in this stage of it, and taking it for granted that I was sent for through motives of friendship and delicacy to the United States, that the proceeding might not be misunderstood, I passed on to other matters, and in a few minutes took my leave.

In the evening of the same day I received the enclosed order, in the case of Mr. Halsey, on which he had before sent for me and consulted me,

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, I.

as he denied having been guilty of any improper conduct I advised him to obey the order, protesting against it in a concise, firm and respectful manner, and holding this Government answerable for any losses he might suffer in consequence thereof, also to request his passports within the 24 hours. My own proceedings you will see in my two letters to the Secretary of State, of the 7th & 8th instant which were duly delivered to him.

On the 8th. Mr. Halsey, while waiting for his passports, I being at dinner with him, received a note from the Secretary to delay leaving the City and call on him at 8 O'clock next morning.

On the 9th Mr. Halsey waited on me at my rooms, and told me that the Secretary had informed him that the order against him was annulled, and the Secretary himself, on the same day intimated that there was no need of my communicating the order to the President, as the thing was at an end, and consequently it would not be necessary to answer my letters on the subject—however to avoid all misapprehensions on the affair, I have thought proper to communicate the facts as they occurred. I did not ask him why the order had been repealed, as it would appear in me too curious. Perhaps it was to avoid an unfriendly act towards the United States. As for myself, I still believe the order is only suspended, till they may get some positive facts against Mr. Halsey, but this is mere conjecture, which time alone will prove.

The part I took in Mr. Halsey's case, was intended to furnish a precedent in future, to show that I took high grounds for a functionary in such a predicament, whether the charges were ill or well founded against him, that his ease, convenience and respectability should be consulted, "limiting" himself voluntarily to a Quinta, which is the most pleasant kind of country residence here, on the Banks of the river Plata, in the suburbs of the City, on the Pampas or Plains, and generally adorned with groves of figs, Oranges, Olives, &c. &c.

I suppose that Mr. Halsey will write to the Secretary of State fully on this subject, and if this Government think proper they will communicate their charges against him. I am told the Portugueze speak in terms of great harshness against him, if so, Mr. Sumpter [Sumter] will no doubt be informed by them.

I must confess that such is the intermixture of our citizens in the War and affairs of these Provinces, that they often perplex me, when I am called upon to get them out of difficulties, as I often am; But in not one instance, wherein I have interfered with this Government have they declined prompt relief. They have therefore taken up the opinion that I have great influence with this Government, and I am applied to in cases, which do not strictly belong to my duties, and not to lose the favourable opinion they may have of me, I am obliged in this unprecedented state of things to move with great caution. But as I do not meddle with their party politics, and am not

engaged in commerce or any Speculations, and live very Simple and unexpensive, we have very little to say to one another, except on matters of General politics &c. or the duties I am charged with. But Mr. Halsey, as his fees of office are small, like most of our Consuls he mixes in commerce, and no doubt has jealousies &c. excited against him. On the whole I suppose the Government of the United States has, or will shortly have all the information respecting Mr. Halsey that they may wish.

I enclose No. 52 of the Ministerial Gazette of Buenos Ayres of the 3d instant, which will shew the proceedings in Chili against the United States private Vessels, the Ship Beaver of New York, and the Brig Canton of Salem, at Talcahuana, which is still held by the Royal Spanish Government. I have seen private letters on the same subject, much to the same purpose. So soon as I can possibly set off, I shall go for Chili, which I think will be in a week or ten days, but our citizens are often liable to be harassed here and my presence or that of some other officer of the United States in aid of the Consul is always necessary.

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Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America, to James Monroe, President of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

BUENOS AIRES, *January 14, 1818.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: As long as the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata considered the issue of the contest in which, in obedience to honour and justice, they had engaged with the Mother Country, as doubtful, they cautiously abstained from requiring of other Nations to compromit their interests by a formal acknowledgment of their Independence. This manly silence, uninterrupted either by actual reverses or the greatest difficulties and dangers, allowed sufficient time to other Nations to apprize them of their unavailing sacrifices, if, on consideration of their magnanimous resolution, they had deemed it rash or unjust;—but having left us to the exertion of our own efforts, awaiting as it were their result, the time appears at length to have arrived, which authorizes us to claim of the respectable powers of the civilized world a warmer interest in our sufferings and in those eventful scenes, which, contrary to every hope of success are renewed by Spanish vengeance throughout every part of the Continent of Columbia. The favourable impression naturally produced by our conduct in the latter years has had its effect on the public mind in Europe, and the case is perhaps

[1] MS. Notes from Argentine Legation, I.

not remote, of the disposition felt by a certain Nation to admit us to a rank with it, and thus secure to it the gratitude of a People whose friendship is not to be despised. We cannot easily persuade ourselves that the United States of North America are willing to renounce the glory of meriting above all others, our gratitude by their formal acknowledgment of our Independence, pointed out as they are by so many circumstances as the first to take this step with honour; if however, motives of interest or policy dictate the necessity of deferring this public testimony of the respect due to our virtues and of the dispositions relative to our future destiny, we shall pursue our illustrious career, without losing courage, or estimating any sacrifices too high as the price of our Liberty.

Such, Most Excellent Sir, are my sentiments and those of the worthy People over whom I have the honour to preside, which I entreat of you to submit to the consideration of the Congress, provided that step meet your approbation. I formerly transmitted to you the Manifest published by the Sovereign Congress of these Provinces on the declaration of their Independence of the Mother Country, the King of Spain his successors and of every other Power whatsoever; and I likewise accompanied it with several other copies to which I request you will be pleased to give the direction which may appear most suitable to you.

I avail myself of this occasion [etc.].

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W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *January 15, 1818.*

SIR: I did hope e're this, I should have been furnished, semi-officially at least, with replies to the enquiries enclosed in my letter of 30th Octr.[2] last to the Secretary of State here, as expressed in my letter to you of the 30th of November, by the Brig Viper. I called on the Secretary Since then to know if they would be answered, and he told me they would, also I was informed privately that they had been communicated to the Congress and would be answered. Yet I have been left to acquire that information elsewhere, which I think had better have come to me as requested. I could conjecture the reasons for this, but as conjectures are often unjust, perhaps it would be best to leave the mistery to unravel itself. As I am much inclined to believe that the policy of the United States, towards these

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, I.

[2] See above, pt. II, doc. 224.

countries, will be guided more by the parts taken by Other Powers in relation to these Colonies, and by the great outlines of their general character and proceedings, than by any minute Statistical details concerning them.

At present, this Side of the Andes is governed by the Portugueze who hold the Island of Goritta, near Maldonado on the North Side of the La Plata, and Monte Video higher up, and they have Blockaded Colonio del Sacramento, nearly opposite this place. Artigas who still retains a considerable popularity, a Solitary daring Chief, seated on a Bulls head under a figtree, gives laws to about 20,000 people, and still keeps possession of Maldonado, Colonio del Sacramento, and other places up to the Parana, and is a declared enemy to the Portugueze and Buenos Ayrean Governments. Some other chiefs rule in Paraguay, the territory called the Entre Rios, Santa fe &c. The Government of this place comes in for the remainder. I think it is from the powers of Europe and the United States, that they will receive their character, therefore the squabbles among themselves are of minor importance.

They want some powerful ally, and perhaps as they claim to be patriots put more stress upon that, than they ought. They often tell me the United States had France &c. in their revolutionary struggle, but they have no one to help them.

Chili is at present in a critical situation, General San Martin, is brave and politic, they say, and has taken the most energetic measures, and on him rests the loss of Chili, or the conquest of Peru.

My baggage has just gone for Chili, and I shall immediately follow, so that I shall most probably be witness to its most interesting struggles for its permanent liberty or Certain devastation. Such is the present state of things in this portion of the Globe, it is not becoming in me to say what part the United States should take, but if they do not watch well their interests, it is my opinion that a certain great Commercial Power of Europe will get a footing here too firm to be displaced, and our countrymen will lose all the glory and profit to be derived from this great contest.

This government requested me to forward by this vessel, some public dispatches, they say, of importance, to their agent Don Manuel Hermenegildo Aguirre, which will require his personal attendance at Washington. I did not ask what were their contents, but their messenger remarked they were of importance and hoped they would be received by our government favourably. I enclose the Provisional Constitution of the 3rd of December, also the Newspapers and other public papers which have appeared for the last month or two in this place. I have not heard from the Department of State Since their letter of the 25th April last.

With distinguished consideration [etc.].

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Manuel H. de Aguirre, Agent of the United Provinces of South America to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

WASHINGTON, *January 16, 1818.*

SIR: I had the honor, in my interview with you on the 13th of this month, to state to you the light in which the invasion of one of the United Provinces, by the troops of the King of Portugal, was viewed by my Government, thereby violating the neutrality which they had bound themselves to maintain conjointly with my Government. I likewise deemed it fit to inform you, that this act of invasion by a neutral nation, for the purpose of dismembering the integrity of the territory of Spanish America within its lawful limits, was considered by the councils of my Government as an act of hostility between the nations at variance, and that on this principle they had regulated their conduct towards the King of Portugal.

In the same conference, I had the satisfaction to represent to you that the trade and communication between the Provinces of Rio de la Plata and the United States had no other basis than a decree of the Government of those provinces, by which a free trade is granted to foreign nations, in consequence of the imperious circumstances of the mother country in the years 1808 and 1809, and by which that Government reserved the right of limiting its duration, on the termination of the urgency of the case.

In the note which I previously had the honor to address you, I considered it my duty to express the sincere and earnest desire of my Government to establish reciprocal and close relations of amity and commerce with the United States; and you will now permit me to request you, sir, that, in making the President acquainted with these loyal sentiments, you will also inform him that it is equally its desire to establish a solid and lasting friendship, in order that the consequent predilection may have its full effect on the communication and trade between both countries.

Our Lord preserve you many years.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 182.

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W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *January 21, 1818.*

SIR: I did not till this day receive the order of which, the enclosed,[2] is a copy from the Secretary of State Mr. Tagle, purporting to bear date on the 8th instant,—or I might not perhaps have been so particular in my letter of the 10th Inst. on the case of Mr. Halsey— It appears from this that the order of the 7th Inst—directing Mr. Halsey to embark, has been revoked and I suppose if this Government present no future complaints against him, this revocation should be taken, to amount to a complete amnesty of all the charges they may have had against him up to this date, but I do not know what representation this Government may have made on the subject—to the President, if they have made any—as my duty is merely to state facts—which I have done—

With distinguished consideration [etc.].

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Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America, to James Monroe, President of the United States[3]

[TRANSLATION]

BUENOS AIRES, *January 31, 1818.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: Swerving from the object of his mission, the Consul of your States in these Provinces, Mr. Thomas Alsey [Halsey], who bordered on the abuse of power did not hesitate to promote the insidious attempts of the malcontents and disturbers of the peace. An act of prudence taken by me far from restraining him, opened a freer field for his ideas. Even with the leader of the anarchists, Don Jose Artigas, he entered into contracts concerning privateering which must necessarily compromise the Provinces under my command with the other Nations. The Consul Alsey has so often repeated these acts contrary to the system of the Provinces that finally I found it necessary on the seventh of this month, to issue an order that within twenty-four hours he should go on board one of the vessels in these

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, I.

[2] Not printed in this collection. Its purport is stated in this dispatch. If genuine, the revocation must itself have been revoked, see below, pt. II, doc. 234. For his letter of the 10th, mentioned below, see above, pt. II, doc. 229.

[3] MS. Papers relative to the Revolted Spanish Provinces.

waters, and wind up his business and return to his country or to the port that might best suit his convenience out of this territory.

It is my duty not to disappoint the government of the peoples by exposing them to the calamities of disorder. This also prompted the measure. Regards entertained toward your Government had some influence in suspending the measure while properly cautioning the Consul. But since, accustomed to following his impulses, he will not be able to desist from these designs, the time may come when this Government shall adopt vigorous measures which might give offense to the public opinion between your States and these Provinces. An evil fraught with so telling consequences must be averted. It is to be hoped that your Excellency for the sake of the tranquillity of Provinces which are yearning for union with your States, will deign to retire Mr. Thomas Alsey from his office of Consul and order him to return to your country sending some one else in his place who would discharge the official duties without meddling in matters that have nothing to do with his office and without disturbing the order and tranquillity of our peoples. While I regret having to acquaint your Excellency with an occurrence that will cause displeasure, I avail myself of this opportunity to return to you my respects and offers of reciprocity.

May God guard your Excellency many years.

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Manuel H. de Aguirre, Agent of the United Provinces of South America to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

NEW YORK, *March 29, 1818.*

SIR: I have the honour to forward to you by this day's mail the enclosed despatches of my Government for the President of the United States, which I received by the Schooner Patriot, lately arrived at Baltimore from Buenos Ayres.

I am specially charged by my Government to promote as far as in me lies, the acknowledgment of its Independence by the U. States, and to express its sincere desire of establishing such relations of amity and good understanding as will have their full weight in the intercourse and commerce of the two countries. If however motives of policy dictate the necessity of deferring this public testimony of the respect due to our virtues and of the

[1] MS. Notes from Argentine Legation, I.

dispositions relative to our future destiny, we shall pursue our illustrious career, without losing courage or estimating any sacrifices too high as the price of our liberty. Such, Sir, are the sentiments of my Government and of the People whose persevering efforts and sacrifices in the cause of their Liberty and Independence, will, I am persuaded, entitle them to the consideration of a Nation established on the principles of wisdom, and to which you have the happiness and the glory to belong.

I have the honour [etc.].

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Manuel H. de Aguirre, Agent of the United Provinces of South America to the United States, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[TRANSLATION]

NEW YORK, *April 5, 1818.*

SIR: Persuaded as I am that deep impressions are produced by calumny on the minds of individuals and of Nations,—that its power is considered proportionate to the matured understanding and prudence of those by whom it is exercised,—that time, the discoverer of truth, rarely finds the happy moment of enlightening opinions to a desirable extent,—and, finally, that history abounds with examples of men who have deserved well of their Country, falling a sacrifice to popular vengeance under the shafts of the most odious calumny, I feel myself prompted by a just and honest desire to efface impressions which might fix themselves in the minds of my Fellow-Citizens and be so interpreted as to do injustice to the real sentiments I entertain in relation to our Union, Independence and Liberty, to request of you to rectify the following expression contained in the Report transmitted by The President to Congress on the 25. of March last, and which according to the Public Papers runs thus:

"He said, the Government of which he requested the acknowledgment was that of the Country which, before the Revolution, had been the Vice-Royalty of La Plata."

"It was then asked, whether that did not include Montevideo and the Territory occupied by the Portugueze: the Banda Oriental, understood to be under the Government of General Artigas, and several Provinces, still in the undisputed possession of the Spanish Government?"

"He said it did; but observed, that Artigas, though in hostility with the Government of Buenos Ayres, supported, however, the cause of Independence of Spain" instead of that of those Provinces.

[1] MS. Notes from Argentine Legation, I.

At the different interviews with which you favoured me, I had the honour to remark to you, that the difference in opinion of Artigas and his secession from the Union, gave him no right or authority to solicit separately, the Independence of his Province or of those which composed the Vice Royalty of La Plata; admitting that the Members of the Congress assembled at the City of Tucuman on the 9th of July 1816, represented the Majority and Plurality of those Provinces, and that the acknowledgment so solicited by General Artigas, was to be considered as tending rather to promote anarchy, than the good order and regularity with which the just cause of Liberty should pursue its course.—I cannot suppose, Sir, that you will refuse me the justice to admit my proposition: that in Civil Wars, there are interests common to all parties, and that History affords many instances of the Union of the most inveterate enemies when the National existence was threatened with imminent danger, and that the greater the pressure, the nearer was the approach to that Union among citizens combatting in the same cause and for the same interests, who by finally conducting them to so sacred an issue as that of Liberty and Independence, must receive the most glorious reward to which a virtuous citizen can aspire,—that of the Deliverer of his Country!

Under a thorough conviction that these are also your sentiments as well as those of every good citizen of the United States as it respects his Country, my sole object in recalling these principles is to claim that justice which you would seek for yourself if placed in a similar situation.

I have the honour [etc.].

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Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America, to James Monroe, President of the United States[1]

May (?), 1818.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: The Supreme Government of these provinces have long exerted their zealous efforts to establish the closest and most amicable relations with the United States of America, to which the most obvious interests seem mutually to invite them. This desirable object has hitherto been frustrated by the events of the times; but the moment appears at length to have arrived which presents to the people of these provinces the flattering prospect of seeing their ardent wishes accomplished. In consideration of these circumstances, and in conformity with the twenty-third of the articles agreed upon with citizen William G. D. Worthington, the agent of

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 418. This undated document was first presented to the President in May, 1818, but the day is not stated. See below, pt. II, doc. 246, De Forest to Adams, December 9, 1818, and above, pt. I, doc. 73, Adams to the President, January 28, 1819.

your Government in these provinces, I have nominated citizen David C. De Forest their consul general to the United States, with the powers specified in his commission and instructions respectively. I therefore request your excellency to grant him the attention and consideration which, in the like case, will be afforded to the public agents of your nation, thereby laying the foundation of those relations which will in future render the name of your excellency memorable in these regions.

I avail myself [etc.].

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Retrospective look at Buenos Aires—Statement of W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru[1]

SANTIAGO, CHILE, *July 1, 1818.*

By the last accounts which I have received The Portuguese have now nearly got possession of the whole Banda Oriental, on the Eastern side of the River Mildonada, Colonia del Sacramento a place the former residence of Artigas about 80 Leagues from Buenos Ayres, called Acoya de la China on the Uraguy—and it is said are in the possession of Purification the late residence of Artigas, He, it is thought is driven about, no one knows where, The Portuguese will no doubt next take the Island of Martin Garcia, near the mouth of Parana, at the head of the La plata, where it forks, and then with their fleet they can have complete controul over the whole commerce of the Rio de la Plata, I have no doubt but they intend this a permanent conquest— The King of Brazils—Portugal &c. thinks his South American Kingdom is and ought to be naturally bounded by the River Oronoka & the River Plate— If therefore he gets the Banda Oriental incorporated into his possessions, he will have in point of physical advantages one of the first annexations in the World—The Banda Oriental, The Territory of the Entre Rios (that is the country between the Rivers Parana & Uraguy.)

The Missionary settlements &c. &c.—all watered by the Rios, Negro, Parana, Uruguy &c. &c. is one of the finest countries under the Sun—What then is Buenos Ayres? A large city on the side of a great river, without a sufficiency of foreign or domestic commerce to support her, for the Pampers are an immense desert.—She draws all her Trade on that quarter from Mendoza San Juan Cordova, Tuceman & Upper Peru as far as it remains now under the Patriots—which consists of Brandies, Wines, dried fruits, hides, tallow, money & vicunia skins; to a considerable amount—but I have no data

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, I. This is number fifteen among some miscellaneous papers following, and apparently as enclosures with Worthington to Adams of July 4, 1818, which see below, pt. v, doc. 457.

wherein to state it with precision. She gets Zenba—Tobacco, & timber from Peraguy Thro' Santa Fe, The Population of the whole Province, including Juxuy, Salto, Chaxamus, San Isidro &c. &c does not exceed 95,000 inhabitants. It must be recollected I am not speaking of the whole Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, but simply of that solitary one—She must now use great exertions—I have no hesitation to believe she will—I think The tenure of the Portuguese is a temporary one, unless they are supported by powerful European Allies & understandings as to their new possessions. There is a great antipathy between them & the People they have lately annexed to them Genl. Lecor, has left Monte vidio, been enobled & gone to Rio de Janeiro. He is succeeded by Pinto, who is said to be less politic and a great enemy to strangers. I am still of opinion that Artigas will unexpectedly sally out, & cut them off. However this seems to be a mere conjecture. I will not at present Hazard a speculation on the Kingdom of Brazils.

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, ex-Consul of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Mr. John Graham (Buenos Aires), Special Commissioner of the United States to South America[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *August 21, 1818.*

SIR: I am sorry to have to inform you that on the night of the 13 Instant many persons were apprehended and thrown into prison, the alledged cause is an intention to seize on the person of the Supreme Director and to send him out of the country or to assassinate him; The principle persons are Don Manuel de Sarratea one of the heads of the Gov'mt in 1812, Don Miguel Irigoyen, one of the members of Gov'mt previous to Mr. Puyrridon's [Pueyrredón] coming into office, and Don Juan Pedro Aguirre a wealthy merchant; whatever proofs exist of this attempt to be rid of the Director has not yet come to the publick.

It is certain that great discontents prevail & little doubt remains that if M[r] Puyrridon does not soon resign his post some commotion will take place.

On his appointment by the Congress the individuals of the Town of Buenos Ayres shewed their opposition and wished at least that his residence

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I. In his letter of this date to the Department of State, probably the one to which he refers in the last paragraph of this, and in a supplementary more extended defense of his conduct, the fact appears that he had been dismissed because of a belief that he was financially interested in privateers cruising against Spanish commerce and that he had been the medium through which blank privateering commissions had been sent to prospective privateers. There is nothing on this letter of August 21 to indicate to whom it was addressed or delivered; but a letter of five days later, which follows immediately after this in the volume, is addressed to Mr. John Graham.

might be at Tucuman or any where else than Buenos Ayres, but the municipal Authorities behaved very well and influenced the town to receive the Director as he had been appointed by the Congress indeed this same M^{r} Irigoyen was one of the leading members of the Cavildo at the time who influenced the people to receive M^{r} Puyrridon and was afterwards appointed ad interim to the Supreme Gov'mt conjointly with Don Fran^{o}. Escalada— so that if M^{r} Mig^{l} Irigoyen is concerned in a plot against the Director, it would appear that he must have materially changed his opinion of the Director, or have thought him too dangerous to the welfare of the state to be permitted to remain longer in Office. It appears that the Director is daring, arbitrary and tramples down every thing that stands in the way of his avarice or his ambition.

Last year he doubled the duties of imports, & this year he reduced them and the first information given to the Congress of the measure was by sending His decree published in the Gazettes for their approbation, altho' the provisional Constitution provides that the power of laying taxes rests with the Congress; further the Director last year seized on the persons of Cor^{ls} Dorego, French and others and sent them to the United States and never to this day has His Excellency laid before the Congress any proofs or evidences of a Conspiracy to justify so violent a measure, altho' in reply to the Dispatch of the Director giving information of the arrest of those individuals, the Congress replied "That those individuals should not be sent beyond the Sea but placed in some secure situation (not to endanger the quiet of the Country) 'till a summary of their causes were formed and evidences of their guilt laid before the Congress"; nevertheless regardless of this they were shipped off to the United States, nor has (as I before observed) any summary of their causes been laid before the Congress These circumstances have been told me in confidence by a member of the Congress and are not generally known; these circumstances are mentioned to give you an idea how this Gov'mt is at present administered.

In pursuit of the war against General Artigas a party was formed at Corrientes (a considerable town on the left bank of the Parana River) by this Gov'mt in its favor and a Corps of 800 men collected and embodied these were attacked about 10 days since in the vicinity of that town by 500 men in the service of Artigas, part of whom were Indians, defeated and dispersed the Corps of 800 and it is apprehended that a severe example will be made of those of Corrientes who engaged in open hostility against their Gov'mt the particulars of this affair are not yet known to the Publick.

Artigas' struggle against the Portuguese is a very arduous and difficult one, cut off from his Sea Ports and hemmed in by an army of 12000 veteran troops assisted by a considerable navy, sufficient for all the purposes of such a contest, and deprived of all succour either of provisions or military stores, while there is a free export of them to the Portuguese added to this the open

Hostility of this Gov'mt; if with all these overwhelming difficulties he should be able to bear up against them, 'till some change takes place in the policy of this Gov'mt, the Banda Oriental may be saved, else it will form a part of the Kingdom of Brazil & from its advantageous Agricultural, Commercial and Military position, together with the means the Portuguese possess the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata will also be exposed to the same fate.

The aforegoing was a dispatch intended to be sent to the Sec^{y} of State, with a few alterations but having rec^{d}. a dispatch from the Department of State revoking my Commission of Consul, I have tho^{t}. more proper to send it to you, to make such use of it as you may think proper: by the next vessel I will send Copy of my letter to the department of State; I have great reason to complain of the severe conduct of the Gov^{t}. to me, without having given any instructions respecting the Policy of the Gov^{t}. & my consequent conduct, & by recalling my commission without giving me some previous notice.—I leave my interest with the Gov^{t}. to your care, persuaded you will do for me what to you may appear best.—It is my present intent to return to the U. S. by the Ontario from this place or Chili, which ever place she may sail from.

With great esteem [etc.].

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Thomas Lloyd Halsey, ex-Consul of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Mr. John Graham (Buenos Aires), Special Commissioner of the United States to South America[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *August 26, 1818.*

MY DEAR SIR: The conspiracy announced & under which pretext D^{n}. Man^{l}. Sarratea, Juan Pedro Aguirre, & Mig^{l}. Irigoyen, & others were imprisoned turns out to be, rather a conspiracy of the Director against those Gentlemen, their lives & liberty than of them against him;—indeed this was suspected by many from an early stage of the examinations, as also from letters of Puyrridon's found among the papers of the denunciation & also from his known intimacy with the individual.—

The Gentlemen charged were set at liberty yesterday, but the affair will not terminate there, the town is much agitated.—The denunciator now feigns madness, altho' physicians who have visited him declared to the contrary, it is a singular affair of which I will not at present pretend to animadvert.—Gen.[1] Artigas has established his head quarters on the Rio Negro, equidistant from a corps of his troops in front of the Portuguese on the Uruguay above Purification (from which place he has driven them) &

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

those near the Colonia.—But he is very short of everything necessary for Military operations, such as provisions, arms, powder & ball & money, how he keeps his men together & makes head against the Portuguese is extraordinary, nothing but his great genius & the love of the people to him could possibly effect it.—

With great esteem [etc.].

P.S. Will not the U. S. do something for this best & most disinterested patriot of these regions?

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Report of Theodorick Bland, Special Commissioner of the United States to South America, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States, on the condition of South America[1]

BUENOS AIRES

[EXTRACT]

BALTIMORE, *November 2, 1818.*

SIR: The fair prospects which seemed to be opening upon some portions of the people of South America; the lively sympathy for their cause felt by the citizens of the United States; and the deep interests of our country in the fate of those provinces where colonial rule or independent freedom seem to have been put at issue, and contested with all the energy which such a stake never fails to excite, justly attracted the most serious attention of the Government. In whatever disposition of mind the South American contest and its scenes were contemplated, whether with feelings of benevolence, and the best wishes, or with regret, and under a sense of injury, the first thought, that which appeared most naturally to arise in the mind of every one, was the want of information as to the actually existing state of things. A new people were evidently making every possible effort against their transatlantic masters, and preparing themselves to claim a recognition in the society of the nations of the earth. In this struggle, each contending party endeavoring to strike his antagonist beyond the immediate area of the conflict, our commercial rights had frequently received a blow, and our municipal regulations were sometimes violated. New and fertile regions, rich and extensive channels of commerce, were apparently about to be opened to the skill and enterprise of the people of the United States; as to all which, their feelings and their interests seemed to require to be gratified with further information.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 270. That portion only of Bland's report which relates to Argentina and adjacent regions is included in this part. The remainder, which relates to Chile, is included in pt. v,doc. 460, under this date, November 2, 1818.

Under these considerations, it became the earnest wish, and was deemed the right and the duty of our Government, to explain the views it had in some of its measures; by timely representations and remonstrances, to prevent the further injury which our commercial and other rights were likely to sustain, and to procure correct intelligence as to the existing state of affairs in those parts of our continent where the revolutionary movements had attracted the most attention and excited the strongest interest.

For this purpose, three persons, of whom I had the honor to be one, were selected, and sent in a public ship to South America; who being, among other things, directed that "if, while in the execution of their instructions at Buenos Ayres, they should find it expedient or useful, with reference to the public service, that one or more of them should proceed over land to Chili, they were authorized to act accordingly." They did, therefore, at Buenos Ayres, take into consideration the expediency and utility of going to Chili, and did there determine that, under the then existing circumstances, it would be expedient and useful for one or more of them to go to that country. In consequence of which, I crossed the Andes; and, having returned, it now becomes my duty to communicate a statement of such facts, circumstances, and documents, as I have been able to collect, and which presented themselves as most likely to be of importance, or in any manner useful to the nation.

When I contemplate the wide range of the expectations of the Government, as indicated by our instructions, and the vast extent of the subject, and, more especially, when I meditate on the novelty and complicated nature of the scene I am called on to portray, and the many circumstances peculiar to the state of society in South America, which cast a shade of obscurity over its affairs, and, in some instances, have absolutely, as yet, closed the avenues of information, I feel myself under the necessity of asking for the most liberal indulgence for the errors I may have fallen into, as well from the difficulties of the subject itself, as from my own want of ability to remove them.

We sailed in the United States frigate the Congress, from Hampton Roads, on the 4th of December, 1817, and touched, as directed, at Rio Janeiro, where we delivered the despatches committed to our charge to Mr. Sumter, the minister of the United States resident there. After a stay of a few days, we proceeded thence direct for the river Plata, which we ascended in the Congress as far as Montevideo. Mr. Graham and myself visited that city, and found it, with the country immediately around, to the extent of about three miles, in the actual possession of a Portuguese army under the command of General Lacor. We were treated by the general with politeness, and an offer was made by him of permission to procure there every facility we might want to convey us thence to Buenos Ayres; and also of leave to obtain for the ship every refreshment and accommodation she might

want. Finding that it would be impossible for the Congress to proceed much further up the river, owing to there not being a sufficient depth of water for her over a bar between Montevideo and Buenos Ayres, which traverses the river entirely, and on which it is only eighteen feet deep, we took passage thence in a small vessel, and landed at Buenos Ayres on the 28th day of February last.

After consulting and advising together as to the extent, object, and manner of executing our instructions, it seemed to us that no time should be lost in presenting ourselves to the Government or chief constituted authorities of the place, and in making known to them all those subjects which we were directed to present to their view. In arranging those points, it was deemed most proper, in the first place, to express the friendly and neutral disposition of our Government, and to place in a fair and amicable point of view those measures which it had been supposed were likely to be interesting, or materially to affect the feelings or the claims of the people of the river Plata; and then to present the injuries many of the citizens of the United States had sustained, and the infractions of their laws which had been committed by armed vessels assuming the name and character of patriots, belonging to the independent Governments of South America; and to seek the information which our Government had directed us to obtain, and which it had been deemed most advisable to procure from the public functionaries themselves as far as practicable.

Accordingly, after ascertaining the names and style of the principal personages in authority, we called on his honor El Señor Don Gregorio Tagle, the Secretary of State; and having made known to him who we were, and expressed our wish to have an interview with the Chief Magistrate of the country, a day and hour was appointed for the purpose; when we called, and were accordingly introduced by the Secretary of State to his excellency El Señor Don Juan Martin de Pueyrredon, the Supreme Director of the United Provinces of South America. After the interchange of some complimentary expressions of politeness, good wishes, and friendly dispositions, we made known to the Director, in general terms, the character of special agents, in which we had been sent by our Government to communicate with him, and that our communications might be either with himself or his secretary. The Director replied that they would be received in a spirit of brotherly friendship, and in that form and through either of those channels which we should deem most convenient.

In a short time after our introduction to the Director, and in about a week after our arrival, we waited on the Secretary of State, as being the most formal and respectful mode of making our communications to this new and provisional revolutionary Government. We stated to the Secretary that our Government had not viewed the struggle now pending between the provinces of South America and Spain merely as a rebellion of colonists, but

as a civil war, in which each party was entitled to equal rights and equal respect; that the United States had, therefore, assumed, and would preserve with the most impartial and the strictest good faith, a neutral position; and in the preservation of this neutrality, according to the established rules of the law of nations, no rights, privileges, or advantages would be granted by our Government to one of the contending parties, which would not, in like manner, be extended to the other. The Secretary expressed his approbation of this course; but, in an interview subsequent to the first, when the neutral position of the United States was again spoken of, he intimated a hope that the United States might be induced to depart from its rigid neutrality in favor of his Government; to which we replied, that as to what our Government might be induced to do, or what would be its future policy towards the patriots of South America, we could not, nor were we authorized to say any thing.

We stated to the Secretary that certain persons assuming the name, character, and authority of an independent Government in some part of the Mexican portion of South America, had, not long since, taken possession of Amelia island, where they had attempted, with the name of the patriot cause, to put on the garb, and exercise the rights incident to national independency; that this island, so seized, lay on the coast of the Atlantic, and immediately adjoining the boundary of the United States; that the persons by whom it was held, under the name of the patriot authority, had committed numerous violations and piratical depredations on the commerce of most nations found in that neighborhood, and more especially on that of the United States. They had not only lawlessly seized our vessels which were navigating those seas rightfully and in peace, but the immediate vicinity of the island to our territory had enabled them to commit other outrages on our rights, no less serious and injurious. It was used by a nest of smugglers to introduce their merchandise into the United States without paying the duties; it had become a harbor for runaway slaves from the neighborhood; and it had become a place of deposite for the most infamous of all traffic, the trade in cargoes of slaves, which were landed there, and thence illegally introduced into the adjoining states, in violation of the most positive prohibition, thus defrauding our revenue, depriving our citizens of their property, and disturbing our peace; that the cruisers, which so mischievously prowled the ocean from this island, not being at all scrupulous about consistency of character, had, as was found most convenient, assumed the flag of Buenos Ayres, or that of the other patriot Governments of South America: that, notwithstanding the notoriety of the daring violences committed by this band of adventurers of Amelia island, it appeared that Spain, too feeble, or otherwise too much occupied, had not extended its authority over it, and suppressed what could not but be considered as an expulsion and contempt of its jurisdiction. We further stated, on this subject, that a station in all

respects similar, and as pernicious, had been formed at a place called Galveston, situated near the mouth of Trinity river, and immediately on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico: that, under these circumstances, the United States had deemed it a right and a duty to break up, and entirely to remove those two establishments, as well to preserve their own interests and that of their citizens, as their peace with other nations; and that the Government of Buenos Ayres, we were sure, could not fail to see, in this measure, the highly honorable and amicable disposition of the United States towards all foreign nations, and more especially to perceive the happy effect which it would have on the patriot name and cause, by preventing it from being soiled with the imputation of acts which the really honorable patriot Governments did not deserve, and could not countenance. We stated, in addition, that our Government would take and hold possession of Amelia island, in order to prevent the misuse of it in future, subject to explanations to be given to Spain; and that Galveston would be taken possession of and held as a part of the territory of the United States.

To which the Secretary replied that the Government of Buenos Ayres had not before been informed or heard of the abuses committed by those who had taken possession of Amelia island and Galveston; that it had no connexion whatever with those who had exercised any authority at either of those places; and that the removal of those establishments could not fail to be attended with good consequences to the patriot cause, by preventing any improper imputations being cast on it; and, therefore, his Government could certainly only see in that measure of the United States the manifestation towards it of the most friendly disposition. We stated to the Secretary that it had been understood that many unprincipled and abandoned persons, who had obtained commissions as privateers from the independent patriot Government, had committed great depredations on our commerce, and had evidently got such commissions not so much from any regard to the cause of independence and freedom as with a view to plunder; and that we entertained a hope that there would be a due degree of circumspection exercised by that Government in granting commissions which, in their nature, were so open to abuse.

The Secretary replied that there had hitherto been no formal complaint made against any of the cruisers of Buenos Ayres; and, if any cause of complaint should exist, his Government would not hesitate to afford proper redress on a representation and proof of the injury; that the Government of Buenos Ayres had taken every possible precaution in its power in such cases; that it had established and promulgated a set of rules and regulations for the government of its private armed vessels, a copy of which should be furnished us; and that it had, in all cases, as far as practicable, enjoined and enforced a strict observance of those regulations and the law of nations.

We stated to the Secretary that a considerable portion of the people of the

United States had manifested a very favorable disposition towards the patriot cause in South America; and the Government, also, had every disposition to treat the patriot authorities with the justice, dignity, and favor which they merited; that, although our Government had, for the present, determined on adhering to a strict and impartial neutrality between the contending parties, it might yet deem it politic and just hereafter to adopt other measures; and, therefore, with a view to regulate its conduct and policy with perfect good faith and candor, as well with regard to its neutrality as with regard to any other measures it might deem advisable to take, it had charged us, as special agents, to seek and endeavor to obtain, in this country, such information as to the actual state of things as would enable it to act with correctness, precision, and understanding, in whatever course it may hereafter pursue. That the information thus to be obtained might be of a character deserving the highest confidence, we had been directed to ask it of those actually in authority, and of the then existing Government of the country. We observed that we did then, in pursuance of our instructions, ask of that Government to furnish us with a statement, or full information, as to the actually existing state of things; of what number of provinces that Government was composed; the form of its confederacy, and the constitution by which they were united; the population in each province; the principal commodities of commerce, the imports and exports; the amount of its revenue derived from foreign commerce as well as from internal taxation; the strength of its regular army, and the number of its militia; the amount of its tonnage, and the strength and number of its public and private vessels of war; and what were its relations with foreign nations, or with the adjoining provinces; or had the Government of Buenos Ayres formed any treaty or understanding with any foreign nation, or with any other of the provinces of South America who had actually declared themselves independent, or were then in a state of revolution and at war with Spain. We assured the Secretary that our Government sought for this information from an experience of the want of it, and in a spirit of the most perfect amity; that, until the commencement of the present revolutionary movements in that country, it had been so comparatively locked up from the eye, observation, and intercourse of every foreign nation, that the real state of things in it had been but very imperfectly, and, in some respects, was wholly unknown; that the friendship so openly and decidedly expressed by a considerable portion of the people of the United States would furnish conclusive proof of the spirit of goodwill in which this information was sought, and, in itself, was a guaranty that their Government would, under no circumstances, use the communications that might be made for improper or unfriendly purposes towards the people of that country. But if that Government should think proper to note any communications it should make as private and confidential, we pledged ourselves that our Government would never suffer it to go to the

public; if, indeed, there could be wanting any other more solemn and decided manifestation of respect, on its part, than the very act itself of our having been sent in a public ship of war to have this intercourse with them. The Secretary, in reply, said that his Government had the greatest confidence in the friendly dispositions of that of the United States, and that the people of the two countries were friends and brothers, felt as such, and would act towards each other as brothers; that the information sought for should certainly be granted, and that orders would be given to the proper public functionaries to collect, digest, and arrange it in the most acceptable and intelligible form; that, as regarded foreign nations, they had hitherto had no official communication with any of them; and that their relations with all, except Spain, were those of mere peace, such as were obvious to the world, without any treaty or stipulation of any kind whatever; that from some they had met with acts of injustice and hostility, but, finding themselves so much occupied with their revolutionary movements as to be unable to resist or resent, they had therefore borne with wrong, and suffered the mere relations of peace to continue.

We had several conversations with the Secretary, all of which were asked for by us, in the course of which the matters I have related were fully and in various forms reiterated and explained to him; and in all, from the first to the last, the request for information was repeated in terms of similar import, and at each interview the promise of its being soon and fully granted was renewed.

As the promised communication was not, however, made before I took leave of the Director and left Buenos Ayres, I shall proceed to present such information relative to the United Provinces of South America as I have been able to collect from those sources which were within my reach, and that appeared to deserve confidence; leaving my statements to be corrected by the official account which I understand has been furnished by the Government of Buenos Ayres, where they materially differ, or to be revised by any other standard you may think proper to apply.

The new Political Union, whose Government we found seated on the shores of the river Plata, which once styled itself "The United Provinces of the river Plata," and which now, having been actuated by caprice, or by more correct or more enlarged views, assumes the name of "The United Provinces of South America," has declared the independence, and claims the privilege of self-government for all the people, and the rights of a nation over all the territory of which the late Spanish viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres was composed in the beginning of the year 1810. It thus designates the boundaries of its territorial claims, and the extent of the jurisdiction it asserts. It will be proper, therefore, to trace out its extreme limits as the country relative to which our inquiries are to be more particularly directed.

The Spanish viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres is situated to the southward of

the Portuguese dominions of Brazil, and, according to the treaty of St. Ildefonso, of 1777, the following boundary between them was finally adjusted: Beginning on the coast of the Atlantic at a place called Invernada de Felix José, a little to the south of the Rio Grande de St. Pedro; thence, in a northerly direction, along mountains or highlands, to the Rio Iquacu, or Caluetiba, or Coreitiba; thence, down that river, to the Parana; thence, up that river, to the lower end of the Illia Grande de Salto; thence, in a westerly direction, to where the Rio Paraguay is intersected by the tropic of capricorn; thence, up that river, to the mouth of the Rio Latirequiqui, near the foot of the Cordillera de St. Fernando; where, taking leave of the dominions of Brazil, the boundary of the viceroyalty, excluding the Indian territory to the north, was further designated by a line directed; thence, nearly west, to the Sierras Altisimas; thence, along the confines of the province of Mizque and the Altos Intinuyo, including the province of La Paz, to the Cordilleras of the Andes which pass to the westward of Oruro and Paria, to the Cordillera Real; thence, south, along the most elevated summit of the principal Cordillera of the Andes, until it is intersected by the parallel of thirty-eight and a half degrees of south latitude; thence, due east, to the Atlantic; thence, with the coast of the ocean, to the beginning, at Invernada de Felix José.

To the south of latitude thirty-eight degrees and a half, and between the Andes and the Atlantic, as far as the straits of Magellan, is, at present, entirely in possession of the various tribes of Patagonian savages, over whom the colonial Government exercised no authority, nor asserted any claim, other than that of a right of pre-emption and of settlement in their territory against all foreign nations; to which rights and benefits the independent Government claims to have succeeded. That tract of country which now forms the three provinces of Mendoza, San Juan, and St. Louis, and which, under the Spanish Government, was called the province of Cuyo, was, about half a century ago, attached to the colonial viceroyalty of Chili; since that time it has continually belonged to Buenos Ayres. And the province of Arica, which covers that space to the westward of Potosi and Chicas from the summit of the Andes down to the Pacific Ocean, was, by a royal order, about the year 1774 taken from the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, and annexed to that of Lower Peru or Lima, and is at present under that jurisdiction.

The vast elevated plains, a great part of which are, in the rainy season, entirely overflowed, lying to the north of the Llanos de Manso and the Sierras Altisimas, that are traversed by the principal branches of the Rio Madeira, which winds its way along the back of Brazil into the Maranon, and that are also drained of their waters by some of the branches of the Paraguay, and which are comprehended under the three colonial divisions of the Chequitos, the Government of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and the province of the Moxos de Musu, like the great pampas to the southward

of the Rio de la Plata, seem to be destined to eternal vacancy, or to the rearing of innumerable herds, and to be inhabited only by their keepers. At present they are in the possession of several tribes of Indians, over whom, and their territory, the Government of the viceroyalty claimed no other right or jurisdiction than over the pampas of the south; which, however, the patriot Government in like manner asserts, has developed on it by the revolution.

To the westward of Paria and Oruro lie the provinces or jurisdictions of Carangas, Pacajes or Berenguela, and to the north of La Paz, and to the west of the Cordillera de Acama, lie the provinces or districts of Omasuyos, Chucuyto or Puno, Lampa, Asangaro, and some others; all of which are said by Ulloa to be within the audience of Charcas, the scene of the celebrated rebellion of Tupac Amaru; and which audience, according to Dean Funes, was given entire to the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres when it was erected, and it is so laid down. But I have excluded these provinces by the general outline I have drawn of the viceroyalty, because, not being able to learn that any revolutionary movements had been made in them, I wished to disencumber the subject of our survey as much as possible, as well by separating it from such districts as from Indian territory.

Such are, then, the outlines of this Union, or rather proposed Government, and asserted confederation, embracing an extent of territory much more prodigious than has ever been yet known to be comprehended under one and the same voluntary association. Excluding the great triangular space of Indian territory, of upwards of two hundred thousand square miles in extent, called the Llanos de Manso, lying between the province of Paraguay and the mountains, and excluding also the high plains to the north and the pampas to the south, we shall find a mixed and civilized population of one million and eighty thousand souls scattered over a space of about seven hundred and sixty-three thousand square miles, from one extremity of it to the other. The thirteen United States of North America, within the boundary designated by the treaty of 1783, comprehended a territory of about eight hundred and thirty-one thousand square miles. They erected almost all, and some of the best of their political institutions in the severest season of the revolutionary struggle, in "a time that tried men's souls." They vanquished their enemy, and accomplished the final establishment of their independence and freedom, with a population of about three millions, seated between the seashore and the mountains, on a tract of country of not more than two hundred and fifty thousand square miles; their population was composed almost exclusively of agriculturists, very thinly scattered, as was said of them, over an immense forest. The difficulties which the invader had to encounter, the ease with which his blows were parried or eluded, and the fortitude with which he was met, and the deadly skill with which he was struck, it has been often said, were owing to various

peculiar circumstances—to the nature of the country, its watercourses, forests, mountains, and fastnesses; to the habits, manners, and customs of the people, arising out of their political institutions, their situation, and their necessities. Each, no doubt, had some effect; and, in the natural order of events, tended to the same great end, the accomplishment of our independence and freedom.

A revolutionary struggle not materially dissimilar to that which so much excited the interest and feelings of the civilized world, as exhibited on the northern coasts of the Atlantic, is now making some of its most active efforts on the shores of La Plata, and within the extensive limits I have designated. The people of the United States, who sympathize warmly with this new contest, will take great interest in drawing out a comparison of difficult situations, and deducing inferences from trying circumstances analogous to those with which they or their fathers formerly contended; and, to enable their Government to act understandingly, and to bestow their friendship in a manner worthy of its dignity and value, it will be necessary to look over and examine this newly-asserted Union; to survey the locality of the several parts of which it is composed, and to estimate the numbers and powers of each; to measure the spaces between them, that we may form some opinion as to how and when they may be filled; to see how each has been, and how it is now governed; and to inspect the bonds which hold them together, and the repulsive principles which have driven some of them asunder. It will be proper that these things should be done, that we may understand how much it is to be attributed to nature, and how much to accident; how far the revolution has been promoted by the virtues and patriotic wishes of the people, and how much retarded by designing and ambitious military leaders; what is to be feared, and what to be hoped, from the future.

The viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, like all others of the Spanish possessions in America, was laid out into civil and ecclesiastical divisions, which grew up under peculiar circumstances, were from time to time altered, and often cast from the jurisdiction of one viceroy or governor under that of another, according to the increase or change of population, as convenience suggested, or to gratify the caprice or cupidity of the regal rulers. And, besides, the very nature of the colonial Government itself was but illy calculated to define and preserve, with any tolerable degree of distinctness, the territorial boundaries of the several audiences, provinces, bishoprics, jurisdictions, intendencies, presidios, and governments, into which the viceroyalty was divided. I have, therefore, put together all I have been able to collect from books and some intelligent persons; and, with what I saw, and by the help of the largest and best map extant of the country, corrected down to the year 1807, I shall describe and give the name of *province* to each of those cities or districts which appear to be politically distinct, by having been at any time so treated, or being now, or at any time heretofore,

separately represented in the body called the Sovereign Congress of the Union.

I propose first to direct your attention to the provinces successively, that we may note the geographical situation, extent, and population of them severally, and the relation which each one has, by representation or otherwise, with the confederacy—recollecting that the ratio of representation, fixed by the existing government or reglamento provisorio, is one representative for every fifteen thousand citizens.

The province of Buenos Ayres, situated in the southeastern corner of the Union, is bounded by the Rio de la Plata; by the ocean to the southward of that river; by the territory of the Patagonian Indians as far as about the sixty-first degree of west longitude; thence by a line north to the Aroyo del Medio; thence, by that watercourse, to the Paraguay; and thence, by that river, to the Rio de la Plata. This is by much the most populous of the provinces below the mountains. It contains, according to the last census, ninety-eight thousand one hundred and five souls, which is said to be exclusive of troops and transient persons; but, including those, it is said to amount to one hundred and five thousand persons of all descriptions. The army, quartered in Buenos Ayres, is said to amount to two thousand five hundred men; if so, then it follows that, exclusive of citizens and soldiers, this province contains a population of more than four thousand resident foreigners and others. According to the same census, there are within the same city and suburbs of Buenos Ayres forty-seven thousand one hundred and eighty-four souls, exclusive of troops and transient persons. The principal towns or villages are Ensenada, St. Isidro, and Las Conchas, on the river Plate, and Luxan in the plain. There are, besides these, some lesser groups of population, the rest of which is scattered over the plains of this pampa province, that may be estimated as containing fifty thousand square miles. In the city of Buenos Ayres is situated the strong fort, within which is the palace, where the former Vice-King dwelt, and which is now occupied as the residence of the Supreme Director. This city was formerly the capital and seat of the colonial Government, and therefore, and for that reason, asserts and maintains that it is of right, and ought now to be, the capital and seat of the independent Government; and the Government is now seated there accordingly. This province is represented in the existing Congress by seven representatives, which is its full quota according to its population.

The province called Montevideo under the royal Government, but which, since the revolution, has acquired the appellation and is most frequently designated by the name of the Banda Oriental, with relation to the river Uruguay, which forms its entire western boundary, and from its lying wholly to the eastward of it; this province lies immediately opposite to that of Buenos Ayres, and is situated in the northeastern extremity of the Union;

it is bounded by the ocean on the east, by the Rio de la Plata on the south, by the river Uruguay on the west, and by the Portuguese dominions of Brazil on the north. Its present population is said to amount to about forty-five thousand inhabitants, who have for their chief leader and Governor, General José Artigas. The city of San Felipe, or Montevideo, as it is more usually called, from an elevated hill or look-out place opposite to the point of land on which the city stands, contains at present, after the waste, devastation, and destruction of the English, Spaniards, and Portuguese in succession, a population of about ten thousand souls. Maldonado is another of its towns, situated on the Rio de la Plata, near the seacoast; it contains about two thousand inhabitants. The capital, or present seat of Government, is held at a place called Purification, formerly Capilla Nueva; it is a town which contains between three and four thousand inhabitants. This province, with some unsettled Indian territory, embraces about eighty-six thousand square miles. It has no representative in Congress, and refuses to be represented in that body under the present political system; and it is now at open war with Buenos Ayres.

The province of Santa Fé, within which may be included what was called, under the colonial Government, the jurisdiction of Corrientes, lies immediately adjoining and west of the Banda Oriental and Buenos Ayres. It extends in a narrow slip entirely across the Union, from the Patagonian territory on the south, to the dominions of Brazil on the north. It is sometimes called the Entre Rios, from the greater portion of it lying between the rivers Uruguay, Paraguay, and Parana. That part of the province which extends over the pampas south of the Paraguay is bounded on the west by a line drawn nearly south from that river, above the city of Santa Fé, passing the easternmost point of the Lagunas Salados de los Porongos, leaving the village of Frayle Muerto on the Rio Tercero to the west, unto the land of the Patagonians; thence east to the province of Buenos Ayres. This province of Santa Fé or Entre Rios, exclusive of the Guarana tribes of Indians dwelling above Corrientes, and the Charrnas, seated below the city of Santa Fé, contains a civilized population of about twenty-five thousand souls. The city of Santa Fé, its capital, which is pleasantly and conveniently situated on the right bank of the Paraguay, is said to contain a population of not much more than six thousand inhabitants; and the city of Corrientes, farther up the river, is about the same size. This long, narrow province comprehends, including the territory of its Indians, about one hundred and four thousand five hundred square miles. In the year 1814, and prior to that period, it had one representative in the Congress of the Union; it now has none, and is in alliance with the Banda Oriental, and at war with Buenos Ayres.

The province of Cordova is composed nearly of that which was formerly the colonial jurisdiction of Cordova. It is bounded by the territory of

Santa Fé and the Rio Salado on the east; by the Patagonian boundary over the pampas on the south; thence, on the west, by a line to the Sierra Comichigeles, and along that ridge to its northern extremity; thence in a northeast direction, including the town of Tamisqui, on the Rio Dulce; and thence across the Rio Salado. Its capital, the city of Cordova, is a neat town, delightfully situated on the Rio Primero, and contains about ten thousand inhabitants. The population of the whole province is estimated at seventy-five thousand souls; and it measures about one hundred and five thousand square miles in extent. It has, heretofore, gone astray from the Union; but it has been brought back into the fold of the confederation by the bayonets of Buenos Ayres. It is reckoned a godo or tory province. It has now only three representatives in the existing Congress, although its full quota is five; because, as it is said, it does not choose to defray the expense of a greater number.

The province of Punta San Luis has been carved out of the easterly portion of the royal province of Cuyo. It is bounded on the east by the territory of Cordova; on the south by the Patagonia pampas; on the west by the Rio Moyalac, Leuvu, and the Desaguedero to the Laguna Grande; thence, on the north, by a line drawn in an easterly direction to the confines of Cordova. This province contains a population of not much more than ten thousand souls. Its chief town, and seat of Government, is San Luis de la Punta, or the point of St. Lewis, from its being situated at the but-end of one of the ridges of the mountains of Cordova. The town contains about two thousand inhabitants, and is agreeably situated in a well-watered valley. From this place, the post road from Buenos Ayres to Mendoza passes over the Travesia, the most dreary region I ever saw, sixty miles in breadth, where there is not a single human habitation, nor one drop of fresh water to be had. The town of San Luis is made one of the principal places of confinement for the prisoners of war captured in Chili and on the frontiers of Peru. This province is the poorest, and has been always the most faithful to the Union. It contains about forty thousand square miles in extent. One representative is now and has always been received from it, although its population is below the given ratio. The present Supreme Director was its representative when he was elevated to the station he now holds.

To the westward of the province of San Luis, stretching along the great Cordillera which separates it from Chili, as far south as the Rio Blanco, lies the province of Mendoza. This province is another, and the largest of those which have been formed out of the colonial one of Cuyo. Its whole population is calculated at thirty-eight thousand inhabitants; of which, about twenty-one thousand are found in the capital and its suburbs, the town of Mendoza, which is very advantageously situated on one of the branches of the Tunuyan, immediately at the eastern foot of the Andes. Mendoza

has a beautiful public walk, and has been much improved of late years. The province has always been zealous and hearty in the cause of independence and liberty. It is of right entitled to two representatives; but it at present has only one member in the existing Congress. It contains, of plains and mountainous territory, about thirty-eight thousand square miles.

To the north of Mendoza, lying along the eastern foot of the Andes, and extending as far north as the ridge which separates the waters of the Rio Magana from those of the Rio Famatina, is that fine territory, bounded on the east by Cordova, formerly called the valley, now the province of San Juan. This includes the residue of what was formerly comprehended under the name of Cuyo. It embraces a tract of about thirty-six thousand square miles, and contains a population of thirty-four thousand souls; about nineteen thousand of which are seated in its capital, San Juan de la Frontera. The patriotic public spirit of San Juan has never been questioned; and yet it has no more than one representative in the present Congress, when, according to its population, it should have two.

Still further north is that pleasant valley now called the province Rioja, toward whose boundaries we are directed by the Rio Anqualasta, by which it is watered, and rendered fruitful, and which, after lifting its arms in various directions among the surrounding mountains that designate the confines of the province, terminates and subsides in a lake to the southward of Simbolan. Its whole surface may be estimated at twenty-two thousand four hundred square miles. The population of this province amounts to twenty thousand souls, and its capital town is Todos Santos de Rioja la Nueva. Rioja has been always attached to the Union. It has at present one representative in Congress, and is entitled to no more.

Turning immediately to the east, and adjoining, we find the delightful valley of Catamarca, which now, with that of Conando, next to it on the north, forms the province of Catamarca. The adjacent ridges form a great rampart all round these two valleys, and are the acknowledged and natural limits of the province. It contains a population of thirty-six thousand souls, and its chief city and seat of Government is Catamarca. Its extent of territory does not exceed eleven thousand two hundred square miles. Catamarca, beside other efforts in the cause, has manifested its sincere devotion to independence and freedom, by furnishing from itself alone nearly six thousand men to the patriot army. It has now, however, no more than one representative, although its population entitles it to two.

Directly to the east of the valley of Catamarca lies the province of Santiago, formerly the colonial jurisdiction of Santiago del Estero. It is bounded on the south by the territory of Cordova; on the north by a line running in a northeasterly direction from the head of the Hondo to the Laguna de Molaras, and by the Indian territory of the Great Llanos de Manso on the east. This province embraces a territory of forty thousand

square miles in extent, and has a population of forty-four thousand souls. Its chief city and seat of Government is Santiago del Estero, situated on the banks of the Rio Dulce, in which there are about ten or fifteen thousand inhabitants. Santiago has wavered in its attachment to the Union, but has never been wanting in bravely defending the cause. Its population rightly entitles it to three representatives in Congress; it has, however, at present only one.

Along the whole northern frontier of Santiago, and of the valley of Conando, lies the province of Tucuman, formerly the royal jurisdiction of St. Miguel de Tucuman. It is bounded on the east by the mountains of the Yuanes; on the north by a line extended from that ridge westerly to the confluence of the Tala and the Salado; thence to the source of the Tala; thence, along the ridges which include the valley of Palicipa, to the great Cordillera; thence, along the Andes, to the Rio de Betlen; thence to the confines of the valley of Conando. The population of this province amounts to forty-five thousand souls. Its chief city and seat of Government is San Miguel de Tucuman, situated on the Rio de San Miguel, which unites with the Rio Dulce not far below the city. The province comprehends about an extent of fifty thousand square miles of territory; it has been generally attached to the Union and the cause. It was once honored with the presence of the Congress, in which body it now has two representatives, although it is entitled to three.

Rising from the unbroken plains, and proceeding still farther to the northward, we next enter the province of Salta, lying in level spaces among the elevated spurs of the Andes. It is bounded on the east by the Rio Vermejo; on the north by the Rio Grande, to the confluence of the Aquilotes and Siancas; thence, to the source of the Rio Perico; thence, including the valley of Calchaqui, which forms its western boundary. This province contains fifty thousand inhabitants, and an extent of forty-one thousand square miles of territory. Its chief city is San Felipe el Real de Salta. Salta has been accused of wavering in its attachment to the Union and the cause, but it has been very much the seat of war. It is now said to be a firm member of the confederation, and it is made the headquarters of the patriot army of Peru, under General Belgrano. Although it ought to have three representatives, according to its population, it has now no more than one member in the Congress.

Ascending still in a northerly direction, we next enter the province of Jujuy, stretching along the whole northern frontier of Salta, and extending westward to the ridges in which are found the sources of the Rio de San Salvador; thence, with its summits as far north as the ridge which surrounds St. Bernardo, and along the mountains of Tacsora; thence descending by the eastern branch of the Rio Tarija, to the territory of Salta, embracing a mountainous tract of thirty thousand square miles. The population of

Jujuy amounts to twenty-five thousand inhabitants. Its chief city is San Salvador de Jujuy, situated on the Rio Grande de Jujuy or de Aquilotes. It has one member in the present Congress, which is its full quota of representation. The whole, or the greater part of this province is said to be at this time occupied by the enemy.

Turning to the west, and crossing the mountains, is found the province of Chicas, extending along the brow of the great Cordillera of the Andes, which separates it from the desert district of Atacama, and north of the province of Tucuman, as far as the source of the Pilcomayo; thence, descending that stream, and passing the ruins of ancient Tarija, and ascending the Rio Toxo until it intersects the Chica mountains, it forms what is called the province of Chicas, extending over a space of twenty-six thousand four hundred square miles, and which has a population of ten thousand souls. Its chief town is the city of Tupiza, distant one hundred and eighty miles from the city of Potosi; besides which, it contains the city of Catagayta, on the river of the same name, which pours itself into the St. Juan below the town and great pass of Suipaca, which, together, unite soon after with the Pilcomayo. This province sends one representative to Congress, to which it is entitled, and no more. It is, at present, under the royal Government.

To the north, and adjoining Chicas, lies the far-famed Potosi. The valleys of Porco, Paspayo, and Yamparaes compose the present province of Potosi; and the circumjacent ridges of mountains, which overlook those valleys, form its lofty barrier and boundary, which embraces an extent of territory not exceeding twelve thousand square miles. This province contains a population of one hundred and twelve thousand inhabitants, thirty thousand of which are seated in the city of Potosi itself; and the city of La Plata or Chuquisca is said to be no less populous. This province was attached but a short time to the Union. According to some accounts, there were four representatives in Congress, which assembled at Tucuman in the year 1816. Its population would entitle it to seven members, but, at this time, it is not represented in Congress at all; and has been, for some years past, entirely under the royal authority.

To the eastward of Potosi, and between the Rio Condorillo, which divides it from Cochabamba and the mountains or Altos de la Intinuyo, is the province of Mizque, which is composed of the valleys of Pomabamba, Tomina, and Mizque. It contains a population of fifteen thousand souls, and is nine thousand square miles in extent. Its chief city is Pomabamba. The population of this remote province exactly entitles it to one representative, which it has sent, although it is now subject to the colonial Government.

Directly to the west of Mizque, and north of Potosi, lie the valleys of Charcas or Chayanta and Oruro, extending to the principal elevation of the Andes, which compose the province of Charcas, that measures only five thousand square miles, and contains a population of one hundred and

twenty thousand inhabitants; thirty thousand of whom are found in the city of Charcas or Chayanta, which is its capital. This province is now, and has been for some time past, under the government of the mother country. But, like some others, as we have seen, from liberality, policy, or intrigue, it has placed or continued three members in the present Congress; and yet, to be fully represented, Charcas ought to have ten representatives.

To the north of Charcas lies the small but prodigiously fertile territory formerly called the valley, now the province of Cochabamba, at the head of the Rio Grande de la Plata or Guapahi, which pours its waters into the Great Maranon. This province contains a population of one hundred thousand souls, the capital of which is the city of Oropesa; and yet its extent does not exceed three thousand four hundred square miles. Cochabamba, according to its population, ought to have seven representatives. As being now, and having been for some time past, entirely under the royal Government, it ought not to be represented at all; yet, according to some notions, or views, or circumstances, which I do not understand, it has one member in the present Congress.

Crossing the ridge of mountains which bound Cochabamba on the north, we enter a delightful valley called Cicacica, watered by various small streams with which the Rio Beni, one of the limbs of the great Amazon, begins to form itself. This valley constitutes the province of La Paz, the most northerly and remote one of the Union. It is said to contain a population of about sixty thousand inhabitants, and may be estimated at an extent of ten thousand square miles. When represented it will be entitled to four representatives. It is now, however, entirely in possession of the colonial authorities, and has no member in Congress.

From the northern boundary of La Paz, leaving the lofty ridges called the Sierras Altisimas, which are almost entirely encircled by the Rio Grande de la Plata, and passing by Santa Cruz de la Sierra la Nueva or San Lorenzo el Real de la Frontera to the mouth of the Rio Latirequiqui, thence down the Rio Paraguay to the lowest extremity of the territory of the Abipones, a short distance above Santa Fé; thence, ascending again by the way of the Laguna de Molaras, and along the eastern boundary of the provinces whose limits have been just described, to the Altos de Intinuyo, will present a very extensive triangular space of country running in a southerly direction into the United Provinces of South America. This territory is altogether owned and occupied by various tribes of Indians. It is an extensive elevated plain called the Llanos de Manso, watered by various branches of the Paraguay passing through it; but it is very illy supplied with timber. The tribes of the Llanos de Manso, as well as many others to the northward, were formerly under the pious pupilage of the Jesuit missionaries; but their pastors having been withdrawn and expelled, they have lost all the genuine notions of civilization that were taught them, if, indeed, they really ever

learned any, and are now, in situation and habits, similar to our neighbors the Osages and Mandans of the river Missouri.

And, finally, after passing in an easterly direction over this great triangle of Indian territory, the province of Paraguay, in many respects the most interesting and important of the Union, presents itself. It is bounded by the rivers Paraguay and Parana, and the dominions of Brazil; and, with an extent of forty-three thousand two hundred square miles, it contains a population of about one hundred and ten thousand souls. Its capital is the ancient city of Assumpcion, situated on the left bank of the Paraguay. This province has never been attached to the Union. About the year 1810 the Government of Buenos Ayres sent an army into it, under the command of General Belgrano, for the purpose of forcing it into the confederacy. The Buenos Ayres forces were compelled to retire. Soon after, Paraguay declared itself independent, or some of the chiefs snatched the power from the hands of the colonial rulers, and declared war or a hostile non-intercourse against Buenos Ayres, which is the present state of the relations between them. And not long after, Paraguay assumed a similar stand with regard to the provinces of Santa Fé and the Banda Oriental. Paraguay, therefore, has never, at any time, had a representation in the Congress of the Union; but, according to its population, it would be entitled to send seven members.

This completes the survey I proposed to take of the several political divisions of this extensive Union, and of the local situation, the extent, the amount of population, and the relationship of each to the whole.

They having sprung from the same origin, and speaking the same language, having been bred up in the same religious creed, and been governed by the same laws, are of themselves strong foundations whereon to rest a political union. These circumstances operate very powerfully throughout Spanish America; they are among the leading causes which hold together a part of the provinces which I have described, and they produce a disposition in them all to unite; indeed, they seem, at times, to have excited the expression of a hope that all who speak the Castilian tongue, and worship according to the Catholic faith in America, might be formed into one grand confederacy. But the good sympathies arising from these circumstances will be displaced by the experience of profitable advantages; and the benevolence that is awakened by the sound of the mother tongue from the lips of the stranger, and his observance of the same forms of divine adoration, will be suppressed or banished by the dictates of self-interest, and a regard to those calls and necessities which local circumstances suggest or imperiously demand, and by those habits and customs which the peculiarities of the country insensibly inculcate and cherish. Therefore, to form an opinion of the nature and strength of those sympathies, interests, and circumstances, by which these provinces are now in part united or dissevered, attracted towards or repelled from each other, and also to render some of the traits in

the character of its population more intelligible, and to understand the nature of its commerce, it will be necessary that we should take a survey of this Union with reference to the physical character of the country, and observe what are the articles produced by its soil, or by the ingenuity and industry of its inhabitants, making no other reference to the provinces than as they may serve to assist in designating the extent of each of those districts which are naturally and characteristically different from the rest.

Supposing we were to draw a line, beginning on the river Paraguay, near the city of Santa Fé, which should sweep northwardly so as to include a portion of the province of Cordova; thence bending round below that ridge of the mountains of Cordova, near the foot of which stands the town or village of St. Augustine; and thence passing along a little below the eastern boundary of the province of the Punta San Luis, proceeding due south, we should very nearly designate the western limits of one of the most extensive and peculiar plains in the world, which stretches from the shores of the Rio de la Plata toward the southern extremity of our continent, between the line I have described and the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. This is the vast flat plain or pasture ground of Buenos Ayres, or, as it is most usually and correctly called, the *pampas*, which word, in the Quecha tongue of Peru, signifies properly a valley.

This pampa, which forms a part of the territory of Cordova and of Santa Fé, and all that of Buenos Ayres, if measured entire into the country of the Patagonian tribes, extends in length fifteen hundred miles, and in breadth in a direct line, following the southern boundary of the Union, five hundred miles from the ocean to its western confines. Over all this immense space there is not a tree, not a shrub, nor a single perennial plant to be seen, save only those few which here and there lift their heads near a herdsman's hut. There are no hills nor eminences, and the undulations are so gentle as only to be perceived by taking a long view over its surface; and then the eye passes round and round the horizon as over the face of the undulating ocean in a calm, where there is not a single object to delight, or to relieve, or to vary the scene. The keen blasts called the pamperos sweep over the houseless and unsheltered plain without the least obstruction; and the fierce rays of the sun are felt in all their unmitigated fervor. You are sometimes in sight of thousands of animals, but they are chiefly horned cattle and horses, and the deer, ostriches, wild dogs, and others, fly as you approach. For a while the pampas present the mind with an agreeable astonishment; but that soon subsides, and the eye may often be directed in vain in any way to obtain a single glimpse of society. Surrounded by a boundless, silent sameness, one sensibly feels the value of the voice and variegated scenes of nature. This interminable plain spreads out one of the most expanded and awful solitudes on earth.

I do not know that any chemical analysis has ever been made of the nature of the qualities of the soil of the pampas, nor can I say that the few experiments that have been tried to shade them with a lofty growth were made with botanical skill; but they have all hitherto failed. I can only relate what I saw, and what were recounted to me as the trials of husbandmen and others, who, actuated by a love of gain, or directed by fancy, were anxious to aggrandize themselves, or to decorate their possessions. It is now two hundred and thirty-eight years since the city of Buenos Ayres was founded, and in six miles out from the Plaza Mayor you take leave of all quintas, and gardens, and orchards, and enter upon the great naked plain. The post road from Buenos Ayres to Mendoza (along which I travelled) passes five hundred miles over these pampas. In all that distance I saw not a single stone, no gravel, nor any sand; the surface of the earth appeared to be entirely a soft, black, rich soil on the banks of some of the rivers, and in places a reddish clay appeared. The water in almost every well in the city of Buenos Ayres is brackish; that of the wells in the pampas is generally as bad, and in some places worse. The water of the river Plate is used for drinking where it can be had. Many of the rivers of the pampas are brackish, as their names indicate, and there are in these plains many salt lakes; those called the Laguna Brava, one hundred and twenty miles, the Laguna Palantalen, one hundred and forty miles, the Lagunas de Monte and del Oeste, two hundred miles, and the Salinas de Paraguyes, two hundred and sixty miles from Buenos Ayres, before the revolution, at one time employed constantly from three to four hundred carts in carrying salt from them to the city for the supply of the country, and they now furnish a considerable quantity. There is under the whole of these pampas from three to twelve feet, and in some places more; below the surface a stratum of earth of a foot or more in thickness, which appears to be a concreted clay, about as firm as a common brick. This concretion, as it projects along the water's edge of the Rio de la Plata at the city of Buenos Ayres, is called *tosco*, or rough earth. On the margins and beds of most of the watercourses this stratum of tosco is visible; and the Rio Arecefe, or the river of the paved bottom, rolls entirely over it for a great distance. Near the banks of the La Plata, the Paraguay, and their branches, there are a few large trees and some shrubbery; but most of the lesser streams creep through the plains as in crooked ditches, without their courses being perceived at any distance, either by trees, shrubs, cliffs, or valleys.

The pampas are exceedingly productive in grass, and a great proportion of them are beset with a species of thistle, which grows from two to seven feet high, and is not unlike our garden artichoke. The only tree that seems to flourish everywhere, as a natural free citizen, is the embudo, or the perennial poke; its trunk, however, is a mere watery pulp, and the growth is utterly useless for every thing but shade. The peach grows well; but, in

our country, it flourishes best on the seacoast and on the borders of the salt marshes. The olive and the fig also thrive; but they are natives of the dry and saline deserts of Arabia. Except these, there are no trees which appear to indicate that nature made them welcome where they were. There is no tradition that, in all this immense extent of territory, called the pampas, one single stick of good timber has been ever found growing at the distance of one mile from the rivers. If I might be indulged in adding a conjecture to the facts I have related, I would say that it seemed to me that this great plain had been gently lifted just above the level of the ocean, and left with a surface so unbroken and flat as not yet to have been sufficiently purified of its salt and acrid matter, either by filtration or washing, as to admit of the growth of any thing more than mere grass and herbage, out of the upper stratum by which it is covered. The pampas are sometimes afflicted with the most wasteful droughts, when vegetation is parched up, the ponds and streams are dried, and the numerous herds of cattle either die of thirst, or wander away towards the rivers in pursuit of water, and are wholly lost.

The soil of the pampas produces good wheat, barley, and Indian corn; but the crops frequently fail. The grain of the wheat has the appearance of a very inferior quality; but it makes excellent flour, and is said to be much superior to that of Chili, which looks so much better on comparison. Chacaras, or grain farms, have neither been extended nor multiplied since the revolution; and I question whether agriculture be likely soon to increase in this country; while, on the one hand, it has to overcome the difficulties incident to the want of timber, and the peculiarities of the soil, and, on the other, to resist the temptations to pasturage, to which the country invites so strongly, and to which it is so eminently suited. The staple commodities of this great district of pasture ground are derived chiefly from its innumerable herds of cattle. It might furnish any quantity of salted beef; but the present Government has thought proper to prohibit the putting it up. Therefore, the only articles which it now furnishes are hides, tallow, horns, wool and hair, viscacha, sheep and wild dog skins. In some years it produces a surplus of wheat; and it has furnished, and still supplies, some salt from its lakes. There are, also, some furs and swan skins, and feathers brought from the Patagonian territory. The ostrich of the pampas, with the size and speed, and much of the manners and habits of that of Africa, has not a single feather of his soft waving elegance of plumage. The pampa bird is clad in a very coarse gray garb, which, when plundered from him, except what is suited for bedding, is neither ornamental nor useful. Buenos Ayres is the principal city of this district; and as it is the seat of Government, the public manufactory of arms has been erected there. The productions of its industry are playing cards, beer, spirits distilled from barley and fruit, cleaned hair and wool, hats, boots and shoes, tinware, Windsor chairs, cabinet manufacture, olive oil, candles, soap, shipbread, and some few

others. In the country, the people manufacture some hats, boots, shoes, and coarse woollen cloths.

Taking in the whole of the Banda Oriental, that which may be properly called the Entre Rios; all the residue of Cordova, below the mountains; all of Santiago del Estero; and so much of Tucuman and Salta as is not extended over the mountains, and we shall describe another vast district of the pasture lands and plains of this Union, the uses of which have been hitherto similar to those of the pampas; but the nature and capacities of which are very different, and the destinies of which may finally, perhaps soon, receive another direction.

The soil of the Banda Oriental is uncommonly productive, and well adapted to all kinds of grain, of which it can easily be made to yield a most liberal return. Its surface is very waving, and everywhere abundantly irrigated with never-failing springs and streams of the purest water. There are some great spaces destitute of timber, particularly along the coast of the river La Plata, towards the Portuguese settlement of Rio Grande de San Pedro. Groves of fine timber, more than sufficient for all its necessary probable wants, are, however, scattered over its whole extent, and its more northern extremity is, for the most part, an entire forest. There has no quality yet been discovered in its generous soil, which indicates the least unkindness to any species of vegetable growth. There are no bogs, swamps, or lakes to be found in any part of it; and its climate throughout is remarkably salubrious. In short, buxom nature frolics over this beautiful scene, and with an open hand bestows everywhere health, variety, gaiety, and fecundity. The Banda Oriental has, however, hitherto been applied to no other purpose than pasturage, and the rearing of cattle, mules, and horses.

The country properly called the Entre Rios is, in most particulars, similar to the Banda Oriental; it is very fertile, and is furnished with an abundance of timber. There are, however, some extensive plashes in it, such as the baxada or low grounds opposite Rosario, which are dry in summer, and, in the wet seasons, covered with water; the soil, in such places, shoots up a species of reed, or large coarse straw; hence they are distinguished by the Spanish name pajanal. It was in one of those pajanals, then dry, near Santa Fé, in which the Buenos Ayres troops suffered so severe a defeat in April last. Almost the whole of the Entre Rios, like the Banda Oriental, has hitherto been employed only as a pasture ground; and, for that purpose, its fertile rincons, or forks of rivers, have been considered as the most valuable estancias, or pasture farms, in the country.

The residue of the territory of Cordova, not embraced as pampa or mountain; all that of Santiago del Estero, with so much of Tucuman and Salta as lays below the mountains, is, in general, an elevated, dry, sandy plain, destitute of timber, except near the watercourses. The Rio Dulce occasionally overflows its banks, and fills large ponds near it, leaving them

stagnant, and making the neighborhood very unhealthy. Hence the addition of Estero to the name of the city of Santiago; for, when the Rio Dulce pours its waters over its banks, forming a great lake in its vicinity, it is then, unfortunately during a sickly season, truly called Santiago of the Lake. This vast plain, as well as that of the pampas, seems destined to eternal pasturage; hitherto, it has been applied to no other purpose. Being at a little distance from the rivers, higher, drier, and more copiously supplied with pure water than the pampas, it is, therefore, better adapted to the rearing of horses, mules, and sheep, of which there are great herds and flocks on those plains.

The principal internal commerce from Cordova and this district, prior to the revolution, was its trade in mules, sent over to Lower Peru and Lima. This traffic, although at present wholly cut off by the war, deserves notice as illustrating the actual state of the country, and the nature of its productions. At two and a half years old the mules were purchased of the breeders, in the Banda Oriental, Entre Rios, and round about, and gathered in herds near Cordova, where they were wintered, and remained about six months. Thence they were taken up to Salta, where they spent a second winter; in which time they obtained their full growth, and were put in good order for the prodigious journey they had before them. Thus, somewhat gentled, seasoned, and prepared, they were presented for sale in the great mule fair at Salta, which opened in the month of March, where they were sold at from ten to fifteen dollars a head. The drover having purchased as many as, assisted by his peons or hirelings, he could manage, which was, on an average, two or three thousand, he set out on his journey towards Lima; which, taking into account the circuits he would be obliged to make to find pasturage for the drove, may be safely computed at not less than two thousand miles, and a great part of the way over the crags and defiles of the most rugged and lofty portions of the Cordilleras, among which many of his mules commonly strayed off, and were wholly lost. To reach Lima with two-thirds of the numbers with which the journey was commenced from Salta, was reckoned a successful voyage. Mules which cost in Salta fifteen dollars, were sold in Lima for twenty-five or thirty dollars. One year with another, there were, in this manner, travelled over, from Salta to Peru, from fifty to seventy thousand mules. All the labor and transportation by beasts of burden in Peru has been, until lately, performed entirely by mules; and they seem to be the only animals which can be trusted along its precipices, and can labor under its burning sun, or that are well suited to the climate and country. This mule trade has now been so long cut off, that the stock of these useful animals in Peru is nearly exhausted, and the conveniencies and the productions of the country are materially affected by it. The price of a good mule now in Peru is more than three or four times what it was in the years before the revolution.

The productions of this extensive district of dry plains and wooded pasture, which I have just described, are chiefly similar to those of the pampas; they are hides, horns, tallow, hair, wool, sheep and wild dog skins, and some peltry, Indian corn, wheat, barley, and rice, fine potatoes, oranges, figs, grapes, and thence wine, brandy, and raisins, tobacco, timber, and lime. The articles which the ingenuity and industry of the people of this district produce for home consumption or domestic exchanges, are hats, tanned leather, coarse cotton and woollen cloths, candlewick, and ponchos or cloak of the country.

To the southward of the mountains of Cordova, and to the westward of the pampas, including the whole of the province of the Punta San Luis, and the eastern part of the province of Mendoza, is another district of mere pasturage. It is a high, dry, broken plain, and perhaps the most barren and unproductive of any in the Union. A great part of it is covered with several kinds of thorny shrubbery, interspersed with which there are some small timber trees. This district produces hides, tallow, horns, some grain, wine, brandy, and dried fruit.

By including a considerable extent of the Entre Rios round Corrientes, and the whole of the province of Paraguay, we shall designate a district which by many is considered as the fairest portion of this great Union, and equal, in its various excellencies, to any tract of similar extent in all our continent. Its climate is delightful, possessing all the advantages of that of the torrid zone, without being visited by the fierce rays of its sun, or being enveloped in its pernicious vapors. The face of the country is not mountainous, nor anywhere flat; it is well supplied by a great variety of streams of pure water; its soil is everywhere found to be exceedingly fertile and productive, and a rich and variegated forest originally overshadowed the whole, and now covers a great part. This forest produces mahogany, and several other kinds of beautiful wood suited to cabinet work, and furnishes, besides, an abundance and variety of timber excellently adapted to domestic and naval architecture. This may be regarded as more particularly and especially the agricultural district of the Union. The state of husbandry in Paraguay is said, however, to be, like that of the other provinces, in a very low and unimproved condition, and conducted in the most rude and unskilful manner. The productions of the country are as various as they might be abundant. The sugar cane grows well, but little sugar is made; its juice is chiefly manufactured into spirits. This district produces Indian corn, wheat, and barley, but exports little or none. All the European fruit trees flourish and produce well; the orange, fig, olive, and vine grow luxuriantly. It produces cotton, flax, hemp, and tobacco, hides, tallow, lion skins, tiger skins, and some peltry. Its inhabitants manufacture hats, shoes, and several kinds of coarse cotton and woollen cloths for home consumption chiefly, and they make, for the markets of the other provinces, tobacco, cigars, and matte.

Within this district grows that singular vegetable, so much in demand and use over all South America, called matte, or the yerba of Paraguay. It is a perennial plant, rather a tree than a shrub, and, when full grown, is about the size of a common apple tree. Every spring, when the tree puts forth, as it does very luxuriantly, its succulent boughs, to about the length of two or three inches, and, when the leaves are about half formed, the young shoots, are cut, gathered, and carefully dried; and, when perfectly cured, are put up in sacks, made of raw hide, of about one or two hundred pounds weight, and sent abroad over all the adjoining provinces. The young shoots and leaves of the matte, it would seem, have received the name of *yerba*, rather from the soft and *herbaceous* state in which they are gathered, than from the character of the plant. The yerba is used in decoction, like the tea of China; but, instead of making it, like that, in a pot, and serving it out in cups, it is made in a little vase, and sucked up through a small tube of about a foot in length, called a bombilla, or little pump, at which each one draws. The matte is used by all ranks and classes, and is one of those luxuries which has grown into as inveterate and necessary a habit as the use of the tea of China in the United States.

Embracing all the residue of the Union under one view, we find an extensive mountainous district, stretching along below the eastern brow of the Andes, from Mendoza to La Paz, and spreading out over the whole of the province of Jujuy, as low down as the confines of the Llanos de Manso. On all those within this district I shall bestow the epithet of the *High Provinces*, as lying entirely among the broken and rugged elevations of the Cordilleras of the Andes; some of them, from Jujuy north and west, have been rather vaguely designated heretofore by the name of Peru-Alto, from their having formed a part of the empire of the Incas, whose seat was at Cuzco, three hundred and seventy miles to the north of La Paz. Throughout the whole of the high provinces, almost every one of the Spanish settlements seems to have been originally attracted to its present seat by an expectation of the wealth to be derived by the extracting of the precious metals from some mine in its vicinity. Each town and valley, from that of Uspillata, near Mendoza, to those of Chicas, Potosi, and La Paz, has had, or now has, some productive mine in its neighborhood. Population has gathered about these subterranean masses of wealth, and agriculture was made necessary for the support of those who came to dig, or to profit by digging for silver and gold. Recourse was had to the neighboring valleys, and the cultivation of their generous soil has, in many respects, been found more profitable, and exposed to fewer disappointments than mining. Hence, this great district, first seated as a mining country, has now become rather more of an agricultural one. The mines of Uspillata and Famatina have ceased to enchant, or to be as productive as formerly; and the watered and cultivated fields and vineyards of Mendoza, San Juan, Rioja, Cata-

marca, and many other valleys, have brought such a pleasing and a comfortable wealth to their owners, that they are, in many respects, perfectly cured of their fanatic love of Plata, and have become as indifferent about searching after it as their predecessors the original natives.

I directed my inquiries in various ways, for the purpose of ascertaining, with some degree of certainty, what had been, or now was, the total amount of the precious metals extracted from the high provinces of the Union, but found it impossible to obtain any data whence a tolerably fair estimate of their fecundity could be made. Before the revolution the productions of the mines of Peru-Alto were, in part, sent to Lima, in part to the ports of Cobija and Arica, on the Pacific; but the greater part was exported from the city of Buenos Ayres, whence between two and three millions of dollars were sent to Europe annually; but then a very great proportion of that amount was derived from Chili. Again: the amount sent to Spain from Chili, every year, was about two or three millions of dollars; but then the whole of that amount, together with what was sent over the Andes, cannot be set down as its own production either, because a great portion of it was obtained from Lima, Arica, and Cobija, in payment for its wheat; so that if we are to ascertain the amount of the exports of each of the three viceroyalties of Peru, Chili, and Buenos Ayres, it would be difficult to say how much was properly its own production, because of their having been so intermingled. Since the revolution the mines of the high provinces have been very much neglected, owing to the country's having been in so distracted a state, and so much the seat of war. It is said that, within the last year, Buenos Ayres has exported about two millions of dollars; if so, a very small amount has been obtained from the high provinces, because much the greater production, or nearly all of that amount of its metallic exports, has been, in various ways, drawn from Chili.

In addition to the precious metals, the high provinces produce copper, tin, lead, and iron; hides, tallow, wool, wheat, corn, and barley, rice and cotton, of which last article Catamarca is uncommonly productive. They produce, also, wine, brandy, and abundance of dried fruit. It will be proper to observe, however, that this district extends over a part of that singular region of America where, owing to the elevation and range of the Andes, or to some other causes, the vapors that are lifted into the sky are not permitted to fall on it in rain during the summer months; and, consequently, as it does not rain for many months together, the valleys, to be made arable, must be irrigated from some neighboring stream of water. Beside the productions of the mines and the valleys of this district, there is drawn from the heights and obscure retreats of the mountains a considerable quantity of peltry, of which gunaca, vecuna, and chinchilla skins are the chief. The gunaca wool is equal to the merino, and the wool or fur of the vecuna seems not only to be capable of being manufactured into the finest cloth, but hats made of it

rival, in lightness and fineness of texture, those made of beaver. The inhabitants of this district of the high provinces manufacture hats, shoes, tanned leather, and several kinds of cotton and woollen cloths, and ponchos. And, in many respects, the native Indian mode of manufacturing, as well as the form of the fabric, has been retained.

The various routes, and the facilities by which internal exchanges are effected, and the points at which they draw together and meet the commerce of foreign nations, with much truth may be considered as the cords by which a nation or a union is bound together; along which, as by so many nerves, each province is made sensible that it belongs to one whole, and every limb is made to brace itself in the common cause of all. Therefore, to complete the concise review which I propose to present to you of this Union, its several parts, and its productions, I shall exhibit some of its principal paths and channels of commerce, and the manner and the places at which its productions are collected for barter among themselves, or gathered together to meet the exchanges of our citizens and those of other nations. These details may, perhaps, appear to be unnecessarily tedious, but I know not how to compress them; and, besides, statistical information consists in mere matters of calculation and interest, in which we look rather to the value and the utility of the knowledge, than to the beauty of the scene which it is in the power of the narrator to depict.

I have endeavored to lay before you a fair representation of the peculiarities of the country; and, as may readily be supposed, some of the peculiarities and the facilities of internal transportation grow out of, or are the natural suggestions of those of the country. The pampas are, in rainy seasons, very wet, and in places there are great pantanas, or spaces of soft mud; for want of stone, or gravel, or wood, the roads cannot be rendered firm for carriages. There are few places of refreshment or repair, and the distance over them is prodigious. The carriage of burden is, therefore, accommodated to these circumstances. The Tucuman and Mendoza carts, at a little distance, look like thatched cabins slowly moving over the plain. The whole machine is destitute of a nail or a bit of iron; its great coarse wheels are not less than eight feet in diameter; six oxen, in general noble, strong animals, move it. The two front pair have a great length of cord by which they draw; and the load of the cart, which, on an average, is not less than four thousand weight, is pretty nearly balanced on the axletree; the body of the cart is either covered with raw hide or thatch made of reeds or straw; and, with a collection of brushwood as fuel, tied on the top, and brought from the westward of the pampas, these carts are seen crossing the plains in caravans of from thirty to forty together. On the journey the oxen are unyoked occasionally through the day, and at night, and permitted to seek their food round about. Thus, without any other provision than what is necessary for himself, the carrier pursues his way over

a waste of thirty days or six weeks' passage. There are in Buenos Ayres and Mendoza a number of owners of these carts; and the several common carriers of Tucuman keep about two hundred of them constantly employed in the trade of that city. From Buenos Ayres to Mendoza the distance is nine hundred miles, and the fare is from one hundred and forty to two hundred dollars the cart load downwards; but, to the westward, the fare is only about forty dollars the load. The route is performed in about thirty days. From Buenos Ayres to Cordova the distance is four hundred and fifty miles, the fare, per cart load, is twenty-five dollars, and the journey is performed in about sixteen or eighteen days. It is nine hundred miles from Buenos Ayres to Tucuman, and the fare, per load, according to seasons, is about one hundred and fifty dollars. From Buenos Ayres to Jujuy, the distance is twelve hundred miles, and it is the utmost extent to which the roads are practicable for wheel carriages; the fare is not less than two hundred dollars the cart load.

Mules are used for transportation in every direction over land, as well where carts can, as where they cannot travel. But they are most commonly employed to traverse the mountains, and to bring down to Buenos Ayres the productions of the high provinces. San Juan is only one hundred and eighty miles to the north of Mendoza; and along the valley parallel to the Andes there is a good cart road from one to the other; but the direct road from San Juan to Buenos Ayres is no more than nine hundred miles, but it is only practicable for mules. In general, in the high provinces, there are no roads which are at all passable for carriages. A mule load, according to the custom of the country, is four hundred pounds weight, for which the fare between San Juan and Buenos Ayres is ten dollars, and the route is usually performed in thirty days. From Buenos Ayres to Cordova the fare is seven dollars, and so in proportion further, or in other directions. From Jujuy, whence the transportation can only be effected, in any westwardly or northwardly direction, on mules, the distance to La Paz, the most remote city of the Union, is about seven hundred miles, and the fare is thirty-five dollars the mule load. The carriers, who make a business of transportation by mules, have from fifty to one hundred of these animals in a drove, the greater number of which are loaded when on a journey; and whatever may be the route they pursue, they carry no provisions with them, nor purchase any by the way for these beasts of burden. Either on the plains, or in the mountains, the patient, hardy animal, relieved of his pack, is turned loose at night to gather his food, and take his rest; and in the morning the load is replaced, and he is driven on, very commonly, the whole day without stopping.

The mail leaves Buenos Ayres for the northwest four times in the month. The whole distance to La Paz is little short of nineteen hundred miles; and the mail usually reaches that city from Buenos Ayres in forty days. It

is said that individuals, by the usual mode of taking relays of hired post horses, and pressing forward, have gone the whole route to La Paz in twenty days, and that extraordinary expresses have gone through in twelve days from Buenos Ayres.

These are the principal paths of the commercial intercourse of the Union over land; the channels of communication by water, that have been accessible to foreigners, or which have been at all used by the inhabitants, are only those of the Rio de la Plata and its tributary streams. If we should measure directly across the mouth of this great river, from the Portuguese dominions to the line I have designated as the boundary of the Patagonian territory, we shall find a length of not more than about three hundred and seventy miles of coast on the Atlantic belonging to the Union; but if, as seems to be most correct, the river Plate be considered merely as a great arm of the sea, and its shore be taken into the account, then the Union will be found to have an extent of between five and six hundred miles of coast. The Rio de la Plata is said by navigators to have many dangerous singularities, and materially to differ from every other known river of the world. No vessel drawing more than eighteen feet water can pass up to Buenos Ayres; and all navigators are cautioned to beware of its singularly changeful currents, and the destructive blasts, called pamperos, which occasionally sweep over its surface. There are no fish of passage, which, at any season, frequent this estuary; and, therefore, there can be no fishery anywhere in it for the purposes of profitable commerce, except, indeed, the seals that may be taken on the islands of Flores and Lobos, near its mouth. The Rio de la Plata commences from Cape St. Maria, on the north, and Cape St. Antonio, on the south; thence it gradually narrows until it reaches Buenos Ayres, where it is about forty miles broad, and it terminates by a round end just above the small island of Martin Garcia, which is said to command the mouths of all the rivers which unite a little to the northwest of it, and pour their waters into the La Plata. At present this island is uninhabited, and seems to be considered as of little other importance than as a convenient place to procure paving stones for the city of Buenos Ayres.

On the shore of the Banda Oriental, just within Cape St. Maria, is the port of Maldonado. The harbor is chiefly formed by the small island of Gorette. There are six or seven fathoms water within it, but it is not of easy access, except for small vessels; those drawing eighteen feet or more must enter by a crooked channel to the westward of the island. Next above Maldonado, on the same side, is Montevideo. It is a tolerably good harbor for such vessels as can enter, but it has not more than fourteen feet of water within the cove. The ensenada de St. Lucia, above Montevideo, has about eighteen feet water at its mouth, but furnishes no harbor. The Rio las Conchas, whose mouth is in the territory of Buenos Ayres, just below the Paraguay, is entered by vessels of ten or twelve feet draught of water, and

for such it affords a good harbor. The city of Buenos Ayres is itself situated on a long, straight reach of the coast of the La Plata, and the vessels trading or belonging there lie out from two to seven or eight miles from the shore, in a bleak, unsheltered roadstead. The ensenada de Barragan, or the mouth of the creek of Barragan, below Buenos Ayres, affords a harbor for vessels of about twelve feet draught of water. Except these, the only security for any vessel, anywhere within the Rio de la Plata, is her ground tackle.

Passing the island of Martin Garcia, and ascending the Uruguay, on tide, by a broad and bold navigation fifty-four miles, the beautiful Rio Negro presents itself, entering from the eastward. This limpid stream, whose waters, collected from the pasture ground and groves, beset with sarsaparilla, of the Banda Oriental, are pleasant to the taste, and said to be for many cases medicinal, is navigable for all vessels that can pass over the bar in the La Plata, as far as Capilla Nueva, about forty miles from its mouth, where the capital of the country, now called Purification, has not long since been fixed. This river hides its head in the Cerro de Lascano, nearly three hundred miles farther up, and is said to be navigable for boats some distance above Purification.

Returning, to follow up the Uruguay, it is found to afford an easy, uninterrupted navigation as far as St. Antonio, or Salta Chico, more than two hundred miles above its mouth, to which place the Government of Buenos Ayres, in the year 1810, sent several launches, of many tons burden, laden with provisions and munitions of war for its army then stationed there; and I have understood that it is navigable to Capilla St. Pero, a hundred miles still further up: thence the stream is uncommonly rapid for more than three hundred miles, to where it receives the Rio Pepry from the west, and its right bank forms the boundary of Brazil; thence, about fifty miles farther, it is met by the Rio Vermejo from the east; and from thence to its source, in the Sierra de Sta. Catherina, opposite the island of St. Catherine, on the coast, a distance of about two hundred and fifty miles, it passes wholly within the Portuguese dominions. The general course of this river is nearly northeast; and its whole length, travelling with its course, may be estimated, from its source to its mouth, at little short of one thousand miles.

Immediately opposite to the island of Martin Garcia, within a space of about forty miles, the great river Paraguay pours its mighty collection of waters into the Rio de la Plata through seven mouths, of which the Brazo de la Tinta, on the left, enters the Uruguay from the west, and the Bocha de las Palmas, on the right, enters the La Plata on a line with its western coast, just above the Rio de Lujan; but the chief opening, and that which is most usually navigated, is the Boca del Guante, which presents itself directly to the west of Martin Garcia. Any vessels which can cross the three-fathom bank in the La Plata below Buenos Ayres may ascend the Paraguay with ease

and safety to Santa Fé, three hundred miles to the westward of Buenos Ayres, which, with a fair wind, may be reached in ten or twelve days; indeed, it is said that such sized vessels may ascend as high as Corrientes. In ascending the Paraguay from the mouth, you pursue a northwest course, about two hundred miles, to Rosario, a town on the right bank; thence north, one hundred miles, to Santa Fé, which is also situated on its right bank, and just above its confluence with the Rio Salado; thence, bending away nearly northeast, and ascending about four hundred and fifty miles further up, and twenty miles below the mouth of the Parana, you arrive at the city of Corrientes, situated on its left bank. Pursuing the same course about two hundred miles still further up, you arrive at the ancient city of Assumpcion, once the capital of the whole country, now that of the province of Paraguay only; thence, following a course more northwardly, after ascending about one hundred and fifty miles further up, you reach the Brazil line at the Rio Ipane, which enters from the east, at the mouth of which is situated the village of Nueva Sta. de Belem; thence rising along the stream, in a direction nearly north, and having the Portuguese dominions on the right, for a distance of three hundred miles, you meet with the Rio Latirequiqui, entering from the west, near the end of the Cordillera de San Fernando, which elevated range of mountains forming the boundary of Brazil, the river becomes wholly the right of the Portuguese; thence pursuing the same course for a distance of three hundred miles further through the great morass of the Xareyes, you find the marco, or marble pyramid, erected as a boundary in 1754, near the mouth of the Rio Jouru; by ascending which some distance, the traders of the country carry their boats over a portage of four thousand eight hundred yards into the Guapore; by descending which to the Madeira, and thence downward, they reach the mighty Maranon. About three hundred miles farther up you find the sources of the Paraguay in the Prisidios dos Diamantos; so called from its being said to have the richest diamond mines in all Brazil, perhaps in the world. So that the Paraguay, in the whole, extends itself, in a northwardly direction, nearly two thousand miles; about fifteen hundred of which affords good boat navigation, and between six and seven hundred is said to be practicable for sea vessels.

The principal branch of the Paraguay is the Parana; and, on entering it, you ascend in an east direction about two hundred and thirty miles to La Candelaria; thence, ascending northeast one hundred and fifty miles, to the point at which it receives the Rio Ipane from the east, which is the boundary of Brazil; thence, with those dominions to the east, pursuing the same course one hundred and thirty miles farther up, and you arrive at the Salta Grande, or great waterfall, which interrupts the further navigation of this stream at the lower end of the Ilha Grande, and near the end of the Cordillera Alto de Maracayu, which is the Brazilian boundary on the right bank of the river. From this, the Parana ascends, in a northeast direction, into the Portuguese

dominions, about four hundred miles, where it is divided into two branches, one the Rio Grande, which, turning to the eastward, and extending about four hundred miles farther, is lost in the great mountains, about one hundred and fifty miles to the north of Rio Janeiro; the other branch, called the Parana-iva, after stretching due north about three hundred and fifty miles, reaches its source in the lofty ridges of the Sierra de Marcella.

Of those rivers which enter the Paraguay from the west, there are only three which, as far as I can learn, merit particular attention. The Rio del Pasage, after collecting the waters from the valley of Calchioqui, and traversing the greater portion of the province of Salta, unites with the Rio Tala, and forms the Rio Salado; which, after winding its way, in a southeast direction, through the plains of Tucuman, Santiago, and Cordova, and travelling a distance of about four hundred miles, throughout the whole of which it is said to afford boat navigation, slants into the Paraguay at Santa Fé. The river Vermejo, after receiving the waters of the valleys of Tarija and Rosario, descends to the western margin of the Llanos de Manso, along which it moves past the territories of Jujuy and Salta; then, turning to the eastward, it crosses those great plains, and enters the Paraguay about fifty miles above the mouth of the Parana, travelling a distance from the town of Tarija of more than seven hundred miles; and, about midway of its course, receives the Rio Jujuy, after it has pursued a route of about two hundred miles in length from the city of Jujuy. In the year 1790, Colonel Cornejo, in a boat of several tons burden, did actually ascend the Rio Vermejo as far as the town of Tarija, without meeting any material obstructions from cataracts or ripples. The river Suipacha, after receiving the waters of the St. Juan from the salt pampas at the foot of the principal Cordillera of the Andes to the north, and those of the Rio del Oro, which are precipitated from the same lofty eminences, to the south, in the province of Chicas, and passing the crags, and wilds, and fertile valleys which it meets in a course of three hundred miles, finds itself associated with the branch called the Pilcomayo or Paspayo, which has traversed a similar country for a distance of three hundred miles from the foot of the mountain of the famed silver mine of Potosi; thence, moving on their joint waters, they meet with the Rio Chachimayo, after it has descended from the mountains of Charcas, and passed the city of La Plata or Chuquisaca, at one hundred and fifty miles above; with which river they unite to form the Pilcomayo, properly so called, near the eastern end of the fertile valley of Ingre, in which the warlike Chiriguanes Indians have twenty-six villages; from which the Pilcomayo, entering directly into the Llanos de Manso, and crossing them in a southeasterly direction, passing great numbers of the habitations of the savages who dwell in those plains, pours its waters into the Paraguay by two mouths forty miles below the city of Assumpcion. How far this river is practicable for boats of any size, I have not been able to learn; but I am induced to believe, from the description

of the plains through which it passes, that it must be navigable a great part of the way.

These are the principal paths and channels by land and water; and this is the manner in which the greater part of the productions of this extensive Union are transported from one province to another, or by which those suited for a foreign market find their way to the city of Buenos Ayres; for the new Government allows of no other port, either for exportation or importation. One of the consequences of independence and union to our country was, that its commerce, as well internal as external, almost immediately left many of its former colonial courses, and sought others; directing itself to points and along ways adapted to the natural advantages of the country and the best interests of the people. Hence, the decline of some of our colonial towns, and the very rapid growth of some of our cities. A similar consequence, to a much greater extent, might have been expected to have arisen from the revolution of the Spanish colonies on the river Plate; but none such has yet taken place. On the contrary, those noble rivers which nature seems to have poured through their country as immense conveniences, advantages, and benefits, have been to them the waters of bitterness and discord. An attempt was made to export and import from and to Santa Fé, which was so great an advantage to all the country west and north of it that much traffic began to flow that way. Buenos Ayres forbade it; and this is one of the grounds of the controversy between Santa Fé and Buenos Ayres. The people of the Union are contending for independence, that they may, among their other rights and liberties, establish the freedom of commerce, so that its courses may be directed solely and exclusively by convenience, profit, and advantage. If commerce be dragged away from courses so chosen, it is a monopoly; and, although it may not, in some respects, be as pernicious as that of Cadiz, it is a monopoly. One of the consequences of the present strife to Buenos Ayres is, that it can procure not a single stick of that necessary article, timber, with which the banks of the rivers beyond the La Plata abound; but is supplied from Cordova by its carts, or timber is brought from Brazil, or the United States; in which cases, it is admitted free of duty, and is said to yield a good profit, such are the present high prices of timber in this new country.

The aggregate amount of the imports of Buenos Ayres, within the last two or three years, has been estimated at about eight millions per annum; of this amount, about one-half consists of British manufactures, and productions of one kind or other; and the rest is made up principally of French, German, and India goods of various descriptions, and a small proportion of the manufactures and productions of the United States. The principal of our commodities which have found their way to advantage to Buenos Ayres, seem to be cordage, pitch, tar, salt fish, furniture, Windsor and rush-bottom chairs, rice, butter, spermaceti candles, porter, ale, cider, gin, peach brandy,

writing paper, plank, and some other articles that I may have omitted. But latterly our trade thither has been very limited, and has constituted rather in carrying the goods of European and Indian continents for the purpose of procuring the few articles we want from them, than its being a market for our own productions of any sort.

The exports of Buenos Ayres for some years past have been, it is said, on the decline. During the last year, they have been thus estimated; it has exported one million of hides of all descriptions, which, valued on an average at three dollars each, makes three millions of dollars; it is computed to have made up three millions more, of the following articles: tallow, horns, horse hair, jerked beef, copper, tin, lead, chinchilla skins, nutria, lion, tiger, wild dog, seal, swan, viscacha, and sheep skins; sheep, vecuna, and guanaca wool, and feathers, with some few others of less value, or that are produced in smaller quantities. And the balance, consisting of two millions, it is said, has been made up by specie derived from the mines of the high provinces, and from Chili, in return for the foreign manufactures sent thither by the way of Mendoza, and in payment for its matte, and by various other ways and means.

The Spanish settlers in America have everywhere discovered a disposition to group themselves together in towns and cities. It is rare to meet a country gentleman resident on his estate, or to find a wealthy land owner, who has not a house in the city, which is his usual place of abode; from which his chacaras and estancias, that is, his grain and grazing farms, committed to the care of peasants or slaves, are occasionally visited. The reason of this mode of life, it is said, arises from the inertia of the Spanish habits. The owner commits the care of his estates to his slaves, or makes them grazing farms, which require little attention, that he may lounge away his time in a city, with every convenience about him, and enjoy those long intervals of repose of which a Spaniard is so fond. But the modern Egyptian and the modern Greek, whose countries were once the busy hives of industry, and the lands of enterprise and science, are as inert and as fond of repose as the modern Spaniard; may we not, then, suppose the causes of this love of repose to have been the same in all?—the hebetating political and ecclesiastical institutions, whose impressions have been with fire and sword, and faggot, cut and branded upon them all? But, whatever may have been the cause, such is the fact, that the more wealthy, intelligent and better sort of people are universally found in the cities and the towns. The best and fairest sample of the population of the Union, it is said, is to be found in the city of Buenos Ayres; and there are some circumstances which render the assertion not improbable. That city, almost ever since its foundation, has been a seat of Government, and the emporium of all the foreign commerce of the country; the people have had much intercourse with foreign nations; and, of late years particularly, they have had the means of information poured in upon them;

and they have, from every account, profited by it very much. They are, in general, very intelligent, and very unanimous in their determination to support their independence, and to establish their freedom. The lower classes have been materially benefited by the change, and they are perfectly sensible of the happy results. With very few shades of difference, however, the population of the great cities and principal towns of Buenos Ayres, Montevideo, Mendoza, Santa Fé, Cordova, Salta, Tucuman, Jujuy, Corrientes, Assumpcion, Potosi, Chuquisaca, &c. are all alike as to intelligence and general information. In the cities are found the great body of the leading and influential citizens of the Union, and their numbers are by no means inconsiderable, who have given an impulse to public opinion, and have kept, and will keep, the ball of the revolution in motion until the great end be accomplished of independence and substantial freedom.

The herdsmen or peasantry of the pampas plains form a very considerable proportion of the population of the country. Thinly strewed over the great pastures, those residing at a distance from the cities have, most commonly, each one the charge of an estancia, many leagues in extent. They have little society, are totally illiterate, lead an indolent life, and dwell on an immense waste, in continual solitude. Their habitations are constructed in the simplest form; in general, they consist of low mud walls, thatched with the long grass of the plains, tied on a layer of reeds, with raw hide thongs, or stuck on with mud. In the pampas a few peach trees stand round about; but the embudo, one single one, and no more, seems to be the herdsman's favorite shade, and designation of his dwelling. The bedding and clothing of the family, and the whole household furniture, exhibit a scene of laziness and dirt, yet mingled with apparent cheerfulness, great kindness, much natural intelligence, and an evident independence of character.

From infancy the herdsman is taught to ride, and there are, perhaps, no more expert horsemen in the world; much riding is required by his situation and mode of life; and to ride well is his pleasure and his pride. Either from the custom of his Spanish ancestors, or from its real and constant utility, the herdsman is never without a long butcher's knife, worn about his waist. His cloak is that gay, party-colored covering, formerly used by the natives, which seems to have been universally adapted to his taste and convenience. The Indians and the herdsman's cloak, or poncho, as it is called, is a square piece of cloth, something larger than a Dutch blanket, with a slit in the middle, through which the head is put, leaving it to hang down all around. This poncho is his bed at night, and by day his cloak, a belt, a saddle cover, or a bag, as fancy or necessity may require. It would seem as if similar circumstances everywhere made similar suggestions. Within that region of the globe designated as Central Asia, there are immense steps or plains not materially different from those traversed by the La Plata and its rivers. And it is said the Asiatic herdsman of those plains, like him of America, has,

from the most remote ages, always used as a utensil, or weapon, the lazo, or running noose, either to manage his herd, or to attack his foe. The lazo is a cord or thong, made of strong, well-prepared hide, about thirty yards long, with an iron ring, or a loop at one end, through which a running noose or lazo may be made in an instant; the other end is fastened to the cincho or broad surcingle, which secures the saddle. The lazo, hung in a coil to the hinder part of the saddle, is thus ready for use. So soon as it is thrown and takes effect, the horse, as he has been taught, stands firm or moves off with what has been caught. The lazo is thrown by a herdsman with unerring aim, either on foot, or on horseback, or at full speed, at a fleeing animal or retreating foe. The herdsman of the plains is usually provided with another instrument similar in its use to the lazo. The bola is an instrument made with three cords of about three feet each from the knot which unites them in the middle; to the end of each of which is fastened a ball of about two pounds weight. The bola, with a few twirls over the head, is thrown like a stone from a sling; and, entangling about the legs of the animal at which it is directed, instantly prostrates it at the mercy of the pursuer. And, whether thrown standing or at full speed, the herdsman's bola seldom flies in vain. This instrument, like the lazo, is usually slung to the hinder part of the saddle. Mounted, and thus equipped, the herdsman is ready for a journey of a thousand miles, the protection or the seizing of his herd, or for the defence of his country.

The European armies that have been landed on the shores of the river Plate have found the lazo and the bola to be weapons of war of a new, surprising, and singular cast. Their outposts often silently disappeared they knew not how; a dragoon, when at a sufficient distance, apparently, to be out of danger from his enemy, would have his horse suddenly thrown from under him, or in an instant he himself would be snatched from his seat and dragged to death. The European forces saw the plains covered with cattle; but none of the wild herd could be taken; their chase and fire frightened them beyond their reach. The nakedness of the country was thus perceived to be its chief fastness, and security to its inhabitants and their herds against foreign invaders. The wars that have been waged in that country, particularly on the Banda Oriental, have made the herdsmen of those plains as expert in the use of a gun on horseback, as of a lazo or the bola, all of which they now carry in their warlike excursions; and they may be considered as the most formidable guerrilla or partisan soldiery that ever existed. In courage they are inferior to none; and the exploits that are related of their adroit and rapid horsemanship exceed what has been told of the Parthian, the Scythian, or the Cossack of the Don. Such are the herdsmen of the pampas and plains, who are usually called gauchos; an epithet, like that of yankee, originally cast on them in derision, but one which has now ripened into a distinctive and common appellation that is no longer offensive. The

most active and efficient portion of the Buenos Ayrean army of Peru, under Belgrano, is the guerrilla party of gauchos commanded by Colonel Guemes.

The peasantry of the high provinces are, a great majority of them, agriculturists, with the addition of the laborers in the mines. This class of the population of the Union is not materially dissimilar from the like class as it is described to exist under all arbitrary Governments. They are wholly illiterate, are superstitious and indolent; but, from the thinness of the population, and abundance of the necessaries of life, this class has not been so pressed upon, and is, therefore, not so sordid and boorish as in some other countries; they are cheerful, docile, active, and extremely susceptible, and desirous of improvement.

Of those three classes of population it must be observed that each has evidently been mingled and discolored with Indian blood. The city class least of any; but the gauchos are a third or a half of Indian descent; and the husbandmen of some of the cultivated valleys of the high provinces have the appearance of being little else than the civilized descendants of the aborigines.

There were at the commencement of the revolution a considerable number of slaves in the Union, of the Indian or African race. But slavery has been abolished. The negroes have, generally, been transferred from domestic slavery to the ranks of the army, into which about four thousand have been enlisted; the half of which were sent to Chili, where their numbers have been reduced nearly half. Some were sent to carry on the war against Artigas, and have been much cut up; and the residue are quartered in the city of Buenos Ayres, where they are believed to make good soldiers. They are used as guards about the directorial palace, the hall of Congress, and the city.

The people of Paraguay have traits of character differing alike from the citizen, the gaucho, and the husbandman of the high provinces. The district of Paraguay was taken into the possession of the Spaniards from the natives, at as early period, almost, as any portion of the viceroyalty; it has a greater population, in proportion to its extent of territory, than most of the other provinces. Paraguay long had the peculiar care of the Jesuits, and has had all the benefits of their spiritual instructions. It is at once a fair sample of their skill at civilization, and of the effects of their system, the fundamental maxim of which was to exclude all strangers. The present race of Paraguays are said to be a mixture of the European Spaniards and natives with perhaps more than half Indian. They are remarkably peaceful, and taciturn in their temper and deportment. They are more industrious than the people of the other provinces, prodigiously attached to their country, or rather the place of their nativity, yield a passive obedience to the powers that be, and are much averse to strangers, to changes and new modes of every sort. They are excessively clannish; when they have heretofore visited Buenos Ayres, for the purpose of trade, it has been always remarked, that wherever the

leader of the squad dealt, there all would deal, and nowhere else. It is rare to meet a Paraguay who cannot read and write, and who does not understand the rudiments of arithmetic. Yet they make no other use of this precious acquisition than to read some few homilies, and to make notes and keep accounts of their little dealings. They never apply it to the acquisition of any useful knowledge whatever. Their literature is merely elementary, and made less use of than the hieroglyphics of their progenitors of Peru. Their stern religion or more rigid habits seem to forbid them to stray from the precepts inculcated in their youth, with so alluring, so wanton, and so erratic a guide as modern philosophy; lest a perverse doubt, like an artful and suspected stranger, should seduce them from the good old ways of their ancestors. The Paraguays are generally healthy, robust men, very abstemious and sober; the great body of them are agriculturists; and their delightful country, alike suited to the growth of the productions of the temperate and torrid zones, supplies them with every necessary, and a variety of the luxuries of life. They manufacture much within themselves, get scarcely any thing from abroad, and have little intercourse with the rest of the world. It is a question which future experience must solve, whether the gay and docile, but illiterate husbandman of the Andes, or the Paraguay agriculturist, with his smattering of letters and his Jesuit habits, shall rise most rapidly from the obscurity of his colonial condition, and profit most by the revolutionary changes now in progress.

This country and these people, whose extent, situation, and character I have endeavored clearly, concisely, and fairly to delineate, were governed by the Spanish power with the coarse machine of monarchy, and according to its few and simple principles. The first magistrate of Buenos Ayres was the viceroy, who was appointed by the King of Spain; and this viceroy governed all, overruled all, and commanded all, civil and military, but the King his master. The members of the supreme tribunal of justice, called the royal audience, were also appointed by the King. And all the other officers of the Government were appointed by the viceroy or the King, or sold by him, responsible to him alone, and removable only at his pleasure.

Whenever the population of a district of country increased to such a number as to require it, or it was otherwise thought worthy of the honor, it was laid off into what was called a province, or jurisdiction, and a governor appointed over it; and if the population was increased and condensed into a town, or its inhabitants had influence with the viceroy, or the viceroy thought a spot suitable for a town, it was laid out as such, and declared to be a city; and a tribunal called a Cabildo was organized for the regulation of its police, and the administration of justice within it, and a certain district round. This ayuntamiento, Cabildo, or corporation, was composed of from six to twelve members, called regidors, according to the size of the city. The governor of the province was, ex officio, president of the Cabildo, with power

to control or overrule its ordinances or decisions, in like manner as the viceroy could those of the royal audience, whenever he chose to take his seat, and act as president. The office of regidor, like most others in the Spanish Government, was venal; the price paid for it in Chili was about five hundred dollars; and I have reason to believe that in Buenos Ayres it was valued at about the same; it was held for life. Besides those to be had in the market, there were generally four other regidors, residents of the city, who were appointed by the viceroy. The alguacils, or sheriffs, and baliffs of this tribunal were venal, bought and sold at a given price, like any other merchantable commodity of the Spanish dominions. It is of these jurisdictions the present provinces of the Union have been constituted; and the Cabildos, thus organized, and which were continued by traffic, and the Chief Magistrate of the Union, for the time being, until the present form of government was adopted, are the sources, with little variation, whence sprang the existing Congress.

Besides these, there were appointed in districts too extensive for justice to be conveniently administered by the governor or the Cabildo, village or country alcaldes, or territorial justices. The jurisdiction of these officers, however, extended only to petty matters, or the apprehension of offenders; they were a sort of justices of the peace. In addition to these, there was, in the cities of Buenos Ayres and Montevideo, a tribunal called the consulado, invested with jurisdiction in commercial affairs only, from which there might be an appeal to the viceroy. These were the civil tribunals, into which the colonist entered, with his purse in one hand and his documents in the other, to seek protection and right, to ask for justice, and to obtain redress against the wrongdoer.

The right of patronage to all ecclesiastical benefices belonged exclusively to the King; but it is said there are a few unimportant livings in Buenos Ayres in the gift of individuals. All ecclesiastical affairs were cognizable only before the spiritual courts, of which each bishop had one, composed of the bishop himself, the fiscal, proctor or lawyer, and the provisor. These tribunals also were subject to the control of the viceroy.

But there was one tribunal which bore sway over all, and that was the tribunal of the holy inquisition, which had the power to fine, confiscate, imprison, hang, or burn for the offence of which the accused was convicted by it. The two viceroyalties of Buenos Ayres and Chili were subject to the jurisdiction of the holy inquisition of Lima, which tribunal appointed its commissioners in those two viceroyalties, who furnished it with information, had its process executed, and the accused sent forward for examination, trial, and suffering.

There was no tribunal, or any officer of any description whatever, emanating from the people, or appointed by them, or responsible to them, either directly or indirectly, in any manner. There was not, in the whole country,

one single popular meeting allowed of, except at church for worship; or any such thing known as a legal and standing congregation of men, gathered from the people for any purpose whatever. Of all the various formal and informal means of which the people of our country have, at different times, availed themselves, to make an expression of their collected and united voices, not one of them, or any thing of the sort, ever appears to have been known in Buenos Ayres before the revolution. The people of that country appeared to have been governed with so total a disregard to their will, or with so watchful a determination that their voice should not be heard in any way, that they seemed to be strangers to the methods by which it may be collected and expressed to advantage, or not to have estimated them as they ought. The viceroy, with a suitable number of military coadjutors and underlings, took charge of the person and property, and the holy inquisition, by its commissaries, had the curacy of the mind of the humble colonist; which independent, irresponsible, and holy officers of the royal power could only be rendered merciful, or flexible, or just, by the secret but potent operations of tangible gold. The sword of the military and the faggot of the church thus executed the will of the monarch; no one dared resist; complaint was never heard; the colonist submitted in silence, suffered, and groaned inwardly.

The Spanish colonial Government of Buenos Ayres was of a character calculated to blight every hope of freedom, and make men passive and calm. Hence the people of those provinces did not begin their revolution in opposition to the oppressions of the mother country. They were not excited, like those of the United States, first to make head against the arbitrary attempts of the parent state, to claim their privileges, to declare their independence, and to resume a Government which had been abused by their transatlantic rulers. It was not until, by the great agitations of Europe, the gripe of the colonial power was loosened; until after the hand of the monarch had been by those struggles, for a time, taken off, that the colonists began to think and feel as men; not until after the people on the shores of the La Plata had been visited by a portion of the wars, and the blaze of those political conflicts of Europe, that they were aroused, and excited to seek, and to endeavor to obtain and defend their own long lost rights.

The British Government, for a long time past, appear to have had a very strong disposition to obtain a station or plant a colony on the shores of the La Plata. So early as the year 1740, the project was proposed, and the subject discussed. At the peace of Paris, in 1763, the subject was renewed, and the value of such an acquisition much urged. In the latter end of the year 1805, the expedition under Sir Home Popham made a formal attack, with a view to obtain possession of Buenos Ayres, but was driven back. And the disgraceful and unfortunate expedition under General Whitlocke, in the year 1807, appears to have quieted British notions of adding to their trans-

marine possessions in that quarter. At present, the British are pursuing with avidity a free, peaceful, and lucrative commerce, where, by their repeated wishes and attacks, they have failed in establishing conquest and monopoly. These attacks of the English gave the first shock to the colonial establishments of Buenos Ayres.

In the month of July, in the year 1807, a French Government vessel arrived in the river Plate with the intelligence that the old dynasty of the mother country had been pushed from the throne, and Joseph Bonaparte declared King in the place of a Bourbon. Liniers, the then viceroy of Buenos Ayres, wished to recognise the new King, and induce the people to acquiesce in the change. This, notwithstanding all their sufferings under the Bourbon line, they refused to do, drove Liniers from power, and declared their adhesion to the old dynasty, and to what they conceived to be the cause of their country. In this state of things, Cisneros came out from Spain, commissioned by the Junta of Cadiz as viceroy, and assumed the reins of government. Thus the old order of things, after having received a rude shock from the English, was thrown entirely into confusion. The British and other foreign traders, finding the old opposition removed or paralyzed, poured into the country; and the people, during these agitations and changes, began to perceive and to feel that a free commerce brought with it considerable advantages; that there were many abuses to reform; and that there was, in fact, no power in Spain which could be said to represent the Bourbon King, to whom they still were determined to adhere, notwithstanding all they had experienced and suffered.

In consequence of these agitations, to advise for the best, and restore harmony, a Junta was convened in Buenos Ayres, composed of some of the principal persons of that city, and their Cabildo. And on the 25th May, 1810, this Junta determined to take the government into their own hands until a Junta could be called and convened composed of representatives from the other provinces, into whose hands it should then be committed, until Spain should so far recover from its misfortunes as to be able to do justice to itself, and to redress the evils in the administrations of its colonies. Accordingly, Cisneros was stripped of all power, and permitted to depart in peace for Europe. This day is called the commencement of the revolution, and it is now noted among the *fiestas civicas* of the country as the day on which "the people of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata were, by a singular providence, delivered from the slavery which the Americans had suffered for three hundred years;" as the day of "the political regeneration of those provinces, by the free use of the rights of man, of which they had been despotically deprived by the Spaniards since the conquest of both Americas." There was still a hope or an expectation, however, that harmony and a union of some sort might some day be restored between them and the mother country, compatible with their freedom and self-government;

which freedom from that day it became the ardent wish and determination of all good men to endeavor to obtain.

With this resolution to establish a free Government of their own, if possible, constantly present, and operating on the minds of a great and increasing majority of the people, the cause has been pushed forward with improving experience and brightening lights, amidst intrigues, and factions, and superstition, and angry passions, from a beginning where even rudiments were to be collected along a curious, crooked, and wavering line, to the present point, at which the people have finally resolved on independence, and totally renounced all prospect of returning to their allegiance to Spain. This declaration of independence was made by the Congress at Tucuman, on the 9th day of July, in the year 1816; and in the *fiestas civicas* of the country it stands noted as the declaration of their *absolute* independence, "*De la declaración de nuestra absoluta independencia.*" At this point the people now are where they seem to be much more disposed calmly to investigate, to learn, and impartially to decide, than their present rulers are willing to indulge the freedom of their speculations. I shall barely sketch out the path of this revolution from point to point so far, leaving the causes by which it has been impelled, and the obstacles by which it has been checked, to be more fully collected and understood from the history of the times, except so much as may be immediately necessary for the elucidation of the present state of things.

After Cisneros was displaced from the viceroyalty, in the year 1810, and compelled, with some of his adherents, natives of Spain, to embark for Europe, a Junta of seven was formed, and a General Congress was called. The Cabildos of the provinces, favorable to the cause of self-government, appointed deputies, who assembled in Buenos Ayres in the month of March of the following year; and, after a deal of altercation, were admitted as members of the Junta Provisional, of whom the historian Dean Funes, from Cordova, was one. A person named Saavedra, by intriguing with the sturdy and free-spirited gauchos of the pampas of Buenos Ayres, obtained their countenance and aid, by which means, on the 6th of April of the same year, he effected a change in the organization of the ruling power, and another set of men were placed at the helm: which change is distinguished by the name of Saavedra's revolution. On the 9th of October following, this ruling party was suppressed, many of its members imprisoned or banished, and a new one formed and placed at the head of affairs, called the triumvirate. The first triumvirs were Chicklana, Dr. Pasos, and Saratea, with Rividavia as secretary, all of Buenos Ayres. This triumvirate gave a new impulse to political movements, and caused great changes in the opinions of the people: "instead of following the public opinion for the independence and liberty of the people, it took the opinion of parties who sought to govern according to the interest of each faction." Hence jealousies, suspicions, fears, and rivalships were

then sown, which have continued to rankle and grow from that to this time, and are not likely soon to be eradicated. One of them, Saratea, was sent to take the command of the patriot army at Montevideo, in the Banda Oriental, and had not been there long before he and José Artigas, who now commands that portion of the gaucho population, quarrelled. Artigas, being apprized in time of an attempt that was to be made on his person, fled to the plains, was soon followed by all the Orientals, and has been at war with Buenos Ayres, except at short intervals, ever since. Rividavia filled the seat of Saratea from the 10th of March, 1812, or thereabouts, until the 25th of May, when Pueyrredon, the present Director, arrived from the army in the high provinces as his successor, and Rividavia resumed his station as secretary until the month of July following, when, owing to some misunderstanding among the rival chiefs, Chicklana was expelled with disgrace, and Rividavia reinstated as a triumvir. This Rividavia is said to be a man of talents. He is now in France; and his object in visiting Europe is said to have been to ascertain the feelings of the monarchs of the old world toward the provinces of the new, which were struggling for independence; to see if the combined potentates could be propitiated, by concessions or otherwise, to mercy and forbearance; whether the angry principles by which they had been united would induce them to make an effort of their strength on this side of the Atlantic against the rising principles of reform; or whether they would be governed and divided by a rational view of their interests as regards the regions of the new world.

On the 9th of October of the same year, 1812, the Moreno faction overturned the triumvirate, and seized on the reins of Government. The Doctor Moreno who headed this faction was a man of a very fine and highly cultivated understanding; he died soon after, on his passage to England. The chiefs of this party were Larea, Lastelle, Pena, Asquinaga, Vieytes, and Posados, who effected the revolution by the assistance of José San Martin, now the commander-in-chief of the united army of the Andes in Chili, and Charles Alvear, who was then the colonel, and lieutenant colonel of a regiment of cavalry stationed in Buenos Ayres. Major Zapiola and Captain Igarasabel, of this regiment, being ordered by its commander to seize or destroy Pueyrredon, then a triumvir, now the Director, repaired to his house, and searched for him with naked weapons; and it is said he narrowly avoided assassination, and effected his escape in disguise, and was finally saved by remaining some time concealed. Of this party, Pena, Pasos, and Jonte, were declared to be the ruling Junta, of which Pena was president. He was, after some time, displaced, and succeeded by Rondeau, who continued in office until the month of ——, when he went to take command of the army in the Banda Oriental. On representing the inconveniences attending an executive Junta, composed of three members, to the Congress, that body formed a single executive, and Posados was elected by it as Director, in December,

1813, and continued one year in office; when Lieutenant Colonel Charles Alvear was elected by the Congress to succeed him. This Alvear was a man of a bold, unbridled temper and disposition; he had been appointed by the Congress to the army of Peru; but, being rejected by the inferior officers, was obliged to relinquish that command, and return. In Buenos Ayres he quietly entered upon the duties to which he was elected. The people, however, were, from time to time, much provoked, by his highly offensive and arbitrary conduct; until, at length, roused past all forbearance, by the barbarous murder of Uvieda, a worthy citizen, on Easter Sunday night, in prison, they flew to arms, and put the city in a state of defence. The Director threatened to force his way in at the point of the bayonet, but was given to understand that his army would not obey him; and he then surrendered, under a guaranty of being permitted to embark on board a British ship then lying in the roads; and with the greatest difficulty made his way, alone and unattended, past an exasperated people, who pursued him to the boat on the shore, which the British commander sent to receive him. This man is now in Rio Janeiro, where he has taken refuge.

A Junta of the people of the city of Buenos Ayres was then summoned by sound of the Cabildo bell; which town meeting, or junta, after some warm debates, elected as Director, Colonel Ignacio Alvarez, acting commander-in-chief of the troops, who had been faithful to the people, in opposition to Alvear; and, about the same time, the Congress passed an act, called the Statute Provincial, by which various restrictions were laid down to prevent abuses in the exercise of the directorial authority. The clamors of the people against Alvarez, charging him with arbitrary proceedings, mismanagement, and peculation in office, caused him to resign his power on the day of the expiration of the term for which he was elected; and in April, 1815, Antonio Balcarce, now brigadier general in the united army of the Andes in Chili, was elected; and, after continuing in office about three months, was forced from his post by intrigue and faction. An executive, or government of three, was then again formed, composed of Francisco Escalada, Irregogen, [Yrigoyen] and ————.

During all these various changes and revolutions there has existed a body called the representatives or deputies from the several provinces. The members of this assemblage were chosen or appointed by the Cabildos of the principal cities which had joined in the revolution; and it is said that there were instances and times when they were chosen by something like a popular election; the traces of such elections are, however, very faint and obscure, such as perhaps would not be deemed popular by the people of the United States, where the substance and outline of such elections are distinctly recollected by the very boys of the country. It does not appear that the members of this representative body were elected for any given time, or that the Cabildos, by whom they were chosen, were at all jealous of their length of

service. Some of them have been members several years, some are newly elected, and others represent provinces in the possession of the enemy, who, therefore, can neither be rejected, recalled, nor re-elected by the provinces they represent. Nor does it appear that they were tenacious of the numbers sent from each province, or that they have been always the same. Buenos Ayres had only four, Mendoza two, and San Juan had two members in the Congress which met at Tucuman in 1816. Now, Buenos Ayres has seven members, and Mendoza and St. Juan only one member each; and yet the members vote in Congress numerically, and not by provinces. Nor does it appear that any stipulated, personal, or local qualification has been required. About half the body are priests; and the citizens of Buenos Ayres seem to be deemed eligible and suitable to represent any province; in consequence of which, the church and that city have always had their full influence. The body, it would seem, had changed its name almost as often as its component numbers and individuals; at first, it was called the Junta; then the Junta Provisional; then the National Constituent Assembly; and now it is styled the Sovereign Congress. Its deliberations appear to be conducted with religious solemnity and much debate; the yeas and nays are most generally recorded; yet the body is guarded by soldiery, usually negroes, deemed perfectly trustworthy; and there are neither frequent elections, nor a free press to call them to an account. Of all the passions and gales of the revolution, whose violence has broken in so many directions, this body has been struck by none. It seems to have glided on, preserving the even tenor of its way, and to have happily retained the buoyancy of its nature amidst every angry burst and threatening squall. Fortunately for itself, this august body has never undertaken to call any state delinquent to account, nor in any instance run counter to the will of the Chief Magistrate for the time being. If the Congresses of Venezuela, Mexico, and Chili, by a factious, headstrong disposition, (as has been solemnly said,) have repeatedly lost those countries to the patriot cause, no such restiveness of temper can be imputed to the Congress of Buenos Ayres; on the contrary, it has, at times, so highly respected the opinions of the people as to yield a little to a gaucho intrigue, or a town meeting, convened by the sound of a Cabildo bell.

Some of the acts of Congress have, however, been of vital importance to the best interests of the cause, and the Union. On the 9th of July, 1816, it made and promulgated a declaration of *absolute* independence. And thus it cast the die. The minds of the people were thus brought solemnly up, and finally fixed at that great point about which there had previously been some wavering. And in December 1817, its ordinance, called the reglamento provisorio, was ratified, establishing a temporary Government for the Union, in which is defined the forms of two popular elections; one of which, that of electing Cabildos, has since, with great ease and success, been reduced to actual practice. The form of electing members of Congress is also pre-

scribed; but no time of election or term of service being specified, there has been no use made of the terms laid down. There have been two popular elections of Cabildos in Buenos Ayres; the first was made in 1816, when only about five hundred votes were taken; but when the same election came round, and was made, according to the provisions of the reglamento provisorio, in the year following, there were as many as three thousand five hundred votes given for the same officers. This is the first form of a popular election ever offered to the people of Spanish America; and although confined to mere police, or corporation offices, it is of great importance in its direct and indirect consequences. It is a beginning which must draw after it more valuable and efficient elections, and the whole representative system. And the great increase of votes is a proof of the readiness with which the nature and uses of the rights of franchise can be understood and adopted by any people.

The Congress which, on the 24th of March, 1816, had assembled in the city of Tucuman, elected Juan Martin Pueyrredon Supreme Director of the State; after which, it made the solemn declaration of absolute independence, and then founded the present temporary Government called the reglamento provisorio, (annexed and marked as exhibit G,[1]) and Pueyrredon has continued in office as Supreme Director from that time to this. By the sixth article of the first chapter of the third section of this provisional Government, it is declared that the person filling the station of Supreme Director shall continue in office until a constitution is formed, unless sooner displaced by Congress. The only check upon this loose and indefinite grant of executive power and influence, to control Congress, and postpone the formation of a constitution, is that of a *residencia*, designated in the ninth article of the last chapter. As this mode of responsibility by a *residencia* is an adoption of that by which it was intended under the colonial system, a governor or viceroy might be called to an account; and as it is wholly unlike any of the forms by which the responsibility of a public agent is secured by any of our political institutions, it may be well concisely to describe it. According to the Spanish laws of the Indies, when a viceroy or governor was removed from office, the King appointed an agent or commissioner, most commonly a lawyer of the country, to receive the *residencia* of the displaced officer; such commissioner accordingly repaired to the capital, and announced, in the most public manner, the time and place when and where he would be prepared to hear and determine on any complaint that might be made against the late officer, by any person, of whatever order or class, as well Indians as others. This scrutiny could only continue in the case of a governor for sixty days, and of a viceroy only six months after the date of the proclamation of its commencement; and no cause of complaint, however grievous, could be heard or inquired into, which was not made known by the commissioner of the *residencia*

[1] This exhibit has been communicated among the papers annexed to the reports of Messrs. Rodney and Graham.

within the appointed time. This sort of impeachment of an officer, after the extinction of his functions, is not unlike the sage old Egyptian process of bringing the dead to justice. It may accord with Spanish colonial notions of calling a public functionary to account, but I should suppose it would be deemed widely different from what we should call republican responsibility.

Before the revolution there was a printing press in Buenos Ayres, whence issued a weekly newspaper, merely for the purpose of printing and publishing sundry papers and documents for the convenience of the viceroy, and under his sanction entirely. The profits of this press, for it yielded some, were given to an institution in the city of Buenos Ayres, called the Niños Expositos, or Foundling Hospital; hence the press obtained that name. This press is still continued, and the ministerial paper, called the Buenos Ayres Gazette, issues from it weekly. There are, in all, three printing presses in Buenos Ayres, and from one or the other of them there are published four newspapers weekly. Besides these, there is a small weekly newspaper printed in Tucuman. From the second chapter of the seventh section of the reglamento provisorio, one would be induced to infer that there existed something like a freedom of the press; but nothing would be more fallacious than such an inference. The press has never been tolerated with a single day of genuine and manly freedom in Buenos Ayres. Nothing is published but what is flattering to the powers that be; nor is any thing inserted in the papers from abroad, without being curtailed or remodeled to suit the taste of the ruling party. A few attempts have been made to discuss political subjects with severity, and to censure the political conduct of some men; the consequence of which has been, that, without ceremony, the parties have been instantly banished or imprisoned. The press of Buenos Ayres is a servile instrument, which neither has, nor merits, any respect or influence whatever. Public opinion receives its direction, and gives its impulse, not through that prostituted instrument of much good, but from books and papers read in the closet, and from verbal conversation and private discussions. And, in that manner, it has acted so efficiently as to turn a chief magistrate from his fort, or to chase a wicked Director into exile, at the very moment when this cowardly or crippled sentinel was going the rounds, and crying out all was well.

Laying aside the abstract principles contained in the reglamento provisorio, which speak for themselves, and the value of which depends on the accuracy with which they are expressed, the currency with which they are received, and the facility with which they can be applied and enforced, it appears that the Spanish code of laws, so far as it is compatible with the changes that have been made, has been adopted. This code, I take it for granted, like that of all others of the civilized nations of Europe, which has been gradually formed from that of ancient Rome, is, in the main, and in a moral point of view, a rational and excellent system. But, as to all the

modes and forms of administration which give to a code the pure practical operation which its principles breathe, and which are generally understood to constitute the leading, if not sole distinctions between free and arbitrary institutions, the reglamento provisorio presents us with a beggarly account of provisions, with large exceptions, which do so allay the good precedent, and articles so pared away that there is left no bold promontory in all its coasts, behind which the storm-chased innocent skiff can take shelter from any of the gales of power. Except the case of the elections of the Cabildos, the whole is, substantially, a mere reorganization of the colonial viceroyalty. It is regarded as such in practice, and, therefore, has obtained little or none of the real respect and confidence of the people.

But the sentiments and wishes of the people, as in all similar circumstances, have had considerable sway over this newly-created Government. There is a point beyond which it dares not go; and a limit, as the numerous changes that have taken place clearly show, beyond which the forbearance of the people cannot be stretched. As the revolution has progressed, more information has been obtained; the people begin to have a correct knowledge of their rights; they are becoming more watchful, and their rulers more respectful. And, as the bounds of information are extended, the field of discussion enlarges, and the political horizon gradually clears and expands in all directions. The past changes and struggles would seem, at first view, to have been a fruitless waste of time and labor: it has not been so; the people have been instructed and improved by them. Public opinion, the pioneer and precursor of all revolutions and beneficial institutions, has been ripening, and the crisis is rapidly approaching when another and a firmer step will be taken, assisted by the newly-acquired lights and helps. More of the old system will be removed, and such institutions will be introduced as will furnish some practical evidence at home of the benefits of civil and political freedom, and the work of the revolution will approach its consummation. This crisis will be considerably accelerated by the present state of the provinces, their murmurings and civil wars; to pacify which, and for their own welfare and safety, it has obviously become necessary to make an entire change, and to introduce a new order of things. The voice of the people must and will be heard.

On inquiring for the causes of these unfortunate differences and hostilities among the several patriot causes, and after removing from about them all that mere vituperation and angry invective with which they have been too much mingled and confused, they will be found to be of vital importance; to have for their object principles materially affecting the good of the people, and to have originated in very rational views as to a frame of government best suited to their country, and which was most likely to promote and secure its general as well as its particular interests. The people of this part of Spanish America have, from the commencement of their struggles, looked

towards the example and the precepts of the United States in the management of their revolution and the organization of their political institutions.

Without, in general, entering into any profound arguments or deep speculations, for which, from their previous education and habits, they were utterly unprepared, they took a view of their own situation *en masse;* they saw themselves, by the removal of the colonial institutions, almost at a single blow divested of every implement of civil government. They looked over the immense extent of their country, and saw that it had been cut up into provinces and jurisdictions, and in that manner governed. They then turned their eyes towards the United States, and saw, or thought they saw, many analogies, and a prosperity which evinced that all they beheld was worth copying. But whether these suggestions were made from such a comparative view, or from the nature of things, or from whatever other cause, the idea and utility of separate state Governments in each province, like those of the United States, with magistrates selected by its own people from among themselves, became very general, and was warmly embraced by a great portion of the patriots. This party, however, in favor of the system of confederation and representation, whatever might be its numerical strength, or the force of its reasonings, were, as they now are, by much the weakest in point of actual power and operation; because they had not the means, nor have ever been allowed to exhibit any examples of their principles; and, besides, they were obliged to address themselves to a people to whom the entire field of politics was a novelty; and they had no press to give stability and currency to their arguments. In opposition to those principles and this party, there arose a faction in Buenos Ayres, who, looking attentively to the interests and the aggrandizement of that city, wished to establish a consolidated Government under a Chief Magistrate invested with powers analogous to those of the late viceroy; but somewhat bridled and controlled with a revival of the political and civil institutions of the colony, so modified as to suit the existing state of things. And the general impression of the necessity of being constantly armed and prepared to meet the hostilities of the metropolis induced the people to yield a ready obedience to their military leaders for the time being. Hence, to get the command of the army, and take possession of the fort in Buenos Ayres, has hitherto been the same thing as a complete revolution. It has at once placed in the hands of such a chief the revenues; because Buenos Ayres has been the sole point of collecting all the customs, all the forces, and the entire command of the state, the affairs of which could be wielded and managed at pleasure by such a Chief Magistrate, according to the forms of the colonial institutions. While, on the other hand, the opposing popular party which advocated state Governments, and the representative system, never have, as yet, had any forms or means by which they could gather together and express their wishes, or even make a show of their numbers and power.

In October, 1812, while Saratea commanded in chief at Montevideo, and Artigas, before the same place, commanded the forces of the Banda Oriental, this great principle of separate state or provincial Governments, interwoven, as it very probably was, with personal and local considerations, gave rise to a heated controversy between them. Saratea, finding Artigas to be refractory, and unmanageable by temptations, threats, or persuasions, determined to have him arrested. Artigas, being apprized of this design, fled to the plains, and in a short time all the Orientals followed; in consequence of which, the further prosecution of the siege of Montevideo, at that time, was abandoned. The ruling party of Buenos Ayres, perceiving the popularity of the cause of Artigas, and his power, became extremely anxious to win him over, or at least to conciliate him. At the request of Artigas, therefore, who then thought, or affected to believe, that his controversy with Saratea was merely personal, Saratea and some others were removed from the command of the army, and his place was filled by Rondeau, and other officers put in command, whose principles, being unknown, were, therefore, not so obnoxious to the Oriental chief. But at the same time, Artigas followed up the controversy, and tested the designs of the Government of Buenos Ayres, by demanding, in form, that the Banda Oriental should be considered and treated as a state under its own government, and, as such, should be left to regulate its own concerns for itself, and be represented in due form and proportion in a General Congress. This was treated by Buenos Ayres as an open dereliction of the standard of the country; and a most unreasonable, criminal, and declared rebellion against the only legitimate Government of the union of all the provinces, which, as it contended, extended over the whole territory that had been subject to the late viceroyalty; of which the city of Buenos Ayres always had been, of right was then, and always ought to be, the capital, whence alone all authority should emanate. This Artigas opposed, and denounced as the assertion of a spirit of unjust and unreasonable domination on the part of Buenos Ayres, to which he could not, and would not submit. The parties were heated, reason was silenced, liberality banished, and they repaired from the field of argument to the field of battle. Artigas, either from an indisposition to push matters to the greatest extremity, from policy, or from a sense of his own inferiority in point of strength, has hitherto acted on the defensive, and confined himself within the territory of the Banda Oriental, or of the Entre Rios, since it has taken sides with his cause. It is said that, in this controversy, there have already been fought fifteen or sixteen sharp battles, in each of which conflicts Buenos Ayres has been defeated, and suffered severely. In the last, which was fought about the 1st of April last, near Santa Fé, on the northeastern side of the Paraguay, there were of the Buenos Ayres army, which was about nineteen hundred strong, eight hundred left dead on the field of battle, and the rest dispersed, so that the whole army may be said to have been extinguished at a blow. This

fatal catastrophe was heard in silent gloom at Buenos Ayres; not a syllable about it was uttered from the press, yet all seemed to lament the policy by which it had been brought about, or rendered unavoidable.

Until the year 1814 the province of Santa Fé, or the district of country called Entre Rios, had a representative in the Congress of Buenos Ayres. Since that time it has withdrawn itself from the Union, and sided with Artigas and the people of the Banda Oriental. This change and desertion of the standard of the country are charged by the Government of Buenos Ayres to the intrigues and seductive principles of Artigas; but, if Artigas has been practising his arts with the people of Santa Fé, the acts of Buenos Ayres have most powerfully seconded his designs. By adverting to the situation of the population of the Union, and the various paths of internal commerce through it, by land and by water, it will be seen how very advantageously Santa Fé is situated as a port of entry and great depot for all the country to the west and north of it. As such it had opened itself; and commerce began to flow into it, when Buenos Ayres interposed, and declared that no trade should go to Santa Fé but what passed through the city of Buenos Ayres itself. This odious and unjust monopoly was at once revolting to the minds of the people of Entre Rios, and a proof of the correctness of the principles contended for by Artigas. They therefore abandoned Buenos Ayres, and are now the allies of Artigas.

In the year 1810 the Government of Buenos Ayres sent a force of five hundred men, under the command of General Belgrano, up to the province of Paraguay, to expel the royal authorities, and to introduce that province under the Government of the Union. But the people of Paraguay rejected the proffered Buenos Ayres auxiliaries. After some time, however, they of themselves expelled the Spanish authorities; and, refusing to submit either to a Spanish or a patriot viceroy, or chief planted in any way at Buenos Ayres, they attempted to establish a government of their own; and, from thenceforward until the present time, they have absolutely renounced and forbidden all intercourse or trade with Buenos Ayres. No active hostilities appear, however, to have been carried on as yet between these two provinces.

The Government of the people of the Banda Oriental and Entre Rios, since their alliance, has been altogether in the hands of Artigas, who rules by his will alone, like an absolute monarch, without attendant guards, or an Indian casique. No frame of constitution is exhibited; none is pretended to exist. Justice is rendered voluntarily, or is administered according to the mandate of the chief.

In Paraguay the reins of government are held by Francia, who, it is said, makes a show of administering all political and civil affairs in the manner, and according to the forms, of the consular Government of ancient Rome.

The two powerful provinces of Cordova and Santiago del Estero have both been in rebellion against the ruling power of Buenos Ayres, which has charged

Cordova with being a very godo, or tory province, and both of them with being seduced into an unnatural desertion of the cause of liberty by the arts and intrigues of Artigas. But Cordova has lost by the revolution its very profitable mule trade, the nature of which I have described, and both have suffered heavy contributions; and all their resources have been made tributary to the Buenos Ayres monopoly, and to sustain its pre-eminence. They have both been brought back by force of arms under the Union, and are now silent and passive. In short, it cannot nor ought it to be concealed that the ruling party of Buenos Ayres has managed the affairs of the Union in such a strain of domineering monopoly as to retard reform, delay the progress of the revolution, and to render the most patriotic provinces extremely dissatisfied. Mendoza occasionally murmurs, and San Juan is very much discontented with the present state of affairs; and the people of those two provinces heretofore most attached to the Union, begin to speak openly, and in sharp terms, of the domineering, monopolizing temper and conduct of Buenos Ayres.

Of the one million and eighty thousand souls which the late viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres has been estimated to contain, it will be seen, by the details I have furnished, that four hundred and eighty-three thousand, including Jujuy, are all that acknowledge themselves subject to the present Government of Buenos Ayres; that the patriot provinces at war with Buenos Ayres contain a population (exclusive of Indians) of one hundred and eighty thousand souls; and that so many of the high provinces in which there have been any revolutionary movements as contain four hundred and seventeen thousand souls, are at this time and have some of them been continually under the colonial yoke. The patriot provinces of Salta and Jujuy have been the chief seat of war from the commencement of the revolution. The royal army was once in possession of Salta, which is now the head-quarters of the patriot forces under Belgrano. And the patriot army was once so successful as to penetrate as far towards Lima as the city of Chayanta, in the province of Charcas; but they gave back from thence, and the Spanish army is now, it is said, in the possession of the city of Jujuy.

Such is the extent, nature, and circumstances of this new and revolutionary Union. The present bonds which hold it together are temporary in name, and more so in their nature. A final declaration of independence has been made; the people have renounced all expectation of a compromise with Spain; and the separation has been resolved on amidst such imbittering severities and cruelties, that any kind of return to their former allegiance is utterly impossible and impracticable. The expectation of reconquest is no less vain; and, to be convinced of it, it is only necessary to view the country, and reflect a few moments on its nature, and the situation and character of its inhabitants.

But what is to be the future course of this revolution, is a question more difficult to determine. One thing, however, appears clear, that unless the

present civil dissensions are healed, and the warring provinces are pacified and reconciled with each other, a very great proportion, if not all, the benefits and advantages of the revolution which would accrue immediately as well to themselves as to foreign nations, will be totally destroyed, or, at least, very much diminished and delayed. The great benefit which they are continually promising themselves from it is, the introduction of the representative system of government, with all its kindly and fostering institutions. But their military chiefs will not suffer the system to have a commencement, to be planted at all, or to have a single undisturbed day to take root. For the petty Cabildo elections are proofs of the wishes of the people and their disappointments. The chiefs (one and all) allege that, during the effervescence of a revolution, popular elections are dangerous; that submission to a strong and energetic power is necessary in such times; and under this plea of the distractions and necessities of the times, they all alike refuse to permit the people to make a single experiment of a general, genuine popular election. Artigas, situated as he is, driven first in one direction and then in another, on one side attacked by the Portuguese, on another by the patriots of Buenos Ayres, and watching lest in another direction an unexpected blow might reach him from Spain, has all the population of the Banda Oriental thus pressed under an unqualified submission to his will; and he is thus furnished with a plausible pretext for ruling over all as arbitrarily as an Indian casique. The rulers of Buenos Ayres talk to the people under them of the infinite dangers to be apprehended from Spain on all hands; and of the indispensable necessity of keeping up a strong army next Peru; of raising forces to invade, reconquer, and now to hold Chili; of the threats and wrongs of Portugal; of the indispensable necessity of having Artigas, and the rest of their wicked subjects, and the rebellious provinces, completely subdued; and of the great importance of preserving the capital, the city of Buenos Ayres itself, in perfect security, by the presence of a strong military force. The military chief of Paraguay finds or frames similar arguments in favor of an energetic Government; and the people have been so far baffled, and not trusted with the means of expressing their will or of exercising their power. Nothing is easier than to make a fine partisan soldier of a gaucho: those of the plains of the Banda Oriental, under Artigas, and those of Salta, under Guemes, are proofs how readily those peaceful herdsmen can be made terrible in war; they are a class of people who have a predisposition to an unrestrained, roving life. To lead them to independence, therefore, an enterprising, spirited leader was all that was necessary. And if the gauchos of the pampas shall, like those of the Banda Oriental, find a bold leader who shall inspire them with a resolution to insist on having their voice heard through their lawful representatives, the city of Buenos Ayres itself may then soon be what Montevideo now is—a place where commerce once was. The peace and commerce of Buenos

Ayres have a happy and continually improving effect upon the neighboring inhabitants of the pampas. With such an example, how misguided, how cruel was the policy which converted the city of Santa Fé from a new and flourishing seat of commerce, exciting industry, diffusing information, the arts of peace, and innumerable benefits all around, into the stronghold of bands of hardy and warlike gauchos. The evils of these distractions and civil wars, as regards the fruits, productions, and resources of the country, are obvious. It is acknowledged that they have not merely prevented the increase of husbandry, but have diminished its amount; many fine chacaras or grain farms have been totally neglected or destroyed; and the stocks of cattle, which furnish the great staple commodities of all the plains, have been everywhere very much diminished.

These are some of the effects of these pernicious conflicts—criminations and recriminations of leaders—and are fruitless, or only serve to irritate and make matters more incurable. As regards the rights of self-government, certainly that which is sound justice and solid argument in Buenos Ayres against Spain, is equally sound and solid in the Banda Oriental and in Paraguay; if any one has the right to throw off the yoke, and to assume to itself its own government, all have the same right. The rights of all of them are, then, perfectly equal; and no one province can, in justice, have the privilege of ruling over any other of them without its consent. To restore peace and harmony to these contending provinces, would be to bestow on them the greatest imaginable benefit; by removing the most imposing and plausible pretext for all internal guards and military forces, the soldiery must be sent, where they ought to be, to meet the foreign enemy on the frontier, which is the only foe in arms the people ought to have to contend with. The chiefs being thus deprived of the source of their arbitrary power, the effect would be, at once, to give the people their liberties, and to restore to their country all its abundance, its resources, and its blessings. But, without this, to attempt to give to any one of the provinces a preponderancy over the rest, would be to confirm or to drive the people of every province into an unqualified submission to the military chief of each division of the country; and it would be to lend a helping hand to settle the country down under the government of a number of petty kings or princes, instead of a confederated republic. The British Government and its authorities, with a continually wakeful regard to their commercial interests, have endeavored to pursue the incongruous and difficult policy of thwarting and confounding the republican principles of the people; and, at the same time, of discountenancing the inveterate hostility of the chiefs of the provinces, so wasteful of the commercial productions of the country. The English admiral, Bowles, concluded a treaty of agreement with General Artigas, regulating the British commercial intercourse with the people whom he controls; and an English consul, resident in Buenos Ayres, with a ship of war always

near, without promoting the establishment of free institutions anywhere, insures an unrestrained trade with all the warring provinces.

Although, by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, of 1777, between Spain and Portugal, the limits which separate Brazil from the Spanish dominions were finally settled; and, therefore, as it would seem, on the score of right, the King of Portugal cannot have the least pretension whatever to the Banda Oriental, or indeed to any portion of the territory of the late viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres; yet that monarch has invaded the Banda Oriental, claiming to hold it by right of conquest, or on some other ground, (I know not what,) as a part of Brazil; and a Portuguese army, under the command of General Lecor, is now in the actual occupation of the city of Montevideo, and about three or four miles around it. The Government of Buenos Ayres and the King of Portugal are now at peace, and apparently a perfectly friendly intercourse is carried on between Buenos Ayres and Montevideo; while, on the other hand, there exists at this time, and has always been waged, the most inveterate hostility between Artigas and the Portuguese. It would appear that Artigas and his gauchos are bravely defending their homes, their rights, and their country; that the King of Portugal, availing himself of the weakness and distractions of the affairs of his kinsman Ferdinand VII., intended to aggrandize himself by annexing a portion of his provinces to Brazil; and that Buenos Ayres, desirous of preserving the lucrative commerce of the river unembarrassed, had either actually compromised with Portugal, or was willing to look with solemn dignity upon that which it felt too feeble to resist or resent; or that it was at present so much exasperated at the enemy against whose edifice the blow of Portugal is aimed, as to refuse to ward it off, even although it may, by its striking effectually, itself be seriously wounded by the scattering fragments.

The revenue of the Government of Buenos Ayres has been extremely fluctuating, owing to the very unsettled state of its political affairs. During the early period of the revolution, it was said to have amounted to between three and four millions of dollars per annum; at present, it does not amount to fully two millions. In the first years of the revolution, confiscation of the property of godos, and imprestitos, or forced loans, levied off the disaffected, poured considerable sums into the treasury. These sources of revenue are now exhausted, or have ceased. A great source of revenue is the tithes, which are all paid into the treasury, except the salaries of the canons, two thousand dollars per annum each, and a small deduction, which goes to the support of the clergy generally; who, with that allowance from the tithes, their first-fruits, alms, &c., and the proceeds of their own property, are very well supported. It may be estimated that the clergy of the several provinces amount to one-seventeenth part of the whole population. But monkish institutions are rapidly falling into disrepute, and the people have every prospect of being soon relieved from their influence and their burden.

The product of the tithes depends very much upon the state of husbandry; and agriculture having declined, this source of revenue has also been diminished. The other branches of revenue, derived from internal taxation, are the alcavala, licenses to retailers, and such like indirect taxes. But the principal source of revenue to the Government of Buenos Ayres is that derived from the customs, or its duties on imports and exports. The changes that have already begun, and are likely to continue and increase, will account for the diminution of its revenue in this principal branch also. Under the viceroyalty, Buenos Ayres and Montevideo were the only ports of entry and collection of the customs for the whole country; but, in consequence of the wars and devastations about Montevideo, commerce was driven entirely up the river, and passed exclusively through Buenos Ayres; since then, the Banda Oriental and Entre Rios have declared themselves independent and unconnected, and having made a commercial regulation with the British admiral, much of the trade which used formerly to fill the coffers of Buenos Ayres is now beginning to find its way direct to the opposite side of the river; and the trade of Paraguay, having been for some time closed against Buenos Ayres, is also taking that direction. A considerable part of the foreign goods, particularly British, which paid a duty at Buenos Ayres, was sent into many places and provinces beyond its immediate jurisdiction. A large amount was sent over the Andes from Mendoza into Chili, or into the high provinces to the northwestward. Since the opening of the ports of Chili, this route of transportation must be too expensive to continue; and, consequently, the revenue thus derived to Buenos Ayres must cease. Some of these causes are permanent, and others will continue to operate until harmony among the provinces shall be restored, and the establishment of peace, order, and freedom shall give that security to person and property which is the only true mode of encouraging all profitable pursuits, of husbandry and pasturage, as well as all others.

The Government of Buenos Ayres has an outstanding public debt of about one million of dollars. This debt has been chiefly created by an issue of what are called boletas, or due bills, given in discharge of salaries due from the state to its military and civil officers. The Government, finding the revenue fall short, ordered one-half only of all salaries to be paid in cash, and the other half to be paid in this scrip called boletas, which is redeemable indefinitely and at pleasure. In April last, boletas were as much as fifty and sixty per cent. below par. Notwithstanding this economical measure of issuing boletas, the Government, not still being able to meet the various demands on it as they were made, has, therefore, from time to time, issued its notes or bills payable on demand, as funds should accrue in the treasury. These notes are called Government cash paper; there is no great amount of it afloat, and it is said to be equal to what we should call good mercantile paper at ninety days.

The military force of Buenos Ayres, as estimated by intelligent persons of that city, according to the representations current there, amount, in the whole, to thirteen thousand infantry, fourteen hundred cavalry, and fifteen hundred artillery, which was thus distributed. From the sum total, the army of Santa Fé, estimated at nineteen hundred, which was extinguished about the 1st of April last, is to be deducted. And of the residue of this military force, there are quartered in and about the city of Buenos Ayres twenty-five hundred; there are, in the army of Peru, at Salta, commanded by General Belgrano, three thousand; and in the army of Chili, under General San Martin, which, in Buenos Ayres, is called and estimated as a part of the military establishment of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, and in Chili is called the united army of the Andes, there were said to be nine thousand five hundred. Of this latter army, about two thousand freed negro troops were sent from Buenos Ayres, with an intention of finally getting rid of them by wasting them in the wars of that country, or of leaving them to be disbanded there. The rest of the army of the Andes was originally composed of fugitive Chilinos. The army of Peru has been almost wholly recruited in the high provinces, and has, in many respects, imposed upon them peculiar hardships; all its provisions, cavalry, and stores have been furnished from that country, and its ranks have been entirely filled from it. And the numerous desertions, and continual recruiting, has had the effect not so much of wasting and diminishing the aggregate amount of population, as it has of throwing it loose from the ties of its habits and domicil, and of shifting and changing its individual location.

The naval armament of the Government of Buenos Ayres consists of ten small vessels, brigs and schooners, of from two to twelve guns each, among which there is distributed a marine corps of about two hundred and fifty men.

I have made every effort to methodize and arrange all I had to present to you, relative to the viceroyalty or provinces of Buenos Ayres, in such form and manner as to cause the subject to be seen in a clear light, and to be fully understood. I trust my efforts have not been altogether fruitless. And, as likely to aid the obtaining a correct view of what I have related, and to facilitate the use and application of some important facts, I have made out and annexed the following statistical table:

A Statistical Table of the Late Viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres

Number	Names of the provinces	Population of			Territorial extent in square miles of			Representatives		Productions
		Those in the Union	Opposed to Union	As yet colonies	Those in the Union	Opposed to Union	As yet colonies	Now sent	Entitled	
1	Buenos Ayres..	105,000	....	....	50,000	....	....	7	7	Cattle, skins, salt.
2	Banda Oriental.	....	45,000	....	....	86,000*	....	..	3	Cattle, skins, fruit, wood.
3	Entre Rios.....	....	25,000	....	....	104,500*	....	..	2	Cattle, wood, skins, fruit, wine, matte.
4	Cordova.....	75,000	....	....	105,000	....	....	3	5	Cattle, wood, skins, fruit, wine, tobacco, lime.
5	Punta San Luis	10,000	....	....	40,000	....	....	1	1	Cattle, fruit, wood.
6	Mendoza.....	38,000	....	....	38,000	....	....	1	2	Fruit, wine, brandy, peltry, precious metals.
7	San Juan.....	34,000	....	....	36,000	....	....	1	2	Same.
8	Rioja.....	20,000	....	....	22,400	....	....	1	1	Same.
9	Catamarca.....	36,000	....	....	11,200	....	....	1	2	Cotton, grain, fruit, wine, brandy.
10	Santiago del Estero.....	45,000	....	....	40,000	....	....	1	3	Cattle, wood, tobacco.
11	Tucuman.....	45,000	....	....	50,000	....	....	2	3	Same.
12	Salta.....	50,000	....	....	41,000	....	....	1	3	Same.
13	Jujuy.....	25,000	....	....	30,000	....	....	1	1	Same. Peltry.
14	Chicas.....	....	....	10,000	....	....	26,400	1	1	Grain, fruit, wine, brandy, precious metals.
15	Potosi.....	....	....	112,000	....	....	12,000	..	7	Same.
16	Misque.....	....	....	15,000	....	....	9,000	1	1	Same.
17	Charcas.....	....	....	120,000	....	....	5,000	3	10	Same.
18	Cochabamba...	....	....	100,000	....	....	3,400	1	7	Same.
19	La Paz.....	....	....	60,000	....	....	10,000	..	3	Same.
20	Paraguay.....	....	110,000	....	....	43,200	....	..	7	Grain, sugar, matte, fruit, wine, brandy, timber.
	Total.....	483,000	180,000	417,000	643,600	233,700	65,800	26	71	
	Aggregate of population and territory.....	....	....	1,080,000	....	....	763,100			

* The estimate of the extent of these provinces includes their Indian territory.

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Joel Roberts Poinsett, ex-Agent of the United States to South America, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

Private. Columbia, S. C., *November 4, 1818.*

Sir: In transmitting to you such information in relation to the affairs of South America as may be useful to the public, I feel it my duty to com-

[1] MS. Miscellaneous Letters, LXV. For Adams to Poinsett, October 23, to which this is a reply, see above, pt. I, doc. 66. The public report, referred to in the first paragraph of this, and its brief covering letter, both bearing this date, November 4, follow this, being reprinted from *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 323. Since certain portions of Poinsett's public report relate more or less exclusively to each of the three distinct portions of Spanish America which were developing into Argentina, Chile and Peru, it has for the present publication been subdivided into three parts. The preliminary paragraphs on the colonial system which apply equally to all three regions are included in this pt. II, doc. 243, on Argentina: for the other portions of the report, see under this date, November 4, 1818, pt. V, doc. 461, on Chile, and pt. XI, doc. 942, on Peru.

municate to the executive my opinion with regard to the recognition of Buenos Ayres.

The objections which might arise from the civil war between the authorities of the Eastern Shore & those of Buenos Ayres; and from the present state of Paraguay are not, in my opinion, important. Paraguay and the Territory of the Eastern Shore have hitherto made no attempt to form any foreign connexion: for the late commercial arrangement between the British Commander & Artigas cannot be viewed in that light. They would be content to participate in the advantages of our Commerce. They would not consider themselves aggrieved by our recognizing only Buenos Ayres and Chile.

But Sir, how will this act be regarded by the European powers? The principles, which characterize their Alliance are professedly antirevolutionary; may not this act render them still more hostile to the republican Institutions of this Hemisphere? Will not the powers which have Colonies take alarm at our espousing the cause of the Emancipation of the Spanish Colonies, merely because it is the Cause of Emancipation? For the advantages, which may result to these states from the freedom of South America are too remote to be taken into account.

The invitation of Russia to the Allies, to seize this opportunity of applying the principles, which characterize the force and Union of the European Cabinets, by settling the disputed claims of Spain and Portugal: and by accomplishing the pacification of the Colonies of Spain, clearly evinces the policy of that court.

Great Britain will probably encourage the intervention of the Allies, to effect a pacification. She will insist upon the removal of what the Ministerial prints call the absurd and oppressive restrictions on their industry and their trade. By this Course She will gain the commerce of Mexico, where the struggle for independence has ceased: that of the Spanish Main, Grenada & Caraccas, where the contest is doubtful; and that of Lima, where there has been no revolutionary movement.

The moral effect likely to be produced by the recognition of these Colonies, has been very much overrated. The people have had but little part in the conduct of the revolution, and have no influence in the government. They would not feel much elated by a act, that would only strengthen the party in power. And the provinces would view it only as confirming the usurpation of the Capital.

The Governments of Buenos Ayres since their first establishment and in all their changes, have invariably acted towards this country as towards a Secondary power. The disposition of the people has been correctly stated, to be favorable to a connexion with the United States; But were that Government to act from its own impulse, the fear of exciting the jealousy of Great Britain, not the desire of conciliating Spain, would prevent their

making a treaty with us upon the footing of the most favored nation. Their late declaration to the contrary, notwithstanding. What Lord Chatham said long since of the Ministers of Spain will apply to these governments "I never met with an instance of Candour or dignity in their proceedings; nothing but low cunning, trick, and artifice."

This disposition of the Government of Buenos Ayres was especially manifested during the late war between this Country and Great Britain. They avoided as much as possible all public communication with our citizens: They suffered the British officers to examine all foreign letters, so as to enable them to intercept our correspondence: and they permitted the British Cruisers to capture our Ships in the Outer roads, within sight of Buenos Ayres, without remonstrance or complaint.

Their principal resources since the commencement of their revolution have been derived from the commerce of Great Britain, and the manufactures of that country have become necessary to the people. The great benefits derived from that trade will never be sacrificed to their gratitude to us, for having been the first nation to acknowledge their Independence. And they will never willingly adopt any measures, which might give umbrage to Great Britain.

And suppose a treaty effected, would there be any permanence or Stability in the advantages derived by a treaty with such a government? Revolutions in that country have been frequent and there is every reason to believe that they will again occur. The policy of those, who succeed in wresting the power from their political adversaries is generally in opposition to that formerly pursued. There is a want of Responsibility and of good faith in these governments, and if it became their interest to disavow the acts of their Predecessors, they would not hesitate to do it.

The advocates for this measure have said that they did not maintain "that every immature revolution, or every Usurper before his power is consolidated was to be acknowledged by us, but that as soon as Stability and Order were maintained, no matter by whom, we ought to consider the actual as the true government." Let us look to the actual state of these countries. Can it be said that Stability and order are established where a corrupt soldiery are accustomed to set up & pull down governments as their Interest or Caprice dictate; & where a great proportion of the people are opposed to the present order of things; and most of the provinces to the Usurpation of the Capital.

The present party in power are corrupt and interested men. The Life of Pueyrredon has been a course of successful intrigue, and he was at one time intimately connected with the Princess Carlotta & disposed to promote her views. Rivadavia their agent in Europe was at one time in the Executive & was notoriously corrupt.

Dn. Carlos Alvear is now in Montevideo, and his partizans are numerous

in Buenos Ayres. Sarrea [?] and others of that party have returned, and a change of government may be again looked for. Carrera too is in Montevideo and breathes vengeance against the murderers of his brothers: he is active, daring and intelligent and has a powerful party in Chile.

The Portuguese have an agent in Buenos Ayres, and from his frequent interviews with Pueyrredon, there appears to be some understanding between that Court and the Supreme Director. The Portuguese Army, rated at 14,000 men, has taken possession of the principal places of the Eastern Shore, and of the country between the Parana and Uruguay called Entrerios: which last they are reported to have taken from the forces of Artigas in the name and on behalf of the Government of Buenos Ayres. Their advanced posts extend to Corrientes; and Buenos Ayres will not oppose their overruning Paraguay, because that province has refused to submit to the Capital.

The Royalists are posted at Jujui, and are in possession of all the country above Salta. The forces of Buenos Ayres are at Tucuman. San Martin is, they say, organising an expedition against Lima; but I do not think their force on the Pacific sufficient to justify such an attempt. It is more probable that his intention is to proceed to Arica or some other intermediate port, from whence there is a good road to upper Peru. By this movement the Army of the Royalists at Jujui will be enveloped. This plan was suggested to them on a former occasion. The Enclosed Diagram will shew you that the Government of Buenos Ayres is not in possession of three entire Intendencies. The Royalists still hold Talcahuano, which is the strongest place in Chile, and in some measure the Key of that Kingdom—I admit that the recognition of these Colonies is no just cause of War; and even if it were that Spain is in no condition to declare war against the United States. But let us recollect that when almost the whole of that country was in possession of an enemy, The Cortes discussed the expediency of declaring War against the United States, on the ground that we fomented a spirit of revolt in the Spanish Colonies. Spain never calculates with prudence the chances of political success, but frequently acts from feeling; and the subjugation of the Colonies is a subject that enlists all the feelings of the nation. And if we are driven to the Extremity of War what assistance can we expect from our allies of South America? They will require Subsidies of Money and Arms, and by their incompetence will embarass all our operations. It is true that we might send them men capable of directing their councils and guiding their armies, but be assured they would not place confidence in them. They would be regarded with distrust, and would have the mortification to see their plans baffled by the jealousy of the Creoles.

It is scarcely necessary for one, who has made so many sacrifices to promote the independence of So. America, and whose enthusiasm in the cause of freedom carried him to the utmost limits of his duties as a Citizen

of the United States, to disclaim all hostility to the Emancipation of these Colonies. The Interest I take in their success yields only to my regard for the welfare of my own Country.

I have the honor [etc.].

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Joel Roberts Poinsett, ex-Agent of the United States to South America, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

COLUMBIA, *November 4, 1818.*

SIR: In conformity with the request of the President of the United States, contained in your letter of the 23d of October, I have the honor to transmit to you such information as I possess in relation to the affairs of South America.

I regret that my absence from Charleston, where most of my documents are, does not allow me to enter more into detail, and to give a fuller description of those countries.

As the Executive will doubtless have received from the commissioners ample information with regard to the recent occurrences at Buenos Ayres and Chili, I have only brought down the events of the revolution to the period of their arrival at Buenos Ayres. In the course of this narrative I have confined myself to facts; for I thought it unnecessary to dwell on the motives which induced the creoles to shake off the Spanish yoke. The oppression under which they labored, the severe and absurd restrictions upon their commerce and industry, are too notorious to require a comment; and the situation of the mother country not only justified but rendered it necessary for them to establish for themselves an internal government.

By letters which I have received since the return of the commissioners from Buenos Ayres, I learn that the Portuguese forces are in possession of the principal places on the eastern shore of the Uruguay, and of the country between the Parana and Uruguay. Their advanced posts extend to the Corrientes. The royal forces in Upper Peru are posted at the defiles of Jujuy, and are in possession of the country above Salta. The forces of Buenos Ayres, under the command of Belgrano, are at Tucuman. By the last victory gained by the patriots of Chili on the plains of Maipu, the royalists have been driven within the fortifications of Talcahuana.

I have the honor [etc.].

[1] See footnote 1 to doc. 242, p. 439.

[ENCLOSURE]

Portion of Joel Roberts Poinsett's Report of November 4, 1818, which relates to the United Provinces of South America

The government of Spanish America is confided to the Council of the Indies. Their authority over the colonies is unlimited; they are the source of all favor, and have the presentation to all civil and ecclesiastical appointments; they constitute likewise a court of appeal from the decision of the audiences.

The viceroy is commander-in-chief, governor, intendant of the province where he resides, and president of the royal audience, and other tribunals. As commander-in-chief he is assisted by a council of general officers, and as governor by an assessor and legal counsellors. He assists with great ceremony at the session of the royal audiences, which tribunal watches his conduct, and has a legal control over his actions; and he in turn renders an account to the Council of the Indies of the public acts and private conduct of the members of the audience. The viceroy is not allowed to trade or to form any connexion with the people of his Government, and it was not customary for him to enter any private house. The laws of the Indies, which in theory are calculated to protect the colonists and Indians from oppression, grant him almost regal powers, but restrain the arbitrary exercise of them by the responsibility attached to any abuse of authority. At the expiration of his office a commission is appointed to inquire into his past conduct, and all people, including the Indians, are called upon to prefer charges against him, and state any grievance or vexation they may have experienced during his administration. This residencia, as it is called, has become an unmeaning ceremony. The royal audience, which is the supreme court in the colonies, is composed of the viceroy, who is the president, of a regent, three oidores, two fiscals, a reporter, and an alguazil.

The law lays both them and their families under the severest restrictions, and the president is enjoined to watch their conduct, and to receive and transmit to the King an annual statement of their acts.

They constitute the last court of appeal in America. The viceroy is recommended to consult them in all emergencies of the state, but is left at liberty to act as he thinks proper. Where the authority of the president interferes with their decisions, they may remonstrate, but his will is executed. They have the privilege of corresponding directly with the King, and may make any representations they think proper on the conduct of the viceroy.

When the functions of the viceroy are suspended by sickness or death, the regent is his legal representative.

Of the Cabildo we have already spoken. Besides the alcaldes of this body, there is a criminal judge. The city is divided into barrio or quarters, and each quarter has an alcalde de barrio or justice. There are likewise justices

of the peace, or lieutenants of justice, as they are called, whose jurisdiction extends over a certain district of country. They are accountable to the governor, and are appointed for two years.

The military and clergy claim their *fuero*, that is, the right of being judged by their peers, and an *esprit du corps* generally screens the culprit from justice.

The spirit of litigation pervades all classes, interrupts the harmony of society, and destroys the confidence and affection which ought to reign in families and among near connexions. The lawyers are a numerous body; and the practice is not, as in the United States, an open appeal to impartial justice, but the art of multiplying acts and of procrastinating decisions until the favor of the judge is secured by influence and bribery.

The ecclesiastical jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the King and Council of the Indies. The Pope has ceded all his pontifical rights except that of issuing bulls of confirmation, and even these are limited to the candidate presented by the King of Spain.

The bishop, assisted by a fiscal and a provisor, forms the highest ecclesiastical tribunal; the business is transacted by the provisor, and the bishops assist only in cases which concern ecclesiastics of rank. The ecclesiastical tribunals have cognizance in all cases of a spiritual nature, and which concern ecclesiastics, and in all questions arising from pious donations and legacies. The ecclesiastical fuero or privileges are extensive; it is sometimes (although very rarely) mixed, as when the plaintiff is an ecclesiastic and the defendant a layman, the cause is tried by a secular tribunal, and *vice versa*.

Buenos Ayres has a chapter consisting of a dean, a sub-dean and chapter, and a certain number of prebendaries.

The parishes are served by rectoral curates, and doctrinal curates officiate in the Indian settlements and villages, which are divided into doctrinas. The former derive their revenue from the fees of baptism, marriage, and interments, which the latter are forbidden to receive, but have an allowance from the treasury. Priests have been frequently employed in the administration of the public affairs, and have had great influence over the minds of the people, and a powerful agency in subduing and attaching them to the sovereign of Spain.

The zeal of the missionaries in this part of South America effected more than the arms of the first adventurers, who, after they had conquered the country, were repeatedly cut off by insurrections of the natives, roused to desperation by their rapacity and oppression.

The conquest of Paraguay by the Jesuits; their large establishments on the Uraguay; the privileges granted them by the King in order that they might prove their assertion that, if left to themselves, and not intruded upon by the Spaniards, they would subdue the Indians of that extensive territory, and convert them to the Catholic faith; their rigid policy in detecting and

sending out of their limits any one whom curiosity or interest might have tempted to trespass on their territory; the rapid subjection and conversion of the tribes on the Uraguay and Paraguay, who were incorporated with the Guaranis Indians; their submission to the organization of the Jesuits, who distributed the day into periods of work, recreation, and devotion, and established, after the manner of the Monrovians, a common magazine for the reception of the produce of their industry, and dealt out to them, according to the number of members in a family, the necessary articles of food and clothing; the frequent attacks made upon them by the unsubdued tribes, and the depredations committed by the Mamalukes, the lawless inhabitants of the Portuguese frontier and of Saint Pablo; the jealousy excited by the flourishing state of these settlements about the period of the expulsion of the Jesuits from Europe; the resistance made to the decrees sent against them from Spain, and the final destruction of their power and confiscation of their possessions, are facts frequently treated of, and in the hands of every one.

There is a fund still devoted to the propagation of the Christian faith and to the payment of missionaries, who transfer the converted Indians to the doctrinas, where they are placed under the charge of doctrinal curates.

In the jurisdictions of Moxos and Chignitors there are some missionary settlements, where the missionaries enjoy nearly the same privileges which were formerly extended to the Jesuits, but they are not animated with the same zeal or by the same ambition, and the progress of civilization has been very slow in those countries. The missionaries are forbidden to exact any compensation from the Indians for the performance of any Catholic rite, but this regulation, like all the excellent and philanthropic laws instituted by the Council of Indies to protect the wretched Indians from the rapacity of the Europeans, is evaded by a shameful traffic in images, rosaries, and scapularies, and by receiving presents and exacting work from the Indians, notwithstanding the laws expressly exempt them from that obligation.

In the first conquest of these countries, the Spaniards profited by the feuds which they found existing among the different nations of Indians; they brought them into the field against each other, and the first adventurers were successively their allies and conquerors.

The Indians were sold into captivity, and thousands perished under the hard treatment of their inhuman masters, until the noble efforts of Las Casas and other friends of humanity drew the attention of the Spanish court to their sufferings. Commissioners were then despatched from Madrid to inquire into these abuses, and to suggest the means of reforming them, and of alleviating the condition of the Indians. The first attempt at amelioration was the Repartimientos de Indios, by which they were divided among the Spaniards, who had the profits of their labor, without a right of property in their persons. Next, the encomiendas, by which they were placed under the

superintendence and protection of the Spaniards. The encomendero was bound to live in the district which contained the Indians of his encomienda, to watch over their conduct, instruct and civilize them, to protect them from all unjust persecutions, and to prevent their being imposed on in trafficking with the Spaniards. In return for these services they received a tribute in labor or produce. The abuse of these protecting regulations followed closely their institution.

The encomiendas were granted to Spaniards who never were in the country. The Indians were hired out, and the most exorbitant tribute was exacted of them. In order to check these abuses, it was decreed that the amount of tribute received from encomienda should not exceed two thousand dollars, the surplus to be paid into the treasury. They were made inalienable, and reverted to the Crown. All these regulations were found ineffectual to secure the Indians against the rapacity of the encomenderos and encomiendas were abolished. The Indians were next confided to the care and protection of the missionaries and of doctrinal curates. The last regulation in their favor gave them magistrates of their own choice, superintended, however, by a corregidor, to prevent the Indian alcaldes from committing excesses in the exercise of their authority.

In the viceroyalty of Peru the Indians were subject to a tribute to the Crown, levied on males only, from the age of ten to fifty. It was collected by the corregidor, who had the power of exempting such as were unable, from sickness or bad seasons, to make up the sum. They could enter into no legal contract or sale, without the consent of the corregidor, or make any conveyance of real estate. Their lands were sometimes seized and sold to satisfy the tribute, and in that way only could a transfer be made, or a legal title be obtained for Indian lands. The Indians were burdened with a personal service to the Crown, called the mita; this was a conscription raised among those subject to the tribute, in order to work the mines of Potosi. Thousands of these unfortunate people were marched every year to Potosi; and although the period of service was only eighteen months, they were attended by a numerous train of friends and relations, who, on the eve of their entering the mines, sang melancholy dirges, and, sounding a horn in solemn strains, mourned over them with all the ceremonies which they used to evince their sorrow on the death of a relative. Their wives and children remained with the conscripts, who harassed by a long march, seldom resisted more than a year the excessive labor and noxious air of the mines. The Indians of Peru have the appearance of habitual melancholy, and still wear mourning for the destruction of their Incas. According to an ancient prophecy, they expect to be one day delivered from their oppressors by a descendant of the Incas, who is to revive the former glory of the nation. They are prohibited from carrying any weapon, or from exercising any trade which might render them familiar with the use of fire-arms. This law has

been so strictly executed, that the unsubdued tribes are not dangerous enemies, and for more than a century have not disturbed the tranquillity of the Spanish settlers; and the attempts made by the civilized Indians to recover their former independence have been more easily defeated. The Indians hand down from father to son the remembrance of their wrongs, and constantly watch some opportunity to revenge them.

The insurrection in 1778 was the most formidable known since the conquest, and laid in ruins some of the finest towns of Upper Peru. Oruro was totally destroyed, and La Paz lost the greater part of its inhabitants by famine, whilst it was blockaded by the Indians. Had they known the use of fire-arms, the whole of the white population of those provinces would have been destroyed. The revolutionary Government, immediately on its installation, released them from the service of the mita, which was the most obnoxious to them, and from the vassalage in which they were held by their magistrates. The tribute was continued from necessity, as it afforded a revenue which could not be relinquished at this period. In 1814 they were relieved from the payment of the tribute, and have taken an active part in favor of the creoles.

The Intendant of the province is the chief of every branch of the administration of finance; he is assisted by an assessor, who reports on all questions of law. The Intendant may reject his decision, and either determine on his own responsibility, or consult another lawyer. The tribunal de cuentas, over which he presides, consists of a contador mayor and a treasurer; they examine and verify all accounts. There is, moreover, a supreme court of finance. This court, of which the Intendant is president, is composed of the regent of the royal audience, (chief justice,) the contador mayor, the treasurer, and the solicitor of the tribunal of accounts. These members, when their sentences are appealed from, do not assist at the session. The customs are collected by an administrator of the customs and a treasurer. Their accounts are received by the tribunal de cuentas.

By the Spanish colonial laws the taxes were levied on the product alone. The alcavala was reduced to five per cent. on every transfer of property and every contract of sale. The retail dealer generally paid a composition, which was calculated annually on the value of their stock.

The almoxarifazgo is a duty on entry, and varies from fifteen to five per cent; the corso is a duty of two per cent. applied to support the guarda-costas; and the consulate one and a half on imports and exports. This last goes to defray the expenses of the consulado or board of trade. There is an excise on distilleries. The pulperias, or small grocery stores, pay, independent of the alcavala, a certain sum per annum, about thirty-five dollars, for license to retail liquors. A fund was formerly derived from the sale of lands, and from the royal domains. The treasury receives the rents of vacant bishoprics and prebendaries until the new dignity is in possession, and the

half-yearly product of all offices. Notaries, attorneys, receivers of the customs, tax-gatherers, excise officers, &c., pay a fine to the Crown in proportion to the value of their office. Ecclesiastics pay the amount of the first month of their benefice.

All articles seized on account of illicit trade, after paying the duties, are divided among the informer, the Intendant, the captors, and the Crown. The bull areas and cockpits belong to the King. A considerable revenue is derived from stamps; the highest cost six dollars; and all deeds and titles, as also papers signed by the chief officers of the administration, must be written on this paper. If the instrument cannot be contained in a single sheet, the rest is written on a stamped paper of a dollar. Contracts and wills must be written on stamped paper, which costs one dollar and a half the sheet. Every document presented in the courts of law must be on stamped paper of ——— the sheet; and all petitions presented by the poor, and by Indians, must be written on stamped paper of the sixteenth of a dollar.

The paper, ready stamped, was sent from Spain, and was renewed every two years.

For some time the treasury received one-fifth of the product of the mines. It was afterwards reduced to one-tenth.

The mint affords a further revenue by the exclusive sale of quicksilver, and by coining.

The monopoly of tobacco is another article of revenue. The administrador de tabaco grants licenses to cultivate, and establishes shops to retail tobacco. These estancos, as they are called, are kept by persons who receive a certain per centage on the sales, and who give security to account for all the tobacco put into their hands. The other monopolies, salt, cards, &c. &c., are not productive. The post office is in the hands of Government, and yields a considerable revenue.

The Indians who were subdued paid a capitation tax. It included all males from ten to fifty years of age, and amounted to between five and seven dollars. This tribute was collected by the corregidor, who had the power of dispensing with the payment, when, from indisposition or bad seasons, the Indian was supposed to be deprived of the means of acquiring the amount. They could enforce it by the sale of their lands. The only legal purchase of lands belonging to Indians was at these sales; in every other transaction they were considered as minors; and no contract or bargain was valid until it received the sanction of the corregidor.

The ecclesiastical dominion of the Spanish American colonies was yielded by the bull of Alexander VI. to the sovereign of Spain. Tithes were established in America by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1501; and in 1541 Charles V. ordained that the proceeds of the tithes should be divided into four parts; one to be appropriated to the bishop; another to the chapter; and out of the other two, that they should set aside two-ninths for the King, three for

building and repairing churches, and the remaining four-ninths for the payment of curates and officiating ecclesiastics. This regulation continues in force, and the tithes are farmed and sold in each province to the highest bidder.

The sale of the bulls of the crusade produces a very considerable revenue. The general bull is bought by all the faithful, and is divided into classes, according to the rank and fortune of the purchaser. Viceroys and their wives pay fifteen dollars; the chief dignitaries, civil, ecclesiastical, and military, and all possessed of fortunes exceeding twelve thousand dollars, pay five dollars; all possessed of fortunes exceeding six thousand dollars, pay one and a half dollar; all other persons pay thirty-one and a half cents. The virtues of this bull are various; but the most useful is the dispensation from fasting on Fridays, and almost all lent. The bull to eat milk and eggs is likewise divided into classes; the first costs six dollars; the second three dollars; the third one and a half dollar, and the fourth thirty-eight cents.

The bulls of composition are bought by those who have obtained money or goods by unlawful means. All classes pay two and a half dollars for this bull.

The bull for the dead lessens the term, or entirely releases the soul from purgatory; the first class costs seventy-five cents, and the second twenty-five cents.

The bulls of the holy crusade are printed on very coarse paper, and the name of the purchaser is written at full length.

In the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres the ninths of the sale of bulls, and the administration of the confiscated lands of the Jesuits, formed a branch of the revenue, under the title of temporalidades.

THE FOLLOWING TABLES PRESENT THE STATE OF THE TREASURY OF BUENOS AYRES, FROM JANUARY, 1811, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO JANUARY, 1812

Remaining in the treasury from		Received	Paid	Balance in hands
Temporalidades	$8,456 4½	$4,706 5¼	$9,163 2½	$399 7½
Tobacco	12,386 6½	11,115 4½	14,352 1¼	9,149 1½
Post office	1,842 3¾	3,601 3½	3,947 2¾	1,456 5
Custom-house	100,571 5½	161,738 6¼	159,068 7½	103,241 4¼
From the royal hacienda	21,177 4¾	119,933 1¼	238,520 1¼	2,581 4½
				$116,828 6¾

FEBRUARY, 1811

Temporalidades	$17,007 4½	$5,663 4¾	$17,814 4¾	$4,856 4½
Tobacco	25,027 1¼	14,393 1	27,033 3¾	12,386 6½
Post office	4,274 6¼	1,525 7	2,158 1½	1,842 3¾
Custom-house	144,141 6½	105,832 1⅞	149,095 6½	100,878 1⅜
Royal hacienda	12,775 0½	235,959 7¼	227,557 3½	21,177 4¼
Balance in hand, March 1, 1811				$141,141 4⅞

A summary view of the trade of Spanish America will complete this exposition of their colonial policy.

It is scarcely necessary to recapitulate all the vexatious imposts with which the Spanish Government oppressed the internal commerce of the kingdom. Of all these, the alcavala was the most destructive of the national prosperity. It consisted of a duty varying from six to four per cent. upon every transfer of property, and every contract of sale. The millones was an excise on the prime necessaries of life, and was generally compounded for with the Government by the municipalities; in consequence of which, the magistrates established public magazines, at which all taxed commodities were to be purchased; and such as were found to have any articles of monopoly, not obtained from the magazines, were prosecuted with the upmost rigor. Almost all these regulations, with the royal monopolies of brandy, cards, lead, saltpetre, sulphur, gunpowder, sealingwax, quicksilver, salt, and tobacco, were extended to the colonies, where their pernicious effects were more sensibly felt than in the mother country. The trade between Spain and the colonies was confined to particular classes in both countries, until Charles V. allowed all his Castilian subjects to fit out expeditions from the principal ports of Spain; but exacted, under the penalties of death and confiscation, that they should return to the port of Seville, which became the emporium of the American trade. The personal influence of the inhabitants increasing with their wealth, they induced the Government to withdraw the permission to clear out from other ports. In 1720, when the navigation of the river was impeded by sand-bars, and became unfit to admit vessels of burden, the monopoly, with all its advantages, was transferred to Cadiz. Twenty-seven vessels were fitted out for the annual supply of Peru, Chili, and Terra Firma; and every three years twenty-three were despatched to Mexico and the northern provinces. The colonists were prohibited from trading with foreigners, or with Spanish vessels, not included in their periodical fleets, and also from trading with each other. Peru could not receive supplies from Mexico, or Buenos Ayres from Terra Firma. No Spaniard could interfere with the trade of the interior, nor could any colonist embark his goods to Spain on his own account. A board of trade, established at Seville in the sixteenth century, regulated the extent, assortment, and distribution of the periodical cargoes. No person could load or land articles from the return cargoes without a license from this board. The galleons could not touch at any port, or break bulk on their passage out or home. The triennial supplies could only be distributed over the northern colonies, and the annual galleons were appropriated to the settlements of the south. These were extremely limited, it being supposed that the Crown had an interest in making the same amount of duties fall upon a small supply of goods, that the duties might be more easily levied, and that the colonist might be made to pay the whole. The duties were

levied in the form of direct customs on the goods exported, or of fees and dues for licenses on tonnage. An impost was laid on the bulk of the articles shipped, without regard to their nature or value. The indulto was a duty on the produce imported from the colonies, and fixed anew by Government every time the fleets returned from America. The declining state of the Spanish manufactories, and the inability of the mother country to furnish the necessary supplies of goods, obliged the Council of the Indies to use foreign articles, but they forced them to pass through the hands of the merchants of Seville, and afterwards of Cadiz. The profits of the monopolists of Cadiz were one hundred and seventy per cent. on goods bought in America, and two hundred and fifty on goods sold there. The import and export duties were exorbitant. Colonial produce bore a very high price in Spain; and the colonists purchased the necessary articles with this monstrous accumulation of profits and charges. Ulloa mentions that, in Quito, a pound of iron sold for a dollar, and one of steel for one dollar and fifty cents. The contraband trade was, in consequence, very extensive; but although this gave the colonists a more abundant supply, it did not diminish the prices; the profits of the smugglers always bearing a proportion to the risk of entering the goods, and to the profits of legal commerce.

In 1740 expeditions separate from the periodical fleets were permitted to sail from the American colonies to ports formerly debarred all direct intercourse with Spain. The high prices paid by these registered ships for licenses amounted to a heavy duty on exports. In 1748 the permission was extended to other ports, but was soon restored exclusively to Cadiz. In 1764 regular packet boats were first established, and sailed from Corunna to the chief ports of America. Although permitted to trade, their cargoes were limited in extent, and to Spanish produce. They were obliged to sail from and return to Corunna. In 1765 the trade of the windward colonies was laid open to several ports of Spain. The palmeo was commuted to a duty of six per cent. on exports, and ships were cleared without licenses. The grant which had already included Louisiana was extended in 1770 to Yucatan and Campeachy. In 1766 the cotton trade was opened to Catalonia duty free, and in 1772 to the other provinces. In 1774 colonial produce, duty free, was permitted to be imported into several ports of Spain. In 1778 the ordinance of 1765 was extended to Buenos Ayres, Chili, and Peru, and soon after to Santa Fé and Guatemala. This last ordinance granted some abatement of duties to vessels laden with Spanish produce, and to the precious metals, which had hitherto paid an enormous duty of entrance. The jealousy of extending the benefits of their trade to foreigners yielded to the necessity of supplying the colonies with slaves. The Spaniards were incapable of conducting this traffic, and for a certain time it was in the hands of a class of merchants in France. By the treaty of Utrecht, the asiento was transferred to Great Britain. The contraband trade which

the English mingled with the importation of slaves brought on a war, and put a stop to this foreign monopoly. The slave trade was then transferred to a private company, whose entrepot was Porto Rico. The total failure of this company obliged the Government to take the supply into their own hands; and the incapacity of the Spanish merchants to conduct this complicated trade forced them to contract with a British commercial house for an annual supply of three thousand slaves. For one year the Philippine company introduced into Buenos Ayres nearly four thousand slaves. In 1789 the slave trade with the islands and with Caraccas was thrown open to Spaniards and foreigners. Several exclusive companies have been formed since the commencement of the eighteenth century, but the Philippine company alone survived the restrictions and extravagant duties imposed on their trade by the Government. The profits of this company are represented to have been very inconsiderable, not exceeding three or four per cent. On the 12th of October, 1778, the Council of Indies issued a decree of free commerce. The vessels were to belong exclusively to Spaniards, and to be of national construction; all the officers and two-thirds of the crew to be Spanish. This decree confined the free trade to a few ports; but subsequent regulations extended the privilege to all the chief ports in Spain. The ports of the colonies were divided into major and minor ports; and some privileges were granted to the latter in order to encourage them. The exports from Spain were divided into three classes: the articles of the growth and manufacture of the mother country were called free articles, and paid nine and a half per cent. duty; the second class consisted of articles only of the manufacture of Spain, and paid twelve and a half per cent. duty; the third class included all foreign goods shipped to the colonies through Spain; they paid fifteen per cent. entry into Spain, seven per cent. export, and seven per cent. entry into America; and with the maritime alcavala, the consulate, and other charges, the duties amounted to thirty-three and a third per cent. In 1778 the exports to the colonies were made in one hundred and seventy ships, were worth 74,000,000 of reals vellon, and paid 32,000,000 duty. The imports of the same year were made in one hundred and thirty ships, valued at 74,000,000, and paid nearly 3,000,000 duty. In 1778 the value of exports was 500,000,000, and of imports 804,500,000, and the duties exceeded 55,000,000. In Buenos Ayres the receipts of the customs in 1791 were $336,532; 1792, $468,850; 1793, $423,623; 1794, $407,984; 1795, $310,858. The average of five years was $389,569. It appears that in 1796 the exports to Buenos Ayres amounted to $2,853,944, and the imports from that port to $5,058,882. The latter consisted of 874,593 ox hides, 43,752 horse hides, 24,436 skins, 46,800 arrobas, (25 pounds,) 771 arrobas of vacuna wool, 2,254 arrobas of common wool, 291 guanaco wool, 11,890 goose wings, 451,000 horns, 3,223 cwt. of copper, 4 cwt. of tin, 2,541 tanned hides, 222 dozen of dressed sheep skins,

2,128 cwt. of jerked beef, and 185 cwt. of cured pork, valued at $1,076,877, and the remainder, 2,556,304, in gold and silver. In the year 1802, after the peace of Amiens, the receipts in Buenos Ayres were $857,702.

Shortly after the war broke out between England and Spain, the invasion of these provinces by Sir Home Popham opened a new era in the trade of Buenos Ayres. This officer, on his return to England, wrote a circular to the merchants, setting forth the extensive and lucrative market opened by this conquest to the trade of the British empire. The want of markets in Europe at that period, and the exaggerated picture of commercial advantages presented by Sir Home Popham, occasioned great speculation to be made to the river Plate, and large convoys of merchantmen accompanied the expeditions of Sir Samuel Auchmuty to Montevideo, and of General Whitlocke to Buenos Ayres. Montevideo, during the short time it remained in the hands of the English, afforded a very limited market, and the total failure of General Whitlocke's expedition obliged the merchants to return to England without having made any considerable sales. The loss experienced on this occasion was attributed altogether to the defeat of General Whitlocke; and an opinion still prevailed among the merchants in London, that the markets of Spanish America, if opened to their trade, would enable them to bear the loss of the commerce of the continent, and to be at least equal to that in the United States. After the British troops had evacuated the provinces of La Plata, the clamors of the people obliged the viceroy to open the ports to neutrals. Some Americans traded to the river Plate, but the high duties and restrictions discouraged the commercial spirit even of our own countrymen. The trade was very limited, and principally carried on by English and Spanish capital, covered by the American flag, and the goods were introduced by bribery, or by favor of the viceroy. The revolution in Spain put a stop to another attempt of the British to obtain possession of these colonies. The deposition of the Spanish authorities, and the establishment of the Junta in Buenos Ayres, again opened the ports of the river Plate to the British flag. Eager to realize their former dreams of commercial prosperity, a large capital was immediately turned into this channel. Entirely ignorant of the consumption of the country, and of the wants of the inhabitants, they overstocked the market with every article of British manufacture. The quantity of merchandise brought into these ports during the first six months was equal to the former consumption of six years; and skates and warming pans were seen dangling in the shops of Buenos Ayres and Montevideo. The former exorbitant duties continued to be levied with so little regard to justice, that frequently the merchants not only lost the prime cost and freight of the articles, but had a further sum to pay for duties; and several petitions were presented, praying to be allowed to abandon the goods in satisfaction of the duties. The monthly receipts of customs in Buenos Ayres, during the year 1810, sometimes exceeded two hundred thousand dollars, and the aggregate

of that year was two million two hundred and ten thousand dollars. From the state of the market in Buenos Ayres, the merchants in England were ruined by the slowness of the returns; and many found it necessary to instruct their agents to make any sacrifice, and to sell at any price. Sales at auction, to an immense amount, were consequently made below the first cost of the articles. The effect of these sales was to reduce the price of all English manufactures; and I afterwards saw English prints and calicoes retailed in the shops of Mendoza, a distance of three hundred leagues from the coast, below the retail price in London. The English agent, who received his per centage on the sales, and the Spanish or native consignee, whom the law obliged him to employ, were enriched, but the principals in England failed. Frequent attempts were made to prevail upon the Government of Buenos Ayres to simplify the manner of collecting their duties, and to establish a tariff of their own, independent of the absurd and complex regulations of Spain. A more liberal system was, with difficulty, extorted from them. The monopolies were abolished. The obligation to employ a Spanish or native consignee was done away, and foreign merchants permitted to enter their ships and dispose of their cargoes in their own name. At the commencement of the revolution the exportation of silver was permitted on payment of five per cent. duty. It was afterwards prohibited; but the Government, finding it impossible to prevent its being smuggled from the country, again permitted the exportation, increasing the export duty to six per cent. for coined silver, and twelve per cent. for uncoined silver; two per cent. for coined gold, and eight per cent. for uncoined gold, and an additional half per cent. on both for the consulate. The mines of Potosi have not been worked to any considerable amount since the revolution. The specie exported is brought chiefly from Chili, and amounts to about three millions of dollars annually. The British frigates on this station are relieved every six months, and, since the year 1810, have carried to England nearly ten millions of dollars. This money was shipped partly on account of individuals, and partly on that of the British Government. Their agent in Buenos Ayres, the consul general, bought the specie at a premium, chiefly from the Spanish merchants, who were anxious to remove their funds from America. In 1813 the Government published the following criminal regulations, which remained in force for some time. The Government, being anxious to regulate the duties, and to establish the order of their collection in the custom-houses within the territories of the United Provinces, in the manner most convenient to the general interests of commerce, and do away all former abuses, to proportion the imports to the nature, necessity, and value of the articles of commerce, as far as the extraordinary demand and present situation of the treasury will admit, and to furnish the merchants with a clear and exact statement of the duties to be paid, in order that they may, in no event, be involved in doubts and perplexity, which might in-

timidate their enterprise, or retard the progress so important to the public prosperity, have decreed, with the previous concurrence of the Permanent Council of the Sovereign Assembly: First. From the 1st day of January, 1814, twenty-five per cent. shall be collected on all manufactures and foreign articles, except those hereafter specified, as the only duty of entry, to be calculated on the current market prices at the time of their extraction from the warehouse. Secondly. For this purpose, the merchants will present the invoices, with the prices affixed, which the officers of the customs shall examine, in order to calculate the duties. Thirdly. In case the prices fixed by the merchant be not regulated on the market price, the officer of the customs shall signify it to him; and, should any dispute arise, two arbiters shall be named, one by each party, and a third chosen by them, in order to decide thereon. Fourthly. Foreign wines and brandies, oil, ready made clothes, boots and shoes, and furniture, thirty-five per cent. Fifthly. Muslins and hats, fifty per cent. Sixthly. Crockery and glass, fifteen per cent. Seventhly. The following articles are free of all duties: quicksilver, machinery and instruments for mining, and those of the sciences and arts, all implements and tools of trade, books and printing presses, as likewise boards and all sorts of lumber; saltpetre, gunpowder, flints, fire-arms, and sabres and swords for the use of cavalry. Published in the Ministerial Gazette, and signed by Nicholas R. Pena, Juan Sarrea, Gervasia Antonio Posadas, (*Manuel*) *José Garcia, Secretary.*

The market of Buenos Ayres continues to be overstocked with English goods, but their merchants are now better acquainted with the wants of the inhabitants; ponchos, rugs, saddles, bits, lassos, balls, and, in short, every article formerly supplied by their domestic manufactures, are now brought from England. The Guernsey and Jersey traders bring French and German goods, which are preferred to English. Furniture, cordage, canvass, naval stores, paper, liquors, and strong black tobacco, find a ready sale, and will bear the duties. All goods mentioned in the seventh commercial regulation are in constant demand. China and India goods sell well, and the British merchants resident in Buenos Ayres have lately despatched three ships, direct to India and China, from the river of Plate. The principal returns are hides, tallow, horses, vacuna wool, skins, feathers, bark, copper, gold, and silver. Hides pay twenty per cent. export duty, and all the other articles, except the precious metals, fourteen per cent. The commerce of Chili offers great advantages to the traders to China and to the East Indies. It is a well known fact that specie is almost our only medium of trade with those countries, which not only deprives the merchant for many months of the use of a large sum, but obliges him often to collect dollars at a premium; whereas, if the ports of Chili were used as a scala, the goods suited to that market, such as furniture and French and German manufactures, are obtained in the United States at a credit, and the returns received in Chili in

copper and silver. In Chili the mines of silver are the most productive ever wrought. The mineral of those discovered within the last three years in the province of Guasco yielded a most extraordinary product of silver, which, compared with that of Potosi, is as forty to fourteen. It is not ascertained whether these rich mines extended to any great depth.[1]

Furs might be obtained if there was any encouragement to collect them. Traders might station small detachments along the coast and on the islands, to procure seal skins, an article of great demand in China, and very abundant in these seas. All instruments of trade and manufactures are introduced into both countries free from duty. During the last war between Russia and England, a press was erected in Valparaiso for the purpose of packing hemp, and large quantities of that article were sent to England. In the event of the intermediate ports, as they are called, (*puerto intermedios*,) Arica, Arequipa, &c., being opened to a free trade, it is probable that Upper Peru will be supplied through that channel. The distance is not so great, and the roads are better than those to the Atlantic ports. The trade of Chili has hitherto been confined to Lima and Buenos Ayres. The viceroyalty of Lima was supplied with grain from the ports of Valparaiso and Talcahuana, and the returns made in sugar, fossil salt, rice, and cotton. The trade between Buenos Ayres and Chili was carried on by caravans of carts from Buenos Ayres to Mendoza, at the foot of the Andes, and from thence on mules to Santiago. The principal articles sent across the continent by the merchants of Buenos Ayres were European dry goods and the herb of Paraguay. They received in return the sugar of Lima, copper, and gold and silver.

In the hands of freemen who were sensible of its advantages, and under an enlightened Government, Chili, from the number and variety of its productions, which yield the raw material of every sort of manufacture, has within itself the means of greatness; and, from the number of its harbors and great extent of coast, might carry on an extensive and lucrative commerce with the intermediate ports, with the viceroyalty of Lima, the Philippine islands, the East Indies, and China.

The commercial regulations of these countries have been so frequently altered, that it is difficult to say what they now are. This uncertainty discourages commercial enterprise, even more than exorbitant duties. . . .

The river of *La Plata*, called by the natives Parana Quasu, (Great Parana,) was discovered by the Spaniards, under the conduct of Don Juan Dias de Solis, in the year 1516.[2]

[1] In Potosi, a caxon of ore yields from fourteen to twenty marks of silver, and in Guasco seventy marks have been extracted from a caxon but the average product is forty marks.

[2] The Portuguese claim the northern shore of the river La Plata by right of discovery, and the Spanish authors are so very contradictory in their dates of the first voyage to that river as to make it doubtful to an impartial reader. They generally agree that the gold and silver which Sebastian Cabot procured from the Guanani Indians, in the year 1526, had been taken from some Portuguese adventurers who were returning from Peru; and that in 1535 Pedro

The earliest establishment appears to have been made on its shores in 1526, by Sebastian Cabot, a Venetian navigator in the service of Spain; and the town of Buenos Ayres to have been first settled in 1535, by Don Pedro de Mendoza. After being twice destroyed by the Indians, it was rebuilt in 1580, and has flourished since that period. Buenos Ayres was at first annexed to the Government of Paraguay, and afterwards made dependent upon the viceroyalty of Lima and the audiencia of Charcas. In the year 1776 the provinces of Buenos Ayres, Paraguay, and Cuyo were united under the government of a viceroy. In 1778 the provinces of Upper Peru were added to the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres. It extended on the north to the frontiers of the Brazils, and to the viceroyalty of Lima, where it bounded on the provinces of Carabaya, Cuzco, and Chucuito, and westwardly on the river Desaguedero and the province of Arica. It included the district of Atacama, which extends along the Pacific ocean from Arica to the desert of Atacama. On the west it was separated from Chili by the Cordilleras de los Andes, and extended south to the straits of Magellan.

By the decree of 1778 this viceroyalty was divided into eight intendencias; each intendencia was subdivided into partidos or districts.

The intendancy of *Buenos Ayres* includes the town of Santa Fé, situated between the river Salado and the Parana, in 31 degrees 46 minutes south latitude. Corrientes, situated on the east side of the Parana, near its junction with the Paraguay, in 27 degrees 33 minutes south latitude. The military government of Montevideo, situated on the northeast shore of the river of La Plata, in 34 degrees 54 minutes 48 seconds south latitude, and in 56 degrees 9 minutes 15 seconds longitude west of Greenwich. The territory of the eastern shore of Uraguay, or Banda Oriental, together with the thirty towns of Guananis missions on the river Uraguay, which formerly belonged to the Jesuits, and the territory of the Rio Negro, in Patagonia, which is occupied by a chain of military posts extending from Luxan to the port of Rio Negro. Buenos Ayres, the capital, is situated in 34 degrees 25 minutes 26 seconds south latitude, and in 58 degrees 31 minutes 13 seconds west longitude. It is the see of a bishop, and includes thirty-four curacies.

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de Mendoza found a party of Portuguese on the northern shore of the La Plata. The Portuguese accounts attribute the first discovery and settlement of that territory to their countrymen, Alexis and Diego Gavica. In the year 1680 the Portuguese formed a settlement on the northern shore of the river, and erected the fort of Colonia del Sacramento directly opposite Buenos Ayres; the same year they were driven out of it by the Spaniards, but it was restored by the provisional treaty of 1681. In 1705 Colonia was again wrested from the Portuguese, and was restored to them by the peace of Utrecht, in 1715: whereas Montevideo and Maldonado were not settled by the Spaniards until the year 1724. Colonia was besieged and taken by the Spaniards in 1762, but was again given up by the treaty of Paris of 1763. The Portuguese were not entirely driven from their possession on the northern shore of the river until the year 1777, and the right of territory has remained a subject of dispute ever since. Commissioners have been appointed, and have frequently met, but have not been able to settle the claims of their respective courts. To the long residence of one of these unsuccessful commissioners, Azara, we owe an excellent work on the zoology of these countries.

The principal articles of export from Buenos Ayres are hides, tallow, horns, skins, bark, vacuna wool, copper, and the precious metals. Buenos Ayres is supplied with salt, from the salt lakes in Patagonia, by annual caravans.

The intendancy of *Paraguay* extends on the north and eastern bank of the river Paraguay to the river Corrientes, which falls into the Paraguay, and to the mouth of the Jaura, in 16 degrees 34 minutes 22 seconds south latitude; on the east to the Brazils; on the south to the river Parana, from its confluence with the Paraguay to the river Guasupraro, which falls into it a little to the west of the town of Candelaria; thence the line runs to the mountains of Santa Ana, including the towns of Candelaria, Santa Ana, Loreto, San Ignacio Mini, and Corpus. This intendancy embraces the districts of Candelaria, Santiago, Villarica, Curuguati, and Villareal. Paraguay is the see of a bishop, and includes twelve vicarages. The exports from this intendancy are sugar, cotton, tobacco, and the herb of Paraguay, commonly called matte, from the calabash in which it is served. The two last are the principal articles.

The capital town, Assumption, is situated in 25 degrees 16 minutes 46 seconds south latitude.

The intendancy of *Cordova* extends to the district of Tucuman on the north, west to the intendancy of Buenos Ayres, and on the east is bounded by Paraguay. It includes the districts of Mendoza, San Juan, San Luis, and Rioja.

The town of Cordova is the capital, and is situated in 31 degrees 15 minutes south latitude. Mendoza is situated on a river of the same name, at the foot of the Cordilleras, in 33 degrees 31 minutes 17 seconds south latitude. The principal articles exported from this intendancy are grain, fruits, wine, and brandy. The bishopric of Cordova includes 8 vicarages.

The intendancy of *Salta* extends on the north to the district of Tarija in Potosi, on the south to Cordova, west to the Cordilleras, and east to the Grand Chaco. The districts of this intendancy are Tucuman, Santiago del Estero, Catamarca, Jujuy, Nueva-Ovan, and Puna. Salta, the capital, is situated in 24 degrees 30 minutes south latitude.

San Miguel, the chief town of the district of Tucuman, is situated in 27 degrees 10 minutes south. The principal trade of this intendancy consists of horses and mules.

The intendancy of *Potosi* extends on the north to the districts of Yamparaes and Tomina, in Charcas; south to the district of Jujuy, in Salta; it reaches west to the Pacific ocean, and is bounded on the east by Cochabamba. The districts of this intendancy are Porco, Chayanta, Chicas, Tarija, Lipes, and Atacama, which last is separated from the province of Arica by the river Loa, and from Chili by the desert of Atacama. The precious metals constitute the principal exports from this intendancy.

Potosi, the capital town, is situated on the north side of the celebrated

mountain of that name, in 19 degrees 50 minutes south latitude, and 66 degrees 16 minutes west longitude. From the year 1736 to 1800, the tenths from the produce of the mines in Potosi amounted to $18,618,917.

The intendancy of *Charcas*, sometimes called the presidency of Charcas, from being the seat of a royal audiencia, or supreme court, extends north to the intendancy of La Paz, south to Potosi, west to the Desaguedero, and east to the intendancy of Cochabamba. This intendancy comprehends the districts of Yamparaes, Tomina, Pelaya, and Oruro. Charcas is an archbishopric, and contains fourteen vicarages.

The capital, Chuquisaca, called also La Plata, is situated in 19 degrees 25 minutes. This intendancy abounds in minerals, salt, sulphur, &c.

The intendancy of *La Paz* extends north to the provinces of Carabaya and Cuzco, in the viceroyalty of Lima, south to Charcas, west to the provinces of Chucuito and Arica, and on the east is bounded by the government of Moxos and the intendancy of Cochabamba. The districts of this intendancy are Sicarica, Pacages, Omasuyos, (to which is annexed the island of Titicaca, in the lake of Chucuito,) Laricaxa, Chulumani, and Apolabamba. The bishopric of La Paz comprehends thirteen vicarages.

La Paz, the capital of the intendancy, is situated in 16 degrees 50 minutes south latitude. The chief produce is the Peruvian bark and an herb called cocoa, which the Indians and creoles chew, and are very fond of. It is an article of export to the other provinces.

The intendancy of *Cochabamba* extends on the north to the Government of Moxos, south it is bounded by the intendancies of Charcas and Potosi, west by Charcas and La Paz, and east by the river Paripiti, which separates it from the government of Chiquitos. The districts of this intendancy are Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Valle Grande, Mezque, Elisa, Arque, Tapacari, Hayopaya, and Sacaba. The bishopric of Santa Cruz de la Sierra comprehends three vicarages and four curacies. Cochabamba is the most fertile of all the intendancies, and is called the granary of Upper Peru. Orepesa, the capital, is situated in 17 degrees 2 minutes south latitude.

The military government of Chiquitos extends north to the mountains of Tapacures, which divide it from Moxos; south to the mountains of Zamucas; west to the district of Santa Cruz de la Sierra; and is bounded on the east by the lake Xarayes. This government is inhabited principally by Indians. There are some missionary settlements among them.

The military government of *Moxos* is very extensive. Separated from Cochabamba by the Cordilleras, it extends south to Chiquitos, and east to the frontiers of the Brazils. It is divided into three districts—Moxos, Baures, and Pampas; and is inhabited by the tribes of Raches, Sirionos, Solostros, and Juracares, among whom are some missionary settlements.

There are several small harbors and roadsteads in the river of La Plata. Maldonado, situated on the north shore, is not far from the capes, and is

said to be the best part of the river. The next, the port of Montevideo, is exposed to the southwest winds, which sweep over the plains of Buenos Ayres and blow with incredible violence.

There are several inconsiderable roadsteads between Montevideo and the Ensenada de Barragan, the first good harbor on the southwestern shore of the river. This port is easy of access, and is protected on every side. The only objection to ships lying there, in preference to the insecure roadstead opposite the town of Buenos Ayres, is the low swampy land which surrounds Barragan, and renders the roads always bad, and in the winter almost impassable. There was a deduction of four and a half per cent. from the duties on goods landed at this port, in order to defray the expense of transportation to Buenos Ayres.

There is a small stream about two miles below Buenos Ayres which is navigable to Baraceas. From hence lighters convey the cargoes to the outer roads.

The entrance of this creek is obstructed by a bar, and during the prevalence of westerly winds, there is not water enough for the lighters to pass. This circumstance often occasions great detention in loading.

The tides extend a great distance up the river, but their duration depends upon the winds. Indeed, the currents are so very uncertain, and run with such rapidity, that it is advisable to heave the log with a lead attached to the line.

The city of *Buenos Ayres* is built on the south shore of the river, and extends along the bank nearly three miles. The streets intersect each other at right angles, dividing the town into solid squares of one hundred and fifty yards each. The houses are generally two stories high, and are built with terrace roofs. The city is defended by a fort, and is ornamented by convents, nunneries, churches, and the buildings formerly appropriated to the royal monopolies. The population of Buenos Ayres and of the adjacent country was estimated at about 70,000 souls.

The climate is healthy and temperate. The northerly winds, when moderate, last for several days, and have the effect of the sirocco on the feelings. When violent, this wind seldom lasts longer than twenty-four hours, shifting to the south and southeast, with rain and thunder. These storms are invariably terminated by a pampero, or southwest wind. The west and west-northwest winds blow with great violence, but are not frequent. During the prevalence of the southwesterly winds the atmosphere is remarkably dry, and the electric fluid acquires very great activity. On passing the low ridge which skirts the river, the eye extends over an immense plain, spotted with a few settlements and enclosures of the cylindrical opuntia, which attains a great height in this climate. Orchards of peach trees are cultivated to supply the town with fuel. The trees are planted very close to each other, and are kept low, so as to resist the force of winds, which tear up larger trees.

The uncultivated plains in the vicinity of the city are overgrown with wild artichoke. This wood grows with such luxuriance that, in the great scarcity of fuel, it is used to heat stoves and ovens.

These plains or pampas extend one hundred and sixty leagues in a west course from Buenos Ayres. They resemble very much the steppes of the south of Russia. Both exhibit the same boundless, unbroken expanse, the same fertility of soil during the rainy season, and dry, parched appearance in the heat of summer; the total absence of trees; the streams few, flowing with a sluggish current, and brackish to the taste; the lakes and ponds of both incrusted with salt: this mineral efflorescence on the surface of the soil in some places giving it the appearance of being covered by a hoar frost. The character of the inhabitants adds to the resemblance. The Querandis, or Indians of the pampas, are Nomades, living in temporary huts and tents on the borders of the rivers; and, when they have exhausted the pasture on one spot, roving with their herds and flocks to where it is abundant. The small deer of the pampas resembles the antelope of the steppes, and the spur-winged thegel is common to both. On these plains animal putrefaction scarcely goes on at all. On the borders of the rivers, and in low, wet places, the entrails of animals putrefy, but on the high land animal substances will dry up. This is the case in some parts of Spain and Portugal; but at Buenos Ayres, where fuel is so scarce, this drying quality in the air enables the inhabitants to burn in their furnaces and kilns the flesh and bones of animals. Sheep were formerly dried, stacked, and sold at two dollars and a half the hundred for these purposes.

From the mildness of the climate, and the abundant pasture afforded by the extensive plains of Buenos Ayres, the cattle originally brought from Spain have become so numerous that they furnish the chief support of the inhabitants; this is, perhaps, the cause of the miserable state of the interior of this country. It is not uncommon to see a proprietor of a league square of land owning several thousand heads of cattle, and sheep, and horses, living in a miserable hut, and having the bare necessaries of life. His house is covered with hides; his furniture is made of the same materials. His yard is enclosed by a few stakes, bound together with thongs; and he may be seen, with his herdsmen, seated by a fire, cutting off slices of beef from a spit stuck in the ground, and eating it without bread or salt.

In the vicinity of Buenos Ayres there are some very productive farms; and wheat and corn are raised in great abundance by simply scratching the ground with a wooden plough, and harrowing in grain by drawing over it a hide filled with earth. Even in the centre of the plains there are some spots cultivated in grain, but the distance from a market prevents their raising more than sufficient for their own consumption. The eastern shore of the river of the Uraguay, including the shore of La Plata, abounds with cattle, and most of the inhabitants are shepherds; where the land is cultivated, it

has been found very productive, and this territory was the most valuable of the intendancy of Buenos Ayres. Paraguay is an agricultural province, and the domestic manufactures supply all the wants of the inhabitants. The effects of the government of the Jesuits are still felt in this country. The people generally receive the rudiments of education, and are very subordinate to their leaders. They were organized into regiments of militia, and it is said that Paraguay can bring into the field upwards of 40,000 men. Many of the provinces of Upper Peru possess mines, and the population is divided between the wealthy proprietors, the speculators, and those who work in the mines; and here is to be found all the corruption and misery which are inseparable from this species of gambling.

Cochabamba and some other provinces are agricultural, and the inhabitants are active and intelligent. During the time Upper Peru was in the power of the royalists, the spirit of the revolution has been kept up in these provinces by the guerrillas of Cochabamba.

In the city of Buenos Ayres property is equally divided; there are no very large proprietors, no entailed estates, and but little property in mortmain; the inhabitants are generally well informed, and their intercourse with foreigners has given them habits of industry.

There is very little mixture of blood in Buenos Ayres, and there are only three castes—the creoles, Indians, and negroes. Notwithstanding this port was for some time the entrepôt of the African trade, very few slaves remained at Buenos Ayres, and the government has been able to emancipate them without any serious injury to society.

Previous to the late revolution, the means of education were withheld from the creoles. It is true that there were colleges at Cordova, Chuquisaca, and Santiago de Chili, where the student was taught Latin law,[1] and theology; but they were prohibited from reading any book that could enlarge their views, or give them an idea of their civil or political rights. Every work that bore the stamp of genius was prohibited by the inquisition.

It was considered sinful to read any book marked with the censure of the church, and was deemed an act of piety to denounce any one who was known to possess such a work.

When this restraint was removed, they eagerly read the theories of speculative politicians, and the controversies and attacks on the Christian religion, published at the commencement of the French revolution; they saw the monstrous absurdity of the doctrines which had been taught them, and they too often stopped there, and became sceptics in religion, and in politics wild and theoretical; their legislators were ignorant of the principles of political economy, and the common maxims of the science of legislation.

In the first Government, the executive and legislative powers were vested

[1] The practice of the law in these countries was not, as in the United States, an open appeal to impartial justice, but the art of multiplying acts and procrastinating a suit until the favor of the judge was secured by bribery or influence.

in the deputies of Buenos Ayres; next, in an assembly of all the deputies from the chief towns. This assembly transferred their executive powers to a Junta of three, and styled themselves the Sovereign Assembly, declaring the executive and magistrates subordinate to them; the executive refused to acknowledge their sovereignty, and published an estatuto or provisional constitution. By this constitution, one member of the executive resigned his office at the expiration of every six months, and no one could act as president for a longer period. The new members were to be elected by an assembly composed of the municipality of the representatives of the towns, and of a considerable number of citizens elected by the people of the capital, according to the manner to be hereafter prescribed by this Government. The Government formed a high court of appeal; they decreed the liberty of the press, and the security of individuals from illegal arrest. These decrees have been renewed by each successive Government; but the people of these countries never have enjoyed the freedom of the press or individual security. This Junta took the title of the Superior Provisional Government of the United Provinces of the river of La Plata, in the name of Ferdinand VII. Pamphlet No. 1 contains the constitution and the decrees. Shortly after this estatuto was published, the assembly was dissolved; after dissolving another assembly, this Government was abolished, and a Supreme Director chosen. The Congress afterwards assembled and confirmed this form of government; and the same men who voted to deprive the president of the first Junta of all distinctions, and those whose fears were excited by his having an escort of twenty-five dragoons, have vested the Supreme Director with regal power and have given him a guard of three hundred select cavalry.

In all these changes the people have borne but little part. In a capital containing upwards of 50,000 inhabitants, not more than five or six hundred have ever voted; and the town meetings which generally decided the change of rulers, and often the form of government, were rarely composed of more than two or three hundred, sometimes of less than one hundred persons. Since the commencement of the revolution, there has been a constant struggle for power between the capital and the provinces.

Buenos Ayres has hitherto maintained the ascendency, from the superior intelligence of the inhabitants, and from having within itself the means of carrying on the war. The duties on imports and exports furnish the principal resources of the Government, and the leaders of the revolution are for the most part citizens of Buenos Ayres. The provinces are governed by a commander appointed by the executive of Buenos Ayres. Paraguay first revolted from this dependence on the capital, and, from the commencement of the revolution to the present day, has been governed by its own chiefs; they are not at war with Buenos Ayres, but have no connexion nor hold any communication with that Government. They, too, have tried a great many political experiments, and their present form of government is copied from

the ancient Roman; it consists of a senate and two consuls. Francia, the principal leader in the revolution, is said to govern that country despotically. As in Buenos Ayres, the constitutional restrictions have been found a feeble check to the arbitrary exercise of military power.

The inhabitants of the eastern shore of La Plata have refused to submit to the capital, and have successfully opposed the arms and negotiations of Buenos Ayres; their character is represented as turbulent and daring, but they are warlike and enthusiastically attached to their leader, Artigas, who contends for independence, both from the Government of Spain and from that of Buenos Ayres. No Government has ever been organized on the territory of the eastern shore, owing to the dissensions between the capital and the provinces. The people of Peru have not taken a very active part in the revolution, and many creoles were to be found in the royal armies; the influence of the clergy contributed for some time to this state of things. By the Spanish laws, the high offices in the convent were divided alternately between the European and the creole monks. The church being the only road to preferment open to the creoles, they crowded into it; but this alternative balanced their influence. The European monks sent from Spain were chosen from amongst the most zealous and intelligent, and from the pulpit and in the confessional chair successfully inculcated the doctrines of divine right, and of unqualified submission to the King, and, above all, of implicit belief in the infallibility of the clergy.

The Government of Buenos Ayres abolished the alternative, and banished some of the most intolerant of the European monks and clergy. The creoles who have taken orders are enthusiastic in favor of the revolution, and have been highly useful to that cause in the interior provinces. The influence of the clergy in the city of Buenos Ayres appears to be at an end. The condition of the people of Chili is different from that of any other of the Spanish colonies; the country is, for the most part, in the hands of large proprietors, who let out their lands to tenants upon the conditions of personal service, and of the payment of a moderate rent in produce. As the landlord may, at will, drive the tenant from his farm, or augment the rent, according to the increased value, the farmers are deterred from improving their houses or land, and content themselves with raising what is necessary to pay the landlord and to subsist their families. Most of the large estates are grazing farms, and the personal services of the tenants consist principally in tending the cattle. They are expected, however, at all times to be ready to obey the orders of their landlord. Many of these estates are entailed, and all of them incumbered with some legacy to the church. More than half the property in Chili is in mortmain. With few exceptions, the clergy have been opposed to the revolutions in each of the districts. In Chili there is a regiment of militia cavalry, well mounted, and armed with lances. These regiments are under the control of the colonel, and have, in every instance,

followed him to the field, and fought for the cause he espoused. Unfortunately, this country has been divided into violent and irreconcileable factions by two powerful families, the Carreras and Larrains, both equally anxious to liberate their country from the yoke of Spain, and both using every means of their power to obtain the command.

In Lima there has been no revolutionary movement. The landed estates are in the hands of large proprietors, and are cultivated by slaves. They are fearful that any attempt to change the form of government would be attended by a loss of their property; and, from the great number of blacks and mulattoes in this viceroyalty, the contest would probably terminate in the same manner as the revolution of St. Domingo.

Buenos Ayres and Chili have been virtually independent for the last eight years, and the effect upon the character and condition of the people has been highly beneficial. The human mind appears to have risen with elasticity from the weight of tyranny which had so long oppressed it, and to have improved rapidly in the arts, in knowledge, and in all the comforts and enjoyments of life. These are benefits which will not be surrendered without a desperate struggle. Their forces are numerous, well organized and disciplined, and, were the provinces united, they possess the means of defending themselves against the efforts both of Spain and Portugal. Their dissensions and ambition render them, in the opinion of some, unworthy to be free; but let us recollect that the virtues which adorn society and brighten the page of history are the offspring of freedom and science, and that, when a people have been for centuries kept in subjection by ignorance and superstition, the first effort to burst their fetters will call into action the most violent of the human passions, and hurry men to commit the greatest excesses. The course of such a revolution will be too often stained by cruelties and crimes, and will almost inevitably terminate in a military despotism. From the mild and intelligent character of the creoles of South America, there is every reason to hope that, when emancipated from Spain, and relieved from these present difficulties, they will follow the bright example of the United States, and establish a government of laws.

From the year 1580, when the city of Buenos Ayres was permanently settled, until the year 1778, the history of these countries comprises only a series of domestic vexations from the despotism of viceroys, of privations from monopolies and commercial restrictions, and of sufferings from wars foreign to their interests. In the year 1778 the Indians of the provinces of Upper Peru made an ineffectual attempt to shake off the Spanish yoke. They assembled in great force, and, under the command of Tupac Amaru, a descendant of the Incas of Peru, plundered and destroyed a great many small towns. They twice laid siege to the city of La Paz, but, being without fire-arms, or ignorant of the use of them, they were repulsed with great loss. After a hopeless contest of three years, they were defeated by the combined

armies of Buenos Ayres and Lima. Tupac Amaru, who had been proclaimed Inca, fell into the hands of the conquerors, and, together with the principal leaders of the revolt, was put to death with the most cruel torments. This decisive action put an end to the insurrections of the Indians of Peru, and these colonies remained tranquil until the sudden invasion of the English in 1806.

Sir Home Popham, aware of the disposition of his Government to obtain a footing in the Spanish colonies, and well informed of the defenceless state of Buenos Ayres, determined to make an attack upon that city. Instead of returning direct to England from the Cape of Good Hope, he entered the river La Plata; and, to the astonishment and consternation of the inhabitants, General Beresford landed a few miles below the city of Buenos Ayres, with two thousand men. The viceroy, Sobremente, was panic struck; arms were distributed to the militia, who, ignorant of their use, ran out without order to look at the enemy, and General Beresford marched into the city, and took possession of the citadel without opposition. Don Juan Martín Pueyrredón was the only officer who, at the head of a company of hussars, harassed the enemy's march.

Sir Home Popham returned to England with the fleet, and General Beresford did every thing that could be expected from a brave and generous commander to reconcile the inhabitants, and to secure his conquest. These officers had calculated only the facility of surprising the town, and had overlooked the difficulty of keeping possession of an enemy's country with a small force, at so great a distance from their resources. The inhabitants were irreconcileably opposed to the British. The Chevalier de Liniers, a French emigrant in the service of Spain, passed over to the eastern shore of the river, and excited the inhabitants to arms; and the viceroy, who had fled to Montevideo, assembled a small force, the command of which was given to Liniers; he crossed the river, and was joined by all the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres who could escape the vigilance of the British sentinels.

The English commander, being summoned to surrender the town, signified his determination to defend himself to the last extremity. General Liniers, at the head of his regular forces, immediately commenced the attack, and soon drove the garrison into the fort, where they were forced to capitulate.

The British general officers were sent on their parole to Luxan, a small town twelve leagues from Buenos Ayres, and the rest of the prisoners were marched into the interior.

The emancipation of the Spanish colonies appears to have been a favorite project of Mr. Pitt. The ex-Jesuit Don Juan Pablo Viscardi Gusman, a native of Arequipa, and an enthusiast in favor of the liberty of America, had frequent conferences with that minister, and, in his answers to a series of inquiries presented to him, gave a favorable view of the facility with which a revolution might be effected in that country. He afterwards published

in London an eloquent appeal to his countrymen, exhorting them to shake off the yoke of Spain. During the administration of Mr. Adams, some proposals on this subject are said to have been made to our Government by the British ministry, which were not acceded to. In 1797, a disposition to emancipate their country was manifested by the inhabitants of the Caraccas, and was encouraged by General Picton's proclamation, issued from the island of Trinidad.

In 1801, Mr. Pitt's eagerness to open this market to the trade of Great Britain induced him to aid the untimely and ill-planned expedition of Miranda; and it appeared at the trial of Sir Home Popham that the administration had countenanced the attack on Buenos Ayres.

From the little opposition experienced by the British troops on this expedition, and from the facility with which Buenos Ayres had been occupied, the plan of emancipating these colonies appears to have been relinquished, and the conquest of all the Spanish possessions in America determined upon by the British cabinet. This change of policy may be inferred from comparing the proclamation of Sir Thomas Picton, published at Trinidad by order of Mr. Dundas, minister of His Britannic Majesty for Foreign Affairs, dated 26th of June, 1797; and the instructions given in 1807 to Generals Whitlocke and Crawford. The former encourages the inhabitants "to resist the oppressive authority of their Government;" and declares that "they may be certain, whenever they are in that disposition, to receive all the succors to be expected from His Britannic Majesty, be it with forces or with arms and ammunition, to any extent; with the assurance that the views of His Britannic Majesty go no further than to secure to them their independence, without pretending to any sovereignty over their country, nor even to interfere in the privileges of the people, nor in their political, civil, or religious rights."

The instructions of the right honorable Mr. Windham, Secretary at War, to Generals Whitlocke and Crawford, were in a different spirit. The first was to proceed with the forces under his command to the river of Plate, and to take possession of Buenos Ayres in the name and behalf of His Britannic Majesty. He is ordered not to introduce into the Government any alteration, except in the appointment of individuals, whose change should be found necessary; nor to give any assurance that they shall not be given up to Spain at the conclusion of the present war.

General Crawford was to proceed to the river La Plata, subject to the orders of General Whitlocke. Thence, as it was supposed that his forces would not be required after the reduction of Buenos Ayres, he was directed to pass round Cape Horn, and take possession of Valparaiso. He is ordered to *discourage all hopes of any other change in the condition of these countries than that of transferring their dominion to the Crown of Great Britain.*

The generals on the Atlantic and Pacific are instructed to establish a line

of military posts across the continent. Their operations are limited strictly to these points, whatever prospects of easy conquest may be held out from the defenceless state of Peru, as an untimely movement might defeat the ulterior operations intended against those countries. These instructions are to be found among the official documents annexed to the report of General Whitlocke's trial, published in 1808.

The following extracts from General Whitlocke's defence will show the effect of this policy upon the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, and will give the opinion of the commanders of that expedition, with respect to the means of defence:

> It was known that the people were divided into factions, and that various causes had rendered a large proportion of the inhabitants ripe for revolt; and great numbers were anxiously looking to a separation from their mother country as the only means of availing themselves of the natural advantages of their local situation. It was therefore naturally concluded that people who feel themselves oppressed rather than protected, as excluded, by restrictions founded upon a narrow and selfish policy, from many commercial advantages, would gladly change their government; and if it were once established in a military post in the country, the above causes would make it easy to open an extensive intercourse with the inhabitants, and new channels for trade and commerce.
>
> It was supposed that the character of this country[1] for liberality and good conduct towards those who came under our dominion insured us the good wishes of the greater part, and the co-operation of a large proportion, at least, of the community. The public hopes and expectations were raised to the highest pitch, and no suspicion existed that it was possible for the greatest part of the population of South America to entertain any other than a just feeling of attachment to our Government; still less that it was possible that such a rooted antipathy could exist against us as to justify the assertion (the truth of which has been proved to demonstration) that we had not, when I arrived in South America, among the inhabitants, one single friend in the whole country. Whether the opinion of the illustrious statesman,[2] now no more, who had so frequently turned his thoughts towards South America, had led him to contemplate the propriety of establishing military posts there, or the co-operating only with those who would gladly have followed the example of North America, and availed themselves of our assistance in establishing their independence, I have no means of knowing; but experience has shown that any other course of proceeding than that last mentioned, even if most successful, and almost in proportion to success, must have had the effect of placing us at a greater distance than ever from our ultimate objects, those of friendly intercourse and trade with the country.
>
> It is supposed in my instructions, that, after effecting my first object, I might safely part with a proportion of the force under my command, and retain only about eight thousand, which, it was supposed, must, in any case, in addition to such troops as I might raise in the country,

[1] Great Britain. [2] Mr. Pitt.

be amply sufficient to conquer and keep possession of the country; for such had been the misrepresentations to Government upon this subject, that it was supposed that a considerable force of this description might with safety be established. I was directed, as the court will have observed, to use precaution as to the raising of this local force, and particularly to take care that one-third of each rank of officers should be British, and to select the description and classes out of which it was to be framed; but, subject to these precautions, it was conceived, and so stated in my instructions, that much aid might be derived from this source towards securing His Majesty's possessions in that quarter, and avoiding, at the same time, the necessity of too large a demand on the regular forces of this country, (I use the very words of the instructions.) Such, as the court will have seen, was the impression in this country on my appointment to the command.

What was the actual situation of the country on my arrival?

I naturally resorted to the very able and experienced officer who commanded at Montevideo, and who had diligently employed himself in acquiring every possible information upon this subject. I found that, in the course of his operations against Montevideo, and after its capture, he had every reason to believe that the people were, without exception, inimical to us; that, previous to the surrender of Montevideo, he could place no confidence in any information he received; and that, after its capture, a sullen silence pervaded every rank. But he also found reason to believe that, however inimical they were to us, they were still more so to their present Government; for, upon reports arriving at Montevideo, which afterwards proved false, of the abolition of the court of audienza, the setting aside of the King's authority, and not hoisting the Spanish colors, those who had appeared hostile and inveterate now pressed him to advance a corps to Buenos Ayres, and assured him that, if he would acknowledge their independence, and promise them the protection of the English Government, the place would submit.

The party in power were mostly all natives of Spain, in the principal offices of church and state, and devoted to the Spanish Government. The second party consisted of natives of the country, with some Spaniards settled in it. The disposition of the mother country had made them most anxious to shake off the Spanish yoke; and though, from their ignorance, their want of morals, and the barbarity of their dispositions, they were totally unfit to govern themselves, they aimed at following the steps of the North Americans, and erecting an independent state. If we would promise them independence, they would instantly revolt against the Government, and join us with the great mass of the inhabitants. The next consideration was our giving up the footing we had in South America. On this subject many important considerations presented themselves. First, the situation of the country and the nature of our instructions. It was supposed, from the information received by Government, that the country would be conquered and kept in subjection by eight thousand troops, which was considered as a large force; but the information received by Government upon this subject must have been founded in ignorance of the true state of the country. I found, on my arrival, that the resistance we should have to contend with far exceeded every calculation; not a single friend had we in the country; on the contrary, every inhabitant

was determined to exert his individual strength. Upon this subject I rely upon the experience of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, who stated that *double the number of troops* I have mentioned would be required to *conquer* and *keep possession of the country*.

On the return of the Viceroy Sobremente from Montevideo, the people refused to receive him, and wished to proclaim Liniers. That officer appeased the tumult, and reinstated Sobremente in his command. The Cabildo, however, deposed him as soon as they heard of the approach of another British expedition, and gave the command to Liniers. They then despatched a deputation to Spain in consequence of which Sobremente was recalled, and Don Santiago Liniers appointed Viceroy of La Plata.

The advanced guard of the second expedition, under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, landed on the eastern shore of the river La Plata, and laid siege to Montevideo. Soon after, batteries were opened, a breach was made, and the place taken by assault. The main body, under General Whitlocke, arrived in the river Plate on the 9th of May, 1807, and, after remaining at Montevideo until the arrival of General Crawford's division, the British army proceeded up to Buenos Ayres; General Whitlocke, following the example of General Beresford, landed his troops below the town, and experienced incredible difficulty in the transportation of his artillery over the low swampy lands which skirt the borders of the river.

The country people were decidedly hostile, and none could be prevailed upon to serve as guides, or to procure cattle for the army. The columns mistook the road, and the men were almost famished when they arrived before the town. The want of proper accommodations for his troops, and the dread of the rainy season, induced General Whitlocke to order an immediate attack. During the march of the British troops from Ensenada, the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres recovered from their first panic; and dispositions were made to defend the town by cutting ditches across the principal streets, placing the militia on the flat roofs, and securing the entrance of the houses.

Sir Samuel Auchmuty, who commanded one column of attack, entered the upper part of the town, and, after a sanguinary conflict, drove the Spaniards from the square, and took possession of the Plaza de Toros, a large circular building, where the bull fights are held. This position commands the whole town. General Crawford led the column which entered the lower part of the town. He met with little opposition until he had advanced within a few hundred yards of the fort; suddenly a tremendous fire was opened upon the column from the windows. Bombs and grenades were showered down upon the ranks from the roofs of the houses; without petaras, scaling ladders, or even axes, the troops in vain endeavored to break open the doors; and General Crawford, after losing half his force, without being able to make any effectual resistance, retreated into a large church, where he defended himself for some time. The church was exposed to the fire of

the fort, and he was at length compelled to surrender at discretion. This decided the fate of the expedition.

General Whitlocke was informed of the capture of General Crawford's columns, and it was intimated to him that, if the attack continued, it would be impossible to protect the prisoners from the rage of the people. Finding that the object of the Government could not be accomplished, he entered into a treaty with Liniers, by which he agreed to evacuate Montevideo, and the territory of the river La Plata, provided he was permitted to re-embark his troops. These conditions were immediately conceded, and the British forces abandoned the shore of La Plata.

The expedition under General Whitlocke, assisted by the disposition of the people, might have secured the emancipation of these colonies, but was not adequate to transfer their dominion to the Crown of Great Britain.

The revolution in Spain changed the destination of a still more formidable expedition fitted out by Great Britain, and intended for the final conquest of these colonies. Monsieur de Chasne, an emissary of Napoleon, arrived in Buenos Ayres in 1808. The viceroy, Liniers, laid his despatches before the audiencia and the Cabildo, and Mons. de Chasne was sent off. He afterwards fell into the hands of General Elio; and, after experiencing the most cruel treatment, was sent back to Buenos Ayres, from whence he was conveyed as a prisoner to Cadiz.

The viceroy, Liniers, issued, about this time, a proclamation setting forth the state of the peninsula, and exhorting the people to remain tranquil, and to follow the fortune of the mother country, whatever might be the issue of the present contest. The same language was held by the regency of Spain. In an address to the Americans, they say, It is not sufficient for you to be Spaniards, unless, whatever be the event of fortune, you also belong to Spain.

General Elio, who had been appointed military governor of Montevideo, had secretly excited the inhabitants of the eastern shore to revolt against the authority of the viceroy. He now accused Liniers of treason, refused to obey his orders, and formed a Junta in Montevideo, on the model of the Provincial Government in Spain. The arrival of Goyeneche, who left Madrid as the emissary of Murat, and afterwards accepted a commission from the Junta of Seville to proclaim Ferdinand VII. in South America, contributed to agitate the public mind, and to encourage the spirit of revolution. The people were invited to take part in the dissensions of the chiefs, and were called upon for the first time to think and to act. Goyeneche landed at Montevideo, where he approved the conduct of General Elio, and assured him that the formation of a Junta would be highly acceptable to the Government of Spain; at Buenos Ayres he applauded the loyalty of Liniers; in the provinces through which he passed on his way to Lima, he advised the establishment of Juntas. At Lima he solicited and obtained the command

of the army sent against the Junta of La Paz, and conducted the war against that province in the most sanguinary and impolitic manner.

Notwithstanding the Central Junta of Spain had been recognised by Liniers, and through his influence by the people of Buenos Ayres, that Government listened to the accusations of his enemies, and superseded the only man whose popular character and services to the state could have preserved this colony from immediate revolt.

On the arrival of the new viceroy, Cisneros, Liniers was strongly solicited to retain the command. The military offered to support him; and hopes were entertained by the patriots that the impolicy and injustice of the Spanish Government would drive over to their party this able and popular leader. But Liniers, who appears to have acted throughout with chivalric honor, disappointed their hopes, by privately withdrawing himself from the solicitations of his friends and the persecution of his enemies.

Cisneros did not possess the character or abilities necessary to repress the revolutionary spirit of the people of Buenos Ayres. The decree of free trade, extorted from this viceroy in 1809, increased their intercourse with foreigners; and the ignorance and superstition by which their allegiance had been hitherto secured was fast wearing away; while their conquest of the capital, and their successful defence against the last formidable invasion, without any assistance from the mother country, gave them confidence in their strength and resources.

Shortly after the news of the seizure of the royal family reached the Brazils, manifestoes were published by the Infant Don Pedro, and by the Princess Charlotte, the sister of Ferdinand VII., and the consort of the present King of Portugal, setting forth their right to the Spanish dominions in America. They were accompanied by letters addressed to the viceroys and governors of provinces, and were circulated from Mexico to Buenos Ayres. The first scheme of the revolutionists was formed upon these pretensions.

They proposed to deliver up the country to the Princess Charlotte, expecting to retain the administration in their own hands; and intending, at some more fortunate period, to assert their entire independence.

They despatched an agent, with their proposals, to Rio de Janeiro. The princess accepted their offer, upon condition that they should admit a Portuguese garrison into Buenos Ayres. As this measure would have defeated the plan of the revolutionists, the negotiation was dropped.

The first revolutionary movement in the viceroyalty of La Plata was made in La Paz; and a Junta was formed in the capital of that intendancy, after the plans of the provisional Juntas of Spain.

The Viceroy of Lima resolved immediately to suppress this party, and despatched Goyeneche, at the head of a large force, into Upper Peru. La Paz was taken, and the members of the Junta, with some of the principal

citizens, put to death—the first example of the exterminating fury with which Goyeneche conducted the war in Upper Peru. The failure of the plan to transfer the Government to the Princess Charlotte obliged the leaders of the revolution to adopt more decisive measures. Their intentions were discovered, and it was expected that every means would be used to frustrate them. Their danger obliged them to act with promptness and resolution; and the first attempt of the viceroy to check them was followed by an open declaration on their part. He was peremptorily ordered to resign his command, and, after a short struggle, and a vain appeal to the people, was obliged to comply. Immediately upon his resignation, a meeting of the principal inhabitants was held in the town-hall of Buenos Ayres. In this assembly, the bishop, whose influence had hitherto been unbounded, ventured to oppose the current of public opinion; but his authority was no longer sacred, and his assertions, that the last Spaniard who remained in America ought by right to govern the country, excited such universal indignation, and drew upon him such a torrent of abuse, that he retired to his palace confounded and dismayed.

This assembly, still wishing to temporize, created a provisional Junta, and named the ex-viceroy president; but the people, who had felt their power, refused all compromise, and on the 25th of May, 1810, a Junta was elected from the creoles of Buenos Ayres, and took possession of the command, amidst the universal acclamations of the people.

Every exertion was immediately made to extend the revolution to the interior provinces, and troops were despatched to favor the patriots in Peru and Paraguay.

The ex-viceroy and fiscals endeavored to counteract this plan, and maintained a correspondence with the Spanish authorities in those provinces. As soon as this conduct was known to the Government, they were summoned to the fort, and directly conveyed on board an English cutter, chartered to transport them to the Canaries. The royal audience was at the same time dismissed for contempt of the Junta; and the Cabildo, chiefly composed of Europeans, having, in a secret meeting, sworn allegiance to the regency of Spain, the members were banished, and it was declared by law that no European should hold any public office under the Government of Buenos Ayres.

The Count de Liniers, who had retired to Cordova, assembled a small force, and determined to oppose the progress of the revolution in the interior. Before he had time to strengthen himself, his party was attacked and totally defeated by the troops of Buenos Ayres; and he, with the bishop, the governor of Cordova, and four of the principal officers, fell into the hands of the victors.

Either from the personal enmity of his judges, or from fear of his popularity and extensive influence, which made it equally dangerous, at that

early stage of their revolution, to banish or to imprison him, it was resolved in the Junta that Liniers and his accomplices should be put to death, except the bishop, whose sacred character protected him. They were met on the road to the capital by a military commission, and were shot, after being confessed by the bishop, who was forced to witness the execution of his friends.

The expedition to Upper Peru was conducted by a commission; Castelle was the member selected for this important command; he was one of the earliest and most distinguished leaders of the revolution from the Junta of Buenos Ayres.

The Indians were emancipated from the most oppressive services; the auxiliary army, hailed by these unfortunate people and by the creoles as their deliverers, soon occupied the whole territory of the viceroyalty, and the towns were invited to elect deputies to represent them in the Congress about to be held at the capital.

In the mean time, the dissensions natural to a Government composed of one numerous body broke out, and produced those factions which have since divided their councils and distracted the state. They originated in the personal animosities of the president of the Junta[1] and of the Secretary of State,[2] a man of violent temper, ardent in his love of liberty, and too conscious of his superior abilities to brook control. As the secretaries had a right to deliberate and vote in the Junta, he was enabled to oppose the president in all his views, and obtained a decree depriving him of all distinction, except that of his presidency when sitting in Junta. On the arrival of the deputies from the provinces, they were admitted into the Provincial Government, and the spirit of party was augmented by this accession of numbers. As they had been received contrary to the opinion of the secretary, who contended that it defeated the intention of the election, which had been to form a deliberative body, the president found no difficulty to procure the secretary's banishment; he was sent on a mission to England, and died on his passage.

The members of the opposition, unable to resist the president's party in the Junta, determined to establish a club in the city, and, by uniting the most factious of the military and citizens, control the measures of Government. Aware of the probable effects of this combination against him, the president had recourse to the most violent and unjustifiable measures to destroy it. On the morning of the 5th of April, 1811, three regiments devoted to his interest were drawn up in the principal square of the city. The corporations were assembled, and the petition was presented to them from two or three hundred peasants, who, in the name of the people, demanded the banishment of the members and officers most inimical to the president. The corporation, awed by the military, reluctantly complied;

[1] Don Cornelio Saavedra. [2] Moreno.

the obnoxious persons were banished; the club abolished; and a number of the citizens thrown into prison.

This impolitic measure was the commencement of those violent changes which have so frequently retarded the progress of the revolution. The leaders of the army of Peru, which was now encamped on the frontiers of the viceroyalty of Lima, declared against the revolution of the 5th of April, and threatened to turn their arms against its authors. It was thought a necessary measure of precaution on the part of the Junta to introduce discord among the chiefs, and their dissensions finally occasioned the entire defeat of that army, at the battle of Hualqui, when the royalists and patriots mutually accused each other of breaking an armistice. The news of this disaster, which well nigh proved the ruin of their cause, was received with joy by the reigning party in Buenos Ayres, who only saw in it the destruction of a formidable rival.

The Junta of Buenos Ayres had neglected to occupy the important place of Montevideo at the commencement of the revolution; and the Spanish marine, which with equal oversight had been permitted to leave Buenos Ayres, rendezvoused there, and commenced hostilities against the Junta; they harassed the commerce on the rivers, and blockaded the ports of Buenos Ayres.

On the arrival of General Elio with the appointment of captain general and viceroy of these provinces, he withdrew the blockade, and made an attempt to get possession of the command, either as viceroy or as president of the Junta.

His proposals were treated with contempt by the Government of Buenos Ayres, and he shortly after despatched a small squadron to the Parana, in order to destroy some vessels belonging to Buenos Ayres, which were stationed there for the protection of the trade. This was effected, and the blockade renewed. The British admiral did not consider the authority of the viceroy sufficient to establish a legal blockade, and came down in person from Rio de Janeiro to insist upon the inviolability of the British flag. After some negotiations with General Elio, he gave orders to the commander on this station to protect the entrance of British vessels into all the ports of the river La Plata. The blockade became, therefore, of no effect; and the squadron was employed in ravaging the coast, but returned from time to time to bombard the city.

During these attacks, the Europeans in Buenos Ayres were harassed and mortified. The unmarried were banished, and those who remained were subjected to the most vexatious and humiliating regulations.

In the midst of these transactions, the inhabitants of the eastern shore of the river La Plata had been excited to revolt against the European authorities in Montevideo, and, as General Elio was particularly disliked by them, this was easily effected: they rose in mass, defeated the royalists at Piedras,

and drove them within the walls of the town. A small regular force was immediately despatched to aid their operations, and that town was blockaded by land.

The expedition against Paraguay had failed of its object, and had served only to irritate the inhabitants of that province; and although they shortly afterwards expelled their European magistrates, and established a provisional Junta, they have constantly refused all connexion with Buenos Ayres. General Elio, alarmed at the spirit manifested by the people of the eastern shore, and pressed by a besieging army, sent deputies to Buenos Ayres to solicit peace, offering to return to Spain, and stipulating that the town of Montevideo should send a deputy to the Congress of Buenos Ayres, provided it was suffered to remain independent of the Junta. The news of the revolution in Paraguay, which was received at the same time, prevented the Government of Buenos Ayres from acceding to this proposal. Ignorant of the intention of the chiefs of that province, and presuming that they would unite in the common cause, they insisted upon the unconditional surrender of Montevideo. General Elio then applied for assistance to the court of Brazil: that cabinet, in hopes to realize their favorite project, and to obtain possession of Montevideo, immediately granted his request, and 2,500 men were ordered to pass the frontiers. In consequence of this measure, the situation of Buenos Ayres became alarming. From the state of their discipline, the defeat at Hualqui proved a total dispersion of that army, and the forces of Lima successively occupied La Paz, Potosi, and Cochabamba.

The Portuguese troops advanced rapidly to the relief of Montevideo, and great discontent reigned in the capital. In this state of affairs, it was thought advisable that the president should proceed to Peru, in order to collect their scattered forces, and, by his presence, restore the confidence of the inhabitants of the provinces not yet occupied by the enemy. He consented to this arrangement, and appointed to the command of the garrison, during his absence, those men who had served under him in the revolution of the 5th of April, and of whose attachment and fidelity he felt secure. He had scarcely left the capital before a town meeting was assembled, which deposed him; they then named an executive of three,[1] and declared the Assembly of Deputies a deliberative body. In their eagerness to change, they neglected to secure themselves against the abuse of power.

They intrusted to the executive the right of enacting their own laws, and permitted them to frame a constitution for their own government. The legislative assembly proved an intolerable restraint upon an executive furnished with such powers, and a pretext was soon found to dissolve that body.

[1] Chiclana, Sarratea, and Pasos were the members chosen upon this occasion. The secretaries of this Junta were Rivadavia and Perez.

The first act of the new Government of Buenos Ayres had been to conclude a treaty with General Elio, by which it was agreed, on the one part, that the troops should be withdrawn from the siege of Montevideo, and that that place, including the eastern side of the river La Plata, should remain under the Spanish authorities; on the other part, that the trade of Buenos Ayres should not be molested, and that the Portuguese forces should retire to their own frontier. On the part of Buenos Ayres, the conditions of this treaty were faithfully executed, and the territory of the eastern shore was immediately evacuated by their troops. General Elio, who had discovered the intentions of the court of Brazil, had been induced to conclude this treaty from fear of so dangerous an ally; but the commander of the Portuguese army, who had been made a party in the treaty without being consulted, declared that he could not act until he received instructions from his court, and proceeded to fortify himself in Maldonado. Having failed in this attempt to obtain possession of Montevideo, without which it was impossible to retain any part of the eastern shore, the Portuguese court sent an agent to Buenos Ayres, and concluded an armistice with that Government; in consequence of which, their troops evacuated the territory of La Plata.

The people of the eastern shore, who dreaded the vengeance of the royalists, to which they had been shamefully abandoned, deserted their homes, drove off their cattle, and followed Artigas, their favorite leader, to the other side of the Uraguay.

Shortly after the return of the army from Montevideo, an unsuccessful attempt was made, by the regiment of patricians, to effect a revolution, and to re-establish their former colonel the first president of the Junta. Although abandoned in the moment of execution by the officers who had excited the revolt, they were not reduced until after a bloody conflict.

As soon as it was known in Spain that General Elio had concluded a treaty with Buenos Ayres, he was recalled; and his successor, General Vegodet, who arrived with reinforcements, recommenced hostilities against the revolutionary Government. The command of the army of Buenos Ayres was intrusted to a member, Don Manuel Sarratea, of the executive, who crossed the river at Santa Fé, and again invested Montevideo.

A Government so constituted as that of Buenos Ayres, without restrictions and without responsibility, could not long command the confidence of the people, or exist in harmony.

The citizens were oppressed, and the rulers were entirely taken up with their own private animosities and disputes. These dissensions, as usual, soon extended their effects to the armies before Montevideo. The inhabitants of the eastern shore separated their forces from those of Buenos Ayres, and the latter caballed against their commander-in-chief, dismissed him, and appointed one of their own choice. The Europeans saw, in these

disorders, a favorable opportunity to effect a counter-revolution. A plan was formed to obtain the watchword by surprising the patroles, to seize on the barracks, and, favored by a descent from the squadron of Montevideo, to get possession of the city.

This conspiracy was discovered on the eve of its execution, and thirty of the principal conspirators were tried and executed.

In October, 1812, deputies arrived from the interior provinces to form a Congress at Buenos Ayres; but differences arising between them and the executive, the Assembly was dissolved on their first session.

The remains of the army of Peru had retired before the victorious troops of Lima, until the want of means to continue their retreat forced them to make a stand at Tucuman. On the 24th September, 1812, an obstinate engagement took place, which, from the active co-operation of the inhabitants of Tucuman, ended in the total defeat of the royalists.

Owing to the dissensions of the Government, the army of Peru was left without the means of advancing, and could not profit by their success. The discontent became general, and the party opposed to the Government seized the opportunity to effect a revolution.

The military, so often the instrument of faction, again lent their aid, and a new executive was appointed by a cabildo abiento, or town meeting. Succors were at length sent to the army of Peru, which enabled General Belgrano to advance and attack the royalists at Salta. In this action, fought in February, 1813, the Spaniards were defeated with great loss; and Belgrano, following up his victory, took Salta by assault, and captured General Tristan, with the remains of the royal army. The prisoners were released on their parole, which they immediately violated, and were again incorporated into the army of Goyeneche. This general had commanded the royal army in Peru since the memorable invasion of La Paz; but being forced to evacuate the territory of Buenos Ayres, by the approach of the victorious army of Belgrano, he was recalled by the Viceroy of Lima.

The viceroyalty of La Plata was again freed from enemies, and the deputies from the provinces and towns once more assembled at Buenos Ayres. They assumed the title of the Sovereign Assembly, and conferred that of supreme executive power upon the former superior Government, which was composed of three persons.[1] They declared the sole right of making laws to be vested in the Assembly, and the executive to be responsible to them for its acts.

One of the first decrees of the Sovereign Assembly manumitted the offspring of slaves born after February, 1813, and emancipated all slaves that might be brought into the territory of La Plata after that period.

The slave-holders were called upon for every third slave, which were enrolled in the army of the republic. On this occasion many of the inhabitants

[1] Pena, Perez, and Alvarez, jointly.

voluntarily manumitted their slaves, upon condition of their serving during the war; and two regiments, called liberti, were formed of them: they are officered by whites.

Commissioners were sent by the Assembly into Upper Peru, to examine into and report on the state of those provinces and of the army.

Towards the close of the year 1813 the arms of Buenos Ayres met with serious reverses. The general of their forces in Upper Peru was induced, by false intelligence, to attack the army of Lima, although advantageously posted at Vilcapugio, and was defeated with the loss of all his artillery. Being pursued by the enemy, and eager to repair his losses, he risked a second engagement at Ayuma, under the most unfavorable circumstances, in which he was again defeated, and forced to retire below Salta, with the remnant of his army.

The garrison of Montevideo had received supplies and reinforcements from Spain; and, although they had been defeated in a sortie against the besieging army, it was apprehended that a junction might be effected at Santa Fé of the victorious army of Lima with the disposable force in Montevideo. The royal squadron having the command of the river La Plata rendered this movement very practicable.

The party in power seized this opportunity to strengthen the Government. They represented to the Assembly that an executive of three persons could not exert the energy and despatch called for by the present perilous situation of the state, and proposed to vest the authority in one person.

This proposal was warmly discussed in the Assembly; but, the military declaring in favor of the change, a Supreme Director was appointed. The Assembly was prorogued during the pleasure of the Director; and a council of seven, called the Permanent Council of the Sovereign Assembly, was chosen to assist him.

The general who had commanded in Peru was superseded, and orders were given to his successor to collect the scattered remains of that army, and to fortify himself in Tucuman, whilst they determined to direct their whole force against Montevideo. Aware of the importance attached by Great Britain to the trade of these colonies, and expecting to derive great advantages from opposing the commercial spirit of that nation to the jealous colonial policy of Spain, they sent an agent[1] to London; and even willing, at that time, to secure the favorable mediation of the English court by granting any privileges, they are said to have instructed their agent to declare that Buenos Ayres would rather be governed by a foreign prince than submit unconditionally to Spain.

The same policy induced them to yield to the solicitations of the English minister at Rio de Janeiro, who was desirous of adjusting the differences between Buenos Ayres and Montevideo, and had expressed a wish that the

[1] Don Manuel Sarratea.

former should acknowledge the regency of Spain, accept the constitution, and send deputies to the Cortes. Commissioners were sent with proposals to Montevideo; but the viceroy, who now contemplated the approaching fall of Buenos Ayres, and considered this measure as a proof of their weakness, refused to receive or treat with them. This result had been forseen by the Government, and great exertions had been made to fit out a squadron, which might give them the command of the river: some stout merchant vessels had been purchased, which were armed from the batteries of Buenos Ayres and Ensenada, and manned by foreigners; and this fleet, immediately on the return of the commissioners, appeared off Montevideo, this measure did not excite much alarm in that place; it was supposed that armed merchantmen would prove an easy conquest to national ships, and a squadron was immediately despatched to attack and destroy them.

The event did not justify this opinion of their superiority. To their astonishment, and dismay of the garrison of Montevideo, who witnessed the action, the national squadron was entirely defeated; two only escaped into port, and the remainder fell into the hands of the patriots. The viceroy, finding himself pressed by superior forces, both by land and water, now condescended to solicit a peace, which he had but a few days before rejected with contempt; but the Government of Buenos Ayres retaliated his conduct toward them, and refused to receive his commissions, or to open his despatches. He was soon after reduced to the necessity of treating with the general[1] of the besieging army.

It was agreed that the Government of Buenos Ayres should acknowledge the regency, and send deputies to Spain. The town of Montevideo was to be given up; the garrison to be sent to Spain; two thousand men to march out with their arms, field-pieces, and ammunition, and to be encamped until the conditions were carried into execution.

Whilst this treaty was pending, disputes arose between the troops of the garrison and the armed citizens, who were violently opposed to the capitulation.

The viceroy, finding it impossible to suppress these commotions, which threatened the destruction of all parties, ordered the gates to be thrown open, and admitted the army of Buenos Ayres. The two thousand men were permitted to march out with the honors of war; and it was at first supposed that the articles of the capitulation would be adhered to. They were soon undeceived. The general of the besieging army published a proclamation, in which he declared that, having entered the town before the capitulation had been signed by either party, exposed to a *ruse de guerre*, and to the risk of being attacked, he considered Montevideo to have been surrendered at discretion to the arms of Buenos Ayres. The viceroy was furnished with a vessel to carry him to Spain; but the garrison, consisting of

[1] Don Carlos Alvear.

six thousand men, were sent prisoners of war to Buenos Ayres. The persons and property of the inhabitants were respected.

To the honor of Buenos Ayres, they have used their victories with moderation, notwithstanding the irritation which existed between the royalists and the patriots, and that the former have frequently disgraced themselves by massacres in cold blood, and by the barbarous treatment of their prisoners. The troops of Buenos Ayres have never sullied their arms by these sanguinary measures, not even in retaliation.

Montevideo had been defended with the utmost obstinacy for nearly four years, and not less than seven thousand persons perished during the siege, principally by famine and disease. The victors acquired seven thousand stands of arms, five hundred pieces of artillery, and a profusion of warlike stores. An amicable arrangement was made with the inhabitants of the eastern shore, and the troops were withdrawn in order to reinforce the army of Peru. It had been determined to destroy the fortifications of Montevideo, which are formidable, from the place being situated on a very narrow peninsula. It may be considered the key of the river La Plata, and, consequently, of the whole viceroyalty; and once in the possession of an enemy, particularly of a maritime Power, they could not expect to wrest it from them, nor could they defend it long against a regular force.

Moreover, in the present unsettled state of the country, it would prove a powerful engine of faction, and the military governor of Montevideo might dictate to the Government of Buenos Ayres, or involve the country in a civil war. The artillery and stores were to have been moved to Tucuman, to which point the armies might retreat in the event of a formidable and irresistible invasion obliging them to abandon the coast.[1]

The Limanean army, which had advanced as far as Salta, on receiving intelligence of the fall of Montevideo, retired precipitately upon Potosi. The commanders of that army, led on by the hope of forming a junction with the troops of Montevideo, and of investing Buenos Ayres, in two instances abandoned the strong positions of Oruro and Potosi, which secured to them the possession of Peru, and advanced towards the plains of Tucuman. The first had weakened his army by leaving garrisons in the towns, and particularly in Orepera de Cochabamba, the capital of the most fertile and populous of the interior provinces.

The present commander, to avoid this fault of his predecessor, to which he attributed his defeat in Tucuman, left his rear and flank unprotected, and exposed to the attacks of the Indians and cavalry of Cochabamba, which harassed his retreat. The revolution of Chili partook, in some degree, of the distinctions which mark the character of that people.

The creoles of that kingdom saw and rejoiced in the success of Buenos Ayres. They wished to follow what they considered a noble example, but

[1] They neglected this precautionary measure, and this important fortress is in the hands of the Portuguese.

were restrained by their natural timidity, when the captain general, on some slight denunciation, arrested three of the principal inhabitants of Santiago—Ovalle, Roxas, and Vera.

Ovalle and Roxas were sent to Lima; but Vera, a native of Santa Fé, in the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, feigned himself sick, and from the castle of Valparaiso, where he was confined, incited the Chilians to reclaim their countrymen, and to protest against this act of oppression, which he represented as the prelude to a general persecution of the creoles. He excited their fears to such a degree that they gathered courage from despair, and addressed a strong remonstrance to the captain general, which alarmed him, and induced him to recall those gentlemen, whom he had accused of treasonable practices, and of forming plans to separate the colonies from the mother country.

These acts of weakness on the one part, and of firmness on the other, decided the revolution. Encouraged by their success, the people declared themselves openly; in the hopes of freedom, even family feuds were forgotten; all the creoles of distinction in Santiago united, deposed the captain general, and instituted a Provisional Government, which acknowledged and acted in the name of the authorities of Spain.

They soon, however, assumed a bolder tone, and a Congress was assembled, which governed in the name and behalf of Ferdinand VII.

On the 1st of April, 1811, the day appointed for the election of the members for the capital, an attempt was made by some Europeans to restore the ancient Government; an engagement took place in the principal square, which ended in the total defeat of the royalists. The captain general and the royal audience were implicated in this conspiracy, and, in consequence, were banished the kingdom, and retired to Lima.

In the Congress, party spirit soon mingled with all their debates; the provinces of Conception complained that they were not fairly represented, and the affairs of the Government were neglected, in the animosities and mutual accusations of the members.

The command of the artillery was in the hands of a European, who was supposed to be a partisan of the Princess Charlotte of Brazil. The creoles dreaded the power and influence of this man, and the three brothers Carrera resolved to make an effort to wrest from him this important command. The eldest, who was a major in the regiment of grenadiers, had distinguished himself on the 1st of April, and was a great favorite with the soldiery.

They chose the hour of the siesta for the attack, and, at the head of sixty grenadiers, surprised the artillery barracks, and seized the commander.

After this action, some reform was made in the representation, and the Congress commenced business by inviting all who were inimical to the present order of things to retire from the kingdom.

They rendered the clergy inimical to the cause of independence, by for-

bidding them to receive any money from their parishioners for the performance of their clerical duties, assigning a moderate salary to the curates in lieu of fees. They passed an act manumitting the future offspring of slaves, and declared that all slaves brought into Chili after that period should receive their freedom, after a residence of six months. They opened the ports to commerce, and published commercial regulations.

The places of the alcaldes (members of the Cabildo) were, by the laws of Spain, sold to the highest bidder. They were now made elective.

In this state of affairs, intelligence of the restoration of Ferdinand VII. reached South America. The Government of Buenos Ayres, notwithstanding they had changed the national flag and cockade, and had coined money with the arms of the republic, had always issued their decrees in the name of Ferdinand VII. It was resolved, therefore, to send a deputy to Spain to proffer their allegiance, on conditions which would secure them in the free exercise and enjoyment of their rights; and hopes were entertained that the present administration would adopt a conciliatory policy towards the colonies, in opposition to the violent measure of the regency. These hopes were disappointed, and their agent returned to Buenos Ayres without effecting his object.

The capture of Montevideo had put into their hands a valuable armament and abundant warlike stores; and the ships, which had contributed so materially to their success, were now employed to harass the commerce of Spain. Some of their cruisers doubled Cape Horn, while others proceeded to intercept the return of Spanish ships off the port of Cadiz.

Don Carlos Alvear, who had commanded the forces of Buenos Ayres at the capitulation of Montevideo, ambitious to conclude the war in Peru, induced the Supreme Director to appoint him general-in-chief of that army, and left Buenos Ayres at the head of a large reinforcement. On the road he was met by the unpleasant intelligence that the officers and troops refused to receive him as their commander, and he returned with his forces to Buenos Ayres. The Supreme Director was glad to resign his title to one who had for some time exercised the chief authority. Alvear was, in consequence, proclaimed Supreme Director in Buenos Ayres; but not being acknowledged in the provinces, or by the army of Peru, the greatest confusion prevailed in the state.

After the conquest of Montevideo, the Government of Buenos Ayres concluded a treaty with Artigas; but, upon their afterwards sending him a commission, he returned it, telling them that he desired his authority from the free election of the people of the eastern shore; that the inhabitants of that province were willing to be the allies, but would never submit to be the vassals of Buenos Ayres.

The troops which were sent to reduce him to subjection not only failed in their object, but were forced to abandon Montevideo. Artigas, after

driving the forces of Buenos Ayres from the eastern shore, crossed the Parana, and took possession of Santa Fé. Two thousand men were despatched to recover this important post; but the officers came to an understanding with Artigas, and turned their arms against the Supreme Director. Under these circumstances, and threatened by a revolt of the citizens, Alvear withdrew his forces from Buenos Ayres, and encamped at a short distance from the city. A town meeting was immediately assembled, which deposed both the Supreme Director and the Sovereign Assembly, and vested the authority in the Cabildo. The city was placed in a state of defence, but Alvear, after some threats, resigned his command, and, with his family, took refuge on board a British frigate then stationed in the river.

The Cabildo then appointed a Junta of Observation, published a new constitution, and elected Rondeau, the general of the army of Peru, Supreme Director. This officer, who had formerly refused to resign his command to Alvear, preferred remaining at the head of the army, and a Supreme Director *pro tempore* was nominated, until he should think proper to assume his command. Another attempt was made to dispossess Artigas of Santa Fé, but the troops of Buenos Ayres were defeated with great loss. General Pezuela, who had fortified himself in Oruro, having received reinforcements from Lima, attacked the army of Peru on the 22d of November, 1815, at Sipisipi, and, after an obstinate engagement, the patriots were forced to retire.

The army of Buenos Ayres retreated to Salta, and the royal forces remained in possession of all the upper provinces of Peru. The people were displeased with the administration of the Supreme Director's substitute, and, assembling tumultuously, they forced him to resign the command: another was appointed, who was soon after treated in the same manner, and the Government was then placed in the hands of a Committee of Safety.

The Congress, which had been convoked according to a provision in the last estatuto, assembled in June, 1816, at Tucuman. They nominated Don Juan Martin Pueyrredon Supreme Director, who immediately repaired to Buenos Ayres and assumed the reins of government. Don Manuel Belgrano, who, since the battle of Velcapugio, had remained in retirement, resumed the command of the army of Peru. The troops received with enthusiasm the general who had so often led them to victory; who had generously distributed to the widows and orphans of those soldiers who had fallen in the battle of Salta the money voted to him by the Government of Buenos Ayres as a reward for that distinguished service; and who had preserved his political integrity amidst the changes of party and the intrigues of faction, and had manifested no other ambition than that of devoting his life and fortune to the great cause in which he was engaged.

An army was assembled at Mendoza to protect that frontier against the royal army which was in possession of Chili, and the command of this

force intrusted to San Martin, who had distinguished himself by repulsing, with a small corps of cavalry, a detachment of the royal forces at San Lorenzo, on the Parana.

On the 9th of July, 1816, the Congress published their formal declaration of independence. In December following, the Portuguese troops entered the territory of the eastern shore, which is claimed by that Government. The invading army, after occupying the towns on the frontiers, took possession of Maldonado, and advanced upon Montevideo. This important military post was surrendered to them without opposition.

Artigas, with the desultory forces under his command, opposed in vain the progress of the invaders, but still continued to harass them by every means in his power.

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John Graham, Special Commissioner of the United States to South America, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

WASHINGTON, *November 5, 1818.*

SIR: Mr. Rodney having undertaken to draw up, for our joint signature, a report respecting the present situation of the country we recently visited under the orders of the President, and circumstances having prevented him from presenting it to me for perusal until his late arrival in this city, I was not aware until then that I should have occasion to present to you my individual views on that subject. But, on an attentive perusal of the paper he drew up, I found that, although there was not, perhaps, any important fact on which we essentially differed, yet that some were stated of which I was not aware; and that we had taken views which it might be difficult to combine during the short time then allowed to us, and of which it might be proper that you should be put in possession. Under these circumstances, I thought it better to submit to the disadvantage of hastily throwing my observations together, and of presenting them separately, than to ask him to derange the general tenor of his report by introducing them into it.

The arrival of Mr. Bland, who will necessarily make a separate report, will, I trust, reconcile the President to the course I have taken, as, from a combined view of what we individually state, he may, perhaps, be better enabled to draw his own inferences as to the actual situation and future prospects of the country we visited, than from any just report in which we could all have agreed; as, under ordinary circumstances, that must have been the result of a compromise of opinions, and would, probably, have ex-

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 224.

cluded some facts, or some views, which one or the other of us will, in the mode now adopted, present to you.

In my particular situation, however, I thought it less necessary to go into detail, as I knew that the report of Mr. Rodney would furnish information on points which I omit.

With great respect, I have the honor [etc.].

The country formerly known as the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, extending from the northwestern sources of the river La Plata to the southern cape of America, and from the confines of Brazil and the ocean to the ridge of the Andes, may be considered as that which is called "the United Provinces of South America."

Under the royal Government, it was divided into the intendencies or provinces of Buenos Ayres, Paraguay, Cordova, Salta, Potosi, La Plata, Cochabamba, La Paz, and Puno. Subsequently to the revolution, in the year 1814, another division was made; and from the provinces of Cordova, Salta, and Buenos Ayres were taken those of Cuyo or Mendoza, Tucuman, Corrientes, Entre Rios, and the Banda Oriental. The others, it is believed, retained their former boundaries, and, with the exception of Paraguay, are generally called "Upper Peru."

This widely-extended country embraces almost every variety of climate and soil, and is capable of almost every variety of production. A large part of it, however, particularly on the west side of the river La Plata, and southerly towards Cape Horn, is deficient in wood, even for fuel, and in water; that which is found is generally brackish.

Although three centuries have passed by since the Spaniards made their first settlement in this country, and some considerable towns and cities have grown in it, yet its general improvement and population have by no means kept pace with them, for the lower provinces have been almost entirely abandoned to the immense herds of cattle which graze on their plains, and require only the partial care of a comparatively few herdsmen; and the inhabitants of Upper Peru have been engaged more generally in the business of mining than was favorable to improvement or population. Certain small districts, having peculiar advantages, are said to be well cultivated, and very productive; but agriculture has, in general, been very much neglected. It is, in a great degree, confined to the vicinity of the towns and cities, and may be said to limit its supplies to their demands. This state of things, combined with the regulations of the former Government, the influence of climate, and the force of example, has stamped the character of indolence upon that class of society usually considered as the laboring class. The same causes have not operated (at least not with the same force) upon the other inhabitants of the country; hence, they are more industrious and more active. Their manners are social, friendly, and polite. In native

talents, they are said to be inferior to no people; and they have given proofs that they are capable of great and persevering efforts, that they are ardently attached to their country, and warmly enlisted in the cause of its independence.

It is not necessary for me to enter into a detail of the causes which led to the revolution in 1810. The most immediate, perhaps, are to be found in the incidents connected with the two invasions of the country by the British, in the years 1805 and 1806, and in the subsequent events in Spain; as they had a direct tendency to show to these people their own strength, and the incapacity of Spain to give them protection or enforce obedience. The groundwork was, however, laid in the jealous and oppressive system adopted at a more early period by the Kings of Spain, whose policy it seemed to be to keep within as narrow limits as circumstances would permit the intelligence, wealth, and population of that part of America subject to their dominion, as the surest means of preserving an empire which they considered the great source of their wealth and power.

The revolution having been auspiciously commenced in the city of Buenos Ayres, was warmly and zealously supported by the great mass of the people descended from the Spaniards; but the native Spaniards, as well as those domesticated in the country as those in the service of the King, were almost all opposed to it, particularly at the time and under the circumstances it took place. Dissensions were the immediate result, and their long-standing jealousy and distrust of each other have, by subsequent events, been heightened into deadly hostility, which time alone can wear away. These dissensions have been considered as one of the causes that produced those which subsequently took place amongst the patriots themselves, and which have been most serious obstacles to the progress of the revolution. Other obstacles, however, have been presented by the royal Government in Peru, which has hitherto not only been able to maintain itself there, but has found means, by enlisting the native Peruvians into its service, to send, at different times, considerable armies into the upper provinces on the La Plata, where the war has been carried on from the commencement of the revolution to the present day with various success; the great extent and peculiar character of the country, and the want of resources, having prevented either party from making a blow decisive of the contest. When we came away, the advantage in that quarter was on the side of the Spaniards, as they were in possession of the provinces of Upper Peru, which had, to a certain degree at least, joined in the revolution, and some of which are represented in the Congress. Everywhere else they have been obliged to yield up the Government and abandon the country, or submit to the ruling power. The peculiar situation of Montevideo, on the east side of the river La Plata, open to the sea, and strongly fortified, enabled the Spanish naval and military forces, at an early period in the revolution, to make a stand there. They were ultimately

obliged to surrender it; not, however, until long-protracted and perhaps ill-directed efforts on the part of the assailants had given rise to many jarring incidents between those who came from the opposite shores of the river, probably the effect, in part at least, of ancient jealousies, kept alive by the individual interests of particular leaders; these have been followed by events calculated to produce a still greater alienation; and, although several attempts have been made to bring about a union, they have hitherto been unsuccessful. The provinces of the "Banda Oriental" and the "Entre Rios," on the eastern side of the river, under the direction of General Artigas, are now at war with those on the western side, under the government of the Congress at Buenos Ayres.

This war has originated from a combination of causes, in which both parties have, perhaps, something to complain of, and something to blame themselves for.

General Artigas and his followers profess a belief that it is the intention of the Government of Buenos Ayres to put them down, and oblige them to submit to such arrangements as will deprive them of the privileges of self-government, to which they claim to have a right. They say, however, that they are willing to unite with the people on the western side of the river, but not in such a way as will subject them to what they call the tyranny of the city of Buenos Ayres. On the other hand, it is stated that this is merely a pretext; that the real object of General Artigas, and of some of his principal officers, is to prevent a union on any terms, and to preserve the power they have acquired, by giving an erroneous excitement to the people who follow them; that it is wished and intended to place these provinces on a footing with the others; that the respectable portion of their inhabitants are aware of this fact, and anxious for a union, but are prevented from openly expressing their sentiments from a fear of General Artigas, whose power is uncontrolled by law or justice, and hence the propriety and necessity of aiding them to resist it. Armies have accordingly been marched within the present year into these provinces; but they were not joined by a number of the inhabitants, and were defeated with great loss.

This war is evidently a source of great injury and regret, and at the same time of extraordinary irritation to both parties; for, independently of other causes of recrimination, each accuses the other of having brought about that state of things which threatens to place a most important and valuable portion of their country in the hands of a foreign Power, who has invaded it with a regular and well-appointed army, and is gradually taking posession of commanding points, from which it may be difficult for their united force hereafter to dislodge them. That they will unite, is, I think, to be calculated on, unless some event disastrous to the cause of the revolution itself takes place; for their mutual interest requires a union. But more of moderation and discretion may be necessary to bring it about than is at this time to be

expected from the irritated feelings of some of the principal personages on both sides.

The city of Santa Fé, and a small district of country around it, also refuse to acknowledge the authority of the Government of Buenos Ayres.

In Paraguay, the events of the revolution have differed from those in any other province, as the inhabitants of that country have uniformly resisted the efforts of the other provinces to unite with them. After having aided the Spanish placed over them to repel a military force which had been sent to overthrow them, they themselves expelled from their country these authorities, and established a Government of their own, totally unconnected with that of the other provinces, with whom they manifest an unwillingness to keep up even a commercial intercourse. This has given rise to a suspicion in the minds of some that there is a secret predilection among them for the ancient order of things. But, from what is said of their cold and calculating character, from the safe position of their country, and its capacity to supply its own wants, it is probable that their object is to husband their resources, and profit by the exertions of others, without giving their own in aid of them; and possibly, in case of ultimate failure, to place their conduct in a less objectionable point of view before the Government of Spain. Whatever may have been their motives, they have hitherto contrived to escape, in a great measure, the evils of war.

Their resources in men and money are said to be considerable, and no country is more independent of foreign supplies.

Their conduct furnishes a striking contrast to that of the people of Buenos Ayres, who entered into the revolution with unbounded zeal and energy, and have ever been ready to meet the difficulties of so great an undertaking. This circumstance, connected with their local situation, greater resources, and more general information, and perhaps the fact of their having been the first to get power into their hands, have had the effect to give them a controlling influence over the revolutionary Government, which has not failed to excite, in some degree, the jealousy of the other provinces, and amongst themselves a feeling of superiority little calculated to allay that jealousy. Great evils were at one time apprehended from this state of things; but the Congress which met at Tucuman, in March, 1816, composed of deputies from the several provinces then united, assumed the sovereign power of the country, boldly declared its absolute independence, and adopted a provisional form of government, which is understood to have the effect of allaying dissensions, and of introducing a more regular administration of public affairs.

It will be seen, from the documents in your possession, that this provisional constitution recognises many of the principles of free government, but with such drawbacks as are little calculated to enforce them in practice. Great allowances are doubtless to be made for the circumstances of the times, and the danger and difficulty of tearing up ancient institutions, or of adapting

new principles to them. But, after due allowance for all these considerations, it did not appear to me that so much had been done for the cause of civil liberty as might have been expected, or that those in power were its strongest advocates. It is generally admitted, however, that some changes for the better have been made. Much care seems to be taken to educate the rising generation; and as those who are now coming on the theatre of action have grown up since the commencement of the revolution, and have had the advantage of the light thrown in by it, it is fair to suppose that they will be better prepared to support and administer a free government than those whose habits were formed under the colonial Government of Spain.

The commerce and manufactures of the country have grown beyond its agriculture. Various causes, however, have contributed to lessen some branches of manufacture since the revolution, but commerce is understood to have been increased by it. A much greater variety and quantity of foreign goods is imported, and a greater demand is opened for the productions of the country. The city of Buenos Ayres is the seat of this commerce. From it, foreign and some domestic goods are spread through the interior, as far as Chili and Upper Peru, and, in return, the various productions are drawn to it. This trade is carried on principally by land, as is that between the different provinces, though some small portion of it finds its way up and down the large rivers forming the La Plata, which is itself not so much a river as a great bay. The abundance of cattle, horses, and mules, and of some other animals peculiar to the country, which are used in the mountainous regions of Peru, furnishes facilities for transportation not to be found in any other country so little improved; hence the price of transportation is very low, and the internal trade greater than it otherwise would be, though it had been materially lessened in some important branches by the war with Peru, and the system adopted in Paraguay.

The export and import trade is principally in the hands of the British, though the United States and other nations participate in it to a certain degree. It is depended on as the great source of revenue to the state; hence they have been tempted to make the duties very high, and to lay them upon both imports and exports, with the exception of lumber and military stores. This circumstance, connected with the fact that payment is demanded at the custom-house before the goods are delivered, has led to a regular system of smuggling, which is said to be carried to great excess, and doubtless occasions the official returns to fall short of the actual amount of the trade. This may be the reason why they were not given to us. The articles imported are almost every variety of European and East India goods, principally from England; rum, sugar, coffee, tobacco, cotton, and timber from Brazil; lumber of almost every description, codfish, furniture, gin, and some smaller articles from the United States, together with military stores, which, however, find their way into the country directly from Europe, and

are thus furnished at a cheaper rate than we can sell them. The principal articles of export are taken from the various animals of the country, tame and wild, from the ox to the chinchilla, copper from Chili, and some of the precious metals drawn principally from Peru; but as gold is worth seventeen dollars per ounce, and passed by tale at that rate, very little of it is exported. Hence the currency of the country is gold, for they have no paper money. The "libranzas," or bills of credit, issued by the Government, are, however, an article of traffic among the merchants, as they are received in payment of one-half of the duties. No distinction is made in favor of the trade of any nation, save only that the British merchants have some peculiar facilities granted them in relation to their letters, which are an object of taxation, at least so far as applies to those sent out of the country.

In the official statements given to us, and to which I beg leave generally to refer for information as to the foreign relations, the productions, military and naval force, revenue, and population, the latter is stated at one million three hundred thousand, exclusive of Indians. This is understood as comprehending the population of all the provinces; but as some of them are not under the Government at Buenos Ayres, I have thought it proper to annex the several estimates I collected of the population of each province, as they may serve to give some general information on that point. The most immediate difficulty felt by the Government, whilst we were in the country, seemed to arise from the want of money; for, although the debt was small, their credit was low. It had not been found practicable to adopt a system of finance adequate to the exigencies of the times, though it would seem, from the statement given to us, that the revenue of the last year exceeded the expenses. The important events of the present year in Chili, of which you are informed, will doubtless have the effect to raise the credit of the country, and to lessen the pressure upon it, at least for a time, and will probably leave the Government more at leisure to attend to its internal affairs.

When we came away, it was understood that a committee of the Congress was engaged in draughting a new constitution, the power of forming and adopting it being exclusively vested in the Congress. Whether it will assume a federal or national character, is somewhat doubtful, as there are evidently two parties in the country, whose views in this respect are very different, and it is believed that they are both represented in the Congress. The one party is in favor of a consolidated or national Government, the other wishes for a federal Government, somewhat upon the principles of that of the United States. The probability seems to be that although there might be a majority of the people in the provinces generally in favor of the federal system, it would not be adopted, upon the ground that it was not so well calculated as a national Government to provide for the common defence — the great object now in view. The same general reason may be urged, perhaps, for giving to the latter, should it be adopted, less of a republican

character than probably would have been given to it in more quiet and peaceful times. There is danger, too, as the power of forming and adopting the constitution is placed in the hands of a few, that the rights and privileges of the people may not be so well understood or attended to as they would have been had the people themselves had a more immediate agency in the affair. It is not to be doubted, however, that it will at least have a republican form, and be bottomed upon the principles of independence, which is contended for by all descriptions of politicians in the country who have taken part in the revolution, and will, it is believed, be supported by them, in any event, to the last extremity.

Their means of defence, of which they are fully aware, are, in proportion to their numbers, greater perhaps than those of almost any other people; and the duration and events of the war have strengthened the general determination never to submit to Spain. This determination rests upon the recollection of former sufferings and deprivations; upon a consciousness of their ability to defend and to govern themselves; and upon a conviction that, in case of submission on any terms, they would, sooner or later, be made to feel the vengeance of the mother country. These considerations, doubtless, have the most weight upon the minds of those who have taken a leading part. They, of course, use all their influence to enforce them, and thus to keep up the spirit of the revolution. In this they probably have had the less difficulty, as, although the sufferings of the people have been great, particularly in military service and in raising the contributions necessary for that service, yet the incubus of Spanish power being thrown off, and with it that train of followers who filled up almost every avenue to wealth and consequence, the higher classes have been awakened to a sense of advantages they did not before enjoy. They have seen their commerce freed from legal restraints, their articles of export become more valuable, their supplies furnished at a lower rate, and all the offices of Government or other employments laid open to them as fair objects of competition. The lower classes have found their labor more in demand and better paid for, and their importance in society greater than it formerly was.

They are yet, however, from their indolence, general want of education, and the great mixture of "castes" among them, in a degraded state, but little felt in the affairs of the Government. The stimulus now given will operate to produce a change in them for the better, and, it is to be presumed, will gradually have its effect, as their docility, intelligence, and activity, when called into service, give evidence that they are not deficient in natural or physical powers.

Labor, as it becomes more general, will become less irksome to individuals; and the gradual acquisition of property, which must necessarily result from it in such a country under a good Government, will doubtless produce the happy effects there which it has uniformly produced elsewhere, and more

especially in countries where the population is small when compared to the extent of territory.

I am very sensible that I may have been led into errors of fact or inference. In that case, I can plead honesty of intention, and the difficulty of collecting at a single point, and within a limited time, correct information, or of analyzing that which was collected, respecting a people in a state of revolution, who are spread over an immense country, and whose habits, institutions, and language are so different from our own.

I have only to add, that we were politely received by the Supreme Director, who made every profession for our Government, and every offer of accommodation to us, as its agents, which we had a right to expect; and that the people manifested, on all occasions, the most friendly dispositions.

ESTIMATE OF THE POPULATION OF THE PROVINCES OF BUENOS AYRES, CORDOVA, TUCUMAN, MENDOZA OR CUYO, AND SALTA, UNDER THE NAMES OF THE DIFFERENT TOWNS OR DISTRICTS WHICH SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONGRESS

Towns, &c.	By an imperfect census taken, it is believed, in 1815, excluding troops and transient persons and Indians	By more recent estimates, excluding Indians	Excluding Indians	Including Indians
Buenos Ayres,	98,105	105,000	120,000	250,000
Cordova,	.....	75,000	75,000	100,000
Tucuman,	.....	45,000	45,000	20,000*
Santiago del Estero,	.....	45,000	60,000	.....
Valle de Calamarca,	.....	36,000	40,000	.....
Rioja,	.....	20,000	20,000	.....
San Juan,	.....	34,000	34,000	.....
Mendoza,	.....	38,000	38,000	.....
San Luis,	.....	16,000	16,000	.....
Jujuy,	.....	25,000	25,000	.....
Salta,	.....	50,000	50,000	.....
Provinces of Upper Peru—				
Cochabamba,	.....	100,000	120,000	200,000
Potosi,	.....	112,000	112,000	250,000
La Plata, or Charcas,	.....	112,000	112,000	175,000
La Paz,	.....	.....	.....	300,000
Puno, { Under the name of Santa Cruz de la Sierra Ouiro, }	.....	120,000	.....	{ 30,000† 150,000† 50,000†
Paraguay,	.....	.....	.....	300,000
Banda Oriental, and Entre Rios,	.....	50,000	.....	.....

NOTE.—It is not understood that any part of the province of Corrientes, or that of the city or district of Santa Fé, is included in this estimate; and some districts of some of the other provinces may be omitted.

* Probably the town only.

† Under the various names of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Majos, and Chequitos.

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Caesar A. Rodney, Special Commissioner of the United States to South America, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

WASHINGTON, *November 5, 1818.*

SIR: I have the honor to present the report herewith enclosed, agreeably to the desire of Mr. Graham, who, on reflection, preferred submitting some additional remarks in a separate paper. For this purpose, two of the documents referred to in the report remain in his possession—Dr. Funes's Outline of Events in the United Provinces since the Revolution, and the Manifesto of Independence by the Congress at Tucuman.

I have the honor [etc.].

[ENCLOSURE]

Report on the condition of South America

SIR: I have now the honor to submit to your consideration my report on the subject of the late mission to South America, embracing the information derived from the various sources within my power, so far as I had an opportunity of improving the advantages possessed.

With the history of the conquest of the Spanish possessions in America you must be familiar. They were principally, if not exclusively, achieved by private adventurers. When completed, a most oppressive system of government, or rather despotism, was established by the parent country.

These extensive regions were originally swayed by two viceroys. The dominions of Spain in North America were under the government of the Viceroy of Mexico, and all her possessions in South America were subject to the control of the Viceroy of Peru.

The remoteness of some parts of the country from the residence of the Viceroy of Lima occasioned, in 1718, the establishment of another viceroyalty at Santa Fé de Bogota, in the kingdom of New Granada. In 1731 New Granada was divided, and a number of the provinces composing that kingdom were separated from it. These were put under the jurisdiction of a captain general and president, whose seat of government was at Caraccas.

In 1568 Chili was erected into a separate captain generalship; in 1778 a new viceroyalty was established at Buenos Ayres, comprehending all the Spanish possessions to the east of the Western Cordilleras, and to the south of the river Maranon.

This immense empire seems, according to the laws of the Indies, to have been considered a distinct kingdom of itself, though united to Spain and

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 217. None of the several appendices mentioned in this report have been included in this present publication. Several are memoranda and statistical tables. Most of the important facts were incorporated in the reports of the commissioners. Some contain communications between the various insurgent governments, which do not logically belong in the present publication.

annexed to the crown of Castile. In this light it is viewed by Baron Humboldt, in his Essay on New Spain.

With some slight shades of difference in the regulations established in these Governments, the prominent features of their political institutions exhibit a striking resemblance, as the general system was the same.

Their commerce was confined to the parent country and to Spanish vessels exclusively. They were prohibited, under the penalty of death, to trade with foreigners. The natives of Old Spain composed the body of their merchants. Though this part of the system had, previously to the revolution, been relaxed, in some degree, (particularly by the statute of free commerce, as it is styled,) the relief was partial, and the restrictions continued severe and oppressive.

All access to the Spanish settlements was closed to foreigners, and even the inhabitants of the different provinces were prohibited from intercourse with one another, unless under the strictest regulations.

The various manufactures that might interfere with those of Spain were not permitted. They were prevented, under severe penalties, from raising flax, hemp, or saffron. In climates most congenial to them, the culture of the grape and the olive was prohibited. On account of the distance of Peru and Chili, and the difficulty of transporting oil and wine to these remote regions, they were permitted to plant vines and olives, but were prohibited the culture of tobacco. At Buenos Ayres, by special indulgence of the viceroys, they were allowed to cultivate grapes and olives merely for the use of the table.

They were compelled to procure from the mother country articles of the first necessity, and were thus rendered dependent on her for the conveniences of life as well as luxuries. The crown possessed the monopoly of tobacco, salt, and gunpowder.

To these oppressive regulations and restrictions was added an odious system of taxation. From the Indians was exacted a tribute in the shape of a poll-tax, or a certain servitude in the mines called the *mita*. A tenth part of the produce of cultivated lands was taken under the denomination of *tithes*. The alcavala, a tax varying from two and a half to five per cent. on every sale and resale of all things moveable and immoveable, was rigidly exacted, though in some cases a commutation was allowed. Royal and municipal duties were laid on imports and on the tonnage, entrance, and clearance of vessels, under the different appellations of almoxarifazgo, sea, alcavala, cerso, consulado, armada, and armadilla. To these may be added the royal fifths of the precious metals, the most important tax in the mining districts. Besides all these, there were stamp taxes, tavern licenses, and sums paid for the sale of offices, of titles of nobility, papal bulls, the composition and confirmation of lands, with a number of others of inferior grade.

Under the Spanish monarchs, who had early obtained from the Pope the ecclesiastical dominion, and thus had united in their royal persons all civil and religious authority, a most oppressive hierarchy was established, with its numerous train of offices and orders, succeeded by the inquisition.

The posts of honor and profit, from the highest to the lowest, were filled almost exclusively by natives of Old Spain.

The principal code of laws thus maintaining the supremacy of Spain over those distant regions, almost locked up from the rest of the world, emanated from the Council of the Indies, established by the King, in which he was supposed to be always present. The royal rescripts, the recopitationes of the Indies, and the partidas, furnished the general rules of decision; and, when these were silent or doubtful recourse was had to the opinions of professional men.

This system was generally executed by the viceroys, captains general, and by the tribunals of justice, with a spirit corresponding with the rigorous policy that produced it. To this form of government the country had for centuries submitted with implicit obedience, and probably would have continued to submit much longer, but for events in this country and the changes in Europe. The sagacious minds of many able writers, penetrating into the future, had predicted at some distant date a revolution in South America before that in North America had commenced. From the period of the successful termination of our own struggle for independence, that of the inhabitants of the south has been with more confidence foretold; and there is reason to believe it has been hastened by this fortunate event. The conduct of Spain, during the war of our revolution, was calculated to make a lasting impression on her colonies. This result was then foreseen by intelligent politicians; many were surprised that she could be so blind to her own interests after she had, on one occasion, manifested the strongest suspicion of Paraguay; for, to her scrupulous jealousy of this Power the expulsion of the Jesuits from that country in 1750 is to be attributed.

The wars that arose from the French revolution have produced in Europe changes of the greatest magnitude, which have had an immense influence on the affairs of South America. When Spain joined France against the combined princes, she exposed her distant possessions to British hostilities. The great naval power of England gave her ready access to the American colonies. Engaged in an arduous contest, she was prompted by her feelings and interests to retaliate on Spain the conduct she experienced from her during the war of our independence. Encouraged, perhaps, by the councils of her enemies, the first symptoms of insurrection in the continental possessions of Spain were exhibited in the year 1797, in Venezuela. These were succeeded by the attempts of Miranda in the same quarter, which were accompanied, or were followed, since the vacillating state of the Spanish monarchy, by revolutionary movements in Mexico, Granada, Peru, Chili,

and Buenos Ayres; and from which scarcely any part of the Spanish dominions in America has been entirely exempt.

The occurrences that led the way to the subsequent important events in the provinces of La Plata were, the invasion of the British under Popham and Beresford in the year 1806, and their expulsion a few months afterwards by the collected forces of the country under Liniers and Pueyrredon. These incidents fortunately gave to the people a just idea of their own strength; and they afterwards repelled, with a firmness and bravery that did them great honor, the formidable attack of the British under General Whitlocke.

The wretched state to which Spain was reduced by the policy, the power, and the arts of Napoleon, the resignation of Charles the Fourth in favor of Ferdinand the Seventh, and the renunciation by both in favor of Napoleon, were productive of the most important results. They threw the kingdom into the greatest confusion. The alternate successes and disasters of the French armies produced a new era in Spain. The people, generally, revolted at the idea of being governed by the brother of Napoleon, to whom he had transferred the crown. Juntas were established, who acted in the name of Ferdinand, then confined in France. These were substituted for the ancient Cortes and the regular council of the nation, to which, in times of imminent danger, they ought to have recurred, agreeably to their usages. Conflicting authorities produced a distracted state of affairs. In the scenes that ensued the proper attention was not paid to the American provinces. Their conduct towards them was versatile and inconsistent; they were lost sight of or neglected until it was too late. Conceiving they were abandoned by the parent state, they thought it justifiable to act for themselves. It was not very long before the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, embracing the example of their brethren in Spain, established a Junta, which assumed the reins of government, and finally, in the year 1810, sent off the Viceroy Cisneros and his principal adherents. For a summary of events subsequent to this period, until the time of my departure, I beg leave to refer to the "Outline" subjoined, (Appendix A,) from the pen of Dr. Funes, drawn up, in part, at my request. Without vouching for the perfect accuracy of the work, I think, from the information received, it will probably be found to contain, in general, a correct and impartial sketch of the prominent transactions and occurrences.

In perusing this interesting document, I have to lament that its pages are marked with some cases of severity and cruelty, which seem almost inseparable from great revolutions. It must, however, be consoling to observe, that they appear to have passed through that state which might possibly have rendered examples necessary, and to have arrived, perhaps, at that stage when, the passions becoming less turbulent and the people more enlightened, a milder system may be expected to prevail.

Their dissensions have produced most of their calamities—in such seasons

they were naturally to be expected. But their disputes have been principally healed by the prudent and energetic measures of the Congress which commenced its sittings in Tucuman in the year 1815, and adjourned in the year following from thence to Buenos Ayres, where it remains in session, occupied with the task of forming a permanent constitution. This respectable body, besides acting as a convention or a constituent assembly, exercises temporarily legislative powers. Their sittings are public, with a gallery of audience for citizens and strangers. The debates are frequently interesting, and are conducted with ability and decorum; they are published every month for the information of the people.

The dispute with Artigas, the chief of the Orientals, has not been adjusted. This, with a certain jealousy of the superior influence of the city of Buenos Ayres on the general affairs of the provinces, the conduct of the Government of Buenos Ayres towards the Portuguese, and the high tariff of duties which, I understand, have been since reduced, appeared to constitute the principal causes of dissatisfaction at the time of my departure.

The declaration by Congress of that independence which they had for many years previously maintained in fact, was a measure of the highest importance, and has been productive of a unanimity and a decision before unknown. This summit of their wishes was only to be reached by slow and gradual progress. The public mind had to be illumined on the subject by their pulpits, their presses, and their public orations. The people were to be prepared for the event; when the season arrived, they cut the knot which could not be untied. The declaration of independence was adopted in the directorship of Mr. Pueyrredon, on the 9th day of July, 1816. It was succeeded by an able exposition of the causes that extorted it, to justify to their fellow-citizens and to the world the measure they had deliberately voted to support with their fortunes and their lives.

Believing the latter paper might be thought worthy of perusal, a translation has been annexed, (Appendix B.)

The salutary influence of this bold and decisive step was at once felt throughout the country. It gave new life and strength to the patriotic cause, and stability to the Government. The victories of Chacabuco and Maipu, achieved by the arms of Chili and Buenos Ayres, have produced and confirmed a similar declaration of independence by the people of Chili, which is also annexed, (Appendix C,[1]) and cemented the cordial union existing between the confederate states. The consequence has been that, within these extensive territories, there is scarcely the vestige of a royal army to be found, except on the borders of Peru.

Having thus, in connexion with the succinct account given by Dr. Funes, traced the principal events since the revolution in Buenos Ayres, I shall proceed to state the result of the information received, according to the best

[1] Not transmitted.

opinion I could form, of the extent, population, government, and resources of the United Provinces, with their productions, imports and exports, trade and commerce.

The late viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, of which that city was the metropolis, was by many considered the largest as well as the most valuable of all the Spanish dominions in South America, extending, in a direct line, from its north to its south boundary, a distance of more than two thousand miles, and, from its eastern to its western, not less than eleven hundred.

It was composed, at the commencement of the revolution, of the nine provinces or intendencies following: Buenos Ayres, Paraguay, Cordova, Salta, Potosi, La Plata, Cochabamba, La Paz, and Puno.

Watered by the great river La Plata, and its numerous tributary streams, which afford an easy communication with countries of immense extent, and furnishing an easy access to the treasures of South America, it has always been regarded by Spain as one of her most precious acquisitions. Enjoying every variety of climate to be found between different and distant latitudes, and blessed with a large portion of fertile soil, it is capable of producing all that is to be found in the temperate or torrid zones. Immense herds of cattle and horses graze on its extensive plains, and constitute, at this time, their principal source of wealth. The mines of Potosi are also included within its boundaries. There are no woods for a very considerable distance from Buenos Ayres. No forest trees are to be seen on the widely-extended pampas, except at intervals a solitary umboo. After passing the Saladillo, in a northerly direction, the woods begin; and, proceeding in the upper provinces, the hills appear, and mountains rise in succession, interspersed with rich valleys. On the east side of the rivers La Plata and Parana, the country is said to be very fine. The Entre Rios is represented as capable of being made a garden spot; and the Banda Oriental presents hills and dales, rich bottoms, fine streams of water, and, at a distance from the great river, on the banks of the smaller streams, some excellent woodland. Between Maldonado and Montevideo, the east ridge of the Cordilleras terminates on the river La Plata.

Since the revolution five more provinces have been erected, making, in all, fourteen within the limits of the ancient viceroyalty, viz: Tucuman, taken from Salta; Mendoza, or Cuyo, taken from Cordova; Corrientes; Entre Rios, comprising the country between the Uruguay and the Parana; and the Banda Oriental, or eastern shore of the river La Plata. The two last were taken from the province of Buenos Ayres, which was thus reduced to the territory on the south side of that river. The subordinate divisions of the country, with the principal towns, will be found in the appendix to this report, with an account of the produce or manufactures of the different districts. (Appendix D.)

Of the fourteen provinces into which the ancient viceroyalty is now

divided, five were, at my departure, principally occupied by the royal forces, (which, in consequence of the victory of Maipu, were expected soon to retreat to Lower Peru,) or partially under their influence, viz: Potosi, La Plata, Cochabamba, La Paz, and Puno; and the nine following, independent *de facto* of Spain, were in the possession of the patriots, viz: Buenos Ayres, Paraguay, Mendoza, Salta, Corrientes, Cordova, Tucuman, Entre Rios, and Banda Oriental. But Paraguay and the city of Santa Fé act independently of Buenos Ayres—though Paraguay is not on unfriendly terms with them, and it is hoped by some will before long join the union. Entre Rios and the Banda Oriental, under General Artigas, in the character of chief of the Orientals, are in a state of hostility with Buenos Ayres.

Montevideo, the capital of the eastern shore, was occupied by a Portuguese army, and a squadron of ships of war from Brazil blockaded the ports of Colonia and Maldonado, and prohibited the entrance of neutral vessels, unless they paid them the same duties on their cargoes that were charged on the importation of the goods when landed in the country.

The territory of the United Provinces is computed to contain one hundred and fifty thousand square leagues, though it probably exceeds that quantity. The lands occupied in the country, remote from the cities, are generally converted by their owners into estancias, or large grazing farms for cattle, and chacras for growing grain. The small farms, or quintas, in the neighborhood of cities, are in fine order. Those around Buenos Ayres, which furnish their market with an ample supply of fruit and vegetables, are, by irrigation, in the highest state of culture.

The population, exclusive of the Indians, is now calculated at about one million three hundred thousand; but adding the civilized Indians only, who are of great importance, it would, in all, probably exceed two millions.

The whole population consists of natives of Old Spain, and their descendants born in the country, or, as they style themselves, South Americans; of Indians civilized, or unreclaimed, with different "castes," or mixed blood; of Africans, and their descendants, or negroes and mulattoes.

I could not ascertain, with satisfaction, the population of the different provinces; the province of Buenos Ayres contains about one hundred and twenty thousand, whilst the population of Entre Rios and Banda Oriental is computed at fifty thousand.

The city of Buenos Ayres contains a population of sixty thousand. The inhabitants of this place appear to be an amiable and interesting people. They are considered brave and humane; possessing intelligence, capable of great exertions and perseverance, and manifesting a cheerful devotion to the cause of freedom and independence.

There is also a certain mediocrity and equality of fortune prevailing among them, extremely favorable to a union of the popular sentiment in support of the common weal. Many industrious mechanics and enterprising merchants

are, however, increasing their estates, and adding to the stock of capital in the country.

The people of the province of Buenos Ayres, residing out of the city, are, generally speaking, poor, and rather indolent, though a hardy race; and, when excited to action, they become zealous defenders of the liberties of their country. They are capable of great improvement, and under the influence of a good example, when a change takes place in their habits and manner of living, they bid fair to become useful and industrious citizens.

The inhabitants of Cordova are said to be more superstitious and more industrious, but less patriotic. This is principally attributed to the loss of the trade with Peru, occasioned by the revolutionary war.

Tucuman, I was informed, possessed an excellent population.

The people of Mendoza, or Cuyo, are moral, industrious, and patriotic. They have sacrificed largely at the shrine of independence, supporting with zeal and confidence the cause of their country; whilst the citizens of Santa Fé are represented as immoral and insubordinate, and manifesting on most occasions an extreme jealousy of their neighbors.

The population of Entre Rios and Banda Oriental is, perhaps, not inferior in valor to that of Buenos Ayres. Nor is it deficient in military skill, particularly in carrying on a partisan warfare, for which its troops are admirably adapted. Their other good qualities have been probably somewhat impaired by the system pursued in that quarter, where they have been compelled to give up every thing like civil avocations, and to continue without any regular kind of government, under the absolute control of a chief, who, whatever may be his political principles or professions, in practice concentrates all power, legislative, judicial, and executive, in himself.

The General Congress of the United Provinces, assembled at Buenos Ayres on the 3d of December of 1817, established, by a provisional statute, a temporary form of government, which will be found in Appendix, marked E.

This Congress is composed of deputies from the different provinces. It actually consists of twenty-six members; but, as a representative is allowed for every fifteen thousand citizens, it would be more numerous if all the provinces had sent delegates in that ratio of population.

With some exceptions, and particularly of that palladium of our rights which is unknown to the civil law, the trial by jury, the provisional constitution will be found, on an attentive perusal, to contain a distinct recognition of many of the vital principles of free government. A church establishment, also, that of the Catholic faith, is contrary to our ideas of religious freedom, though a measure adopted from necessity, perhaps, by them.

It declares that all power, legislative, judicial, and executive, resides in the nation. The Congress are to be chosen by electors, who are to be voted for by the people in the primary assemblies. The Cabildos, or municipalities, are to be elected immediately by the citizens. It recognises the independ-

ence of the judiciary, and declares the tenure of office, with respect to the superior judges, to be during good behavior. It provides for the election of a Chief Magistrate by Congress, removable when they choose to appoint a successor, and responsible for the execution of the duties of his office, which are defined and limited. In the oath of office, he is sworn to preserve the integrity and independence of the country.

The three great Departments—of State, of the Treasury, and of War—are distinctly marked out, and their respective powers and duties assigned.

On some subjects it enters more into detail than is usual with us, particularly in those of their army, navy, and militia; but this, perhaps, in their situation, was necessary.

It provides that no citizen shall accept a title of nobility, without forfeiting the character of citizenship.

It provides, also, against general warrants, and the arrest of individuals, unless on probable proof of guilt.

It contains a salutary provision, that a judge, having original jurisdiction, before taking cognizance of a cause, shall use all possible means of reconciling the parties. This constitution is but temporary. The Congress are engaged in the task of forming a permanent one. In the mean time, no alteration can be made in the present, unless with the consent of two-thirds of the members. In this manner some alterations have been adopted.

The subject of a permanent constitution was before a committee of sixteen members of Congress. There was a difference of opinion prevailing among them on the point of a confederated or a consolidated Government. If they should adopt the former, they will frame the constitution, in all probability, nearly after the model of that of the United States. Should they decide on the latter, it is highly probable they will incorporate the leading features of our system into their form of government. They seem to concur in the proposition to have a Chief Magistrate elected for a term of years, and a representative Legislature, to consist of two branches—a Senate, to constitute the most permanent body; and a House of Representatives, whose term of service will be of shorter duration.

Perhaps it would be better for them to delay the completion of this all-important task, after the example of the United States, until a period of peace. Their present provisional statute is an improvement on those which preceded it; and we may expect their proposed constitution will be still more perfect, as they advance in the knowledge of those principles on which republican Governments are constituted.

But, however free in theory this provisional statute may be, it is undoubtedly true that, unless administered agreeably to its letter and spirit, it will not afford security to the citizen. Whether any infractions have occurred since the date of its existence, I cannot pretend to determine, not being in full possession of the facts.

When we recollect that they have the benefit of our example, it may reasonably be expected that they will, in general, adhere to their written constitution. They have, also, the fatal result of the French revolution, warning them of the dangers of its excesses, of which they appear to be sensible.

The productions and the manufactures of the different provinces will be found in Appendix D; but I was unable to procure any satisfactory estimates of the probable value or amount in each province. There is, however, a considerable internal trade carried on, in the interchange of various articles, between the several provinces: cattle, horses, and mules furnish a considerable source of barter; with the latter, Peru is usually supplied; the Paraguay tea is a great article of trade throughout the country; the brandy, wine, raisins, and figs of Mendoza and San Juan, are becoming important; the hides of oxen, the skins of the vaccina and granaco, with a number of fine furs, afford valuable articles of exchange. These, with the foreign goods transported in every direction from Buenos Ayres very readily by oxen and mules, which also furnish the means of carrying their native productions to their seaports, form a branch of trade of great magnitude, considering the population of the country.

Their exports are calculated, with some degree of accuracy, at ten millions of dollars. These consist, principally, of ox hides, jerk beef, and tallow, the present great staples of the country; a variety of furs and peltry, some grain, copper, mostly brought from Chili, with gold and silver in bullion, and in coin, chiefly from the mines of Potosi.

The imports are computed to be about equal to their exports; British manufactures form the principal mass, and they are to be had in great abundance. They consist of woollen and cotton goods of every description, some of them wrought to imitate the manufactures of the country; ironmongery, cutlery, hardware, saddlery, hats, porter, ale, and cheese, are among the remaining articles.

From the United States they receive lumber of all kinds, and furniture of every description, coaches and carriages of all sorts, codfish, mackerel, shad and herring, leather, boots and shoes, powder, and munitions of war and naval stores, ships and vessels, particularly those calculated for their navy or for privateers.

From Brazil they receive sugar, coffee, cotton, and rum.

From the north of Europe they receive steel and iron, and from France a number of articles of its manufacture.

Their foreign commerce is principally carried on by British capitalists, though there are some Americans, a few French, and other foreign merchants, also settled at Buenos Ayres; they are all placed, I believe, on the same footing of equality.

The revenue of the state may be estimated at about three millions of dollars annually; but their system of finance is very imperfect, and, although

their debt is small, their credit is low. They have hitherto avoided the issuing of paper money, and they have established no bank; but they have sometimes anticipated their revenue, by giving due bills receivable in payment for duties on goods imported or articles exported. The impost furnishes the principal part of the revenue. A copy of their tariff, as at first established, was some time since transmitted, I believe, to the Department of State; in this, the duties were generally specific and high. I understand they have been lately reduced, as their exorbitancy had occasioned much smuggling.

Voluntary contributions from those friendly to the revolution, and forced loans from the old Spaniards, have constituted another portion of their funds. To show the public capital adequate to all exigencies, their different civil, military, and naval establishments have been taken into view, and are comprised in the estimate furnished—a thing unusual with us; but they have omitted their public lands, which, if a prudent use be made of them, must at no distant day become a very productive source of revenue to the state.

The mines of Potosi, which in all probability will very soon fall into their hands again, may furnish them with a considerable supply of the precious metals. It is stated, on respectable authority, that so late as the year 1790, the amount of gold and silver coined at Potosi in that year was calculated to have been $299,846 in gold, and $2,983,176 in silver.

The state of their army, and the condition of their navy, will be seen by a reference to the original return presented. (Appendix F.[1])

Their army is composed of regular troops, ciorcos, and militia; in one or other of these classes, they are educated to the military art, and, as far as I had an opportunity and was capable of judging, they appeared to be well acquainted with the elements of their profession. Their forces, according to the paper furnished, are estimated at nearly thirty thousand men. They are composed of 1,296 artillery, 13,693 infantry, and 14,768 cavalry, of which 12,143 are troops of the line, 7,041 are ciorcos, and 10,573 militia. These form the different armies of the centre of Peru, of the Andes, of Cordova, and the auxiliary forces in the Entre Rios. This statement, however, only includes the militia of the province of Buenos Ayres itself. Their supply of arms and munitions of war is ample, as will be seen by the statement annexed on that subject.

Their navy is small, and some of their vessels are laid up in ordinary. A list of them, as well as of their privateers, will be found in Appendix F.[1] Their private armed vessels are subjected to very strict regulations, agreeably to their prize code, which is among the original papers presented and herewith delivered. It may be proper in this place to introduce the subject of the irregular conduct of the privateers under the patriot flag, against which the commissioners were directed to remonstrate. Having taken an opportunity of explaining to Mr. Tagle, the Secretary of State, the proceedings of our

[1] The document referred to is not sent.

Government relative to Amelia island and Galvezton, agreeably to their instructions, the commissioners embraced a suitable occasion to urge the just cause of complaint which the malpractices of private armed vessels, wearing the patriot colors, had furnished our Government; on both topics, they had long and interesting conversations. With the conduct of the Government respecting Amelia island and Galvezton Mr. Tagle expressed himself perfectly satisfied, and he disclaimed for his Government any privity or participation in the lodgements made at those places, by persons acting in the name of the patriots of South America. In reference to the acts of cruisers under the patriot flags, he said he was sensible that great irregularities had occurred, though his Government had done every thing in their power to prevent them, and were willing, if any instance of aggression were pointed out, to direct an inquiry into the case, and, if the facts were established, to punish those concerned, and redress the injured individuals. He professed his readiness to adopt any measures that would more effectually prevent a recurrence of such acts, in which he expressed his belief that the privateers of Buenos Ayres had rarely participated, though the character of the Government had suffered from the conduct of others. He stated that they had on one occasion sent out some of their public vessels to examine all cruisers wearing the Buenos Ayrean flag, to see that they were lawfully commissioned, and to ascertain whether they had violated their instructions.

Among the causes of dissatisfaction to which I have alluded, the preponderance of the capital has been mentioned. Its great weight in the scale of national affairs is to be ascribed to its greater exertions in the national cause. These are owing to its comparative wealth, and to its active, intelligent, and enterprising population. The armies that have been raised in this city and the neighboring country, with the supplies in money and munitions of war drawn from these sources, have been truly extraordinary.

It would be a difficult task to make an exact calculation, or to form even a probable estimate, but all seemed to concede the superior merit claimed on account of their exertions, when compared with their wealth and population; and it is not unlikely that Buenos Ayres has, in consequence, assumed a higher tone, and acquired a controlling influence, which she has sometimes abused.

Another source of discontent is, the unfortunate dispute between the Banda Oriental and Buenos Ayres, which had also an influence on the proceedings of the latter towards the Portuguese.

The original cause of division may be traced to a jealousy long subsisting between the rival cities of Montevideo and Buenos Ayres. This has become habitual, and has extended to the country. Private interests and personal views have also increased their dissensions.

General Artigas (who bears the character of chief of the Orientals, as has been already stated, and has also assumed that of the Protector of the Entre

Rios and Santa Fé) was originally, in the royal service, a captain in a provincial corps. In this he continued for some time after the revolution had commenced at Buenos Ayres. But in the year 1811, taking offence, as it is said, at some conduct of the Spanish commandant of Colonia, he abandoned the royal cause, and entered into the service of the patriots. So early as the year 1813, when acting against Montevideo, he became dissatisfied with Sarratea, the commander-in-chief from Buenos Ayres. On his removal from the head of the army, he quarrelled with General Rondeau, who it was supposed would have been acceptable to him, and finally withdrew, before the siege of Montevideo was finished under General Alvear. For this conduct, Posadas, when he succeeded to the government, treated him as a deserter from their service. By a proclamation, he offered a reward for his apprehension, and set a price upon his head—an act which General Artigas never forgot or forgave.

During the subsequent directorship of Alvear, he induced the Cabildo of Buenos Ayres to issue a similar proclamation against General Artigas. When Alvear was dismissed, the people of Buenos Ayres endeavored to atone for their conduct by burning, with every mark of ignominy, the degrading proclamation. They also addressed a conciliatory letter to the general, and received from him a corresponding answer. These were preliminary to a fruitless attempt at reconciliation, made by the director *ad interim*, Colonel Alvarez, who succeeded Alvear. The correspondence on this occasion is annexed. (Appendix H.) Other endeavors to reconcile him have failed, notwithstanding the changes in the office of Director at Buenos Ayres. On one occasion, the proposition was made that the Banda Oriental should remain independent of Buenos Ayres, and merely send deputies to the General Congress to concert measures against the common enemy. On another, when the Portuguese army was approaching the frontiers of the Banda Oriental, an effort was made by Pueyrredon to reconcile him, and to unite him in the common defence. Ample supplies of arms and munitions of war were offered and some furnished; but this attempt also failed.

In order that a fuller view of this subject may be had, I have subjoined a translated copy of an animated letter from General Artigas to Mr. Pueyrredon. (Appendix I.) It is but justice to add, that General Artigas is thought, by persons entitled to credit, to be a firm friend to the independence of the country. To express a decided opinion on this delicate question would scarcely be expected of me, as my position did not command a view of the whole ground. I had not the satisfaction to be derived from a personal interview with General Artigas, who is, unquestionably, a man of rare and singular talents. But if I were to hazard a conjecture, I think it not improbable that in this, as in most family disputes, there have been faults on both sides. It is to be lamented that they are in open hostility. The war has been prosecuted with great animosity, and in two late engagements the

troops of Buenos Ayres have been defeated with great loss. By some it was said that the inhabitants of the eastern shore were anxious that a reconciliation should take place, whilst the people in the country preferred their present state.

I must not omit to take a glance at the situation of Paraguay. This province presents a singular spectacle. It stands aloof from the rest. The people, with the aid of the few remaining royal troops, repulsed an army sent to compel them to join the common standard. Very soon afterwards they expelled the royalists, and set up for themselves. Since this period, they appear to have adopted a partial non-intercourse system. But Buenos Ayres, on one occasion, succeeded in obtaining an understanding with them. Some suspect that they are secretly inimical to the existing order of things, and wish to keep themselves within their shell in case of a change, that they may profit by future events; others calculate with some confidence on their ultimate union with Buenos Ayres, with which, at present, they indulge a limited and reluctant intercourse. Paraguay is under the immediate control of a person named Francia, who styles himself Dictator of Paraguay.

From the domestic concerns of the provinces we naturally turn to their foreign relations. On this subject the commissioners were informed that they had nothing more than a friendly understanding with any foreign nation. With the Portuguese Government they concluded an arrangement in 1812, under the mediation, it is said, of the British, with respect to the Banda Oriental. They have since had a correspondence with them on the subject of their entrance into that province, and the forcible occupation by a Portuguese army of the city of Montevideo, of which a copy is annexed. (Appendix I.) This will present the state of affairs between Buenos Ayres and the Brazils, which has been the theme of much discussion. The superior naval force of the Portuguese stationed in the river La Plata could have effectually blockaded all the ports of Buenos Ayres. By this means they would have prevented supplies of arms and munitions of war, and entirely destroyed the great source of revenue to the state, the duties on imports and tonnage, at a season when money was much wanted: for, about this period, Buenos Ayres had a powerful army to contend with on the side of Peru, and had taken the burden of the renewed contest of Chili with Spain. Under such circumstances, they were in some measure obliged to adopt a cautious and moderate policy. Their conduct in this respect seems to have been coerced. Their unhappy state with the Orientals had also an influence on their measures; they alleged that the restless conduct of Artigas had furnished the Portuguese with a pretext for the invasion; but it is probable that they will ultimately break with the Government of Brazil.

The British Government have, through their official agents, entered into commercial stipulations with General Artigas, as the chief of the Orientals,

on the subject of their trade with the eastern shore. A copy of this instrument will be found in Appendix K.[1]

The Government of Buenos Ayres have a confidential person in Europe, soliciting, from England and other Powers, it is said, assistance of every kind and a recognition of their independence. England has a consul, who, with her naval commander on that station, appeared to conduct the confidential affairs of the British cabinet with the Government of Buenos Ayres.

What effects the victory of Maipu will produce abroad, it would be hazardous in me to conjecture. Whether, like the capture of Burgoyne, it will procure for the United Provinces foreign alliances, I cannot pretend to say.

From a source which is entitled to credit, I was informed that the raising and embarcation of Osorio's army in Peru was not accomplished without serious difficulties. Alternate force and persuasion were used to collect them; and nothing but the name, character, and promises of their general could have induced them to go on board of the vessels prepared for the purpose at the port of Callao. Some of them were actually in a state of mutiny, notwithstanding they were told they would be received with open arms by their brethren in Chili.

The forces finally embarked, agreeably to an account furnished by a gentleman of undoubted veracity on the spot, consisted of the following troops:

1 company of artillery,	70
1 company of sappers and miners,	81
Regiment of Brugos,	900
Regiment of San Carlos, infantry,	907
Regiment of Arequipa,	1,000
Arequipa dragoons,	160
Limas,	144
	3,262

This army was composed of all the regular soldiers they could spare from Lima, who were united at Talcaguna to the royal forces left in Chili. By the battle of Maipu it has ceased to exist. The probable effects in Peru, and other parts of South America, may be conjectured, but cannot be affirmed. The same gentleman who has been mentioned, and who is conversant in Peruvian affairs, apprehended that important changes would result.

I cannot conclude this paper without drawing your attention to a rapid survey of the reforms and improvements in the province of Buenos Ayres, produced by the revolution, and its influence on knowledge, society, and manners.

[1] Not transmitted.

The effects of the revolution are visible in the changes produced in the state of society. The difference in the freedom of acting and thinking which preceded the revolution must necessarily be great. The freedom of commerce must have given a spring to exertions of native enterprise and intelligence; while the active scenes of war and politics, for the last ten years, have awakened the genius of the country which had so long slumbered. The generation now on the stage may almost be said to have been reared under a new order of things. The common stock of ideas among the people has been greatly augmented, the natural consequence of the important political events which daily transpire, and in which every man, like the citizen of Athens, feels an interest. The newspapers are everywhere circulated, together with the manifestoes of the Government, which is obliged to court the approbation of public opinion on all measures of moment. It is not very unusual for the same countryman, who, a few years ago, never troubled himself about any thing beyond the narrow circle of his domestic concerns, to purchase a newspaper on coming to town, as a matter of course, and, if unable to read, to request the first one he meets to do him that favor. The country curates are, moreover, enjoined to read the newspapers and manifestoes regularly to their flocks. The spirit of improvement may be seen in every thing. Even some of those who are under the influence of strong prejudices against the revolution frequently remark the changes for better which have taken place. Their habits, manners, dress, and mode of living, have been improved by intercourse with strangers, and the free introduction of foreign customs, particularly English, American, and French. Great prejudices prevail against whatever is Spanish. It is even offensive to them to be called by this name; they prefer to be identified with the aborigines of the country. The appellation which they have assumed, and in which they take a pride, is that of South Americans.

A powerful stimulus must necessarily have been given to their industry by two important circumstances—the diminution in prices of foreign merchandise, and the great increase in value of the products of the country, with the consequent rise of property. Though the grounds in the neighborhood of cities are highly improved, as I have already stated, agriculture, comparatively speaking, is in a low condition. In general, the lands are badly tilled; the plough is rarely used, and the substitute is a very indifferent one. But, notwithstanding the disadvantages of the present method of culture, I was informed by reputable persons that the average crop of wheat is not less than fifty bushels per acre in good seasons.

On the subject of religion, especially, the change in the public mind has been very great. The Catholic faith is established as that of the state; but there are many advocates, both in conversation and in writing, of universal toleration. Some members of Congress are said to be strongly in favor of it; but the ignorant and superstitious part of the people, together with the

regular clergy, would not be satisfied with such a measure, while the liberality prevailing among the better informed classes is such as to secure a virtual toleration for the present. Besides, from the circumstances of there being no sects in the country, such a provision may wait the progress of liberality in public opinion. In fact, the human mind has been set free on all matters of a general abstract nature, although the liberty of the press is circumscribed, in some degree, with respect to strictures on public measures and men, and the established religion; but there is neither inquisition nor previous license. They acknowledge the Pope as a spiritual head merely, and do not think him entitled to any authority to interfere in their temporal concerns. His bull in favor of the King of Spain against the colonists, which may be almost regarded as an excommunication, produced little or no sensation.

The number of monks and nuns never was very great in Buenos Ayres, when compared with other portions of the Spanish dominions. They have diminished since the revolution. There was at one time a positive law passed forbidding any one to become a monk or a nun; but they were obliged to repeal it, and it was afterwards passed with some modifications. The restrictions substituted, aided by public opinion, have nearly produced the desired effect. Few of the youth of the country apply themselves to the study of theology, since other occupations much more tempting to their ambition have been opened to their choice. Formerly, the priesthood was the chief aim of young men of the best families who were desirous of distinction, as, in fact, it constituted almost the only profession to which those who had received a liberal education could devote themselves; which will readily account for the circumstance of so many of the secular clergy directing their attention at present almost exclusively to politics. The regular clergy, who are not permitted by the nature of their profession to take part in the business of the world, or to hold secular offices, are many of them Europeans; but those of them who are natives take the same lively interest in passing events with the other classes of the community.

They have gone cautiously to work in reforms in the different branches of their municipal laws and the administration of them. The number of offices has been considerably diminished, and responsibility rendered more direct and severe. The judiciary system has undergone many improvements, and nearly all the leading features of the law which did not harmonize with the principles of free government have been expunged, though some of the former evils still remain. The barbarous impositions on the aborigines have been abolished; the odious alcavala and other obnoxious taxes modified so as no longer to be vexatious; slavery and the slave trade forbidden in future; and all titles of nobility prohibited under the pain of the loss of citizenship. The law of primogeniture is also expunged from their system. In the provisional statute, as has already been stated, nearly all the principles

of free representative government are recognised, accompanied, it is true, with certain drawbacks, for which they plead the necessity of the times, but which they profess their intention to do away with on the final settlement of the Government—a consummation anxiously desired by all classes of inhabitants. The example of France has warned them not to attempt too much at first. They have followed the plan of the United States in the introduction of gradual reforms, instead of resorting to violent and sudden innovations and revolutions.

Next to the establishment of their independence by arms, the education of their youth appears to be the subject of the most anxious interest. They complain that every possible impediment was thrown in the way of education previous to the revolution; that, so far from fostering public institutions for this purpose, several schools were actually prohibited in the capital, and the young men were not without restraint permitted to go abroad for their education. There was a college at Cordova, at which those destined for the bar or the priesthood completed their studies upon the ancient monkish principles. Another, called San Carlos, (now the Union of the South,) had been opened at Buenos Ayres, but was afterwards converted into barracks for soldiers. It is an immense building, more extensive, perhaps, than any which has been dedicated to learning in this country, and it has lately been fitted up at very great expense. The school was to have been opened in May or June last on a more modern and liberal plan of discipline and instruction. The library of the state is kept in an adjoining building; it occupies a suite of six rooms, and contains nearly twenty thousand volumes, the greater part rare and valuable. It is formed out of the library of the Jesuits, the books collected in the different monasteries, donations from individuals, and an annual appropriation by the Government, and contains works on all subjects and in all the languages of the polished nations of Europe. A very valuable addition has been lately made of several thousand volumes, brought to Buenos Ayres by M. Bonpland, the companion of the celebrated Humboldt.

Besides the University of Cordova, at which there are about one hundred and fifty students, there are public schools in all the principal towns, supported by their respective corporations. In Buenos Ayres, besides an academy, in which are taught the higher branches, and the college before mentioned, there are eight public schools, for whose support the corporation contributes about seven thousand dollars annually; and, according to the returns of last year, the number of scholars amounted to eight hundred and sixty-four. There are five other schools, exclusively for the benefit of the poor, and under the charge of the different monasteries; these are supplied with books and stationery at the public expense. There are also parish schools in the country, for the support of which a portion of the tithes has been lately set apart. It is rare to meet with a boy ten or twelve years of

age, in the city of Buenos Ayres, who cannot read and write. Besides the scholars thus instructed, many have private tutors. In addition to all this, I must not omit to mention the military academies, supported by Government, at Buenos Ayres and Tucuman, at which there are a considerable number of cadets.

There are no prohibited books of any kind; all are permitted to circulate freely, or to be openly sold in the bookstores; among them is the New Testament in Spanish. This alone is a prodigious step towards the emancipation of their minds from prejudices. There are several bookstores, whose profits have rapidly increased; a proof that the number of readers has augmented in the same proportion. There had been a large importation of English books, a language becoming daily more familiar to them. Eight years ago the mechanic art of printing was scarcely known in Buenos Ayres; at present, there are three printing offices, one of them very extensive, containing four presses. The price of printing is, notwithstanding, at least three times higher than in the United States; but as there is no trade or intercourse with Spain, all school books used in the country, some of them original, are published at Buenos Ayres; the business is therefore profitable, and rapidly extending. There are many political essays, which, instead of being inserted in the newspapers, are published in loose sheets; there are also original pamphlets, as well as republications of foreign works. The constitutions of the United States and of the different States, together with a very good history of our country, and many of our most important state papers, are widely circulated. The work of Dean Funes, the venerable historian of the country, comprised in three large octavo volumes, considering the infancy of the typographic art in this part of the world, may be regarded as an undertaking of some magnitude.

There are three weekly journals, or newspapers, published in the city, which have an extensive circulation through the United Provinces. They all advocate the principles of liberty and republican forms of government, as none other would suit the public taste. The year before last, it is true, one of the papers ventured to advocate the restoration of the Incas of Peru, with a limited monarchy; but it was badly received. No proposition for the restoration of hereditary power, of any kind, as far as I could learn, will be seriously listened to for a moment by the people. Even the ordinary language has changed. They speak of "the state," "the people," "the public," "country," and use other terms, as in the United States, implying the interest that each man takes in what appertains to the community. The first principle constantly inculcated is, "that all power rightfully emanates from the people." This, and similar dogmas, form a part of the education of children, taught at the same time with their catechism. It is natural that the passion for free government should be continually increasing. A fact may be mentioned to show the solid advancement they have

made, which is, that the number of votes taken at their elections increases every year. In becoming habituated to this peaceful and orderly mode of exercising their right of choosing those who are to be invested with authority, the tumultuous and irregular removal, by a kind of general oratory or acclamation, of those who have been chosen, will gradually cease.

Rather than disturb the order of society, they will endure with patience until the time arrives for effecting a regular and constitutional change. Since the election of the present Director, none of these tumults, before so frequent, have occurred. These tumults have seldom been attended with bloodshed; yet they produce great confusion and disorder, and give rise to habits of insubordination, at the same time that they are ruinous to the character of a nation.

The viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres differed from the rest in one important particular. It contained no nobility; or, if any, very few. This may be regarded as a favorable circumstance in their society. Another favorable feature, very necessary to the successful administration of their affairs, is the conduct of many individuals, who have filled the highest office of state, in descending from that dignified situation to inferior posts, and discharging their duties with alacrity. Thus we behold General A. Balcarce, who was formerly Director, acting as second in command to Colonel San Martin; Colonel Alvarez, also a Director at one period, now serving in the staff under the chief of that department, General Azcuenega; and General Rondeau, once elected to the chair of state, is at present employed in a minor office. There are others, who have occupied the same elevated post, who have retired to the station of private citizens.

The general capacities of the United Provinces for national defence are also important, in many respects. The nature and extent of the country afford the inhabitants numerous advantages over an invading army. The ease with which their herds of cattle may be driven to distant places, beyond the reach of an enemy, and the rapid movements the troops of the country can make, from the ample supply of horses and mules, are circumstances of great consequence in a military view. Even the towns not fortified, from the manner in which they are built, and from the construction of their houses, furnish powerful means of defence, as the British army under General Whitlocke experienced, in their attack on Buenos Ayres.

I am sensible that, in the course of these statements and remarks, some inaccuracies and errors must have occurred; but they have been unintentional. I have only to add, that the reception of the commissioners at Buenos Ayres by the Chief Magistrate was friendly and flattering. From every class they met with a cordial welcome. The people, in general, appear to be very much attached to the American character, and to the Government and citizens of the United States.

Should any thing further occur, it shall be made the subject of a future paper.

I have the honor [etc.].

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David C. de Forest, Agent of the United Provinces of South America at Georgetown, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

GEORGETOWN, *December 9, 1818.*

I have the honor to announce to Mr. Adams that I have again arrived in this District, in order to renew my solicitations to be accredited by this Government as the consul general of the United Provinces of South America, founding my claim on the credentials from my Government, which were laid before the President in the month of May last.

The information recently acquired by this Government respecting the provinces of South America, I presume has established the fact beyond a doubt, that Buenos Ayres, their capital, and a large proportion of their territory, are and have been free and independent of the Government of Spain for more than eight years, and possess ample ability to support their independence in future; that a regular system of government is established by their inhabitants, who show themselves, by the wisdom of their institutions, sufficiently enlightened for self-government; and that they look up to this great republic as a model, and as to their elder sister, from whose sympathies and friendship they hope and expect ordinary protection at least.

The messages of the President of the United States, as well the last as the present year, have created a general belief that the United States have placed us on an equal footing with Spain, as it respects our commercial operations; but, sir, it is found not to be the case. A consul of Spain is known and respected as such by your tribunals of justice, which enables him, *ex officio*, to protect and defend the interests of his countrymen; whereas, the verbal permission I have to act in the duties of my office will not avail in your tribunals; and a number of instances have already occurred where the property of my absent fellow-citizens has been jeopardized for want of a legally authorized protector. The case of the Spanish schooner ———, a prize to our armed vessels Buenos Ayres and Tucuman, which was brought into Scituate, some time since, by her mutinous crew, after having murdered the captain and mate, by throwing them overboard, is a striking instance of the necessity of there being resident here an accredited agent to superintend the commercial concerns of South America, and without such accredited agent our citizens cannot be considered as completely protected in their rights.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 415.

I request you, sir, to lay this communication before the President of the United States as early as it may be convenient, and to assure him that I duly appreciate the friendly reception I met with from his Government on my arrival in this country; and that, as circumstances have since materially altered, I have no doubt but I shall receive his permission to act in the accustomed form.

While I remain [etc.].

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David C. de Forest, Agent of the United Provinces of South America at Georgetown, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

GEORGETOWN, *December 12, 1818.*

I took the liberty, on the 9th instant, of addressing a note to Mr. Secretary Adams, requesting to be accredited as the consul general of the United Provinces of South America; and have now the honor of informing Mr. Adams that I have lately received an official communication from the Government of Buenos Ayres, directing me to inform the Government of this country that the supposed conspiracy against the person of the Supreme Director proves to have originated with an obscure and disappointed individual, who, to gain adherents, pretended to be connected with people of the first respectability and influence, several of whom he named, but who have convinced the Government that they had no knowledge whatever of his base project.

The Supreme Director, anxious to do away any unfavorable impressions which the report of such an affair might cause at this distance, has ordered me to assure the President of the United States that the Government of South America was never more firmly supported, nor its prospects more brilliant, than at the present time.

I have the honor [etc.].

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David C. de Forest, Agent of the United Provinces of South America at Georgetown, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [2]

GEORGETOWN, *January 8, 1819.*

SIR: It is not my intention to give any unnecessary trouble to the Department of State; but having had the honor of receiving two notes from Mr. Secretary Adams on the 4th instant, dated December 31 and January 1, some explanation appears to be necessary.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 416. [2] *Ibid.*, 417.

In the first place, I do not suppose "that any privileges which may be attached to the consular character can avail in the judicial tribunals of this country to influence in any manner the administration of justice." But I suppose that a consul duly accredited is, *ex officio*, the legal representative of his fellow-citizens not otherwise represented by an express power; and that the tribunals of justice do and will admit the legality of such representation. Mr. Adams has misunderstood me in another observation, which was, in substance, that there was a general opinion prevailing at Buenos Ayres that the Power first recognising our independence would expect some extraordinary privilege or advantage therefor; and that, in my opinion, the Government of Buenos Ayres would readily grant it if demanded. I know nothing, however, of any resolution having been passed on this subject by the Congress at Tucuman.

It appears, from the relation of a fact in Mr. Adams's note of the 31st ultimo, that the Government of Buenos Ayres had intimated a desire (in the course of a negotiation with an agent of the United States) to reserve the right of granting more extraordinary privileges to Spain on the settlement of a general peace, which must appear to every one contrary to their inclination as well as interest; and it can be accounted for only by supposing that the proposition of the United States agent was merely of a temporary nature, and did not extend to an acknowledgment by the United States of the independence of South America; which act, I am confident, would have rendered any such reservation altogether unnecessary in the opinion of the Government of Buenos Ayres, who must have seen that they were treating with an unauthorized person, and must have thought it good policy at this time to suggest such an idea. Indeed, were the Government of Buenos Ayres to pursue that course, they would plead the example of a neighboring Power acknowledged to be independent by the United States, and its chief both illustrious and legitimate. It is well known that the Government of Brazil taxes the commerce of the United States about sixty per cent. higher than that of Great Britain. It may be that Great Britain is entitled to this preference on account of important services rendered by her to the King of Portugal; and permit me to ask you, sir, what services could be rendered to any nation already in existence so great as would be the acknowledgment by Great Britain or by the United States of the independence of South America? Such recognition merely, by either of these Powers, would probably have the immediate effect of putting an end to the cruel and destructive war now raging between Spain and South America, and crown with never-fading laurels the nation thus first using its influence in favor of an oppressed but high-minded people.

The account given by Mr. Adams in his note of the 1st instant, respecting the irregular conduct of vessels sailing under the Buenos Ayres flag, has caused me much mortification, and has already been transmitted to my

Government by the Plattsburg; as also a copy of Mr. Adams's frank and friendly communication of the 31st ultimo. The Supreme Director will certainly be desirous to adopt the most prompt and efficacious measures within his power to remedy the evils complained of. But pray, sir, what can he do more than has already been done? The Government of Buenos Ayres have established the most just rules and regulations for the government of their vessels of war as well as of commerce, and have sent me to this country invested with the title and powers of their consul general, as well to guard against any breach of those rules and regulations by their citizens and vessels frequenting these seas and the ports of these United States, as to protect them in their rights; but, sir, without a recognition of my powers on the part of this Government, I can have no right whatever to question any individual on the subject of his conduct; nor can any responsibility justly attach to me nor to my Government, during such a state of things, for the irregularities committed.

A considerable number of our seamen are foreigners by birth, who have voluntarily entered our service; therefore, it is not a matter of surprise that, of the mutineers of the prize crew of the vessel at Scituate, three should have been born Englishmen, and one a North American. It is, however, an absolute fact, to which I am personally knowing, that the captors of that prize (the *Buenos Ayres* and *Tucuman* privateers) were legally fitted out at Buenos Ayres early in the last year, from which port they sailed on a cruise off Cadiz; and it will afford the Government of South America much satisfaction to learn that the United States will prosecute those mutineers, and punish such as are found guilty of crimes, according to the laws.

Before I close this note, I beg leave to make a few observations in answer to one of the reasons for not accrediting me, given by Mr. Adams, by direction of the President of the United States, in a conversation which I have had the honor of holding with him, viz: "That the act of accrediting me as consul general would be tantamount to the formal acknowledgment of the independence of the Government which sent me." I do not profess to be skilled in the laws of nations, nor of diplomacy; nor would I doubt the correctness of any opinion expressed by the President, for whose person and character I have ever entertained the most profound respect; yet I must say, that I cannot understand the difference between the sending of a consular agent duly authorized to Buenos Ayres, where one was accredited from this country, four or five years ago, and has continued ever since, in the exercise of the duties of his office, and the reception of a similar agent here. I also beg leave to mention that I was in this country soon after the arrival of the present minister of Spain, the Chevalier De Onis; and to have heard it observed that, being a political agent, he was not accredited, because the sovereignty of Spain was in dispute; but that the consuls who acknowledged the same Government (one of the claimants to the sover-

eignty, and the one not actually in possession of it) were allowed to exercise their functions. If this was the case at that time, the Government of the United States must have then had a different opinion on this subject from what it now has. Mr. Adams will please to bear in mind that I have only solicited to be accredited as a consular agent, having never agitated the question of an acknowledgment of our independence as a nation, which most certainly is anxiously desired by the Government and people of South America, but which, being a political question, I have never asked.

Mr. Adams will also be pleased to accept [etc.].

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W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 7, 1819.*

SIR: Tomorrow I shall go on board the ship Sachem hence for New York— Since my letter of the 11th. Inst. notifying you of my appointment of Mr. Strong as Consul at this place I have issued to him the enclosed Circular marked *A* of this date. . . .

It was nine o'clock at night when I arrived here on Friday the 26th. Ulto.— and as it was said the Sachem wou'd sail on the Wednesday following, altho I had ridden upwards of twenty five leagues that day thro' a most intensely hot Sun, with miserable fare on the road, I sat up attending to business till two oclock in the morning, and in consequence of the Consulate being vacant, have been much harassed with that kind and other business ever since— Mr. Halsey informed me he had left in his stead a Mr. Dunn a native of Delaware, but when I came here, I found the Government wou'd not only, not recognize Mr. Dunn but had placed under their own care for safe keeping the Consular documents &c.— I have paved the way for Mr. Strong so that if he attend as I trust he will to his duties, he will not meet with extraordinary difficulties.—

One reason why I have appointed Vice Consuls and Consuls instead of commercial agents, is because the latter wou'd expect salaries, the others only legal perquisites.—So Soon as I read the President's Message here, and saw that the relations of the United States were intended to remain in Statuquo, touching these Provinces, and found no successor had been sent in the place of Mr. Halsey, it struck me that the President either expected me to

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, I.

remain here or, he wou'd run the risk, if he sent a Consul not addressed particularly to this Government, (which he cou'd not do according to his message) of having him not received— Because many years ago when the Patriots were just assuming the form of Government, and not near so important and self consequential as they are at present, they for a long time refused to receive Robert Ponsoby Staples Esquire the British Consul, a gentleman related to the late distinguished Mr. Ponsoby of the House of Commons, of fine taste and irreproachable character—because he was not addressed to them and was at last with difficulty received—and now in addition to those circumstances, we had, I was told, declined receiving a consul they had sent to the U. States last Spring—and further since the return of the Commissioners in the Congress I found the feeling here, on the attitude our Government had assumed towards them, of a dissatisfied irritated Cast— I therefore concluded as I have all along done in this mission that my Government expected me to act, so as at the same time I conciliated these people, and promised for the protection and benefit of our Citizens in these countries, I did not bring them into collision with Spain— If neither my agency, nor those appointed by me, were complained of by Spain and we acted in other respects for the best, why, the Government wou'd find no fault with us— If Spain did complain of my acts or those of my deputies, then our Government cou'd shew what my appointment was in reality, and that I cou'd not infuse a character in an officer created by me which I did not myself possess.—

Viewing the very interesting and critical manner in which the U. States stood not only as it regarded the jealousy and watchfulness which the great European powers directed towards us thro' the medium of the South American contest, and also with Spain particularly I have thought our Government wou'd prefer appearing to Ferdinand himself, to be suspicious of and lukewarm towards the Patriots, and upon friendly terms with him, till our demands upon him were satisfied—in one word, till we got the Floridas &c. as there appeared no other way of getting satisfied— Then to be sure, our future conduct wou'd be guided by circumstances, but we shou'd be much more free to act up to the plain, unembarrassed rule that the wishes, the interest and honor of the Nation demanded.—

These were the considerations which have in a great degree influenced me to act as I have done— I have made no appointment that I did not approve, nor have I adopted any line of conduct which was not my choice, for if what I conceive to be the views of the Government in those affairs, had not have accorded with my own opinion— I most candidly say I wou'd have resigned my place— My rule of action was to do nothing in opposition to the will of the Government, as far as I cou'd divine that—and at the same time not to do any thing as of the Government, which was against my own will— in two words I never was and never will dwindle down into a mere diplomatic machine—a mere Knight or Rook upon the great Political Chessboard of

this life— Whether I have acted well or ill, is not for me to decide—so much for this consulate.—

I will now take a final view of the state of affairs here, so far as my short residence enables me— When I reached Mendoza I found the state of the Pampas said to be impassable, the Governor and many others advised me by no means to attempt it, the country being over run with the Monteneros— However I halted a short time and having received a card from the Wife of Genl. San Martin, who was living at Mendoza, this being one of the polite fashions of the country, I paid my respects to her and thought she might know if her husband were coming over the mountains, but on my observing that I feared it wou'd be some time before she wou'd see him, since he wou'd most likely enter Lima first, she rather seemed to think if I judged correctly that he wou'd first come across the Cordilleras— I understood at Mendoza, that for fear of their falling into the hands of the Montoneros the Government had prohibited the wagons going on for Buenos Ayres as also had denied passports to travellers— However he furnished me with a friendly letter to the Governor of San Luis and I pushed on— When I got to San Luis, there had just been an insurrection of the prisoners and a bloody massacre— Here I obtained letters both from the Buenos Ayrean party to their friends shou'd I fall in with any of them, and some to the heads of the Monteneros, but determined as long as I cou'd to pass, amongst the Buenos Ayreans, as I looked upon them as the only organised established Government party, and I had never taken side in this country with any party trying to get into power, nor against them, I only meddled with the party existing in the Government— With me I did not care whether it changed one time or twenty— Except regretting the ill effect such instability was calculated to produce to them both at home and abroad.—From San Luis I pushed on for the remainder of my journey, and as at more leisure, I intend, that any thing which is new and interesting in this return journey shall accompany the 4th part of my diary, it is needless here to say further than when I came to the town of Luxam which is about sixteen leagues from Buenos Ayres, I found that Cornelio Saavedra was located there as *director Delagado*, and had the whole command and direction of the movements of the army, in fact was I suspect more efficient than Pueyrredon in the affairs of the present crisis.— He is said to be rather inclined to the Artigas party— I waited on him fatigued and dusty as I was but had no time to gather any thing, except his being of opinion that San Martin and his army were coming to Mendoza— He had a Court or Cabinet about him and appeared to be a very good honest man— I never saw him before, he was quite in the back ground when I was last in Buenos Ayres, yet he had been early in the revolution at the head of affairs— I thought his present elevation indicated the retirement of Pueyrredon— Saavedra did not know where the Montoneros were, he had not for some time heard from his own army, which was now commanded by

Genl. Viamont, in the room of Genl. Juan Ramon Balcana, who resigned on account of ill health— It was said from good authority, that the Buenos Ayreans had lost in the affairs with the Montoneros about 13,000 horses— and I told Saavedra of an action which took place at Amadura on the Peru road which I was informed of at the village of La Carlota as I came along, but the result not known— After getting to Buenos Ayres, I declined waiting on the Director for three or four days, with the view of ascertaining first how things stood— I found Commodore Bowles, the British Commander on this station, having invited me to dine with him at the beautiful Quinta of Alton Aguirre he said he was continued I think three years longer on the Buenos Ayrean station— His frigate is a 32 called the Creole, in compliment I suppose to the people of this place,—two other vessels of war are under his orders—the Tyne Capt Falcon and the Slaney sloops of war— Capt Shiraff in the Andromache and Hickey in the Blossom are under his orders in the Pacific.—I was informed he stood very well with the Government here, he as well as the British Consul, Mr. Staples and the other English officers behaved very friendly to me.—Bowles did not appear to like Lord Cochrane, he told me he had sent round to his Captains in the Pacific not to salute him—but I have no doubt they will not object to salute the flag of Chile— In speaking of our Government not recognizing their independence and letting things remain in Statuquo, he thought it was the most proper course— I told him I was informed that they had assurances of being recognized by England, which I was told by an American who thought he was in the secrets of the Cabinet here— Bowles denied there was any foundation for such a conjecture— Indeed he seemed to have rather an unfavourable opinion of them altogether, yet acknowledged, that taking all things together he was surprised to see them do as well as they did— He said from the best accounts he cou'd get, the monteneros did not exceed 1,500 men— He lived in a handsome genteel stile, and I was told had from time to time at his parties, the first South Americans in the place— In the last year the influx of Foreigners was very considerable— The English seem very fond of this place— The British Consul is building a mansion in the European fashion of 20 or 30,000$—they seem to be locating themselves in South America pretty permanently— There are a good many French, but not in much repute as Genl. Brayer's pamphlets—against San Martin has put them in the back ground— Few Americans— Whilst at dinner, Bowles received a note, which appeared to be more than usually important, as he must have noticed, that by my studied listlessness of manner I showed him, that I was aware I had no right to enquire what it was, and I supposed that wou'd be the most likely manner to cause him to tell what it was, if it were of any general consequence— He observed to me, this is a note I have just received from Genl. Lecor (calling him Count—Something, I forget his title) it is an extraordinary one, he wishes me to inform him for what reasons

the Director has put Mr. Barossa in prison— I shall write him I know nothing about it, I suppose this Government can inform him.—By the way you must know, that Barossa was an intelligent, cunning, and I suspect intriguing Portuguese. He has for a long time resided here as the Secret Minister or Agent of the Court of Brazils— I thought he seemed to have no inclination to be acquainted with me when I was here last, I never knew him except by sight, he was generally in uniform, being a Captain in the Navy.—You will recollect, his correspondence which I enclosed to you in the affair of the Schooner Ellen Tucker, at that time he went out to Pueyrredon's Quinta where he was, near San Isidro to explain or apologize— But the Director raved and stormed, and he staid out there all night and if my memory be not treacherous, refused to see him till the next morning—and then was very sharp and abrupt—with him— These particulars I had from an acquaintance of mine, a frenchman who was on a friendly visit to the Director of two or three days— But I must confess altho' that a gentleman believed it all real displesure in the Director, I looked upon it as a kind of hoax, either to deceive the Americans who had complained in that case, or to impress Barossa, with the idea of his own nerve and power, or to excite Barossa's jealousy, by making him believe he had cause to be so tender and careful of his friendship with the U. States— These things however gave me no great opinion either of his manliness or talents—and now I hear he has been thrown into prison by the Director for about two weeks, because he was found receiving and circulating handbills, placards, caricatures &c. against this Government, which he received from Montevido, Some, said to be written by Genl. Carrera and others in that place.—On this message of Lecor, he was I believe, released and ordered to quit Buenos Ayres in one hour. I observed well, I suppose they and the Portuguese will go to war— Bowles replied, I dont know, but think they had better try to keep on good terms with the Portuguese, as they appear to be their Allies, and they have enough of fighting already on their hands— However I suspect, in truth and reality the English like the Court of Rio de Janeiro much better than they do the Government of Buenos Ayres— I know that Capt—Sharpe who was here in the absence of Bowles, used to speak of Barossa to me, in favourable terms, and Bowles did not seem to dislike him— This reference of Lecor's too, confirmed the intimacy— I was told at the Forts by a South American officer who was standing there as I went to see the Secretary of State, and fell into casual conversation with him, that the English had eight or ten vessels of war at Rio de Janeiro— I mentioned that to Bowles, as if I suspected it an exaggerated rumour, to which he remarked that they are always lying about their fleet &c., or something to that effect— I have endeavoured to ascertain if there is any truth in this, but have not been able— Perhaps as I am now upon it, 'twill be as well to go thro' every thing that I know respecting the Portuguese subject— The highest officer in the Buenos Ayrean marine

is Commodore Chaytor, a man about 44 years of age, a native of Virginia and for many years one of the most respectable sea Captains out of Baltimore, during our late war with England he commanded some fine privateers out of the U. States, and at the attack of Cochburn and Ross against Baltimore, commanded a launch of 50 men— After peace he entered into the Buenos Ayrean employ and his vessel, the "Independence of the South" is perhaps at this time the only regularly documented vessel in this service, she in fact and reality is his private property, but appears on the Marine record of this place, to have been given gratuitously to him by the Government— She has no limit to her commission, the other vessels which sail under this flag are Privateers with commissions limited to one two years &c.—so the Commodore informed me— On my reaching Buenos Ayres from New York, I found him in that City, and having myself in 1810 married into his family and esteeming him a brave and honourable man I of course became intimate with him— Since I first knew him—he had been always at sea, so that we had very little intercourse with one another— But inasmuch as the Commodore knew I was an agent of the U. States, and therefore intended to pursue a neutral conduct in the contest with Spain—and I did not wish by force of the circumstance of affinity between us to learn thro' him any secrets of his Government, we generally mutually, avoided from motives of delicacy those subjects— Yet—having early taken an interest in the Marine in the Pacific Ocean— I wrote at his suggestion a plan of operations &c. necessary for that sea, before I crossed the Andes and they were translated and laid before the Secretary of Marine Irigoyen, but not as from me, from him, after I got to Chile as related in my letter of the 26th Ulto., I became confirmed in my opinion of the great facility in destroying the Royal supremacy on the Pacific, and to induce the Commodore to pass round or over, to take the command of the Chile fleet, which I had no doubt of his getting, I kept him fully advised of all matters relating to the subject—gave his name to Genl. San Martin, on his going over after the battle of Maypu—in consequence of which an interview took place between him and San Martin—and the Commodore told me that San Martin with the greatest quickness immediately comprehended his plans— I also spoke of him two or three times to Pueyrredon, who held him in the highest estimation— He told me this in my last interview with him— To ward off any inference that I interfered for Commodore Chaytor, from motives of self interest— I must observe, that when applied to or sometimes voluntarily, I interfered for various foreigners who applied for ranks in the Patriot service,— Lieut. Carson an American, I applied to O'Higgins and he placed him in his escort— Capt Gumer a Swiss formerly in the service of the King of Bavaria, I did him a service with the Director— Major Petrie informed me that he had written to Sweden, that the Director had appointed him a Major, and that the North American Minister (as he incorrectly called me) had interfered and he was ranked as

Lt. Col:— The simple fact was that I spoke to the Director about Petrie and he said he shou'd appoint him Major— I replied that he was a Brevet Lt. Col: under Bernadotte and perhaps, if not improper it wou'd be best at least not to lessen his grade as he appeared a man of merit and was too modest to speak for himself. Whether this had any effect I know not, he thought it had— I introduced Wooster to the Director— Indeed many others, that it wou'd be useless to enumerate— I will now return from this digression—

Chaytor did not come to Chile, he was detained by various propositions from the Buenos Ayrean Government— And on my return here I found him as friendly as ever— He told me that the Supreme Director, said to him the people wished a Portuguese war and that feeling had now reached the Executive—and as Chaytor was about returning to the U. States, the Director told him to keep him advised by every opportunity where he might be found, that he shou'd dispatch a vessel for him immediately that the war between Buenos Ayres and the Portuguese became certain— Chaytor also said, that the Buenos Ayrian Government wou'd buy the two frigates the Horatio and Curioso from Chile and that he shou'd go to the U. States with powers to break up the pyracies and suppress the spurious commissions afloat under the Buenos Ayrian flag— The principal reason why I took this interest in the Patriot marine, was to get Americans at the head of it— If these provinces, while foreign Governments stood aloof, were to be aided by foreign individuals, I wished to see them mainly assisted by Americans in atchieving their independence— And as I was certain Commodore Chaytor, who had become a citizen of this country, was an Honorable man and both willing and able to do them eminent service, both for the glory of his native country, for his own benefit and for the happiness of this I wished him to be at the head of affairs.—I had no private Interest in one solitary vessel that floated— I never had or ever saw one solitary commission for privateers &c. since I have been in the country— The Lautaro as I heretofore shewed you in the papers accompanying Townsend's protest, was brought under the most peculiar circumstances—the purchase was justified by that same imperious doctrine of necessity, which in the President's message before me, justified the violation of Neutral Pensacola, on the ground of self preservation, which he ably and justly says is a principle that cannot be abandoned— When all the foreigners were straining to throw in their mite, my countrymen looked to me as their public functionary, to join with them—what wou'd this Government have said, if I declined stepping forth, on the cold abstract hypothesis of rigid neutrality?

I threw down a thousand dollars, half of all the money I had and risked it on the crisis.—Immediately that the necessity ceased to exist, I transfer'd all my right at par before she left the port of Valparaiso, when the hopes

of the enterprise were dazzling and little doubtful—because when the imperious necessity ceased, I deemed it improper for me, peculiarly as an officer of our Government, to wage war against Spain.—If the Government doubt this statement I can produce sufficient proof and the originals— I thought proper to mention these things, because one consul has been dismissed for meddling with commissions to privateers &c. and this transaction might not be otherwise correctly understood by my country— As to my advice about the marine and giving such opinions and information as I came honestly by, to the Patriots, I look upon that as fair play— For my conscience revolted at doing any thing in favour of the Royal Spanish cause, as it respected South America, as being virtually in opposition to, and a libel upon the just and rational intention of the laws of God, of Nature and civil society.—It is not necessary for me, to support this remark by going into what some persons might perhaps think a speculative philosophic theory, that the Crown of Spain having comparatively only a few subjects scattered over one of the most extensive and richest portions of the Globe, have not a right to indulge in their miserly monopoly and hermetically Seal it up against all the rest of the great human family.—

I find that many people are of opinion that the Chile fleet has been furnished by Lord Cochrane and as so expensive a force cou'd not be procured by his individual funds, they insinuate that the Governmt. of Great Britain must secretly furnish the means— It is no such thing—the Lautaro was bought as stated to you, by the American, English and Patriots— the San Martin by the Patriots, The Chacabaco, the Galvarino the same— The Chilenos *particularly*, brought in all their old plate, and to their honor and that of O'Higgins they subscribed individually every thing they cou'd to get it to sea— I have enclosed you heretofore, a list of the individual subscribers, you will see that according to their means, some subscribe one dollar—some a half—some five hundred dollars—some gave clothes, some provisions, some one thing some another as they were able— Men Women and even the Priests.—This act in my opinion is an imperishable monument to the patriotism of the Chilenos— The English, only brought them those old superannuated East India vessels and got sweeping prices for them— Lord Cochrane has not brought a solitary vessel of their money— even the Rose an old English sloop of war in which he came, belongs to a Mr. Henderson, who is trying all in his power to sell her to the Chile government.— His Lordship is said to have expended nearly his last five thousand pounds in a steam frigate, I heard that when she attempted to sail some of her machinery got out of order and she put back to England— I doubt whether she ever doubles Cape Horn— I do not pretend to ascribe to myself any thing extraordinary in the influence I had in creating the Chile Navy— Fame ascribed to Judge Prevost and Capt Biddle, a much greater credit in inducing the Government to purchase the Lautaro, than it did to

me, without their open, personal activity in the affair, it was generally thought the purchase never wou'd have been completed— I don't believe either of them subscribed a single dollar but they did every thing else in their power to egg on the Patriots—

However let them answer for themselves— I don't justify my conduct by what others do—yet I must confess the decided part taken by those two Gentlemen, both so recently from the U. States, and deservedly high in the confidence of our Government, on my Meeting them in Chili as they were proceeding to Lima, made me believe that there was no necessity to be over scrupulous in behalf of the Patriots: and I recollect making this same remark to Judge Bland in talking over those affairs.—

Having ascertained as much preliminary information as I required and delayed my visit to the Supreme director as long as I cou'd with propriety— On Monday the 1st. Inst. I waited on Mr. Secretary Taylor [Tagle?] and told him, that tomorrow at the accustomary hour of 11—I wou'd present myself at the audience room of the Director, if he had no objection, and accordingly on the 2d Inst was received by Mr. Pueyrredon with marks of unabated politeness and friendship. We first got thro' the consular subject, then he remarked on the Commission in the Congress—saying that they had furnished all the information which had been requested, for the President— He had read Mr. Rodney's report and was pleased with it, also Mr. Graham's, but had not seen Mr. Bland's—and seemed to be disappointed that the U. States had not recognized their Independence I thought laying a stress on what he thought the prompt manner in which he had furnished information to the Commissioners— However he appeared more grieved at the event, more hurt than irritated— I asked him how he liked the Commissioners— He replied with rather an arch, good humoured smile, that they were very good plain men,—that they were "tres quakeros" I cou'd not help half laughing at the epithet— I observed to him that the Congress of Aix la Chapelle had not meddled with South America— He said it was not so— I think he observed that they had appointed a Mediation thro' the Duke of Wellington— I asked him if there was not an immense expedition coming against him from Spain— He said yes—but that they had no doubt of it and rested confident that the nation had patriotism and strength sufficient to defeat it— I told him I had understood that like Cincinatus, he was fond of amusing himself on his farm, when not employed in the service of his country— (I wished to find out from this compliment if he intended to resign his chief magistracy—) He said that he was very fond of that kind of life (and I thought with an air rather untranquilised, If I may so speak) and shou'd shortly retire altogether to his Quinta on the banks of the La Plata.—Knowing on my entrance that he was very much occupied with despatches of two months delay having just come to him from Chile as also from Tucuman, and seeing his room full of officers, I wou'd not

detain him any longer but shook hands with him and bid him a final adieu— He spoke some minutes on my parting, it seemed somewhat premeditated— Yet with I am inclined to think, unfeigned sincerity, offered me any aid in his power, or any assistance which I shou'd stand in need of— I declined every thing of the sort— He was not dressed in a Colonel's uniform which he used to wear, but I think a Brigadier General's— He has received that rank— The stile of the Fort its guards, aid De Camp, of the Director &c.— much as it was when I was here before— It is not near so tasty as the Directorial Palace of Chile nor so stilish— I mention these things because, those two Directors assume a stile and are approached with a difficulty and formality, little inferior to some of the crowned heads in Europe— Major Graaner at present wearing the order of the North Star, being aid de camp to Bernadotte King of Sweden, and the most accomplished and intelligent foreigner I met in Chile, told me one day that the King of Sweden was much plainer and far more accessible than the Supreme Director of Chile— Those you see are rather unfavourable symptoms in those new and rising Governments— But it will not govern affairs— They will soon settle down into an elective, confederative republican form of Government, both here and in Chile and Peru—before a distant day— They may for some time have a national religion—a more lengthened and energetic Executive and want many of our Republican peculiarities— But nevertheless they will form freer Governments than any in Europe and approach next to us— I conclude so, from pervading those countries and knowing their population and localities.—The country of Chili is divided into mountains and vallies— The people grow up uncorrupted and independent in those vallies—and like Switzerland, from a thousand reasons which must strike you, and wou'd be pedantic and tedious for me to enumerate,—as they are destined, they must be free— When even the antient Nobility of Chile travel through it, their Marquises, Viscounts &c. they are obliged to pass those mountains on Mules &c. and the Necessities of human nature bringing them down on a level with the hardy sons of those Mountains, and the kinder charities of the heart bringing them wearied into the social enjoyments of the inhabitants of the vallies, they are necessarily induced to experience and practice equality— Those people are not like the Peasants of Poland and Hungary or the Cerfs of Russia—they are in their lives and manners, independent and free from servility of mind and manners— I speak civily— Religiously they are still fettered, but those clamps of iron on the human mind, which the deepest policy and most absolute tyranny under which the sons of Earth were ever borne down—and burried alive, for ages past, have riveted and doubly clutched them to the Papal Faith, begin daily to lower and wear away— The country of Buenos Ayres is pretty much in contrast to that of Chile—physically—but politically, the people must be necessarily very similar— Living detached and sparse in the

most luxuriant, and in some respects fertile plains in the world—with ease, they satisfy the pressing calls of nature, and feel themselves free and independent— Forever on horse, like an arrow in the air they avoid or pursue their enemy— And let me impress this great distinction, between the inhabitants of the Pampas and Paraguay and indeed the whole people of the country of Spanish South America, from the savages which may be either folded within its limits or prowling on its borders— Rude and native as the Gaucho of Buenos Ayres or the Obrero of Chile may be, and at first sight often seeming better than the wild Indian— He is in many respects always better— He has stepped within the pale of civil society— He has his places of religious worship, and Christianity however it may be distorted, perverted and buried beneath the villainous contortions and machinations of men, yet from it there will always break out some rays around its profession, which surpass in their beneficial, civil and religious effect, the finest philosophy of the Antients and the purest morality of the Savage. This indestructibility of our Gospel, if its divinity stood in need of such a proof, is one of the most striking and irrefragable nature— They often read and write and they seem to have been already initiated into the rudiments of the social compact— Despotism will attempt to exert itself in the Capitals and populous Cities— But there must and will spring up great and honest men amongst them, who guiding the will of the people, must arrive at and establish free and liberal institutions and Governments— I think I have met in South America some distinguished foreigners who already wish to influence their choice in a government— I recollect having at dinner with me one day at Mr Lynch's when I lived in Chile, Col: Las Heras the Director of the Mint, and some other South Americans with Major Graaner of Sweden, a Polish Gentleman said to have been aid to the Prince Neufchatel, an officer said to have been aid to the duke of Wellington in the Peninsular war—and some of these Gentlemen advanced the doctrine that, as to the form of Government for these Countries whether it was a Monarchy or a Republic, it was of little consequence so it was a *constitutional* Government— I think I have found this kind of doctrine, pretty well received— They get over the propriety and necessity of following the example of the U. States, by complimenting us highly and saying those people are not fit for such Republicanism— But I assure you when I travelled through the Province of Coquimbo I cou'd not help thinking, that there particularly as also in the valley of Aconcagua—I got acquainted with South American Gentlemen, who even then, wou'd have made an honest, able and respectable figure, not only in a fine legislative body of their own country, but on the floor of our Congress— You may depend upon it, that this idea of any people not being fit for a good Republican Government, and that so they be *constitutional* it is of little importance, what be their character, are doctrines both false and dangerous.—I opposed them then

and most likely ever shall— The great threatened Spanish Armada will be the last attempt of Spain to subjugate these people— It will end as disastrously as did that of Philip the Second in the time of Elizabeth.—The intestine divisions of these countries I look upon as drawing to a close— I was told this morning by Mr. Escalada, the father of San Martin's wife, who called to see me, that the Genl. Was actually on his way hither with three thousand men and I think he said he was at Mendoza— I have heard this report from other sources I told Tagle the Secretary of State, I did not believe he wou'd come— It is generally said and believed he will be made Supreme Director— First to oppose the Spanish Expedition—and they think he will unite Artigas and his party to the Buenos Ayreans— The Monteneros as they are called are certainly gaining ground—and I do think if San Martin do[es] come over and assume the Directorship he will unite with Artigas against the Portuguese—so that the country will be stronger than ever it was.—Shou'd Pueyrredon retire I doubt if he wou'd long remain in the country. He is a man of handsome address—about 38 or 40 years of age— He is not deficient in abilities—but if my physiognomical judgment be not erroneous I never have thought him a man of genuine personal bravery— He possesses two important qualities, to enable him to govern— He uses flattery to persuade when he wishes to succeed and power to coerce when he is afraid or thinks it necessary— He understands the people and parties he has to deal with—and having been formerly at the court of Madrid speaking the French language fluently &c. he is not dull at Diplomatic intrigue— On the whole he has perhaps managed the affairs of Government better and longer than any of his predecessors— and from the stability which they have experienced under him his resignation will be regretted by many— Except the party violences with one another one of the worst things which I have heard of him, is that he made private speculations of provisions &c. furnished the Portuguese.—But whether this be true or not is conjecture— The Secretaries of State and Treasury Tagle and Gascon will go out with him—it is said Irigoyen Secretary of War and Marine will remain in— Now after all this high authority, I still doubt, that San Martin will accept of the Directorial chair— He is a Character into which it is necessary you shou'd have every insight which I even think in my power to give you— I shall not be prolix nor attempt any thing like a regular Biographical sketch of him— However some of his ruling traits shall be delineated— He is a native of that part of the Vice royalty of Buenos Ayres, settled peculiarly by the Jesuits and called the Mission Territory and was born at a small town called Llapallu— He is, I shou'd think about 39 years of age well made neither very robust nor very spare, rather inclined to be lean, nearly six feet high, very brown complexion, black strong hair, black, rolling, wild, penetrating eye, an aquiline nose, a chin and mouth when he smiles peculiarly pleasing—

Handsome address very polite, quick as thought in movement reply [*sic*] n. n.— Brave, careless of money, abstemious in eating, and till perhaps he has thought his constitution required it as much so in drinking, plain and unostentatious in his dress, decidedly a shunner, rather than a courter of public pageantry—yet distrustful and suspicious—this character I think grew out of the times in which he is called to act and the persons with whom he has had to deal— He speaks French and Spanish and served as Aid to the Marquis of Romana in the peninsular war— He is fond of the cavalry and in that first distinguished himself at the affair of San Lorenza— He prides himself too much I think on his talent of stratagem in warfare and cunning and finesse in matters of party and politics— However he may have found those the best and most potent modes of proceeding— I never did like any thing like suspiciousness or cunning in my life— I fear he will be always finding out plots if he is made Director and I pronounce shou'd he take the chair of state at Buenos Ayres for even a year or two both his health and his fame will suffer if not be destroyed by it— When he confines himself to matters of state or diplomacy he is liable to a hemorrhage from the lungs and I think is constitutionally predisposed to gloom and some shades of superstitution— However in matters of Religion he is liberal— He has been the first to cause Marriages to be tolerated between Foreigners not Roman Catholics, to South American ladies of that religion, without requiring a change of the husbands and— Yet at a grand Te Deum, I have seen him conduct himself with a kind of studied formality— I cou'd not once in particular, help thinking of Oliver Cromwell— For he must see that a great deal of those Church ceremonies and customs are contrary to a new state of things, if they ever intend to be free from the King of Spain and the Pope of Rome— My first interview with him was after the disaster of Talca— He appeared to be excessively hurt, but, bore it like a man— I had received from him the inclosed original letter written by him to me from San Fernando— It will let you into his politeness of manner &c.— The letters he alludes to were furnished me by some of the first people in Buenos Ayres— His lady was so polite as to give me a very esteem'd introductory letter from herself to him— When I went to Buenos Ayres I had but one solitary letter and that a sealed one from the Department of State to Mr Halsey when I left there for Chile, I was furnished with a trunk full— I was much prepossessed in favour of the General on my first visit—and just as I was taking leave of him I observed, "but Sir, there is one thing I must be excused in mentioning to you— It appears that in many instances you have thought that those Americans who came to South America, with Genl. Carrera, were hostile to you and you have treated them accordingly, if you had have treated them otherwise I am certain they wou'd have been your friends, for the manner in which they have stuck to Carrera is the best proof of their firmness of principle—yet it was the cause of the Patriots

they came to serve, not Genl. Carrera, they wou'd have been as faithful to you as to him, had you have treated them, not as partizans of Carrera but as volunteers in the great cause of your Freedom" This was a most delicate subject, yet I was determined to broach it and came out plain and home down with it— He replied a little agitated— "Do you know that there were two great political parties in Chile" I said yes—and therefore think that the best policy was to strengthen your party by adding to it from the other side rather than by irritating and cutting off persons from it— I thought he seemed to regret the course he had pursued, and mildly said, well, well we will think of this— He certainly afterwards shewed attentions and favours to some of those young men who had before been suspicious to him— Just before the affair of Maypu, I called at his tent— He was much engaged I introduced to him an American and a Swiss officer who accompanied me— I conversed with him some time on the approach of his enemy, and as he had been taken by surprise at Talca—ventured to say, "I think Sir, Osorio moves on with great caution." From the emphasis with which he replied he took my meaning—he said doubtingly, or rather as if he had all his eyes on him "nous le verrons"— He waited on me outside of his tent and in the most polite manner thanked me for the honor of my visit—and in shaking hands with him for the last time before the great approaching conflict, I said— Not only the freedom of Chile depends on the next action but perhaps that of South America, and not only are the eyes of Buenos Ayres, Chile and Peru, turned towards you General, but those of the civilized world,— I said this not in a presuming way but with an honest and rather diffident solemnity—for I felt it— he did also—by the manner in which he listened, bowed and returned to his tent.—The next time I saw him he was sitting on the right hand of the Director in the palace after the victory of Maypu— I went at night to congratulate the Director on the event— He appeared tranquil and easy—dressed in a plain blue surtout and on my felicitating him particularly on the late occurrence—Modestly and smilingly replied "It is only the fortune of war"— I enclose you his proclamation on the defeat of Concha Rayada, I think it a fine instance of candor, not unlike Napoleon's acknowledgement of his disasters in the Russian campaign— I saw him at various other times as I have heretofore written to you—after his return across the Andes— I met him at the Director's, he appeared particularly pleased to see me—and as I knew he was affected with a hemorrhage from the lungs or stomach I was glad of his safe arrival—he replied, "Yes Sir, thanks to God"— His health I noticed always improved in the clear dry climate of Chile.—I attended the laying of the corner stone of a chapel or church on the plains of Maypu— It was done in great solemnity— Soldiers, cannon, musick, the Bishop and clergy, the Director and Genl. San Martin and almost all the inhabitants of the capital were at it— I got on

the ground when the Director and Genl. San Martin and officers were eating a kind of camp breakfast in a small building temporarily fitted up for the occasion, I shortly after went into it, and found all of them eating without plates, but holding perhaps a turkey's leg in one hand and a piece of bread in the other—they immediately invited me to partake with them, and San Martin walking up to me gave me a piece of his bread and turkey and I took a drink of Carlon wine with the Director out of a tumbler— It was quite in the soldier stile— They were dressed out honor [?] in all their medals and insignia—from what I have heretofore written, and this sketch I hope you will form some opinion of the Hero of the Andes— I think him the greatest man I have seen in South America—and had he have been born with us, wou'd have been a distinguished republican— I still think if he goes against Peru, he will emancipate it and be the Chief Magistrate of the great confederation.—Genl. Belgrano, is said to be the most disinterested and polished man in these countries—but from his operations in upper Peru, I shou'd not think him a very active military man— His brother the Canon told me the Genl. had translated Genl. Washington's farewell address and some other writings of his into Spanish— and had them always on his table— He is said to be a passionate admirer of our great founder— He travelled in Europe and was a kind of Minister in England— I enclosed you an original letter from his brother the Canon, Dominga—to him, given by him to me as an introduction, shou'd I have gone to Tucuman— I was much indebted to the politeness of this Divine— as also to the family of Balcaru, another of the most distinguished ones in these countries—

As to Genl. Carrera, I never saw him— I wrote you in my letter of the 4th July last that the Carrera party were the great North American patriot party— They were so—and if all the Buenos Ayrean troops shou'd be withdrawn from Chile and Genl. Carrera shou'd be able to get there, I have no doubt of his being at the head of affairs in a very short time— But I confess I am not an admirer of Genl. Carrera— Whenever a man seems to take party with, or by his conduct possibly aids the enemies of his own country, from any cause, I cease to respect and confide in him—when he found that Genl. San Martin by the battle of Chacabuco had liberated Chile and O'Higgins was at the head of the Government, as South America was still struggling for her liberty he shou'd have accepted some inferior office and endeavoured to render her all the service in his power— He does no such thing, but flies over to the Portuguese and wastes away his life in plottings and intrigues— I think this looks more like the foe than the friend of liberty— Even Genl. Moreau, I suspect wou'd have gone down to posterity, with a more interesting and consistent reputation had he have fallen by the side of Napoleon rather than under the auspices of the Emperor Alexander!— Of the execution of the two Carreras at Mendoza as also of

Manuel Rodrigues near Quillota I have never had an authentic account But unless San Martin and O'Higgins clear it up nothing can save their reputations from an indelible stain in the page of future history— I sincerely hope they may be able to do it— Of those two as they are dead I shall say nothing.—Artigas is another important character in this revolution— I have no personal acquaintance with him— But can form some opinion of his character from the thousands with whom I have talked concerning him— It is true they differ widely—some making him out the most uncouth, barbarous villain in the world, and others the best, most patriotic disinterested and engaging man of the age— I know one time of an American, an Englishman and a German going over to see him, and all three returned agreeing in the opinion that he was the most plain, honest man in his life and actions that they had ever seen— The truth is I suppose that he is neither so rude nor so good as his friends and foes represent him— Perhaps he is nearer like Tippo Saib or Tecumsee, than any other great chief we have any late accounts of— I think him not calculated to advance the great cause of South American emancipation and improvement, except at most in a secondary capacity— He has been at the head of a party, kept together by his Tartar like energy and consistant implacability— I think he has injured the cause of his country, when he might have been of great benefit to it— It is possible that he may coalese with the new Buenos Ayrian Administration but I can scarcely think he will be at the head of it— Perhaps it may be offered him— I doubt his acceptance— He is too fond of being the head of the Banda Oriental— He is growing in years—and I suspect he will be supplanted before long in his popularity by some young rising Chief— I heard something to this effect on my arrival here— I forget the name—

As to Artigas and the Carreras, I never had any thing to do with them against the existing authorities—and much to the well understanding of such being my character, I attribute the good treatment I received both here and in Chile from the time I landed to the present moment— For what party in power can respect and have confidence in a public foreign officer, who colleagues and plots with their opponents? It is not even looked for in the U. States— Much less here where parties are so violent—

Since the patriots have had possession of these countries, not only has there been a considerable influx of foreigners, who have improved the state of society, but education and even refinement have grown up with the new order of things— The influence of the Church has diminished and become more correct, even the celebrated Spanish amusement of Bull fighting, has been discountenanced by the Director and the Citizens in general and the expensive Rotunda which the Vice Kings built and appropriated to that purpose, since I was last here, I now see torn down and

converted into a Barracks for soldiers—to defend the country. Spacious hotels and houses of elegant recreation are establishing—all so contrary to Spanish manners— The English are taking the lead here—and yet it appears that they do not in any manner seekingly, identify themselves with the Government— I heard a person who did not like them say—that their policy was similar to that they practised in India, to set one Chief against another, exhaust the strength of the country by fomenting parties and divisions and draining the Country of all its plate and specie and inundating it with their manufactures— San Martin was certainly once their great favourite, it is probable that Artigas or Alvear is now— As for Carrera he having identified himself with the North Americans, I doubt if the English ever take him by the hand— They are not a popular nation in a foreign land, because they often rudely compliment every thing english at the expense of the country where they carry on their trade— The American is seldom so partial—and scarcely ever so unpolite— He is therefore more popular on that head, But John Bull being more in the habit of complimenting and counting rank and titles in his country, can please in that respect abroad—while Brother Jonathan is mainly stiff and even sometimes offensive in that particular— However I think the latter the better beloved— But as he is completely born down by the wealth and influence of the other in South America his might here I assure you is extremely delicate and precarious.— Their enemies too say, that the English seem to dislike every body who do not think them and their Government the best in the world and in Diplomatic matters seem to think whatever makes for the aggrandisement of the British nation or its great commercial interest, even morally justifiable—that all moral and national law and usage are to bend to their overwhelming systems of superiority in matters of Government and monopoly in trade— I am not their enemy—but suspect something of this is true, you know them well, and can form the best judgment— However nothing but some great political movement of our Government can give us importance in these countries— Quere if these people become free, will they not be our competitors? I have no doubt of it—where can there grow finer Tobacco & cottons than in Paraguay—wheat, flax and almost every thing in Chile—besides her exports of the precious metals to India—for take my word those mines of Gold and silver and copper &c. in Chile the richest in the world, will be worked to great advantage by foreign emigrants so soon as their independence is established— Then Tobo. Sugar, rice, &c. &c. from Peru— But I presume our Government are too exalted and liberal in their views to regard considerations of this kind, when the liberty and happiness of our South American Brothers are at stake!— Let them enter into the market—we can excel them or any other nation on earth, except the gigantic commercial abilities of England in either a fair or unfair competition— We have too much of the start of them to be much hurt for

centuries to come—and I think we shou'd derive great immediate benefit from their friendship and emancipation—

I suspect we have been of much greater service to the Patriots than they are aware of—that is our Cabinet have influenced the conduct of the European powers towards them—we may have had an influence in preventing their espousing the cause of Spain and caused them to be more polite and favourable towards these people— But if such has been the case, they give us no credit for it—they ascribe all to the credit of their foreign agents, to the goodness of their cause and the uninfluenced favourable opinion of those Powers— We they think ought to have done every thing and we have done nothing for them— They shou'd be set to rights on this subject, if we can do it— I cou'd not, for I know nothing, except from conjecture, about our European Diplomacy since I have been here.

While I think of it, I wou'd beg to say a word or two on the compensation to our Foreign officers— When persons call to see a representative of our Great Republic, as it is now universally esteemed and called, he expects to find him accommodated with that suitable ease and convenience becoming his station, and if he finds it otherwise he turns away dissatisfied if not with the representative himself, at least with his parsimonious Government and draws opinions prejudicial to its capacity, fame and character— The same ill opinion will not result from a foreigner in our own country, seeing a public officer sparingly compensated—for he looks around and nevertheless sees wealth and power and happiness at least in his other countrymen—and he may attribute the official economy, not to the meanness or poverty of the Government, but to its republican simplicity or the public spiritedness of the officer— He can't do so abroad, for he only looks at the Representative and draws from his character that of the American Government.—I have suffered in this respect myself, therefore I speak knowingly—but as I am now retiring from my station, I make this remark, simply for the benefit of others— If according to Scripture a labourer is worthy of his hire, I think it is equally sound scriptural deduction that the hire ought to be worthy of the labourer— I never saw an American in a foreign country who did not regret, from National pride, to see his public functionaries so illy paid— Had the objection come from the functionary alone I wou'd not have mentioned it— It is from the native.— I am afraid that this letter is very tedious— Yet I thought I cou'd not say less— I do not recollect any thing else at present worth detailing— It is true, that I cou'd go into long historical and geographical accounts of these countries, but I shall decline it because I think I was sent here to gather facts and circumstances and characters, which were fresh and interesting at this time—and cou'd only be known by persons on the spot— Those of history and geography I shou'd have to compile from the public libraries &c.— And if I may judge from the letter of the 12th March last,

of the Secretary of State to the Spanish Minister at Washington on the history and geography of Louisiana, He is much better able on these subjects of literary research to inform the nation, without ever moving from his office, than all the Commissioners and agents which have been sent to South America— I therefore look upon that kind of thing as a work of supererogation.—It is also I think impossible for a foreigner to be the best relater of the revolution, or history or geography of another Country. You must look to people who have grown up in the country for the best information—

And now Sir I close my reports on South American affairs— I may hereafter furnish the conclusion of my diary and some further miscellaneous remarks— With thanks to the President for the honor he conferred upon me in this mission, wherein I have always endeavoured to do my best, I now bid adieu here, for my native country, rendered a thousand times more dear to me, by knowing its superior worth, both comparatively and intrinsically—

With the most distinguished consideration [etc.].

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John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *December 12, 1819.*

SIR: In conformity with my note of the 25th. September forwarded by Mr Higginson of which I enclose a Triplicate, I returned to Sant Iago and after making the necessary preparations set out on my way hither. Difficulties that occurred on the Andes from the quantity of snow and afterwards on the Plains from other causes retarded me beyond the usual time consumed in the journey, so that I did not arrive until the 13th. Ulto.— On reaching the first settlement on this side of the mountains, I learned that the Monteneros had renewed hostilities and had possessed themselves of a Post near the High way in order to intercept all communiciation between the Capital and the Interior— This Intelligence determined me to address myself directly to their Chief for a safe conduct, before I entered within his Limits, and after travelling about 150. leagues within a short distance of Santa Fé, I despatched a Courier to the Governor of that Place, advising him of my arrival at Sancy, [?] with the intention of visiting Buenos Ayres, to which Place I was proceeding in compliance with the orders of the President— Every obstacle was accordingly removed and the necessary Passport enclosed in a letter of which I transmit

[1] MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

herewith a copy, as an interesting Document detailing with the feelings of a Patriot the principal grievance and Source of this contest—

It is difficult at this day to discover the motives that could have decided this Government to acquiesce in the nearer approach of a nation of all others the most hostile to the progress of Liberty, and by the Contiguity of its possessions the most interested in defeating every object of the Revolution— Many ascribe the Policy to impure motives on the part of the late Director and his associates; others who judge with less vigor and probably more justly, attribute it altogether to the influence of private enmities—

Whatever might have been the inducement, whether proceeding from Profligacy or whether arising from passion, the measure has proved abortive and the consequences so pernicious that a change must and I venture to predict will take place within some short Period— Among the causes immediately operating to hasten this event is one which I observed throughout my route hither, I allude to the discontent manifested by the delay of the national representation beyond the term contemplated by the Constitution— Every Town and every Village seemed inclined to resist this encroachment and in some, meetings have since been had, and notice given of a determination not to submit to a continuance of the present rule— I mention this circumstance particularly as indicating a sense of political Liberty and a fitness for self government, that was scarcely to have been anticipated, when we recur to the State of Thraldom from which they have so lately emerged—

The Character of this People although essentially the same with that on the other side is yet more developed and more exalted, they possess greater vigor of mind and all that Self Esteem which Liberty always engenders— They had prejudices to conquer, They had everything to learn— They have conquered those prejudices and they have learned much— It is indeed gratifying to view the ameliorating effects of the Revolution upon the manners and feelings of every class of Society, particularly upon the Clergy, who instead of cherishing Errors and relying upon Forms for the support of Religion, practically illustrate the principles inculcated by its Divine author, and exhibit examples of Liberality incompatible with a long dependence upon the See of Rome—

The Papers of Mr. Halsey I found deposited in the office of the Consulate, the Duties of which were on my arrival exercised by a Mr. Strong under the appointment of Mr. Worthington— The office with my approbation has since been transferred to Mr. I. C. Zimmerman a Citizen of the U. States distinguished by his attachment to our Institutions and every way qualified to the discharge of its Duties— He has received an exequatur as Vice Consul and can thus keep up all those relations necessary for the Interests of our Countrymen and for the protection of our Seamen— The Government having consented to recognize this authority with full Knowledge of the Source from whence it is derived, I thought it the most judicious course to adopt and

I shall hope if approved that the President may hereafter confirm this appointment— Without intending to impeach Mr. Strong I venture to say that a more indiscreet Selection could not have been made, he was at that moment agent for the Vessels built in New York, at variance with all or most of the members of the administration and subsequently Party to a transaction which has excited more Odium and more illwill, than would have been produced by the destruction of the same vessels in the Harbor of New York.

It appears that Ld Cochrane on his arrival at Callao made three Successive attacks upon the Fleet of his Enemy, without the success anticipated— He however met with no loss, or rather so inconsiderable was the loss, that it does not merit notice— The Spaniards had so moored and protected their ships with Iron Cables that it was impossible to cut them out, and his rockets for setting them on fire had no other effect than that of creating sufficient confusion to render the tremendous Batteries of the Castles of no avail— The official report has not reached us so as to permit me to offer other details, except that he remains in the Bay waiting the coming of the Ship of War and Frigates which I mentioned in one of my former letters to have been on their way thither— It is now also ascertained that they have a number of Troops on Board, a circumstance that must facilitate their Capture should they attempt to enter—

When I passed through Mendoza San Martin was prepared to pass the mountains with a Body of two thousand five hundred men that he had collected and disciplined for the expedition and was then only waiting for the melting of the Snow— He is still there, chagrined and disappointed beyond measure having received orders from this Government to advance and cooperate with the army of Belgrano against the Montonera. I am inclined to believe that the disaffection demonstrated by the People to this War, will lead to its early conclusion, but if not, I am persuaded he will never lend himself to the Policy now pursued and if persevered in that he will resign and enter the Service of Chile, under which Government the highest rank has already been conferred upon him—

The Nonsuch arrived some weeks since at Montevideo with duplicate of your note of the 3d. of May, the original of which I had the honor to acknowledge while in Valparaiso— I shall of course wait here such other instructions as you may please to forward and in the mean time will occupy myself in gathering such information as may be useful to my Country, and in striving to allay those unmerited jealousies, to which a succession of unfortunate Incidents has given rise—

William G. Miller at present of this Place sometime since made all his preparations for removing to Montevideo under a persuasion that he had been appointed Consul at that Place, his Friends at Philadelphia still assure him of the fact and not having received his Commission, he has requested me to suggest its Loss— In which case if such be still the pleasure of the President, he

would be particularly gratified by its renewal— My acquaintance with this Gentleman is limited, but he speaks the language with great ease and appears to me to be well qualified to discharge its Duties with honor to his Country—

Upon reading your report to Congress of January last,[1] which fell into my hands a few days Since or rather shortly after my arrival I felt extreme Surprise at the sentiment said to have been avowed by Pueyrredon on the subject of Spain in the course of his discussions with Mr Worthington— After a residence of a twelve month among those People or rather among those of the same Family I thought it was impossible I could thus have deceived myself as to the general Enmity towards the Parent State and I determined to take the earliest means of ascertaining the fact— It is alledged to be, as I supposed it was, altogether a mistake on the part of Mr. Worthington, most probably growing out of an imperfect knowledge of the Language— Understanding that the late Director denied the position unequivocally, it struck me as more decorous to obtain assurances of different feelings and of different Intentions, if such could be had from the highest authority, and I accordingly wrote a private note to the Secretary of State in that View— A copy of his answer, together with one of my note are enclosed for your inspection— I think he says enough to remove the impressions which had been formed on this information.

I have the honor [etc.].

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John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [2]

BUENOS AIRES, *February 14, 1820.*

SIR: Commodore Morris in compliance with the Instructions from your Department has furnished me for my guidance with a copy of those addressed to the late Capt. Perry— [3] These are so much in consonance with my feelings that I shall have a double pleasure in promoting the views of the President— It has been uniformly my Study to cherish an American feeling, and although circumstances may at times have thwarted the effect, yet I have always discovered a Sentiment towards the People of the U States upon which to operate.

The Commodore has witnessed an event that some future Historian of the Revolution may record with Pride— He has witnessed the dissolution of a Government, a total change of men and of measures without commotion, without Bloodshed and without Proscription Congress has surrendered its

[1] See above, pt. 1, doc. 73, under date January 28, 1819.
[2] MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.
[3] See above, pt. 1, doc. 79, Secretary of State to Secretary of Navy, May 20, 1819.

powers, the Director has resigned his Office and Bs. Ays. renouncing its Supremacy now approaches the other Provinces as one only of the great Confederacy—

In my two former of the 12th Decemb.[1] and of the 10th. of January I intimated to you my impressions of an approaching change, but the Moderation and determination with which it has been conducted I could not have believed— I forbear entering into the details as the Commodore in his report will necessarily embrace all such occurrences as may merit the notice of the Government—

A peace with the Montonera may be anticipated as an immediate result and I might add a declaration of hostilities against the Portuguese— This last step will be resisted at the Conference with all the influence of the mercantile part of the Capital; but I am inclined to believe without effect— Every mischief experienced here during the Control of Puerreydon has been engendered by the agents of the Court of Brazils and it really appears to me that War alone can heal the wounds they have caused— This proud Director has fled to that Power for an Asylum and thus augments the Suspicions which have latterly prevailed on the subject if his relations with Gen Le Cor— I have watched this man since my arrival and confess that I have not been able to trace one virtue to justify the confidence that has been reposed in him. All his measures have been in direct opposition to the best interests of his Country, destructive of its quiet, destructive of its prosperity and calculated only to retard the progress of the revolution—

San Martin will now be aided in his views and enabled to embark with the Force he at first contemplated: Whether he will receive the Intelligence in season to avail himself of the advantage of those Troops formed by him for the Invasion is however uncertain— It is said his preparations are in great forwardness but nothing specific has reached us on account of the Montonera, except that he passed the mountains at the date indicated in my last.

With every Sentiment [etc.].

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John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [2]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 9, 1820.*

SIR: The change that took place some weeks since, the details of which will have been communicated to you by Commodore Morris, was followed by a Peace with the Montonera upon terms of such perfect equality, that all was joy— Illuminations succeeded illuminations for nights in succession and the

[1] See above, pt. II, doc. 250. That of January 10 is not important to the present work.
[2] MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

event was hailed by most as the term of the Revolution— Indeed such it ought to have been, but a Tumult excited by a combination of causes which I am about in part to unfold has disturbed this happy result—

The Transition from the Sovereignty of many States to that of one, was necessarily to be attended with changes affecting a variety of interests, many abuses were to be corrected among which was to be anticipated a general retrenchment of a Host of Dependents civil and military growing out of a War of ten years duration— Under the impression of these feelings, before they had time to reflect, many were seduced by the intrigues of the disaffected of the former Administration, openly to reprobate the Treaty as disgraceful to Buenos Ayres this clamor continued to augment for some days when upon the delivery of a few hundred stand of arms to the agent of the Montonera in compliance with the third article, a ferment was excited which terminated in the choice of a military Chief, who was to restore to the Capital its lost Dignity by recommencing hostilities forthwith.

A measure so precipitate, so subversive of all order, so derogatory to good faith and so immediately affecting the Independence as well as the Interests of the City, has compleatly indisposed the Citizens towards the New Chief and his Followers— He may attempt something with the Troops, but as he will not be sustained by the Inhabitants, the struggle will not probably last beyond 48 hours.

Sarratea is a few leagues distant from the City where crowds are flocking to him with a determination to support his administration and to maintain the Peace— I still hope that before the vessel shall sail by which this goes, I may be enabled to announce the dissolution of this mischievous operation together with the return of order in the triumph of principle and of federalism. Sarratea had discovered some documents to which he intended to have given publicity and I know not from their tendency, whether this may not have operated powerfully with many of those who have distinguished themselves by their zeal on this occasion— It appears that the late Director Puerreydon in Conjunction with the Congress had secretely formed a Treaty with France for the reception of a branch of the Bourbon Family now in Italy and for the surrender of the Capital upon the arrival of the Prince— France was to advance 12 millions of livres and Portugal guarantees the stipulations in consideration of the cession of the oriental District— These are the principal Heads of this Instrument as communicated to me, of the existence of which I am not at liberty to doubt— The fact I hold directly from the Governor a Gentleman whose integrity has never been impeached, and he was good enough at the same time to promise me a copy for your inspection, but in this I am disappointed by his abrupt departure— I hope he still may retain the minutes of the Congress disclosing this disgraceful transaction, in which case I shall obtain it on his return and will forward it by the Amazon to sail in about three weeks from hence for New York.

It may be important to you to know the extent of this consideration, for although I understand that the arrangement is made upon the Basis of Independence, yet it is one to which the People are not Parties and one to which they will not assent. Whether it be a Ferdinand or a Charles is a matter of Indifference, they are to them alike objects of abhorrence, and will be so of resistance to the last extremity— A French Frigate left this about two months since on board of which it is said was a secret Agent with whom the final arrangements were concluded— However extravagant it may appear on the part of France in her distracted State, yet I am inclined to believe that the measure has been taken without the Knowledge of Great Britain, because in a late conversation with Mr. Sarratea he told me that Lord Castlereagh had advised this Government through its Agent resident there to adopt every mean possible to induce the U. States to a recognition, saying that it must proceed from them first—

I have just received letters from Chile of a late date by which I learn that the Troops San Martin left behind him at Mendoza as stated in my last had since crossed the Andes and were now in St Iago— The General is at length prepared for the Invasion so long threatened and will embark on the return of Ld Cochrane from Valdivia to which Place he had been sent by the Government of Chile— He takes with him a Body of six thousand men and will be supplied with provisions for four months by those furnishing the Transports—

By a vessel taken near Guayaquil it is ascertained (the expression in my letter is "Noticias Correctos") that Bolivar had taken Pasto in Popayan and was advancing towards Quito only Sixty leagues further South— Cuenza a beautiful district of country about the same distance South of the Province of Quito is affirmed to be in a State of general insurrection— Thus every thing seems to favor the expedition of San Martin and to promise his entire success.

Ld Cochrane during his last Cruise on the Coast of Peru sent into Valparaiso for condemnation two other of our vessels, the Pallas and the Canton, the former I believe from Providence, the latter from Boston— They have both however been liberated upon the representations of Mr. Hill and I take the greater pleasure in this act of the Government of Chile, because I know the Canton to have subjected herself to forfeiture during my stay in Lima— I am persuaded that Genl O. Higgins has even disapproved of the Capture of any vessel not laden with Arms and that Ld Cochrane by multiplying the subjects of forfeiture as to ours, has determined him to adopt a course which circumstances heretofore did not permit—

What has been the fate of the Macedonian I know not nor can I learn that any sentence has yet been pronounced. Mr. Hill has probably made his communications immediately to the Department in conformity with my instructions upon leaving St. Iago—

In one of my letters from the other side I used an expression as to Genl.

Artigas, which I find to be wholly incorrect, I was deceived in common with others who received their impressions from this Place— That he may have committed outrages I will believe, that he has his peculiarities I well know but he has been uniform in sustaining the Independence of his Country and has exhibited an adherence to principle under every species of privation, that will exalt him in the page of history— I enclose an extract from Mr. Horne of Montevideo by which it appears that he has suffered latterly a defeat— It is true, but the loss is greatly exaggerated— I attach to it little consequence as he will now be enabled to renew his supply of arms and ammunition from hence—

With every Sentiment [etc.].

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W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

BALTIMORE, *March 10, 1820.*

SIR: I am inclined to believe that my friends from Maryland, will at the present Session, make a strong Appeal to the friendship of the President to shew by his employing me at home or abroad, that my late mission to South America, eventuated rather in the continuance than the denial of the future confidence of the Government.

As I have never published a word either directly or indirectly on South American affairs, except the Summary of Politics on my arrival, which I sent to your office, I have never informed my out-door friends of the peculiar situation in which I stood on the termination of my Agency, looking on those things as confidential between me & the Administration—

In all my transactions both abroad & since my return, I know of nothing with which to accuse myself or to explain, further than I have already done in my official correspondence— It is true, I have often since thought, that in my last interview with you in August, when I looked upon my Agency as finally closed & viewed my own proceedings with an eye, perhaps, too partial, expecting unequivocal approbation, instead of a cold & even half accusing reception on my return, I was governed by irritated feelings, rather than cool reason in some remarks which I made on the day, but now too indistinctly recollected to be particularised.—

I must be permitted to request that you will judge of me then, with much liberality, on the score of a sensibility being wound up to the highest pitch— For neither while abroad nor since my return have I willingly and knowingly accused or embarassed either the Government of the United States or any

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, I.

one employed under it; but endeavoured to uphold them in all respects to the extent of my ability—

I know of no further explanation which I have to make to the Government; And I do this not from any interested motives, but from a conscientious duty, that I owe it, of my own mere motion, to the President & yourself, & to certain of my friends— Yet, your better judgment, most likely, long since considered the whole of it, in the proper light—

I therefore now conceive myself acquitted in all respects, as far as it has come to my Knowledge of any explanation due from me as lately an officer of the Government— However holding it truly magnanimous in every one, at all times to correct mistakes—

I therefore hope the proceedings of my friends, may be viewed through a medium, cleared from any personal prejudice of mine—

I pray your pardon this occupation of your time—

With distinguish [*sic*] consideration [etc.].

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John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

March 20, 1820.

I have succeeded in obtaining a copy of the document in season for this conveyance and now enclose it for the consideration of the President—

[1] MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost. This is a postscript of this date to a letter of five days earlier, which reported matters of minor importance and added the statement that he would endeavor to obtain for the Department a copy of the important document mentioned in his letter of March 9, which see above, doc. 252. The enclosed document follows:

[TRANSLATION]

Memorandum of Baron de Renneval, Minister of Foreign Relations of France, to Doctor Don Valentine Gomez, Agent Accredited to the said Court by the Government of Buenos Aires

SIR: The French Government is taking the most lively interest in the situation in which the government of Buenos Aires finds itself, and is ready to do everything possible to promote its measures for constituting itself into a constitutional monarchy; that being the only form of government that may suit their reciprocal interests and insure for the future all the necessary guarantees towards the powers of Europe and towards those that are near to the Rio de la Plata. The French Government being forced by political circumstances to act with the greatest circumspection so as to avoid the obstacles that might arise mainly from England in the conduct of so important a negotiation, will not manifest for the present in an noticeable manner its desire to enter into relations with the Government of Buenos Aires, but it will not allow any proposition likely to promote its desire to afford convincing evidence of the interest with which it considers it to go by. Therefore, in order to reach the goal so much desired by the Americans of the South, which is independence from the Crown of Spain, and sow the foundation of their constitution on a substantial and unconquerable basis, which would put them in position to deal with all the Powers, the French Government proposes to take the necessary steps to secure from

This explains the proscription of a Host of Patriots together with the persecutions of the Past— This develops the motives of the War with the

all the crowns their consent to placing on the Throne of South America the Prince of Luca and Etruria, to whom they will extend the necessary assistance both in sea and land forces, so that he could not only force respect, but also maintain himself if need be against any power that might be adverse to his elevation. The Prince is eighteen years of age, belongs to the Bourbon family, and although related with that of Spain there is no fear that his principles are in any way antagonistic to the interests of the Americans whose cause he will no doubt enthusiastically endorse. He is gifted with qualities that are as commendable as may be desired either from a moral standpoint or from that of his military education, which has been one that has been given very great attention and he can offer in every respect the most promising prospects. In order to establish and secure his dynasty, it is proposed in case the Prince is acceptable to the United Provinces to seek a marriage with a Brazilian Princess, in which both governments would find incalculable advantages being united by ties of blood would be interested in drawing them closer and closer. Another advantage and one which is not the least to be considered is that the principal condition for the alliance would be to compel Brazil to forego possession of the Banda Oriental without compensation, and to enter upon a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. As regards the United States, since they have none to fear more than England, and as it is to their interest to live on good terms with South America, it is clear that it would not be difficult to overcome the obstacles that might be aroused by them to the establishment of a monarchial government. Furthermore, the French Government will take charge of the diplomatic negotiations in that respect and undertakes to grant to Prince de Luca all the support, assistance and protection it would grant to a French Prince. I beg you, Sir, to make these propositions known to your government as I believe them to be advantageous and think that there is no other form that would be more suitable. It is asserted that a powerful party wants the United Provinces to institute a republic. I beg you to allow me to offer a remark on this point, which I believe will not be out of place under the circumstances. I shall not go into particulars as to the difference in every respect between the United States and South America. You are well aware of them and there is, therefore, no necessity for me resorting to logics in order to convince you. You know very well that a State may not organize into a republic except when its area is very limited, its manners have been refined and when civilization has been general. What constitutes the strength of a republic and may secure its duration is harmony that must prevail among all classes, and the sincere wish of every individual to contribute to the general good, in one word, it is necessary to have virtues that are very rare in your section. And so South America, that is to say Buenos Aires and Chile lack the greater part of the elements needed for that purpose. The area of the Provinces is very great; civilization is in its infancy; and far from having reached the desired goal, passions and partisan forces are in constant struggle, in one word anarchy has reached its apex in many points which ought to be possessions of the Government of Buenos Aires, witness the Banda Oriental of Rio de le Plata, which on account of its position could not be separated without giving rise to endless wars. In this condition of affairs, I do not see—in order to [establish] the happiness of the country, to bring to an end this conflict of powers which paralyzes largely the means of the Government and to bring and join together all the parties in the same cause which for nine years has already cost so many sacrifices:—I do not see, I say, any other means except a constitutional and liberal monarchy, which, while guaranteeing the happiness and rights of the people in general, would bring it into friendly relations with all the nations of Europe; a matter which could not be ignored in connection with commerce. Things being so the country would have a well constituted government recognized by the other governments. Agriculture which is now lacking would become one of the sources of wealth and abundance; arts and science would flourish; the surplus of European population would come there to increase that which is now inadequate for these immense countries which are deserts, which to the eye of the observer and traveller offer nothing but sterility and which would be turned into the most fertile land. It would also be possible to turn to great advantage the treasures contained in their subsoil, so many mines of all kinds, which may be relied upon some day not only to supply revenues beyond calculation, but also to contribute to the happiness of many other peoples. I believe that all these considerations are more than sufficient to induce your Government to adopt the proposed plan, because they would prepare for your country a happy fate, that is, rights to recognition and immortality, the most glorious and only titles which the ambition of virtuous men may claim. I also know that there is in the

Montonera and unfolds a mystery heretofore inexplicable in the manner of conducting that War— This discloses the Inducements to the admission of the Portuguese— This accounts for the Impediments to San Martin at different times when prepared to invade Lima— This unravels the web that has enveloped the treacherous campaign in Upper Peru— This detects the object of the late Congress in prolonging the exercise of powers which had constitutionally become extinct—

The whole administration of Puerreydon has been a series of deception practiced upon a brave and confiding People— The pride of Supremacy, heretofore the folly of the Capital, was fostered as the mean of seducing its Judgment in support of measures in which he had ulterior and sinister views—

All is now changed, the determination of the whole of the Interior to resist the war with the Montonera as well as the authority from whom it emanated produced the revolution referred to in mine of the 14 of feby. last and saved

United Provinces a considerable pro-English party, and I beg you to allow me to offer some remarks and reflections on the subject. Suppose that England places a Prince of her house on the Throne of South America, and that, through ascendancy gained among the Courts of Europe by the long wars, which have always been so costly and in her interests in order that she might not herself fall under the blows that threatened her, she can for sometime save the country from fresh wars and, united with her own physical forces, cement its power. Is it believed that in this way the people would be made happier? What is it that makes people happy? And especially a people like that of the United Provinces who have worked so long to obtain that state of independence which is to make them glorious and sure of their happiness, that happiness which they have a right to yearn for, so many sacrifices. First, in the establishment of the rights which Nature demands and does not condemn; Second, in the free exercise of the religion they practice and the truths of which they know and appreciate; Third, in the national character which constitutes the good social spirit that already distinguishes the inhabitants of South America from many other nations which have not yet reached the stage of civilization in which the general happiness of peoples consist. Well then what in all these respects might be expected to come from England or from a Prince imbued to the point of fanaticism with the principles of his nation? There would be occasion to fear if not the overthrow of the Catholic religion which dominates in the country, at least its belittlement or perhaps internecine wars of religion which would bring misfortune on the people. Furthermore, the national character of the civilized Americans would lead to acts inconsistent with social happiness and by making themselves hateful to the sons of the country they would injure the latter's self respect, driving them in a spirit of revenge if not to destroy the nation which aroused them, at least to weaken it so that they could handle the reins without interference. Through this description which unfortunately is not overdrawn, you may see that far from having set up the solid foundations of edifices which have been so well started this nation would be destroyed and a people who without doubt are worthy of a better fate would relapse into slavery. To sum up I believe that if the happiness of those countries is kept in mind they must not be surrendered to those who could do no more than enslave them and destroy an incipient happiness bought at the price of so many sacrifices.

On the contrary by accepting for a sovereign the Prince proposed by France there is no fear of an overthrow of the religion: rather one may be sure that he would prove a strong support and at the same time would be exempt from the fantacisim that is so harmful to all religions. His liberal mind would condemn licentiousness, which is so contrary to any civilized state and all the qualities that may insure South America perfect happiness; in one word, a Prince who turned American will and can have no other object than to promote agriculture, arts, science and trade, and win thereby the love of his subjects.

I believe that under the circumstances it will be necessary for your Government to reach an early decision unless they wish to allow a most favorable opportunity, which may never again occur, for their happiness and the promotion of their commerce, to pass by.

the Capital from the dangers with which it was threatened by the Intrigues of the Courts of Versailles and of that of the Brazils—

I know not what impressions the perusal of this Instrument may create, but if deemed sufficient to permit a separate recognition on the part of the U States, I venture to say that it would give a character to the Politics of all South America directly in opposition to those contemplated by this Treaty— The tendency towards our Country and its institutions is perfectly understood by the Powers of Europe and every Species of Intrigue is kept on foot to suppress a feeling which if developed in its movement would necessarily destroy all political dependence and confine their relations to those of Commerce merely—

Tribunals have been established for the Trial of those engaged in this transaction but the greater part and those of consequence have fled upon its disclosure— It will however serve to indicate to the world the public feeling on a question so vitally important—

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W. G. D. Worthington, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

WASHINGTON, *April 8, 1820.*

SIR: Previously to my leaving Baltimore on the 6th Inst. it was intimated to me, by a friend, that he thought it probable, some suggestions had been made to the Department of State, respecting my being interested in a pecuniary point of view in some of the public or private armed vessels of the South American Patriots—

Except in the *peculiar* instance, of which I frankly informed you, before I left Buenos Ayres, I, on honor, pronounce any insinuation of this Kind utterly groundless:—And beg leave to submit to your perusal the enclosed affidavit & Certificate, which, I think, must be considered as conclusive on the subject— The parts of the Affidavit not relating to this point appear to be surplusage; And if I have been totally misinformed, I pray your pardon this intrusion—

With distinguished consideration [etc.].

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, I.

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John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *April 30, 1820.*

SIR: I had the honor to transmit to the Department by the Heisilia an American Brig. the copy of a secret Treaty made by the late Congress with France for the reception of Prince of the Bourbon Family and I now enclose another copy of that Instrument together with a Duplicate of my several letters accompanying it, in order to supply any loss to which the casualties of the Sea may have subjected that Conveyance— Perhaps I ought to apologize for the haste which the last of these exhibits, the fact is that the one of the 15th. was despached in expectation of the immediate departure of the vessel and remained in the hands of the Master until the morning of the 20th. when it was withdrawn at the moment of weighing the Anchor for the purpose of covering the Document to which it referred and I could not resist the few desultory observations that were added as a Postscript [2].

Upon adverting to those remarks I cannot discover a single one to retrench; on the contrary I am persuaded that they may all be sustained by a retrospect simply to measures without reference to the late disclosures.— It was my intention to have enlarged upon this subject and to have submitted the facts corroborative of this view, but I am relieved from this Task by the publication of the Secret Minutes of Congress— These afford matter enough to account for all the obstructions to the views of San Martin and Belgrano, and will suffice to convince you that Puerreydon and his associates were ever swayed by other motives than those of Country.—I have seen the volume containing the originals and can vouch for the correctness of the Treaty with France as well as that with Brazil . . . to both of which I paid particular attention— You need not however entertain a doubt as to the authenticity of the extracts throughout, there is no motive for addition, the whole is without Parallel, even Machiavel would have blushed to record such a series of Treachery of Intrigue and of dissimulation—

Sir Thomas Hardy upon learning the Treaty with France immediately despatched the Blossom to England with a copy— I thought it might offer a propitious moment to press the views of the President upon that Cabinet and accordingly transmitted to Mr. Rush by the same vessel the documents to use for that purpose at his discretion—

So much lenity was indulged towards those of the late conspirators who remained behind after the flight of their Chief, that a similar effort was made on the 26th. Ultimo under Alvear formerly a Director but since and still a Proscript— It assumed an aspect equally alarming because of the defection of the Troops, but fortunately was not of any duration— They were awed

[1] MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost. [2] See above, pt. II, doc. 254.

by the una[ni]mity of the Citizens and dispersed on the second day when Alvear retired to the Province of Santa Fé with a few Followers.

Notwithstanding the variety of materials for Sedition, tranquility and order have since prevailed, and that, amidst the system of reform pursued with an Energy that does honor to the present Chief magistrate I have every hope that his patriotic efforts may dissipate the cloud that has been so long hovering over Bs. Ayres— All his views are directed to the restoration of the Civil Power. He has dismissed the crowd of Soldiers that surrounded the avenues of the public offices, He appears in the Simple dress of a Citizen, claims no distinction, is at all times accessible and prompt in the despach of business, submits his measures to the Public through the medium of the Press and invites discussion on every occasion— With all this in performing the Task of Hercules he has not acquired popularity his labors have thrown upon Society so many discontented Dependents that I doubt whether he would be reelected if inclined to Serve— He has intimated a determination to retire as soon as a Successor can be legally named by those chosen at a late election for that purpose.

The meeting of the Deputies from the several Provinces is proposed at a short day hence at a Place in the Interior about 70 leagues distant— I understand they have it in view to adopt some system analogous to that of the U States, each Province to retain its Separate government subject to the control of a general Congress in those branches connected with foreign relations—

It is my intention to repair thither and to remain as long as may be necessary to enable me to give you the most correct information on points so materially involving the Destinies of this Country. Happily the dependence of one Province upon the other is such by their Locality, that there can arise no collisions from distinct Interests the only subject upon which a difference of opinion may arise is the course to be adopted in relation to the Portuguese —Artigas has avowed his intention to form one of the confederation as soon as they shall determine upon a war with that Power, what may be the effect of this I know not, but I am inclined to believe his views will obtain— It is evidently the policy of the Provinces to root out from the Capital this corroding influence—

On the other Side of the Andes the Scene is different, exempt from foreign Intrigues, all is success— Ld Cochrane has taken Valdivia a place esteemed by the Spaniards the Key of the Pacific and fortified by them at an immense expence— The official report accompanies this, together with the proclamation of San Martin announcing his expedition— Bolivar continues to advance Southerly and although from the nature of the Country he cannot approach so as to be of immediate Service yet his contiguity and Success must Serve to distract the Councils of Lima and to destroy confidence—

With every Sentiment of respect [etc.].

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John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *May 24, 1820.*

SIR: The selection of those constituting the Electoral Body although taken from among the most respectable Inhabitants, has proved unfortunate— They are generally of the Class infected with the former spirit of Dominion and appear little disposed to meet the Provinces upon that footing of equality imposed upon them by the late Charge [?]. They have filled the several offices of State with those of like impressions and all their measures yielding to this Infatuation present an aspect wholly unfriendly to the Union, although uniformly accompanied with professions of adherence to the confederacy— These Incongruities in the present State of distrust, have excited jealousies among the People and I think will lead to another visit from the Montonera within some short term— Should such be the case I shall be deceived if all the exertions of those in Power can effect a resistance.—It is rumored that the Followers of Puerreydon in conjunction with their Chief have solicited Troops from the Portuguese in aid of the idle pretensions of the Capital: That such an application has been made to Gen[l] Le Cor and by him referred to the King his master, I really believe, but I venture to predict that it will be without effect, however much a renewal of the civil war might promote the mischievous polities of that Cabinet— The fact upon which I found my prediction, has probably reached you through another Channel, it was communicated to me in confidence and may be relied upon, I allude to the interference of Great Britain for the purpose of inducing the Portuguese to withdraw their Troops altogether from the other side— Several conferences had taken place there about the time of the late disclosures in which this measure was pressed by M[r] Thornton— It may therefore fairly be presumed that the information since obtained of a secret Treaty disclosing views at variance with their professions on the subject of this possession, together with a knowledge of the french Intrigues favored by that power, will give to the Representations of this Minister a character so positive, as at least to deter it from granting the aid contemplated by the disaffected to the Liberties of their Country—

Among the characters exhibiting on this Theatre J. M. Carrera may be considered as prominent— He joined the Montonera about two years since, residing at or near Santa Fe where he was principally employed in conducting the public Correspondence and in digesting matter for the Press— At the Conclusion of the Treaty of peace and of Union in February last he obtained great credit for the liberality which he was supposed to have infused into the Leaders of those People— He accompanied them to this City and availing

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

himself of the Influence thus acquired, obtained leave to form a Corps of Chilenos of whom it appears there were some hundreds in this Service— It was a matter of surprize and excitement at the time, so much so as to become a subject of news paper discussion but no explanation of the motive was given by the Government. My impression then was and still is, that Sarratea had in view a Force for sustaining the Union to be placed at the disposal of the Convention at its first meeting and for that purpose solely and with that understanding assented to the measures— There is no doubt but that this Corps composed of about 500 men under the command of Carrera, has since been sustained by the Governments of Santa Fe and Entre Rios, and that they are acting in perfect concert— The effect however has not been happy as it respects the relations between this Government and that of Chile, as the latter has suspended all intercourse by mail until proper explanations can be had— A measure growing out of the Indiscretion of Gen[l] Carrera who in order to revive an influence he once possessed, had caused proclamations to be distributed in Chile announcing an intention to return forthwith at the head of a regular Army—

A Deputy had arrived in S[t]. Iago from New Granada for the purpose of establishing permanent relations between the two Governments and of making arrangements for a Cooperation in the liberation of the whole Coast— The enclosed paper gives such details as have reached us from Chile in print, all of which are confirmed by private letters—

As B[s]. A[s]. has delayed sending a Deputy to meet those of the other Provinces I shall remain here until that event can be brought about— It cannot long be retarded, when I shall hope to present you a correct view of the Polities of the different Provinces together with a sketch of those who are now distinguished among them—

With every sentiment of Consideration [etc.].

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John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *June 8, 1820.*

SIR: The Intercourse with Chile is again revived and by the Mail of Yesterday I received among others a letter from Genl O. Higgins[2] of which I have

[1] MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

[2] For the letter from O'Higgins, see below, pt. v, doc. 474, under date April 21, 1820. Bound in the volume of Prevost's letters immediately following this of June 8, 1820, is also the following translation of a remarkable letter dated at Santiago, September 30, 1819, from Thomas

now the honor to transmit a copy for your perusal— It is in answer to one addressed to him by me covering the communications of Rondeau and Gomez

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Guido to the Supreme Director of the United Provinces regarding the mission of Prevost. How it came into the possession of the Department is not indicated. It bears the penciled direction "To be filed with Mr. Prevost's correspondence:

[TRANSLATION]

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: On the 25th. of January 1818. Mr. John Prevost, a citizen of the United States, arrived at Valparaiso, in the American Sloop of War, the Ontario; on his way to the North-West Coast, with a commission and instructions from his Government, to take possession of the English Settlement on the Columbia River, in conformity with the Treaty of Ghent. Notwithstanding his studied reserve, the real object of his mission Soon transpired and it was intimated to me that this person had been empowered by the President Monroe, as a private Agent, for the purpose, not only of observing the political and military State of Affairs in Chili, the extent of the plans formed there, the means of their execution and the force and power opposed to them; but of investigating the proceedings of the Commission composed of Graham, Rodney and Bland in Relation to Chili, and of acquiring, by a comparative view of the information transmitted by him, correct ideas of the objects contemplated.

I at once saw the propriety of cultivating an intimacy with Prevost, as by giving me a close observation of his movements, it might produce such an effect upon the objects he had in view, as would be Serviceable to our cause. His agreeable manners and the circle in which I was introduced to him, facilitated my approach; and after a short intercourse, I discovered him to be a person of strong democratic principles, a warm friend of our Independence and well disposed to prepare the American Government to Adopt a course favourable to the happy conclusion of our Revolution.

The outfit of the Lautaro frigate, which, at the particular request of the Government and of H. E. Don José de San Martin, I had undertaken a short time previous to the battle of Maypu, afforded me a new proof of the Sentiments of Prevost. Being at Valparaiso, when I was preparing to execute the business I had engaged in, amidst a total privation of every requisite assistance, he not only furnished me with all that could possibly be Spared from the Ontario Sloop, but he afforded me his personal aid and by his active exertions among the foreigners then in the port greatly promoted the object alluded to; discovering throughout the whole as lively an interest as could be felt by the most decided friends of the Country.

In the month of March of the Same year, he proceeded to Lima; and after engaging the Viceroy of Peru to agree to the proposal of General Dn José San Martín for an exchange of prisoners, he accompanied the Commissaries Pezuela Olhaverriague and Blanco, and returned to this Capital with much information on a variety of topics highly interesting to us, and with letters from Several respectable patriots, the contents of which Your Excellency was made acquainted with at an early period.

The incorrect conduct of Captain Biddle, the Commander of the Ontario, having determined Mr. Prevost to leave that vessel, he embarked at Valparaiso on the 13th of July on board H. B. Majesty's Sloop of War, Blossom, to proceed to the Columbia, first touching at Callao—. Being informed, on his arrival at Lima, that the Viceroy was negociating the purchase of the Ship Cumberland (now the General San Martin) with Captain Shirreff of the British Frigate Andromache, for which this Government had been treating without having come to an agreement, Mr. Prevost facilitated the movement of Mr. Cleveland, an American Citizen; and in addition, charged him with information on that as on other important points, which proved extremely useful.

After accomplishing the object of his mission to the River Columbia, he returned to Valparaiso in March last, when I cultivated a Still closer intimacy with him: this, Some time after, led to his communications to me the President's instructions to him, his Credentials and the personal instructions of Mr. Adams, the Secretary of State. In the first of these documents I perceived a decided interest manifested by the President Monroe in the fate of Chili and our cause in general: the letters written by Prevost had given favourable impressions of events here, and had opened a field for the Cultivation of those amicable relations which the President Monroe Seems desirous to recommend and maintain, and also, for the recognition of the Independence of the United Provinces and of Chili, a measure which Prevost has uniformly advocated.

Another incidental circumstance tended still further to add to the impression in favour of Prevost; this was the difference observed in the opinions entertained by him and

as taken from the Secret Minutes of the late Congress— By referring to these in the Collection forwarded to the Department, you will perceive that the Agent of Chile is there stated to have assented to the propositions of France and it was from a conviction of the Integrity of views of the Director that I sent them for his disavowal—

Bolivar is Stated to be in Sight of Quito and little doubt is entertained of the Surrender of that Capital— What course he may afterwards take is not known, that is, whether he will advance Southerly to Cuzco by the great Road of the Incas, or proceed to Guayaquil on the Pacific— To the latter I am inclined, because the first will subject him to great privations and to difficulties almost insuperable— It is true that he is not to be judged by common rules and may attempt it at whatever risque should San Martin have Solicited or advised his approach in that direction. . . .

Nothing has occurred since my last, no Deputy has yet been sent from hence and the result must be another visit from the Montonera— It is lamentable to witness the perversity of these rulers and the mischiefs they are engendering, all of which must recoil upon Bs. Ayres.

With every Sentiment of Consideration [etc.].

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by Judge Bland during his visit to Chili; the former drawing his conclusions from Solid data and sound arguments; while the latter relied upon a mass of incidents loosely brought together and most frequently collected from doubtful Sources. This discrepance of Sentiment produced some difference between those Gentlemen; which had, indirectly, a good effect, as it put Prevost, in his communications to his Government; upon correcting the information given by Bland, by pointing out its numerous errors and redundancies and by setting objects in a light advantageous to our future plans and prospects.

In the course of the last month Mr. Prevost received the President's directions, through the Secretary of State, to repair hither, where he would receive further instructions from Mr. Graham, the New Envoy of the United States to the Court of Brazil; and in the mean time to take into his possession the official papers of Mr. Consul Halsey; he was also informed that the conduct of Mr. Worthington had been disapproved, from his having exceeded his instructions. Mr. Secretary Adams requests of him the earliest possible information on the State of Affairs here; with a view, as is presumeable, to throw the necessary light upon that Subject, during the ensuing Session of Congress.

I have thought it would be proper to give Your Excellency this Sketch of the character and individual Sentiments of Mr. Prevost, as well by reason of the esteem to which they justly entitle him, as in consideration of the effect they may have on our future relations with the Government of the United States of America, an object he is anxious to promote and which we may hope he will be instrumental in furthering.

May God long preserve Your Excellency! Santiago de Chili 30. September 1819.

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John B. Prevost, Special Agent of the United States to Buenos Aires, Chile and Peru, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 28, 1820.*

SIR: A severe gale of wind some time past caused such destruction among the Shipping lying in the Roads that I have not been enabled to procure any conveyance by which to forward a line to the U. States. Even now I hazard this by the way of Martinique that my silence may not subject me to censure— The Capital still adhering to their perverse system the Montonera aided by Alvear and the Division of Chilenos under Carrera entered this Province towards the latter end of June— The event had been anticipated as it appeared by the preparations for resistance which had been secretly made, and some address was discovered in the Selection of an officer of favor throughout the Province; notwithstanding which as soon as the respective Forces came in Sight of each other, the greater part of those of Buenos Ayres joined the invading Powers and thus enabled them to advance without opposition within a few leagues of the City— The dismay and excitement produced by their near approach induced the Cabildo to send out a Deputation authorized to accede to any terms that Lopez might impose— The Citizens composing this Delegation were mostly hostile to the Union, individually friendly to Alvear and all averse to the prosecution of those whose Infamy had been detected and disclosed by Sarratea— You may, Sir, easily believe that with such men, there were sufficient motives for defeating the reelection of a Patriot, but you may be surprized when you learn that Carrera was the Instrument through whom they effected their object— The choice of Alvear was suggested by the Deputation from a belief that there was some understanding between him and Carrera that he should favor the Invasion of Chile, the proposal was too gratifying to his views to be resisted, and principles were abandoned and the Confidence of Lopez betrayed and deceived in order to give it effects although perfectly aware of the Enmity of the People to this Proscript— An arrangement was accordingly made for placing Alvear at the head of the Government together with some other stipulations which have never been divulged [nearly half of a line destroyed in binding]. whispered, the Indignation of the lower Orders could not be suppressed, they took up arms and continued on Duty for several weeks during the most inclement Season with a firmness not to be overcome— The fervor gradually communicated itself to those without and the federal Standard then so lately the rallying point, was wholly abandoned and Lopez compelled to retire with loss of reputation.

During the convulsion, the Cabildo alarmed for its safety made every

[1] MS. Letters, J. B. Prevost.

effort to regain the popular favors, disavowed the act and appointed Governor ad Int. one of those who had been peculiarly an object of persecution under the reign of Puerreydon, a young officer by the name of Dorrego waiting gallantly with enterprize— He immediately availed himself of the ardor of this undisciplined mob, induced them to follow the retreating army and by a forced March overtook surprized and destroyed the greater part of Carrera's Division Killing one hundred and taking nearly four hundred Prisoners among whom were Sixty officers who had joined the Fortunes of Alvear and Carrera.

I feel myself at a loss to form anticipations from a result which although it has been productive of good, yet must produce much Evil— On the one hand, the determination of the People to resist any dominion to which they are not a Party, coupled with the destruction of a Force destined by its late leader for mischievous purposes, are positive benefits. On the other hand are Evils, but I think not of duration, the continuance of the State of disunion together with a probability that the Partizans of Puerreydon may obtain Power; They have so long practised the arts of delusion, that they have rather gained an ascendancy even while they were furnishing Alvear with the means of destruction, and that, by affecting to be zealous in the cause of the People— It is only here that such scenes are witnessed and the People must remain victims, while their credulity leads them to confide in Papers edited under the auspices of Such Rulers— The succors furnished to Alvear and Carrera are said to have come from Montevideo and I have reason to believe such to be the fact, and hence conclude that they are equally with Puerreydon Instruments of this disorganizing policy of the Portuguese— They have no doubt distinct views, but all are alike in Selfishness and in a total disregard to the happiness of their Country—

Privateering under any circumstances is an odious warfare, but when indulged by a neutral under a foreign Flag for the mere purposes of Plunder it becomes a Crime of magnitude— In Baltimore I am sorry to say there are many who forget the National character by employing their Capital in this unworthy mode of acquiring gain— The Confederation manned and officered by American Citizens was equipped in this Port and sailed sometime in the beginning of the last month under the command of one Captn. Levely, and it is said but I hope without foundation, that he has committed some depredations upon the Portuguese off the Harbor of Rio— A Mr. Armstrong of respectable connexions in Baltimore went as a Passenger and is supposed to be the agent of the Concerned— It is in vain, Sir, that laws are made and penalties attached to their infringement while the exercise of the right of disfranchisement is unaccompanied with some previous form, or measures adopted through the agents abroad for detecting those who engage under a Foreign Flag without a change of allegiance— It appears to me that this might be effected either by some previous step at

Home or by making a Consular certificate abroad indicating the change of Citizenship, necessary, to protect them from arrest and imprisonment by our ships of War—

The Expedition for the liberation of Peru has at length sailed under the auspices of San Martin, the exact place of debarkation is not known nor do I venture to give an opinion on this Point— I however do not hesitate to offer my conviction that unless a material change has taken place at Lima during my absence, it will succeed— The paper containing this intelligence together with the Force employed is enclosed for your perusal—

Sir Thomas Hardy has been good enough to shew me some sketches and surveys of the lately discovered Continent, made by the officer sent out sometime since for that purpose by Capt. Shirreff of the Andromache, The Vessel was not equipped to justify its remaining out long, his principal object having been to ascertain the fact— I think they coasted it nearly Six hundred Miles.

With every Sentiment of Respect [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *December 4, 1820.*

Friday 27th October. Agreably to appointment I went at 12 oClock, accompanied by Mr Zimmerman, to a private audience of the Governor. I found Mr Yrigoyen with His Excellency and the Conversation was partly in French and partly in English, interpreted as before. I stated to the Governor my sincere regret that any misconception of the extent of my powers or the objects of my mission should have taken place previous to my arrival; that my Agency had merely for its object to repeat assurances of the good disposition and wishes of the Government and people of the United States towards those of this Country and to put myself in communication with the existing authorities on certain points interesting to both Countries.

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I. He had reached Buenos Aires on October 24. In the introductory paragraph of this dispatch the statement is made that Prevost had been summarily ordered by the Buenos Airean authorities to leave within four days, the last of which was October 25, the day following the arrival of Forbes. This decided the question, left open in their instructions, whether Forbes or Prevost should remain at Buenos Aires. See above, pt. 1, docs. 88 and 90, Secretary of State to Forbes, July 5, and to Prevost July 10, 1820. The authorities had taken offense at statements made by him in his dispatches to the Department of State which had been published in the United States. During the following five days Prevost remained on board a United States ship in the harbor and on October 30 sailed for Chili on a British vessel.

that I was in no wise authorized to treat of the recognition of the Government, as had been stated in the papers published here, that the question had in truth been agitated in Congress but for many reasons had been postponed, that it was always liable to be brought forward again, in which case, the state of this Country and the greater or less stability and permanency of the Government would very materially operate on public opinion in the United States. I thought this hint might be justified by all the circumstances of the case. In reply, the Governor said he should always be happy to receive and attend to any Communications I might think proper to make. He expressed a wish to know the nature of any document of which I might be the bearer, that he hoped that, in a very short time, their dissentions would terminate in a peace with the other provinces and that my arrival had already stimulated the desire felt on both sides to come to an amicable adjustment of all existing differences. Finding that nothing short of the exhibition of the document,[1] with which you were pleased to furnish me, would satisfy them, I first explained to them, that the Government of the U. S., informed of the political dissentions which existed here, could not address the document in question to any man or set of men and of course that it was addressed "to all whom it might concern". I then presented it. Mr Yrigoyen read it in Spanish to the Governor, who requested that I would furnish a translation of it in that language, this I promised to do. I then took occasion to make a profession of my fixed determination not to meddle or partake in any party opinions or measures in this Country; which course, I assured the Governor, was not only enjoined on me by my instructions, but also in perfect accordance with my personal feelings. To this the Governor replied that, during their whole revolution they had never sought to enlist foreigners residing here in any of their controversies. . . .

Sunday 29th October. Among the visits I had received was that of Doctor Castro, a Doctor of Laws, President of the Highest Tribunal and Editor of the Official Gazette. I this day returned this Gentleman's visit and was accompanied by Mr Lynch, a popular young man, of very extensive family connections, speaking fluently English & Spanish. As Doctor Castro is a man of talents and of much influence with the present Government, I took occasion to talk freely with him of the exaggerated expectations which had been entertained by the people of this Country in relation to the political course which in their view the United States ought to have taken and explained to him some of those arguments which satisfied us and ought to satisfy them that the strict neutrality observed by the United States had been much more beneficial to the Republics of South America than could have been a direct participation in their struggle which must necessarily have excited the most gigantic coalition against them. The learned Doctor declared his entire assent to my position and said that, although he had once distrusted the friend-

[1] See above, pt. 1, doc. 88, Secretary of State to Forbes, July 5, 1820.

ship of the United States for these Republics he was now fully convinced that our course had been wise and magnanimous. I left him, being much satisfied with the important conquest I had made. I learned this day from different quarters that the friends and enemies of the present Government are extremely busy in their conjectures about the objects of my mission. Some asserting that I had been authorized to acknowledge this Republic, but had, on my own discretion, declined doing it in consequence of the distracted state in which I found the Country, others stating that I had only come out with Agencies to claim money on different contracts between individuals of the United States and the different Agents of this Government. The first of these reports emanates from among the deposed chiefs of the various parties which have passed through this political, "*magic lanthorn*," all of whom find an asylum at Monte Video. The last idea has, I presume, been put into circulation by M^r^. Aguirre or some of the many Agents who, after having duped our fellow Citizens, return here and seek to justify their own bad faith by the most studied and malignant calumnies on our national and individual character. As far as opportunities have occurred in conversation I have resisted both these assertions and have decided that, under existing circumstances, it will be most prudent to suspend all applications to this Government for money on claims, however well founded, because on the one hand, they would refuse to assume any contract made with the *United Provinces*, that Union no longer existing, and, in case even of a claim fixed on this Government, the payment would be refused on the ground that they have not the means. On the other hand, such applications would so entirely disaffect them towards me that I should find it difficult to continue my residence here, until a more settled and prosperous state of things shall result from the efforts now making for general pacification and the reunion of the Provinces. I shall therefore keep my claims carefully "*en porte feuille*" and hope soon to see a state of things more propitious to their just liquidation and payment. I hope that these motives and this decision will find favour in the view of The President. The present rulers here can only obtain the means of defraying the daily and indispensable expences of the Government and armies by new loans. The whole Government, if so it may be called, is a mere matter of expedient from one day to another, a mere military police. M^r^. Halsey and a M^r^. Diverhagen (by birth a German but a naturalized Citizen of the U. S.) who claims under M^r^ Halsey's contract, have applied to me to support their claims, but I have advised them to suspend all proceedings for the reasons above stated; and they have acquiesced in the reason and the result. I learn from M^r^. Zimmerman who has had some Agency in General John Mason's claim for Cannon delivered to M^r^. Aguirre, that, in a more prosperous state of its finances, this Government will, in M^r^. Z's opinion, be disposed to pay that claim, but, even if a liquidation of it could now be obtained, nothing could be had in payment but Government paper selling at 60 per cent under par. I have hinted

at the malignity with which many of the Citizens of this place seek to asperse our national and individual character. The poison of these disappointed men has been concentrated and communicated to the public, in the writings of a certain Franciscan Friar, named *Casteñada*. This man, whose effrontery only equalled by his malice, has, for many months previous to my arrival, been in the habit of maltreating every thing North American, in a paper called, "*Despertador*". his attacks were very well repulsed at the time by a writer under the signature of "*a North American.*" These replies were ascribed by many to M^r^ Prevost, but I have reason to believe that they all emanated from the same pen which has more recently vindicated us against a bitter attack since my arrival. This attack commenced in a letter from "*La Patriota Clara*" who is neither more or less than a singular character here, a *M^rs^. Clarke*, who is supposed by some to have been secretly married to *Commodore Taylor*, now in Baltimore. her letter complains of the conduct of our Government in refusing a passage in the Constellation, to *Taylor*, adorned by the most patriotic and gallant atchievements in the Buenos Ayrean service and, at same time, granting a passage to *M^r^ Halsey*, known here only by his traitorous correspondence with *Artigas*, furnishing him with arms &c. In reply to this real or pretended letter, *Father Casteñada* goes on to remark, in the most insulting style, not only on the character and conduct of our Government, but on the total want of religion and honour among the North Americans. In reply to this odious Phillippic, our acting V. Consul, M^r^ Zimmerman, with his usual zeal, wrote and published, at his own expence, the enclosed letters, addressed first to "*La Patriota Clara*", next to "*Padre Casteñada*" and, lastly to the "*Citizens of Buenos Ayres*", all tending to vindicate the political character of our Government and the individual character of our Citizens.

Indignant as I felt at the vile charges brought against us by this hypocritical libellist, I did not feel warranted in noticing anonymously any such attacks, and, considering the responsibility of my official character, I wished to preserve an attitude of contempt for the author and his writings. I presume that similar motives influenced Judge Prevost in declining all such contests. I will not dissemble that I readily furnished M^r^. Zimmerman with such data as I felt myself at liberty to communicate. Among the official visits I have received is that of M^r^. *Zaniartu*, Minister Plenipotentiary of Chili, who called at my house on 2^nd^ November, with an apology for having delayed his visit on account of ill health (perhaps *indisposition* as he is known to have been very unfriendly to M^r^ Prevost and is said to be generally so to all North Americans) he spoke french tolerably and some few minutes of common place conversation, not worth reporting, passed between us. I returned his visit the next day but did not find him at home. On the 18^th^ November I received a visit from Colonel, Don Francisco Uriundo, the Deputy of the Province of Salta who was sent to the different Provinces to

invite them to send deputies to a General Congress. he told me that all the Provinces had readily acceded to the proposal of a Congress and all, except Buenos Ayres, had already chosen their deputies; he spoke freely of the great distrust which existed among the distant provinces towards this Capital. he positively assured me that but one sentiment prevailed throughout the other Provinces and that was, a firm resolution to be *independent* and *republican*, and that, if Buenos Ayres continued in her perverse tendency towards Monarchy, the other Provinces would undoubtedly form a federal republic to the exclusion of this City, and this opinion I have received from various respectable sources. M^r^. Uriundo asked me if I was authorized to assure the Provinces of the friendship and protection of the United States, in case of their thus uniting in a federal republic. I replied that I was authorized to make no such engagement in the name of the United States, that I could assure him that the Government and people of my Country very sincerely wished to see all South America, *Independent* and naturally felt a cordial predilection for a *Republican Government*. that I was authorized by my Government to offer the fullest assurances of good will towards the South Americans, but, as to any positive measures on the part of the United States, either of recognition or co-operation, it was impossible for me to promise or to foretell them. The Councils of the United States would always be dictated by the purest principle, tempered by a prudent observance of events.

On this point I am daily pressed and as often compelled to defend myself in this way. M^r^. Uriundo told me that it was in my power to give a tone to public opinion if I were authorized to take a decided stand in the name of my Government and so am I daily told by the violent men of all parties. At a late hour of the night my doors have been almost forced by individuals unknown to me, proscribed by the existing Government, coming to me in disguise and holding the most violent and inflammatory language, talking of the dreadful events which are preparing for this City and invoking my opinions, but all to no purpose. My uniform language to men of all parties is, "I am neither authorized or disposed to enlist in any of the parties which unfortunately exist in this Country, I wish the South Americans every possible happiness, but cannot undertake to instruct them as to the means of attaining it." I sometimes hazard the opinion that a permanent and good government is very important, not only to their domestic security, but to give them a character and enable them to command the respect of other nations. . . .

[In a postscript dated January 16, 1821, he explained that he had not previously had opportunity to send to the United States his despatch of December 4; and continued:]

Enclosed is also a "*sketch of the occurrences at Buenos Ayres within the last year*", presenting a stronger picture of numerous and rapidly succeeding

revolutions than is to be found in any period of ancient or modern history. I owe this narrative to M^r. Zimmerman, our acting Vice Consul here, who was an impartial eye witness to all these changes and who is an intelligent and zealous friend of our Country. this statement only comes down to the time of my arrival; As to the events which have since occurred, I shall endeavour to give as faithful a report as can be collected in a Country, torn by numberless dissentions and where truth is never to be found untainted by party spirit. The Theatre on which these events have passed is so vastly extensive that, in collecting information the distortions resulting from distances alone, without any other vitiating cause, are enough to shake our faith in all such facts as do not occur within our own immediate observation. The operations in which this Government is engaged, naturally divide themselves into *cis* and *ultra-mountainous*. As the brightest page of the history of passing events is to be found with the liberating army of Peru, I shall reserve that as a balm for the wounds which the gloomy and discouraging picture of nearer scenes is calculated to inflict on the philanthropic heart. I shall first therefore endeavour to give some idea of the state of things on this side the mountains.

The War which existed at the time of my arrival between the *Buenos Ayreans* under *Rodrigues* and the *Santa Fe-sioros* under *Lopez* was terminated by a treaty of peace signed by these two chiefs on the 21^st^ day of November and ratified by the Junta here on *27^th^* same month. One article of this treaty stipulates that a Congress of all the Provinces shall be held at Cordova in two months after its date. On the night of the 22^nd^ November Jose Miguel Carrera, well known in the United States and who is the implacable enemy of this Province, left the Camp of Lopez for *Melingue*, an Indian town on the frontier of Cordova, followed by One hundred and fifty Chilenos and the principal officers attached to his fortunes, Jordan, Benevente &c. *Rodrigues*, being advised thereof by *Lopez*, who had sent Garcia with a Corps in pursuit of him, also dispatched a body of Cavalry which returned after an ineffectual chase of three days.

On the 2^nd^. December a party of Indians headed by Carrera and the Chilenos with him, attacked a small place called *el Salto* and carried off about three hundred women and killed a number of males.

Several bodies of Indians entered the Southern posts and carried off five hundred families, women and girls with upward of 28,000 head of Cattle, availing themselves of the absence of the effective male population which was with the army of Rodrigues. These Indians acted under the instigation and orders of Carrera, who, having caused general consternation by these predatory irruptions, made his way to Conception in Chili, where, it is presumed that he will avail himself of the absence of San Martin's army to excite an insurrection in his favour. On the *3^rd^ December* Rodrigues, the Governor, came to this City and on the *4^th^* issued a most virulent proclama-

tion against Carrera and his partizans. I waited on the Governor, who received me very politely and told me that the sole object of his visit to the Capital was to arrange for the pecuniary and other means of carrying on this new war against the Indians, of whose belligerent character he spoke with great contempt and told me, that he was taking measures to enlist some of the tribes as auxiliaries.

On the *14th December* fifteen hundred men left Chascomres a small town to the south about forty leagues distant, under command of a Colonel *Hortiguera* to advance into the Indian territory. Commandant *Rosas* and Colonel *Madrid*, both enterprizing Officers, accompanied Hortiguera. they directed their march to the southward and westward of the Sierra de la Ventana. On the *24th December*, the Agent of one of the most powerful Caciques, called *Ancafilu*, having solicited a cessation of hostilities was answered by Rodrigues that he would only treat in the *Sierra* for which he should set out with a division of sixteen hundred men in a few days. The Indians can only be intimidated by great severity and it is the intention of *Rodrigues* to carry the war into their recesses and holds and by the most energetic measures to curb this incipient disposition to plunder. This is the first irruption of the Indians since the year 1780, when their spirit was completely curbed by the Vice Roy, *Berti*, who, according to Funes' history, attacked them vigourously, pursued them to their holds and put an end to their incursions. . . . On the *1st January* The Governor *Rodrigues* received from *Lopez* original communications made by *Ramirez* to him, inviting him to renew the War against *Buenos Ayres*, under the pretext, that the *Puyerredon* faction had been reestablished and that the *Prince of Lucca* was actually concealed in *Maldonado*. There is no doubt that *Sarratea* who is with *Ramirez*, inculcates a belief in these stories and promotes, by every argument in his power to suggest, this new war which will deluge this City in blood, if it is not averted by the wise measures of the Congress about to be assembled at Cordova. *Rodrigues* has written to the Governors of the several Provinces, inviting them to make common cause with *Lopez* and himself against *Ramirez*. Lopez has manifested good faith towards this Government and seems to wish very sincerely to refer all the affairs of the Country to the Congress.

I have seen a letter from an officer of Rodrigues' Staff dated the 4th of January by which it appears that negociations had already been entered into with several *Caciques*, by which, not only many horses and plenty of Cattle, but two thousand men, had been procured; this is in pursuance of Rodrigues' plan as stated to me, and, by thus inciting Indians against Indians, *Rodrigues* becomes the mere spectator and arbiter of the Contest. On 4th instant, *Rodrigues* with his auxiliaries, was within twenty leagues of the principal body of hostile Indians and news are hourly expected of the result of a battle.

These are the principal *facts* in relation to *Rodrigues'* war with the *Indians* which I have been able to collect from official correspondence and other

authentic sources. If I were to give the thousand *reports*, which are daily put in circulation to distract the public feeling, I should neither know where to begin or where to end. In another quarter a cloud is arising which portends more serious evil and excites more alarm than the Indian War. I mean the threatened invasion by *Ramirez*.

This man, as will be recollected, grew up into military fame under the auspices of old *Artigas;* he has finally turned his arms against his patron and chief and has compleatly overthrown him. *Ramirez* retired from the frontier of this Province, with his troops, in the month of march last, since which time he has made war against *Artigas* who has finally been compelled to take refuge in *Paraguay*, where *Francia*, the Governor, has granted him an asylum in the Convent of S^{t} Francisco, which asylum is neither more or less than a prison, since the fallen chief is strictly watched and will not be allowed to quit his present *protector*. *Ramirez* is actually at *Corrientes*, which he has made the Capital of his *republic* of *Entre Rios*, and is much engaged in disciplining a considerable body of troops and in augmenting a naval force, rendered considerable by his success over that of *Artigas* and without which he cannot maintain any command in the river or defend his territory against the Portuguese. his actual force amounts to about three thousand men, well clothed and disciplined and commanded by officers who have been in service since the Commencement of the Revolution. he has also a naval force of fifteen to seventeen vessels, consisting of Brigs, schooners, Gunboats and launches. He has formed a Council for the administration of the Government of the Province, composed of seven Individuals, of which he, as Governor of the Province, is President. Doctor Cassio, formerly Secretary of the Treasury of the United Provinces, is Governor of Corrientes and Provincial Secretary of State, and is generally considered one of the most able men of the Country. Circulars have been sent by *Ramirez* to the adjacent Provinces, inviting them to the immediate assembling of the so long delayed Congress, a declaration of war against the Portuguese and to assist him in an effort against this Province with a view to overthrow the Puyerredon faction, which, as he asserts, now forms this Government. It is said that the most active preparations are making for these purposes. *Ramirez* is however not without opponents in that quarter.

The cooperation of the Cacique *Seité*, the firm friend of Artigas in all his reverses, was asked and flatly refused, a division of five hundred of the troops of *Ramirez* attempted to force him and were defeated. Amidst all his political and military efforts, *Ramirez* is said to have kept his personal interest in view and to have amassed a fortune of upwards of *Two hundred thousand dollars*, by participating in speculations in *Tobacco*, and *Matté* or *Yerba* from *Paraguay*. He is liberal to his officers, intrepid and possesses great strength of intellect and a fertility in expedients suited to his circumstances. The Interior Provinces have become more tranquil. The infamous *Corro*, who kept the town

of *San Juan* under contribution for months, has finally been driven out of the Province of *Cuyo* by the militia, in consequence of arms and other assistance given by *Chili*. He has taken refuge in the hills of *Larioja*. The extreme apathy of this Province in not giving aid to the people of *San Juan* has alienated their friendship for this Capital, and, joined to the more liberal commercial system of Chili, will, it is believed, induce the Province of *Cuyo* as well as that of *Mendoza* to cast off their political and commercial relations with this Province and to seek a connection with Chili.

The Gazettes which accompany this despatch will explain the history and result of the attempted negociation on the part of the Royal Commissioners from Spain. The whole story is briefly this: that the Spanish armed Brig *Eagle*, having those Gentlemen on board, came to anchor in the outer roads here on *4th December*, and on *5th same*, the Commissioners addressed a note to this Government asking permission to land, and requiring assurances of the accustomed diplomatic immunities for the persons, papers &c of the mission. to this note *the Junta* replied on *6th December*, that, unless the Royal Commissioners were authorized to propose, as the basis of the negociation, the recognition of the Independence of these Republics, no negociation could be commenced. This answer, communicated to the Commissioners on the evening of 6th, was the signal of their immediate departure. The Brig sailed on the night between the 6th & 7th December. The whole correspondence will be found in the Gazettes. The financial is not less depraved and vicious than is the general political system of this Country. The duties are enormous, the coast is naked and extensive and the whole Government a fleeting, ephemeral speculation among certain powerful families and needy military Adventurers. The consequences are, that the high duties necessarily discourage all fair trade, the Government is rendered odious without being rendered rich and smuggling is most unblushingly pursued almost to the entire extent of which the trade is susceptible. A Commission has again been organized to put the fiscal department of this Government in order, but I augur faintly of the beneficial result of the labours of this Commission. In reporting passing Events in this quarter, I must not overlook a late manifestation of angry feeling between this Government and *General Le Cor*, *Baron of Laguna*, Commander in Chief of the Portuguese forces in the Banda Oriental. this Correspondence will be found enclosed and by the tone of defiance held by this Government nothing short of immediate hostilities could be expected—but, the truth is, that this angry tone is assumed to catch a little momentary popularity. If the present rulers are, as many pretend, *Puyerredonnists*, their tutelar Saint is now enjoying the hospitality of this same *Baron of Laguna*. I will not, however, permit myself to embark in party politics, but merely hazard the opinion, "*en passant*", that a war with the Portuguese will be found to embrace all the great means of cure for the evils which afflict, by dividing these Provinces. it would at once do away the ostensible object of

Ramirez's threatened invasion. it would unite the Provinces and restore to them the compleat dominion of this great and splendid River and the possession of the fairest and finest territory of its' banks.

January 18, 1821.

. . . I shall now endeavour to give you some idea of the operations of the *liberating army*, so called, of General *San Martin*, in Peru. I wish I could have obtained a regular file of the official Gazettes of *Chili*, but, in failure of that, you will find most of the proclamations and reports of *San Martin* in the papers forwarded. The Expedition sailed from Valparaiso on 20th August, consisting of 5,500 effective men and on 7th September entered the roads of *Gallou*, three leagues to the South of *Pisco*. On the 8th General *Heras* disembarked with the battalions of 2nd, 7th & 11th and 80 Cavalry and commenced the march for *Pisco*. they were observed by 80 horsemen of the enemy—at seven oClock in the evening they reached Pisco and came to a halt. After duly reconniotring, they found the town abandoned by the enemy and *Heras* entered without opposition. this division was immediately reinforced by the General in Chief and the Head Quarters were established at Pisco. Upwards of 1200 men of the Country joined the army. The posts of *Caucato*, *Chunchanga*, the *valley* of *Chincha palfa* and the town of *Icor* were successively occupied and Vessels detached from the squadron to reconnoitre the Coast between *Callao* and *Nasca*, in the hope of meeting the Royal Frigates *Esmeralda* and *Venganza*. On the 26th September an armistice was entered into, to be maintained until 4th October—during this interval Deputies were named on the part of the Vice King and of the General in Chief and met at *Miraflores* within one league of *Lima*. As a preliminary basis of negociation, the Vice King proposed the recognition of the Constitution of Spain by the *Government* and *people* of *Chili* and by the *army* under General *San Martin*. this proposition was negatived in such manner as left the field open to discussion on the part of the deputies of the Commander in Chief, but, those of the Vice King, being restricted to this point, were at a loss. An interview between the Deputies and Vice King took place which ended in the latter granting the necessary passports for the safe conduct of the Deputies of San Martin, and hostilities commenced on the 5th of October. The principal points discussed in this abortive negociation appear to have been—1st, whether, under the recent changes in Spain, it would not be deemed within the powers of the Vice King to terminate all further difficulties by giving liberty to Peru, thus conciliating the real interests of Spain as well as those of America? With this point in view, *San Martin* was ready to sacrifize all the laurels of Victory. 2nd. The Proposition submitted by the Deputies of the Vice King, in his name, was, that Chili should remain precisely in its present state, should send deputies to Spain with ample powers to treat, that the troops of San Martin should retire immediately from Pisco to Chili, that no hostilities should be

commenced until the result of the mission to Spain should be known, that all maritime enterprizes should be suspended, that neither the sea or land forces should be augmented or any alliances contracted. That the King's ships sent to America for money &c. were not to be interrupted or considered as infringing this article. The Commerce of *Chili* and *Lima* to be replaced on the same footing as before the war. In reply to these propositions the Deputies set forth the nullity of the constitution of Spain as it respected the Americas, inasmuch as *acknowledged* deputies from the Americas were not present at its formation; that its good effects were limited to the Peninsula of Spain and only held forth the phantom of liberty to the Americas, every part of it tending to shew the determination, on the part of Spain, to preserve the colonial system in all its rigour. The sentiment of conciliation must exist in the hearts of Spaniards and Americans without losing sight of the rights of nature or those principles of reciprocal justice which must be the basis of any Convention. With these views, the deputies of San Martin proposed, that the troops under his command should retire to the ancient limits of the Province of Buenos Ayres, the *Desaguadero*, that those of the King should repass that line. The troops of the King in Chili should pass to Chiloe. All maritime enterprizes should cease, the naval force should not be augmented, nor should the King's ships sent to the Pacific be employed in any enterprize, even should hostilities commence, until the expiration of a year. The Commerce of *Chili* and *Peru* should be free to both parties, the Commerce of the Interior equally so. *Chili* should remain precisely in its present state, should send Commissioners to Spain, fully authorized to treat with His Catholic Majesty. Accredited Agents of the Governments of *Chili* and *Lima* should reciprocally reside in the respective Capitals. A conciliatory Commission should be named to consist of the highest naval officers of the British & American Vessels on the Station. This Commission shall determine the expences which shall be allowed for the equipment of this expedition, that there should be no restriction of the liberty of the press—that, in the event of *Bolivar* having sent deputies to *Madrid*, the *Vice King* of *Peru* shall give no aid or augmentation of troops to *Morillo*. If nothing favourable should result from the proposed mission to Spain, hostilities should not commence for three months after notification of the failure, and, finally, to secure the due fulfillment of this Convention, the oldest Commanders of the British and American Ships of War on the station shall be invited to guarantee the same in the name of their respective Governments. The Deputies of the Vice King consented to these propositions, with the exception of that which refers to the occupation of *Peru*, insisting on the reimbarkation of *San Martin's Army*. Hence resulted a total rupture of all negociation and the deputies severally retired. The attentions shewn to the *Deputies of the Army*, whilst in the vicinity of *Lima*, the continued vigilance of the *Vice King* to prevent any communication between them and the Inhabitants, evinced the feeling of

the patriots and the apprehensions entertained by the Vice King of the effect of a free and frank interchange of sentiments and views.

San Martin appointed the first Alcalde of *Pisco*, Governor, and dispatched the enterprizing Colonel *Arenales* with a division of One thousand men to *Huacuanga*, a populous town, sixty leagues to the southward and eastward of Lima, where he was received with every demonstration of enthusiasm on the part of the Inhabitants. On the 9th of November he was joined on the road by crowds of women with fruit &c and four thousand native Cavalry armed with Pikes. Our last intelligence from the army reaches only to *11th November* and advises the arrival of deputies from *Guaquil*, with the pleasing intelligence, that the patriot party had, on 10th October, quietly effected, the deliverance of that City from the Spanish domination. *Escobedo*, actual Governor of that City, had sent eleven of the public functionaries as Prisoners to *San Martin*, to be exchanged for Patriots confined in the dungeons of Lima and requesting to be assisted by the sending of military officers to aid in disciplining the troops and other persons capable of instructing in the formation of a system in perfect accordance with those of the other liberated Provinces of South America. for these purposes *Luzuriaga*, formerly Governor of Mendoza, had been sent, accompanied by Colonel *Guido*, one of San Martin's Commissioners to the Vice King, formerly Secretary to *Moreno* on his mission to London. The total absence of news from San Martin's Army for some time past, has opened a wide field for the mad speculations of those who are badly disposed towards him and his enterprize. Of course, there are not wanting, daily reports of disasters to this distant army and it has even been asserted that *San Martin* himself was a *Prisoner* in *Lima*. I have seen so often the miscolourings of party in Europe that I lend a most difficult and unwilling credence to the mere suggestions of political spleen and jealousy. The mischief suggested in this despatch of *Carrera's* attempting to avail himself of the absence of the army to raise a party in Chili, has now vanished, it being most positively asserted since yesterday that *Carrera* is still hovering about this distracted Province.

In consequence of news that St Julien's Squadron had gone round into the Pacific, *Sir Thomas Hardy* has left this, with the Superb, 74. and the Creole Frigate for that sea. *Captain O'Brien* in the *Slaney*, remains here to represent the British Government and protect that trade. I am happy to say that Commodore *Sir Thomas Hardy*, and all the officers of his staff, continued to the last hour of their stay here, to treat me with the most marked attention, and that I have the prospect of being on the most agreable footing of friendly intercourse with *Captain O'Brien*. *Sir Thomas Hardy* carries to the Pacific the best disposition to keep up a good understanding with our ships there, of which I have apprized Captains Ridgely and Downes and recommended the reciprocation of these feelings.

Two different sets of Deputies have been named from this place to the Con-

gress at Cordova, the first resigned and were excused. the second set were peremptorily ordered to leave this City on the 16th Instant, but are not yet gone and, I am told, they have positively refused. Doctor Aguero, one of the Deputies named, presented himself in the Hall of the Junta and protested against its authority to appoint him, as, he said, the choice should have immediately emanated from the people and that he would not hazard his reputation by accepting an appointment made in any other way. If that Congress does not succeed in organizing a wise and good Government, I foresee the most dreadful scenes here.

I have the honour [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 10, 1821.*

. . . On the 16th. of February the American *Schooner Rampart*, Capn. Farrin, was brought in here, a Prize to the *Heroina*, *Capn. Jewett*, Captured at Anchor at the Faulkland Islands. In this case every possible irregularity has been committed. the Crew has never been examined, the Hatches have never been sealed, the Cargo has been discharged without notification to the Captain and to cap the Climax, we know and *hope* to *prove* that the Captor was cruizing under two Commissions. but such is the arbitrary military despotism which reigns here and such is the still more arbitrary despotism of poverty and want of means, that I have very great doubt if the best arguments and the strongest Proofs will avail anything against them.

I addressed a letter to H.E. the Governor on Saturday the 24th February which was delivered by a confidential person into the hands of one of his Aids du Camp, the object of that letter was to request that the discharging of the Schooner Rampart might be suspended until the Captain should be regularly notified and present and that the regulations for Privateering of 1817. might in all things be observed. On monday morning 26th February I learned to my surprise, that, notwithstanding my letter, the discharging of said Vessel was Commenced. I waited on the Governor, accompanied by Mr. Zimmermann, and on the question being put to the Governor, if he had received my letter, he answered in the negative, I then explained the purport of it and he repeated his denial of having received it, and added that if I would send him a duplicate it should be immediately attended to. I then immediately sent him a duplicate with a short postscript under the 26th to which I received a

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

reply under 28th from the Secretary of War, *Mr. de la Cruz.* Copies of my letters and of Mr. de la Cruz's reply will be found enclosed. it will be seen that in Mr. de la Cruz's reply he intimates to me that I have no public Character and am only permitted to approach the Government by *representation* and not by letter as I had done. This word *representation*, in the usage of this Government, means *memorial*, which must be made on stamped paper and is the ordinary privilege of every Citizen. this insulting intimation was made to me after I had been received with distinction by *Governor Balcarce*, my document exhibited, a translation furnished and sent to the Governor, by whom it was admitted to be satisfactory, and after Mr. Zimmermann, only *acting Vice Consul*, had been permitted for more than a Year to address himself officially to the Governor. I consulted two of my Countrymen, most versed in the language and manners of this Country, Mr. Zimmermann and Mr. William G. Miller, who both thought the letter highly offensive. I shewed it to the most learned Lawyer and Statesman of the Country, who, by the most significant shake of his head and shrug of his shoulder, expressed a surprise and disapprobation to which he dared not give utterance. Under all the Circumstances, having previously determined that it was prudent to retire from this City until the impending storm shall have burst and passed away, I determined to ask plainly and concisely for my passport, which I did under 1st. of the present month without offering any motive. This demand produced an apprehension among the members of the Government that I had found some cause of dissatisfaction. On the 8th. of the month, I received a very polite note from Mr Luca, Secretary of the Government and Treasury, inviting me to a conference for the next day at one oClock, which I immediately accepted by written reply. at the hour appointed on the 9th. instant, I attended at the Office of the Government, accompanied by Mr. Wilde, teacher in the Colledge and perfect master of the two languages, who served me as interpreter. Mr. Luca opened the Conference by observing that the Governor was apprehensive from the manner in which I had demanded my passport, that I had some cause of Complaint. I replied that I had two motives for asking my passport at this moment. The first was, that, as every Circumstance indicated the near approach of a violent political Commotion in this Province and City and as my instructions were very precise to mingle in no manner in the political Contentions of the Country, prudence counselled me to retire from the scenes which were preparing. The other motive was found in the total disregard which had been shewn to my representations in the Case of the American Schooner Rampart lately brought in here as a prize; I then, producing the Prize Regulation of 1817 in Spanish and English, went through several articles, the observance of which had been wholly neglected in that Case. Mr. Luca confessed his incompetence to speak on that matter, as it belonged to the Department of War. I then spoke of the Secretary of War's letter and handed him a Copy of it. I called his attention to the latter

part of it, denying my Claim to official Character and enjoining me to approach the Government by way of *representation* and not by letter as I had done. He said that he would lay the subject before the Governor and take his orders on it. I then requested and obtained his permission to make certain observations connected with the Case and proceeded to observe, that the relations between the United States and the south American Republics form an entirely new Case in political history; these relations must necessarily be informal on the part of the United States, because the adoption of the accustomed forms of diplomatic intercourse would involve the recognition of the South American Governments, a measure which, for political reasons well understood, the United States wish to avoid for the present; in two instances Naval Commanders had been employed by my Government as the Organs of Communication and this was also practised by Great Britain, who has always been represented here by a Naval Officer. In the laws of Nations are mentioned two kinds of Powers. The *Mandatum manifestum* or public Credential and the *Mandatum Secretum* or instructions of the Sovereign both of which form the power of the Agent. the First as before stated, cannot be expected in my case. the last has been given me in the most Copious manner. I am also furnished with a Certificate from the Secretary of State of my appointment and authority to act. The present case is a mere question of *expediency* and may be reduced to a very small Compass. The United States have no motive for keeping up an intercourse with this Country, except the desire to see its independence and happiness established and to see the family of Republics extended. The Commerce of this Country offers no advantage to the North Americans. My Government has often declared its' determination to ask no Commercial preference and it is among my instructions to say that the Object of obtaining a preference in favor of their Commerce is considered by my Government as not worthy to be associated with those elevated motives and Considerations which form and direct its policy in relation to these Republics. It is merely to manifest its good will towards this Country that an Agent is sent here by my Government; if this Government decides that such an Agent is not entitled to the respect due to a public Character because he is not clothed in all the forms of diplomacy, I am neither instructed or disposed to press upon it, different views or a different Course. But having no personal motives, it is my duty, not less to the Government which has placed Confidence in me than to those fellow Citizens who expect official aid and protection from me, to say that I can never consent to make representations in a merely individual Character. When I first presented myself on my arrival to the then substitute Governor, Colonel Major Balcarce, the Certificate of my appointment was shewn to him, a translation of it was furnished and as I was informed, sent to the Governor then with the Army. It proved satisfactory to both. I was admitted to the privilege of receiving my effects, free of duty, and otherwise treated with the respect shewn to a public

Agent. On the 1st. of December, I paid my respects to Governor Rodrigues, accompanied by Mr Zimmermann. I asked his Excellency if he had seen my Credential, to which he replied in the Affirmative, adding that he should always receive with pleasure any Communications I might think proper to make to him.

Vattel says (B. IV. Ch. VI. §75) that "when a Prince sends an Agent, with Credentials *for public Affairs*, the Agent from that time becomes a public Minister. The title makes no alteration. This is likewise applicable to Deputies, Commissaries and others charged with public Affairs." I observed that the difficulty in the present case is entirely on the side of the United States, who can ask no official prerogative without involving the recognition of this Government, whereas on the part of this Government, it cannot be compromitted in any manner by encouraging the proffered intercourse in the manner in which it came and extending to the Agent all the respect due to the most formally authorized and accredited Minister. I took occasion also to say that if I had not developed more fully to this Government the Objects of my Agency, it was owing to the state of War and Agitation in which it had ever been since my Arrival, that I waited for a moment of Calm to address the Government on many subjects of great international interest. The foregoing is the substance of the Conference on my part. Mr. Luca promised that he would on that Evening bring the whole subject before H. E. the Governor. He expressed a wish that I would furnish him with my observations in an informal, unsigned note. I did not promise or refuse it but took my leave. I afterwards told Mr. Wilde my interpreter, that I did not choose to furnish any note, either signed or unsigned, but that I would give him from memory a sketch of my observations, which he might call on Mr. Luca and read to him in Spanish and that he might permit him to make notes from his reading. This Mr. Wilde promised to do the same afternoon, but did not effect it until the next morning the 10th. instant. I have as yet received no reply or decision of the Government, but have reason to believe that it will be of a satisfactory nature.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *April 1, 1821.*

. . . The Congress of Cordova, the long contemplated object of Paramount National interest, has not yet opened its session. Many doubt

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, I.

whether they will ever form into a body even to deliberate. Many others believe that should they both deliberate and resolve, their doings will prove compleatly nugatory, inasmuch as they will be addressed to Provinces, distracted by factions, destitute of every thing like Public opinion and having but one common principle and that the habit and love of Military Government. The Congress, therefore, not possessing any Semblance of Military power, can only carry into effect such measures as are agreable to those who now are or may hereafter become the Masters of that power. Indeed I think this *Republic*, if it ever merited that name, is now in the most utter darkness of despair and without one ray of hope. Nothing can protect civil liberty here but the virtue of a popular General at the head of a Victorious Army, both General and Army true Republicans. But where is such a General and such an Army to be found? Not on this side the Equator. General San Martin has had more success than any other, but, in the long silence of Government, insinuations are circulated unfavourable to the ultimate success of his measures in Perú. If successful, there is no doubt that he will remain and enjoy his fame where he has won it, because he knows that he would have to conflict with many Enemies here and because he has long since resigned his Commission in this service and has identified himself with the fame and fortunes of that of Chili. besides no one believes in the sincerity of San Martin's republican professions. I hinted in my last, the report prevailing that *Carrera* had beaten Bustos. this report was fully confirmed and it appears that *Bustos*, having gone out of Cordova at the head of disaffected troops to meet Carrera, his Army abandoned him and dispersed as soon as they came near to that of Carrera, so that the latter obtained a Victory almost without shedding a drop of blood. It is not believed that many of Busto's troops joined Carrera, but that they dispersed to their several places of abode. the Activity, perseverance and constancy of Carrera have been seldom equalled. His whole regular force does not exceed one hundred & fifty Chilenos with a greater or less number of savage auxiliaries according to circumstances, and with this flying band he has for 12 Months kept & still keeps all those Provinces in agitation, never remaining long enough in any one place to admit of his being surprized. It is said that he has also beaten the *Puntanos* or people of the Punta de S^{n}. Louis; his next attempt will be at Mendoza. It is supposed that he will occupy the attention of all those Provinces to facilitate the Progress of Ramirez. The recent movements in Brazil in favour of Constitutional liberty have excited similar feelings & measures among the troops of General Le Cor's Army at Monte Video. It appears that among the late measures of the King at Rio Janeiro, was a Decree attaching irrevocably to the Brasilian Empire the whole Army now serving in Brazil and in the *Banda Oriental*. On receiving the news of this measure, a club was formed at Monte Video consisting of 18 young Officers, determined to bring about the immediate recognition of the Con-

stitution formed or forming at Lisbon. Colonel Claudino Pimentel was the only officer of his rank admitted to a knowledge of the secret measures of this Club. Every thing was concealed until two oclock of the morning of the 19th of March, when the troops to the number of 2200, men were assembled on the Public Square and the Colonel of the Regiment of Artillery, of the Regiment of Infantry, *Collow* and of Cavalry were all surprized in their beds and invited to take their places at the head of their Regiments or submit to the consequences. They preferred the former. At daylight a message was sent to General Le Cor (who was understood to be opposed to the Constitution) by Colonel Claudino on the part of the troops, to invite him to sanction their proceedings by his presence and example. After some hesitation he finally assented and followed the officer who had been dispatched to him for the third time. At half past eight oClock he presented himself and was received with the Customary military honours and every demonstration of respect. He passed through the lines and took his station in the Centre of the Square. Drums beating, arms presented, hats off, colours lowered, and with the right hand extended in the Air, the Oath was taken by the Commander in Chief, the Officers and troops, to support the Constitution then forming or formed, Religion and the King. The Air was rent with repeated and enthusiastic acclamations. A Commission was named on the Spot and was to proceed on 22d, March for Rio Janeiro; I have not the positive information of their having sailed. the liberty of the press is insisted on. As in Catholic Countries no great measure can be consummated without Mass, that Ceremony was performed with great magnificence, attended by all the officers civil & military of the place. I have news from Rio Janeiro to 10 th. March, by which it appears that all was then tranquil and it was expected would remain so until the arrival of the Constitution from Portugal. The opinion prevailed there that the King would proceed soon to Europe, Count Palmella was to embark in a few days in the Frigate *Icarus* it was presumed, for Europe—the U. S. Frigate, congress had arrived there from China and I regret to learn, with the loss of a great number of men by sickness and a long list of sick on board. From the great difference of Interest and views between the Portuguese and Brasilians, some troubles are apprehended at Rio and the opinion is repeated that the *Banda Oriental* may probably be evacuated; connected with this last event are many intrigues to acquire the supreme power there. This Government has published a representation addressed to the Citizens of this place in which they charge Don Carlos Alvear with having accepted a Commission in the Portuguese Service and having embarked to cooperate with Ramirez. The last part of this charge meets a ready credence, but no one belives that *Alvear* having spent his fortune in the attempted revolution of these Provinces, having a certain fame and a party here would sacrifice all these to attach himself to an expiring foreign power. The Government is *threatening* War with Portugal but, in the

present agony of that power, the effort will now be but an inglorious one. It would seem to be the natural and necessary course of things that in case of the Portuguese abandoning the *Banda Oriental* that Country should come under the joint domination of *Ramirez*, *Sarratea*, and *Alvear*, who will employ all its resources to support their ultimate enterprizes against this Province and City; should they succeed in establishing their power here also, they will then have compleat command of the River and of foreign Commerce, which will furnish revenue and various means of compelling the other Provinces to come into a federal Republic. This Course of events is the only one which seems to offer any chance of establishing order and good Government in these Provinces. On the other hand, should the two Banks of the River be in the hands of two different hostile parties, the smiling pursuits of a prosperous commerce must be exchanged for the horrid Scenes of pitiless and bloody war.

. . . I was assured that there was a hope that, in six weeks or two months, there would be formed a general federal Government. I was advised, in a very friendly manner, to address a Note explaining all the circumstances of this business and assured that it would be referred with a favourable opinion to the Junta and that it would probably be one of the first objects of deliberation of the National Government, when formed. I asked M^{r}. Nuñes, the Under Secretary what were the grounds of his opinion that a General Government would be formed? he then shewed me the Original letters of the Deputies of this City at Cordova dated 30th. March, stating their arrival on 27th. and that the following Provinces were already represented on the Spot, to Wit, Buenos Ayres, four Members, Santa Fé, one, Cordova two; Mendoza, one, San Juan, one, San Louis, one, Sain Iajo del Estero, one, Jujui, one, in all twelve Members present. The following provinces are wanting, to Wit, Salta, Tucuman, Catamarca, Ríoja, each one Deputy, making four Members. M^{r}. Nuñes also shewed me a very spirited note in manuscript, not yet published, addressed by this Government to General Le Cor at Monte-Video. breathing War and Vengeance for his supposed, and, as is alledged by this Government *proved* co operation with *Alvear Ramirez* and *Sarratea*. by which the latter are to guarantee to the King of Portugal the Possession of Entre Rios, in consideration of Le Cor's aiding them to conquer this Province. This Note which is to be dispatched to Monte Video to morrow or the next day by an Officer, will be printed in a few days. By the last Accounts from Monte Video it appears that a Regiment of Brazilians stationed at about fifteen leagues from that place and commanded by Colonel *Martez* had declared against the Constitution of Portugal and in favour of Independence, that General Le Cor had sent one or two Regiments against them, to compel them to swear to the Constitution formed or forming at Lisbon. It also appears that the Portuguese troops, who it is said have not been paid, for three years, are determined to return to Europe.

A young Officer named *Placa* has already sail'd for Gibraltar to represent the portuguese Division at the Cortes of Lisbon. It also appears that notwithstanding that General Le Cor is doing every thing in his power to sap and destroy the resources of the Banda Oriental, the Cabildo and Consulado of Monte Video have petitioned him (and requested that their petition might be laid, before the King) that the Portuguese troops should on no account evacuate that Province. . . .

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *July 3, 1821.*

SIR: Herewith I have the honour to transmit duplicates of N^os^. *15* and *16*, originals of both went by the Ship Balloon of Baltimore. Since those reports, no events of importance have occurred between the conflicting Armies in Santa Fé and Cordova, except the repulse of *Ramirez* and *Carrera* by *Bustos* with the loss of fifty men killed. It is not precisely know where Ramirez and Carrera are but we hourly expect to hear that *Lopez*, whose force is very superior, has reached and beaten them. The fortunes of the *Montoneros* become daily more desperate and the only effort they have now the power of making against this Government is to raise the Indians in the South and this will undoubtedly be done. *Rodrigues*, however, is preparing with great energy to resist their incursions and no apprehensions are entertained for this City. It was confidently asserted ten days ago that the Regency of Brazil had already sent off for this place a Commissioner to offer the recognition of the Independence of these Provinces, as some said, unconditionally, but as others with more probability stated, with the previous Condition that the incorporation of the Banda Oriental as an integral part of the Kingdom of Brazil should be assented to and sanctioned by this Government and it was asserted that the Brazilian Minister was hourly expected here. I have since ascertained *from the best source*, that the Inhabitants of the Banda Oriental have been invited to pass under the Sceptre of King John, that the representative authorities of that Province are to deliberate and pronounce on that proposition on a fixed day of the present month (I believe the 28^th^), if they accede, then this Government will be invited to ratify the act and on their so doing, the Regency of Brazil will immediately acknowledge their Independence.

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

All these facts I have from the Department of the Government with the further assurance that the arrangement in question has been indignantly rejected by this Government and *that War with the Portuguese is quite certain*, "so certain (said my informant of high official standing) that you may announce it to your Government."

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Minute of the first conference of John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, with Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of State of the United Provinces of South America[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *August 5, 1821.*

M^r^. Rivadavia the new Minister of State having announced his intention to visit me this day at one o'Clock, with a promise to confer amply on the many interesting objects of my Agency, I had prepared myself for this conference, by carefully perusing the various instructions with which I have been honoured by the Secretary of State. At the appointed hour M^r^. R. arrived, but accompanied by M^r^ Luca, the Secretary of the Treasury. . . . Mr. R. who spoke in French (M^r^. Luca remaining silent from his ignorance of that, and every other Language but that of the Country) went into a wide range of reflections connected with the course of Policy observed by the Government of the United States in relation to this Country's pretending to a perfect knowledge of all our Diplomatic measures in Europe, and intimating that his knowledge on some points was derived from his intercourse with M^r^. Gallatin at Paris. I sought to elude this discussion and among other things said to him that I hoped, when he should be more accurately informed of our Diplomatic March, he would have different views; adding that I could not reply to his observations in a manner worthy their importance, until I should have an opportunity in the promised conference of developing more at ease the views of my Government. He then waved the subject for a few minutes; and entered on another of very little importance:—he said, that, as there were now three foreign Agents here, it was necessary to form a Diplomatic Corps, and to agree on Certain rules of precedence, which he wished might be done by common accord among the Agents, and in conformity with the rules on that subject now established in Europe. that when he was informed that the rule of precedence was agreed between us, he would give the necessary orders for the observance of Ceremonies on public occasions. I observed, that supposing us to be equal in the rank of our employ and the regularity of our Credentials, there could be

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II, enclosed with Forbes to Secretary of State, September 28, 1821, which see below, pt. II, doc. 271.

no question that M^r. Zaniartu, Minister from Chili, was entitled to precedence, on the ground of priority of residence; but that I could claim no rank, in as much as I held an *Authority* from my Government without being accredited in the usual forms of diplomacy, that I had on a previous occasion explained this matter to M^r. Luca. He said that it was a new case, and asked if I had not written to my Government to request more formal Credentials; I replied in the negative; adding that I was fully possessed of the views of my Government; and persuaded that under existing circumstances no other form of Agency would be established. He then touched on the extreme prudence of my Government and stated it to be its general reputation thro' out Europe; that we always shewed too much deference for the Cabinets of Europe, and particularly for that of Russia. I replied that my Country was a healthy youth seeking to gain strength by a natural and progressive growth; and that if it began by jostling Giants, it might finish by having some of its Youthful limbs broken. He then said, that an example was given by his most Faithful Majesty, that all Governments were not equally circumspect; for that His Majesty, the King of the United Kingdoms of Portugal, Brazil and Algarves, had just offered an unconditional recognition of the Independence of these provinces. In reply, I observed that the motives which influenced his Most Faithful Majesty were in no wise analogous to those under which the Government of the United States acted, that it might possibly be the Case that His Brazilian Majesty looked despondingly to his tottering Empire in Europe and wishfully to the extension of his Dominions on this Continent; and with these views readily offered the hand of mutual friendship to his American Neighbours. It might be that His Majesty acted in this business as the Agent or Friend of some other Monarch. I added that the United States had always appreciated the efforts of the South Americans to obtain their Independence, and had felt a lively interest in their success. that comparing the degrees of advancement to independence made by the different provinces, they had given the preference to Buenos Ayres, had considered her claims to the fraternity of other Nations, superior to those of the other Provinces:—until the unfortunate events of the last year had cast a gloom over the bright prospects; that I now saw the light of Hope again surrounding her Destinies; and expected soon to know that all internal war was put down, and that the affairs of the Province would take a more solid form. M^r. Rivadavia, with much form of phraseology and affected Courtesy, then intimated that other Countries had not watched the progress and success of our revolution, as much as the Government of the United States watched that of the South American Provinces; and mentioned the example of France. I was commencing a suitable reply to this insinuation when I thought it prudent again to put myself under the promise of a more convenient occasion to discuss these subjects at the agreed conference—this was assented to by M^r. Rivadavia who assured me if nothing prevented

he would give me notice for Thursday next.—I told him I would not permit him to take the trouble to call on me, but would attend him at his house, or at the office of Foreign affairs, at any time he might be pleased to indicate. The Gentlemen then took leave and retired. Correct minute taken immediately after the Conference closed.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 2, 1821.*

. . . The latest accounts from Lima are much more favourable to S[t] Martin than those which I reported in my former Dispatch on the authority of M[r]. Caldeleugh. By news from Santiago de Chili of 17th July, it appears that Captain Spencer, of the British Navy had just reached that place from Lima, bringing the news that the Viceroy of Lima, *La Serna*, had proposed to S[t]. Martin, an Armistice of 18 Months, and to send joint Commissioners to Spain to treat with the Cortes for the acknowledgement of Independence, and had offered to put S[t]. Martin in possession of Callao which propositions have been rejected and hostilities were about recommencing. It was thought that Lima must surrender in one Month or at furthest six weeks. Moderate men do not exist to see Lima taken by force, but rather desire to see a concentration of the views & wishes of the great divisions of this immense Country, by a general Congress. I have formerly mentioned the violent dissentions and warfare existing between the provinces of Tucuman, Salta, & Santiago del Estero. The Governor of Salta, Güemez has been assassinated; and a Corps of Royalists under General Olañeta has entered that province coming from Peru. On the 14th July an Armistice was concluded at the City of Salta, between Olañeta commanding the Royalists Army and Commissioners on the part of the province. The *ostensible* object of which is, by agreeing to the withdrawing their Troops on both sides to leave the people to a free election of a new Governor and of Deputies to a General Congress. The *real* motive on the part of Olañeta however is suspected to be a desire to avail himself of a chance to augment a fortune already commenced, by permitting a free trade between the Provinces; the best fruits of which are for his private Chest. I have great pleasure in announcing to you a new organization of this Government which promises great solidity and character,

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

and from whose exertions the most important reforms are daily taking place. The Department of State & Treasury were, until the 18th of July last, united in one person Don Juan Manuel de Luca,—the Junta then decreed that these Departments should be separated; and the Governor called to the first, *Don Bernardino Rivadavia*, with the title of "Minister of the Government and of Foreign Relations". M^r. Luca remained charged with the Department of Treasury until the 1^st. August, when he offered his resignation, which was accepted, & a complimentary decree of the 8th of August published with the acceptance of the Governor. D^n Manuel Jose Garcia, many years Diplomatic Agent of the Director at Rio Janeiro since, has been appointed to that office. These two Gentlemen, Rivadavia and Garcia, both possess a great share of public confidence; have both acquired experience in public Affairs by long residences near foreign Courts; and they both seem animated by a zealous desire to establish order in the various branches of the Administration and economy in the public expenditure. This spirit of Reform which was the great cause of the overthrow of *Saratea* [Sarratea] by exciting the discontent and violent opposition of Military men, now furnishes also a hope to the partizans of *Purreydon* [Pueyrredón], who are raising great clamour against the new Ministers and working diligently to regain their influence. In short the present moment seems to be the crisis of struggle between public Virtue and Corruption, between a newborn impulse of public opinion, growing in the liberty of the press with that of parliamentary debate, and the rotten legacy of the Vice Royalty, the deleterious influence of military patronage. It is a struggle on the event of which hangs the future liberty and welfare of this province. May heaven smile on the efforts of Virtue and Patriotism!!

Another very important event has occurred since my last report. The Annexation of the Banda Oriental to the Kingdom of Brazils, and the recognition of the Independence of these provinces by His Most Faithful Majesty King John. These measures were simultaneous and correlative. On the 28th July, Don Juan Manuel de Figuieredo presented himself to this Government with the character of Consul of Portugal and Brazils, and with a Letter of Credence from the Brazilian Secretary of State, acknowledging the Independence of these provinces and expressing a hope that these provinces would acknowledge any and all Governments *of fact* which should be admitted and obeyed by the people of any neighbouring Provinces. This Government received M^r de Figuieredo with great courtesy, and passed over in silence the recognition with its implied condition.

. . . I yesterday saw M^r. Rivadavia for a few minutes, and again received an apology for his delay of the long promised Conference. I took occasion to say that I was aware of his unceasing occupation in the arduous place he held and must conform to his convenience but that there was one subject on which I had been instructed to communicate the views of my Government, and which by the information daily received, became most

imperiously pressing, as interesting to the Character of this Government; which I knew he had so much at heart. I then stated, that by late advices from the West Indies the horrors of Piracy which had so justly excited universal indignation, were daily increasing, as well by the numbers of the Vessels as by their strength of Armament, and the boldness of their nefarious Enterprizes. That recently a Vessel fitted out here under the name of the *Confederation* had changed her name, and her Commander, and was captured under the Commission of Artigas by a French Frigate, and carried into Martinique; from whence the Captain, and a number of the Crew being Seamen of the U. S. had been sent to Philadelphia in a French armed Brig for trial. That all these Vessels were notoriously furnished with several different Commissions. & according to the Privateering Regulations of this Province, they were to be deemed pirates. That one of them had recently fired on a Government Brig of France and killed the Commander. That I was instructed by my Government to make the strongest remonstrance on this subject. To all these observations M^r^ Rivadavia replied that this evil would no longer exist, that there would soon be given an order recalling all privateers; that he was fully convinced that the most important object with this Government is, to acquire the good will and friendship of all other Governments.

And that he was determined to make every sacrifice to attain this great end. He said that Governments seated in perfect peace and security reasoned calmly on these subjects; but that this country had experienced so many difficulties in its struggle for Independence that the Government had been compelled to adopt the strongest measures against the Spanish Commerce; but, said he, "this is now all finished". I regret only that I have not had an opportunity to bring the subject to the view of this Government in the strong & energetic language of my Instructions; and should the promised conference be longer delayed I shall feel it my duty to write a note, and shall adopt the irresistible arguments with which I am armed by the Secretary of State.

At the moment I am writing, a Salvo of Artillery and the most extravagant demonstrations of joy through the streets, announce the Capture of Lima, by S^t^ Martin's besieging Army. If this News be true, it puts the seal to the Independence of South America. The Spanish Royalty driven from its last hope in these provinces and enlightened by a Representative Government, will I think within Six Months, acknowledge their Independence. But I should not be surprised if the total absence of all the great means of self government should induce them to accept the Condition of receiving a limited Monarchy. It is possible that they may even be brought to accept a Spanish Prince. But what is most to be apprehended is that they may come under British protection and Influence. I dare not offer my poor opinion, but it appears among possible effects that the fraternity and friendly Councils of

the Government of the U.S. if not too long delayed might have a tendency to counteract the relapse of these people into Monarchy. In this suggestion I hope I shall not be suspected of any personal motive; as I must take the occasion to say that a less conspicuous Employment at home would be much more agreeable to me than the ostentatious and uncertain Establishment of Diplomacy. Advancing years, at once damp the ardour of ambition, and warn me of the necessity of a tranquil and permanent Employment. Enclosed I hand a Copy of the Bulletin published of the capture of Lima. Although it comes through the Channel of Individual Correspondence it meets with general credence.

September 6, 1821.

We have as yet no *official* news from Lima; it's fall, however, is still very generally believed. Letters just received from Spain confirmed by the opinion of the best informed Spaniards at Rio, hold out the confident expectation of an immediate recognition of the Independence of these provinces by the Cortes.

I have the honour [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

September 11, 1821.

Enclosed I transmit an important state paper published here—a manifest of the governor and his secretary on the projet presented to the honorable junta in relation to the congress now assembled at Cordova, together with the projet submitted, which, as will be seen, is intended to lay the foundation for future federation. Messrs. Rivadavia and Garcia are pressing with great vigor their system of reform, and, by a strong blow at the root, have violently shaken the branches of the tree of corruption. Consternation has been spread through the ranks of smugglers, by the arrest and close imprisonment, the day before yesterday, of *Don Fernando Calderon*, first inspector of the custom-house. This man, although enjoying a very liberal salary, has notoriously patronized the unblushing atrocites of the giant smugglers who have totally dilapidated the revenues of the country for years past. The leading man, accustomed to ask and obtain every thing of the Government, yesterday solicited of the governor a mitigation of the imprisonment of Mr. Calderon, and perhaps his discharge on bail. The governor consulted Mr. Rivadavia on the expediency of listening to the call of mercy. The latter replied

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 821.

very respectfully to the governor, that he certainly had the power and the responsibility of any measures he might adopt, but that, if his excellency yielded to the solicitations in question, he (Mr. R.) must decline any further service as secretary. This firmness prevailed. The truth is, Mr. Rivadavia, being the father of the incipient system of order and virtue, from his growing influence, has become indispensable to the accomplishment of the views now cherished by the public opinion. If this system should prevail, the immediate effect of it will be the prevalence of civil over military influence.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Relations of the United Provinces of South America[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 14, 1821.*

SIR: Although I have been more than ten months in this city, I have never until now found a moment when, under all circumstances, I deemed it expedient to lay before this Government the sentiments and views of that of the United States in relation to many interesting subjects as contained in the instructions I received on my departure from Washington. On the recent organization of the Government, I intimated to you the desire to hold a full and frank conference, which you had the goodness to promise me at the commencement of the past month, but which has been unavoidably delayed by your more pressing occupations.

Appreciating as I do the great and efficient efforts now making by you in the cause of your country, I should most willingly continue to wait your convenience for the proposed conference, were I not impelled by recent information to press on the early attention of this Government one of the subjects on which I am instructed by that of the United States—I mean those indiscriminate violences which are daily committed on the ocean against the peaceful commerce of unoffending nations, under the various flags of the South American provinces.

It is now a long time since those violences have called forth the most pointed reprobation of many Governments in Europe, and of that of the United States. Several Governments have made active efforts to repress them by force. These efforts have been unavailing; these privileged plunderers

> Can add colors to the chameleon,
> Change shapes with Proteus for advantage.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 822.

There is nothing fixed but the blackness of their purpose and the boldness of their atrocities. They are furnished with various commissions, and navigated by crews of men without country, without morality, and without other ties than those of crime and plunder. By the privateering regulations of Buenos Ayres, a privateer owned here, or commissioned by this Government, who shall be furnished with a commission from any other prince or republic, even if allied with this, "*shall be adjudged a good prize, and her captain or commander punished as pirates.*" It is therefore under the sanction of its own laws that I presume to call the early and efficacious intervention of this Government to vindicate those violated laws. But, sir, it is, above all, from a full faith in those sentiments of honor, that love of order and justice which so eminently distinguish every step of the present administration, that I derive the strongest hope that this call will not be disregarded. The public gazettes recently received from the United States contain several well-authenticated statements of new outrages committed by these freebooters, whose numbers are multiplied, and the boldness of their wicked enterprises increased by their impunity. I will not swell this written communication by any extracts from the information received; but hope that, at an early day, it will be convenient for you to admit me to a personal conference, when I shall be happy to communicate with you in that spirit of frankness, which is the best pledge of friendship, as well the facts in my possession as the feelings of the Government of the United States on this highly interesting and important subject.

I avail myself with pleasure of this occasion to renew to you, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration and respect.

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Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Relations of the United Provinces of South America, to John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 15, 1821.*

The Minister of Government and of Foreign Relations has had the honor of receiving the official note from the agent of the United States under yesterday's date, and he considers it as his particular duty to make an acknowledgment of the honorable distinction the said agent shows towards him. With respect to the principal affair therein contained, he can only repeat what he had the satisfaction to make him acquainted with in his last interview, which was, that the Government had adopted every measure in its power to suppress the evils committed by privateers of this country towards the commerce of neutral nations from the abuse of their commissions.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 823.

Nevertheless, the Minister of Government and of Foreign Relations feeling desirous of contributing towards the completion of these measures as far as they are capable of being made perfect, he will be happy to receive any further explanation on this subject that the agent of the United States may think proper to give him: for which purpose, it will be taken as an honor if the agent would take the trouble to call on the minister at his house on Monday morning, the 17th instant, at eleven o'clock.

The Minister of Government and of Foreign Relations expresses his thanks to the agent for the distinction he confers upon him, and begs to return it by the assurances of his consideration and respect.

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Minute of a conference between John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, and Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Relations of the United Provinces of South America [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 17, 1821.*

I received this morning at ten o'clock, by the hands of one of the clerks of the department, an answer from the Minister of State to my letter of the 14th instant, containing an invitation to a conference at eleven o'clock at his house. Although the notice was too short to admit of any preparation, I gladly accepted the invitation, taking with me my instructions, including those intended for the late Commodore Perry. I found the minister, Mr. Rivadavia, quite alone, and was, as always, well received. I commenced my conversation by very sincere assurances of the enthusiasm I felt in the present march of events, and compliments to the minister on his zealous efforts for the establishment of order in the administration, and the formation of a sound public opinion in the country. I then observed that, not having had time to prepare extracts, I had brought my instructions *in extenso*, and would ask permission, in frankness and friendship, to read certain parts of them in the original language in which they were written, which I was aware was well understood by him. I then read the assurances of the good-will of the United States towards these provinces, and the interest they had constantly felt in the success of their efforts for independence. I continued through the history of our diplomatic correspondence and measures in relation to the South American affairs, to all which the minister listened with much attention and apparent approbation. When I communicated to

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 823.

him the fact that the United States Government had proposed to those of France and England to acknowledge, in concert with them, the independence of Buenos Ayres, in reply to my question he confessed his previous ignorance of that fact. I then continued the forcible expositions in the instructions to Commodore Perry of the evils and horrors of the system of piracy as practised by vessels carrying various colors of the South American provinces, and stated to him that the United States would not acknowledge as legal any commission granted in blank; which he said was perfectly just, and continued by saying that he was fully sensible of all the injury which had been done to the cause and character of these provinces, and deprecated as much as any one the atrocities which had been committed on neutral commerce; that the Government had determined on an entire change of system, and that, probably, this day a decree would be drawn up revoking all privateer commissions, and ordering them all to return within a given period. But this decree would be communicated to me, when it would be seen if any thing more efficacious remained to be done within the scope of the Government's authority. I observed that the decision of the Government was in perfect unison with the whole system now going into operation, eminently wise and politic, and would have a most important influence on the opinion of other nations in regard to this country; that, as nothing had so much operated to damp the enthusiasm of my countrymen in favor of South American liberty as the enormities committed under the patriot flags, so nothing would so effectually tend to reanimate their good wishes as the suppression of those crying abuses. I stated to the minister the measures adopted by Congress to repress the predatory system, and particularly the act of 20th of April, 1815, of which he requested and I promised a copy. I next read from the instruction of 12th July, 1820, the remarks on the subject of commercial preferences, and the magnanimous feeling with which the Government of the United States disclaimed any wish to barter an acknowledgment of the independence of these provinces for any exclusive advantages in their commerce; at the same time, their firm reliance that no such exclusive privileges would be granted to other nations to the prejudice of the United States. On this, Mr. Rivadavia assured me that it was the firm determination of this Government to grant no exclusive privileges of commerce to any nation whatever, and that I might communicate this decision to my Government, with an assurance that the most complete reliance might be placed on it. The minister proceeded, that his most decided opinion was, that no measure whatever ought to be taken to solicit an acknowledgment of the independence of these provinces by any Government. He expressed himself in flattering terms of his good-will towards me personally, and added, that it would be an abuse of the confidence I had evinced towards him if he were to engage me to make any representations to my Government tending to that end, and that he was much less disposed to take any such measure towards any Govern-

ment of Europe; that such proceeding must operate, if unsuccessful, to the humiliation of the provinces, and, if successful, to mislead the people, by persuading them that such recognition was all-sufficient to their political existence and happiness; that, in his opinion, the most efficacious system would be to establish order and wise institutions of government throughout the provinces, and to show themselves worthy of the fraternity of other nations, when it would be voluntarily offered; that such voluntary recognition, in every point of view, would be much more beneficial than that protection which should result from a compromise of honor or interest; that he had told his countrymen, *de haute voix*, his sentiments on the important topic of self-government; that much was to be done, but that he hoped to see the successful progress of a sound system of domestic and foreign policy. Our conference lasted, with a short interruption, nearly two hours, and we separated with assurances of mutual satisfaction.

An exact minute taken immediately after the conference.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Affairs of the United Provinces of South America [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 22, 1821.*

SIR: Enclosed I have the honor to transmit a correct copy of the act of Congress passed on the 20th of April, 1818, for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, to which act reference was had in the conference to which you did me the honor to admit me on Monday, the 17th instant.

I pray you, Mr. Minister, to accept [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [2]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 28, 1821.*

SIR: My two last despatches (N^{os}. 18 & 19 under 2nd. & 11th. Instant) went by Brig Fox, Captain Frazier, via Havannah, and Duplicates by Ship Amer-

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 824. For the minute of the conference of the 17th instant mentioned, see above, pt. II, doc. 269.

[2] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

ica, Hilliard, from Monte Video to New York. I am still without any direct opportunity and send this to Monte Video to go by the Brig Oswego, Hamilton, to the Havannah. In ten days I hope to have a direct opportunity by which I shall forward a more detailed report of occurrences here together with copies of correspondence and official Documents connected with this Agency. I have a despatch from Judge Prevost containing the Gazettes of Lima published since the Revolution there, which I shall forward by first direct opportunity. The night before the last (26th. Instant) The Governor (Rodrigues) received an official despatch from General San Martin confirming the previous news of the surrender of Lima to the liberating Army, and accompanied by Gazettes giving the details of that important event. Yesterday Morning this great event was announced to this City by Salves of Artillery from the fort and National Vessels which were repeated at Noon and at Sun set. At 5 O'Clock in the afternoon The Governor, attended by his Ministers and all the public functionaries, went to the Cathedral to attend a *Te Deum*, and in the Evening the City was Brilliantly illuminated; other public festivities are said to be contemplated, among which a Ball, by the Chillian Minister, at the Theatre and another by the Government are spoken of. In fact this event is generally considered as a finishing blow in the contest for Independence. Inclosed is a paper just published here containing a familiar letter from San Martin (addressed I presume to his father in law Mr. Escalada) Signed *Pepe* which is the familiar abreviation of Joseph, and does not mean (as Mr. Breckenridge has it in his Book) Papa or Father, also various public documents relating to the taking possession of Lima, a correspondence between San Martin and the Archbishop of Lima, the Declaration of the Cabildo & c. By these public papers it appears that San Martin has added to his fame by the moderation and respect for Public opinion which he has manifested on this great occasion. Everything here breathes joy and the brightest hope of the perfection of their political happiness. The Congress at Cordova is now entirely lost in the contemplation of a grand Congress which it is said will be agreed on by the Three great Republics of Peru Chili and La Plata. Perhaps the Sister Colombia may be invited to this family party. . . .

Among the important events which have occurred on this side of the mountains, I must not omit to notice the total destruction of the party of José Miguel Carrera, and the public execution of that active, intelligent, and extraordinary man. Enclosed I herewith transmit two bulletins published here concerning this event. By the first, it will appear that a colonel (Don Manuel Arias) had organized a revolution in Carrera's band, which he communicated to the Governor of Mendoza on the condition of saving his own life, and those of some of his adherents. By the second, entitled "Detail of the destruction of Carrera," it will be seen that Carrera's party was totally defeated by the Mendozinos on the 31st August, and that, on the 4th of this

month, Carrera was shot on the public square at Mendoza; he died with the most heroic courage, asking for only favor of his conquerors that he might be buried in the same grave with his two brothers, who were shot in the same city on a former occasion. It would be well for humanity if the story of this event stopped here; but I again have to state another act of savage ferocity. The murdered body of this brave and distinguished man was shockingly mutilated; his head was cut off and exposed in the square of Mendoza; his right arm was sent to the Governor of Cordova, and his left to the Punta San Luis. When these particulars were known here, they excited a sentiment of horror; and it has even been said that if this victim of the ferocity of their half savage brethren at Mendoza had been sent to this place, even his life would have been probably spared.

Carrera, by his great personal resources, had proved the most dangerous enemy of the present state of things in these provinces; and had San Martin failed in Peru, and had Carrera survived that failure, he would have menaced the tranquillity of Chili; thus his death is a great event for the present rulers here, although the manner of it may be very revolting to their more civilized breasts. . . .

October 1, 1821.

P. S. Since writing the foregoing, there has been a further publication of papers connected with the occupation of Lima, containing certain proclamations of Generals San Martin and Arenales; this publication I herewith enclose. The new ministers have very judiciously availed themselves of the present moment to propose to the junta a general amnesty, and that all those who have been exiled for differences of political opinion should be recalled to the bosom of their country: this proposition, so worthy the high-minded cause of the present ministry, and so well calculated to conciliate all parties, is to be discussed this evening at the junta. I shall attend the debate, seats being assigned to the foreign agents. Among the events tending to consolidate the moral and physical force of these provinces, it is said that a revolution has taken place in the Entre Rios against the brother of the slain Ramirez. At the head of this revolution is a Mr. Mansilla, of whose rank and history I am ignorant. The flotilla of this province is co-operating, and further assistance has been asked of Lopez, the Governor of Santa Fé. The trade of the Baxada has been opened in consequence of this revolution. I just now met Mr. Rivadavia in the street, and took the occasion to remind him of the decree which he had promised to send me on the subject of privateering; he said it depended only on him to reduce it to writing, which he had not yet had time to do. He has given me reason to hope that he will call on me to-morrow; but the Herculean labor of cleansing the Augean stables so entirely occupies him, day and night, I sometimes fear he will be quite exhausted before he can accomplish it.

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Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Relations of the United Provinces of South America, to John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *October 6, 1821.*

The Minister of Government and of Foreign Relations, in consequence of the offer made, has the honor to transmit to the agent of the United States a copy of the decree which has just been issued by the Department of War and Marine concerning privateering.

The minister salutes the agent [etc.].

DECREE

DEPARTMENT OF WAR, BUENOS AIRES, *October 6, 1821.*

Among the resources which the unfortunate rights of war have rendered lawful, and its object necessary, is privateering. The wars of the independence of the provinces of Holland and of the United States of North America have proved that this kind of warfare is the most advantageous for a country which prepares to defend its independence against a more ancient and remote country that has governed it. It is impossible to prevent or repress all the abuses which may result from privateering. The Government which finds itself under the painful necessity of authorizing, and even of encouraging it, has only two ways of lessening its illegal consequences, and in so far has only two obligations in this respect: the first is, to dictate such rules and take such precautions and guaranties as may correct abuses, not suffering them to pass unpunished. In this respect the Government of these provinces has fulfilled its duty, and the regulation of privateers proves it. The other obligation is, to put an end to this kind of warfare, either when it shall be no longer necessary to the object which induced it, or when the effect which it produces no longer equals the risks and inconvenience which result from it. The Government considers these two cases as having taken place, and, in virtue thereof, it has agreed upon, and now decrees, the following articles:

1. In future, no commission of privateering whatever shall be granted without a previous solemn publication, expressing the cause which obliges the Government to have recourse to this measure.

2. Every individual who possesses any commission, and shall be now in the territory of this province, shall be obliged to present it to the Minister of Marine within fifteen days from the date of this decree.

3. Those individuals who hold privateer commissions, and are in countries situated on the other side of the equinoctial line, or on the coast of the Pacific, shall be held to present the said commissions at the Ministry of Marine within the term of eight months.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 824.

4. The sureties given shall answer for the fulfilment of the foregoing articles.

5. Every commander of a vessel armed as a privateer in virtue of a commission of any one of the Governments which have commanded in this capital, on sight of this decree, shall cease to cruise, and shall put into port to disarm and return his commission.

6. Every one who shall contravene the preceding article will incur the pains of piracy.

7. Every vessel which, after the term of eight months from the date of this decree, shall continue to cruise under the authority of a commission of the Government of this country, shall be treated as a pirate.

8. The Minister of War and Marine is charged with the execution of this decree.

MARTIN RODRIGUEZ,
Minister of War and Marine.
FRANCISCO DE LA CRUZ.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *October 8, 1821.*

SIR: The detention of the vessel by which I had prepared to send the foregoing despatch furnishes an opportunity to communicate a translation of the promised decree for suppressing privateering. It has not yet been published here, but will undoubtedly appear in the first official register, which will perhaps be printed to-morrow or next day. I hope that the terms of it will prove satisfactory to the Government of the United States. Although the right is reserved of resorting again to this kind of warfare, yet I hope that the restrictions under which it will be renewed will be more efficient to guard against those abuses which have heretofore been so justly and extensively complained of.

By the schooner Essex, to sail to-morrow for Providence, I shall have the honor to transmit duplicates, together with Judge Prevost's despatch, mentioned in the foregoing.

I am, [etc.].

October 11, 1821.

P. S. By this vessel, (the Essex, via Providence,) I send Judge Prevost's despatch, and a large file of newspapers. The decree against privateering was published yesterday in the "*Registro Oficial.*"

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 824.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *October 26, 1821.*

. . . As I before hinted, the opinion of the best statesmen here is, that the conquest of Lima and Peru, although it cuts the last thread of connection between old spain and South America, yet it will not accelerate the great objects of self Government. We have also various reports (without any direct intelligence either in confirmation or negation) that the occupation of Lima was a mere *ruse de guerre* of *La Serna*, who, 'tis said, has returned and now blockades *San Martin* in that City. Many also say that *San Martin* is the known advocate of a limited monarchy. All these circumstances cast a thick cloud over the future destiny of this Country. On this side the Mountains it is said that *Bustos* the Governor of Cordova, is striving most diligently to excite the other provinces to an united attack on this, to force it to cooperate at once in the congress already assembled at Cordova. In the mean time *Rivadavia* and *Garcia*, firm as they are enlightened and patriotic, are pursuing "the even tenor of their way". They have added public credit to the other sinews of war which this province before possessed, by repaying with great punctuality in Gold, several loans, (a thing without example in the history of this Revolution) they enjoy now to so great a degree, the confidence of the Community, that I believe they could borrow, to any reasonable amount, for an immediate exigency. It is said also that an entirely new System of Finance is agreed on and will appear in a few days. By this Tariff, as it has been represented to me, the duties, with a very few exceptions, will be *ad valorem*, and will vary from 5 to 15 per cent. Every possible measure is taken to prevent smuggling—and public opinion and morality are cherished by the Government. If, therefore, Buenos Ayres, in all the darkness of her most gloomy period, public sentiment paralyzed by deadly dissentions and public resources completely delapidated, has been able to struggle successfully against the machinations of the other provinces, it is not too rash to expect that, when she fights with a twofold armament of reason and force, seconded by a vigorous public credit, the victory must eventually be hers. The most deplorable result, however, of these continued agitations is, the necessity of continuing an onerous military establishment.

The most alarming state of agitation prevails in the neighbouring Kingdom of Brazil. It was some days since confidently reported on the authority of Captain M^{c}. Lean, of the British Government Brig Beaver, in six days from Rio to Montevideo, that Prince Don Pedro, was to have been Crowned King of Brazil on the 13th. of the present Month. Subsequent accounts contradict

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

this fact, and it is now no longer believed. It is however, well known that the public mind there is in a most feverish state and, should civil war burst forth, it would be the signal of the emancipation of a numberless horde of slaves and the most horrid scenes of blood and devastation would overwhelm that Kingdom and eventually threaten these provinces, where it would find easy victims in the scanty white population here. the progress of this all destroying flame could only be arrested by the Indians and, in such a conflict, this delightful country would be totally lost to civilization. . . .

P.S. October 31st. 1821. Two rumours are afloat. the one is, that Don Ricardo Lopez, brother to the slain *Ramirez* and his Successor in the Chief Command in *Entre Rios* has been compleatly beaten and has fled towards the Banda Oriental with only half a dozen followers. The other report is, that the Congress at Cordova has dismissed the Deputies of this Province and proceeded without their Co-operation to form a federation, has chosen General San Martin as Supreme Director, and named as his substitute, *Bustos*, the present Governor of Cordova. the first report is confirmed to me by a Gentleman, just arrived from Baxada de Sta Fé. if the other be true in any, or to what extent, I am as yet unable to say. . . .

I inclose a Bulletin just published relative to the Events in Entre Rios.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *November 8, 1821.*

Since my last respects, we have received news from Lima and Chili, by which it appears that the royalist army, which had evacuated Lima on the

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV, 825. The following enclosure commenting on the decree of October 6, quoted above, pt. II, doc. 272, suppressing privateering is copied from the MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II:

BUENOS AIRES, *November 8, 1821.*

SENOR ARGOS: Although I have seen in many instances the desire on the part of the disaffected to find fault with every measure of our present administration, yet I confess I was much surprized to observe that a Writer in "*El Patriota*" N° 14 has even censured the decree for the suppression of Privateering. It is impossible, Mr. Argos, among the many wise measures of the present Government, to select one more wise, more magnanimous, or so much calculated to propitiate the respect and fraternal esteem of other nations.

The language and tone of the decree are dignified and such as become an honorable Government. It asserts the legality of Privateering and reserves the right of again

6th July under La Serna, had returned on the 22d August under the command of Canterac, La Serna remaining sick at Xauxa. The strength of the

resorting to it, when circumstances shall render it necessary. It gives two cases in which it becomes a Government to relinquish this mode of warfare, the one is "When it is no longer necessary to the object which induced it" the other is "When the effect which it produces does not compensate the risks and embarrassments to which it exposes". The first of these cases has occurred, inasmuch as the Spanish Commerce has disappeared from the ocean; should Spain reestablish her Commerce and continue the struggle with us, or, should our Country be involved in war with any other Government, then we can claim the right under the reservation of the decree, of resuming Privateering. the second case has taken place in a far greater degree than is known or understood by our Countrymen in general. But, every South American who has had any intercourse with other nations or has even read foreign Gazettes, if he has any sentiment of Patriotism in his heart, must have suffered the most distressing humiliation in reading the narrative of daily outrages committed under the Flags of the South American Republics on the unarmed Commerce of neutral and Friendly nations.

The exalted and cherished name of *Patriot* has been brought into the most odious contempt and has at length become confounded with the ignominious and execrable epithet of *Pirate*. All these enormities are easily to be traced to one single cause. This Province being wholly without native Mariners; the authority and countenance of Government, as far as concerns all Maritime enterprizes, has necessarily been delivered over to a set of desperate foreign adventurers, who, having no tie of attachment to our Country, and, in most instances, not even the feeble leaning of an habitual residence, have gone forth with the Commissions of this Government (many of them granted in blank) into foreign countries to seek associates worthy of their Criminal views. These associates, sacrifizing at the blood-stained Altar of rapacity and crime, every moral sense of duty to God or man, have in many instances revolted, and murdered, or turned on shore, their Commanders, attacked and plundered defenceless Islands, robbed indiscriminately every vessel which came within their power, seduced the crews of some to join them in their depredations, suborned others to make false declarations of property, to alter and disguise the marks upon Bales and Cases of Merchandize, transshipped whole cargoes, and stranded captured vessels to escape the detection of their guilt, and evade the redeeming Process of the law. Thus, robbery and Plunder prowl on the waters of every Sea and retributive justice itself has no means of correcting or arresting the mischief—but by rousing rapine and murder to turn upon itself and punishing the crimes of their leaders through the rebellion of their associates. Of the many existing original cases suited to this black and disgraceful picture, it is only necessary to select two, fitted out in this place, *The Rondeau* and *The Confederation*. Where are these vessels and how have they finished their belligerent career? The first had made one, perhaps two prizes, when her crew revolted, killed one officer and set the rest adrift in a boat; after which the mutineers sunk the Vessel on the coast of the United States and landed on the shores of North Carolina. The last, after furnishing herself with an *Artigas* Commission and capturing even at the mouth of this river, a Portuguese Vessel, repaired to the West Indies, her first Captain left the Agent on shore, at Marguerita and ran away to S^{t} Bartholomews, a Swedish Island, to which the Agent followed the Vessel, and by, great pecuniary sacrifices, induced the Captain to resign the Command; a new Captain was named, and with another Flag and another name, *The Confederation* has been captured by a French Ship of War and condemned at Martinque! It would be well for the honor of our Country, if these were the only instances of similar histories among our maritime efforts, not always for national honour, but too frequently to enrich foreigners, who only assume the name of Patriots to prostitute it to the most criminal objects. If the enormities which may be traced to the cupidity of such men were not sufficient to excite the indignation of honest minds the authority of *Vattel*, one of the most distinguished publicists who have enlightened international morality, puts the stamp of execration on them. "Subjects are not obliged to weigh the justice of the War, which indeed they are not always able to obtain a correct knowledge of, and in case of doubt, they are to rely on the Sovereign's judgement; there is no doubt but they may serve their Country with a safe conscience by fitting out Privateers. But on the contrary, *foreigners taking Commissions* from a prince to prey on a nation, absolutely innocent with respect to them, *are guilty of an infamous practice*. The thirst of Gold is their only inducement and however their commissions may assure them of impunity *it cannot wash away their execrable guilt*". Vattel B. III Ch. XV. § 229.

In the treaty between the United States of North America and the King of Prussia

returning army was between three and four thousand men; the official accounts say that they avoided an engagement with San Martin, but I have seen several private letters, and one from a citizen of the United States, who was two days in San Martin's camp, in view of the royalist troops, and who states that San Martin's force was much superior, and extremely anxious to give battle; but that San Martin retired, and permitted the unmolested march of the royalists into Callao. The motive of such a proceeding is generally deemed strange and incomprehensible; but it occurs to me that San Martin, being sure of eventually forcing the garrison of Callao, augmented as it is, to a capitulation, prefers to continue his influence by protracting the military conflict until the civil organization of this new-born republic shall be completed, rather than to put down the remnant of the royal troops, and leave the country to the agonies of conflicting factions; or, in a few words, to make himself, at his own choice, King, Dictator, or Director. He has at present taken the head of the civil and military power, with the title of Protector. All accounts agree in the enthusiasm for independence prevailing in Lima. On the late return of the royalist troops, it became necessary to imprison twelve hundred old Spaniards, as it is said, to preserve them from the popular fury. I have conversed on these events with several gentlemen well acquainted with Peru and Lima, and particularly with a sensible friar, native

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are two articles which deserve to be cited on this subject. Article 20th. of this Treaty stipulates "that no citizen or subject of either of the contracting parties shall take from any power with which the other may be at War, any Commission or Letter of Marque for arming any vessel to act as a Privateer against the other on pain of being punished as a Pirate".

Article 23rd of same treaty stipulates—"If war should arise between the two contracting parties all merchant and trading vessels, employed in exchanging the Product of different places and thereby rendering the necessaries, conveniences and comforts of human life more easy to be obtained and more general, shall be allowed to pass free and unmolested, and neither of the contracting parties shall grant or issue *any commission to any private armed vessels* empowering them to take or destroy any such trading vessels or interrupt such Commerce". this treaty was negociated and concluded in behalf of the United States by that zealous Patriot and enlightened Philanthropist, John Quincy Adams, now Secretary of State.

But, even in the bloody reign of Robespierre, the Nero of the French Revolution, a proposal was made by the French to the British Government to renounce Privateering mutually.

I would ask the advocates of Privateering what proportion of the whole property captured under the Commissions of this Government has been brought into this Province? what part of all these captures has been lawfully condemned by a competent authority? I apprehend that a strict inquiry into the facts on these two questions would shew that not one quarter part, certainly not one half of the whole amount captured, has either been sold or condemned in this Province. thus, the honor and character of this Province has been put at stake, in perfect contempt and mockery of its legislation, without enriching or in any possible manner, benefiting the Country. To have put an end to this revolting, disgraceful course of things, is the great offence committed by our Government in the decree for the suppression of Privateering. That our Ministers may continue to commit such faults, until they shall have engraven their names on the loftiest and brightest Pillars of imperishable fame, is the prayer of

A *Porteno**, real friend of his Country.

It is believed that the Chilian Government has put an end to Privateering.

* *Porteno*, means native of Bs. Ayres.

of, and, until recently, resident at Lima, who agrees in the general opinion that the return of the troops to Callao is a most fortunate event, inasmuch as it places the termination of the war in the hands of San Martin; whereas, had La Serna kept the country, and increased his forces, he might have continued the war for a very long time. I send enclosed a bulletin issued on the subject, by which you will be able to see and appreciate events in their detail.

Of this province I have only to say that there are still active but occult efforts making to overturn the present administration, and bring the Pueyrredon party into power.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *November 13, 1821.*

SIR: Inclosed I transmit duplicate of my last respects (N°. 22) under 8th Instant. My solicitude for the Brig Canada is at an end. She has escaped the menaced investigation and gone to sea. Since my last we have the important news of the Surrender of Callao; I send inclosed the bulletin published here by which you will see the particulars of the Capitulation. Private letters state that *Canterac's* Army was much harrassed on its retreat and were still pursued; it is said that eight hundred of his army had joined that of *San Martin;* it was thought that there would not remain five hundred men to join *La Serna.* I have seen a private letter which states that when the report reached Lima of Canterac's approach, funds to the amount of five or Six hundred thousand dollars were embarked on board the Ships at L'Ancon. Lord Cochrane had been for some time making every exertion to procure money to pay off the Crews of his Ships, but without effect. On hearing that this amount was on board the different transports, he repaired to Ancon with the O Higgins and Esmeralda and forcibly took possession of the whole sum in defiance of the strong representations of the General, and immediately paid the arrearage due to his men. report says that he has not dared to put his foot on shore since he took this violent measure.

I have recently in a familiar table Conversation ascertained from the Chief Clerk of the Foreign Department that the offensive letter of the Secretary at war, *La Cruz,* addressed to me under 28th February, as reported in my Despatch N° 9 under 10th March,[2] was dictated by a premeditated intention to send me away, which was in conformity with the public sentiment in relation to us prevailing at that time. My readiness to feel the insult and to quit them, had the effect to bring them to reflections which produced a change in

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II. [2] See above, pt. II, doc. 261.

their views. I cannot pretend that the general feeling towards us is materially changed, because it has not been proper to make those explanations to the people which I have made to the Minister, but with this last I have reason to believe that I am on the best possible footing. the prevailing feeling among the natives here towards foreigners is distrust, mixed with somewhat of contempt. Their successes against the English have inspired them with a senseless conceit and insupportable vanity. They do not love the English but the Government likes much the revenue derived from their rich Commerce and Individuals like the fine things which are furnished at low prices. yet, with all these motives to cherish the British Commerce, there is a strong desire on the part of the principal Creole Merchants to monopolize the Commerce of the Country to the entire exclusion of foreigners and this party was very active in fomenting the warm discussion which arose last April between this Government and the British Merchants, and which, had it arisen in a moment like the present, would probably have been pushed to greater extremities.

I am [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

November 16, 1821.

The "Registro Oficial," No. 13, published yesterday, contains the resolution of the honorable junta on the subject of general amnesty, and oblivion of political acts and opinions, together with a decree of the governor, by which all those who have been exiled under the special powers vested in the Executive by the decree of 6th of October, 1820, and all who have voluntarily absented themselves to avoid the evils of political agitation, may forthwith return without passports: only nine persons are excepted from this amnesty, and they are not named.

It is said that an officer has arrived here, sent by the Governor of Tucuman, charged to solicit military aid to deliver that province and its vicinity of the presence of the royalist troops, and at the same time to declare a perfect coincidence of opinion with that put forth by this Government on the subject of the confederation. Every thing continues to go on well here. Enclosed I send a printed paper entitled "*Dictamen de un Arribeno,*" (which means citizen of the interior provinces.) It goes to maintain the inexpediency of a confederation at present, which is the ground taken by this province.

[1] *American State Papers, Foreign Relations,* IV, 821.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *December 12, 1821.*

SIR: I had this honour under 13th of November (N°. 24) and under 23 Same (N°. 25) both which went in Original by same Vessel (The Brig Homer Captn.

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II. For the dispatch number 24 mentioned in the second paragraph, see above, pt. II, doc. 276, Forbes to Secretary of State, November 13, 1821. The item referred to as "under 16th November" was added as a postscript of that date to the dispatch of three days earlier. The following is the enclosure referred to in the first paragraph as a constitution given to Peru by San Martin:

A provisional Statute given by the Protector of the liberty of Perú for the better regulation of the free Departments, until the establishment of the permanent Constitution of the State

At the time of taking the supreme command under the title of Protector of Perú, my only intention is to lay the basis for the labours of those who in future may be called to the sublime destiny of procuring happiness to the people. I have received the whole authority to answer for its use before the whole nation. I disclose my designs without reserve, that they may be estimated according to their nature; and from the field of battle, where, united with my companions in arms I have sought the glory of destroying oppression I have come to put myself at the head of a difficult & responsible administration. The motives of that resolution which I adopted on the 4th. of August are deeply engraved on my conscience, & the Statute to which I am about to swear this day explains and justifies at once those motives.

I might have extolled the liberality of my principles in the provisional Statute, by making splendid declarations of the rights of the People and by increasing the list of the functionaries, so as to give to the actual forms a greater chance for popularity. But, persuaded that the super-abundance of plausible maxims, is not the best way in the beginning to establish them, I have confined myself to those ideas, which can & ought to be reduced to practice.

While the enemy shall exist in the country, & until the people can acquire the first notions of Government, I shall continue in the direction of the affairs of the State, which without being the same, are yet analogous to the legislative & executive powers. But never will I interfere in the exercise of the judiciary functions; for the independence of the judiciary is the only & true shield for the liberty of the people. The ostentation of good & philanthropic maxims does not produce any benefit, when he who makes the law, is the same who executes it.

Before requiring the inhabitants to pay obedience to the Statute, I solemnly promise from my part its observance. Those who with the experience of the past consider the posture of affairs and are in the habit of reflecting on administrative measures, will find in the simplicity of the principles here adopted that I do not promise any more than what I think convenient to fulfill; that my object is to do good, & not to prevent it; and lastly, that knowing the extent of my responsibility, I have endeavoured to proportion duties to the law of the existing circumstances.

With such sentiments, and confident of the cordial cooperation of all my countrymen, I beg leave to hope for the time when it shall be expedient to restore the deposit put into my hands with the satisfaction of having discharged all its duties. If after giving liberty to Peru, I can leave it in the full possession of its destinies, I shall retire to look for happiness in the recess of private life, passing the rest of my existence in the contemplation of the goodness of the almighty, & in humble prayers for the continuance of his bounty over future generations.

PROVISIONAL STATUTE GIVEN BY THE PROTECTOR OF THE LIBERTY OF PERÚ FOR THE BETTER REGULATION OF THE FREE DEPARTMENTS, UNTIL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE

FIRST SECTION

ARTICLE 1st. The Catholic, apostolic, roman religion is the religion of the State—the Government acknowledges as one of its first duties to maintain & perserve it by all

Phillips to Baltimore) Copies via Monte Video. Since writing the foregoing some important events have occurred of which I shall endeavour to give a

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the means which are within the reach of human prudence. Whoever attacks in public or privately its dogmas & principles shall be punished with severity in proportion to the Scandal which he may have occasioned.

2d. Those others who profess the same religion and dissent in some principles from the religion of the state, may obtain permission of the Government, with consent of the Council of State, to use the right which belongs to them, provided that their conduct shall not transcend the public order.

3d. No one can hold a public office, without professing the religion of the State.

SECOND SECTION

ARTICLE 1st. the Supreme Directive power of the free Departments of the State of Peru shall remain for the present on the Protector. his powers emanate from the empire of necessity of force, of reason and of the exigency of the public good.

2d. The Protector of Peru is the Generallissimo of the forces by sea and land, it being his principal duty to give liberty to all the people who form an integral part of the territory of the state, he may augment or diminish the armed force as he may deem proper.

3d. He shall have power to impose taxes, establish duties and require loans to provide for the public expences, with the Consent of his Council of State

4th. He shall form regulations for the better service and organization of the Sea & land forces, comprehending in them the Militia of the State

5th. He shall regulate Interior & exterior Commerce in conformity with those liberal principles on which essentially depends the prosperity of the Country

6th. He shall make those reforms which he may deem necessary in all the Departments of the public administration, abolishing the offices which existed under the former Government and creating others

7th. He shall establish a provisional Coinage of the State but shall not alter the weight & law which has hitherto existed for the money of Peru.

8th He shall name Envoys and Consuls near foreign Courts & shall promote the acknowledgement of the Independence of Peru, by adjusting Diplomatic & Commercial treaties which shall be conformable to the Interests of the Country, the whole with consent of his Council of State

9th. He shall have the Title of "*Excellency*", which shall not be given to any other Individual or Corporation, excepting that which may hereafter be indicated, because the dignity of Government requires it. Those who have heretofore had the title of Excellency, shall in future have that of "Your illustrious Lordship"

THIRD SECTION

ARTICLE 1st. The Ministers of State are the immediate chiefs in their respective Departments of all the authorities which depend on each one of them

2d. They shall expedite all orders & direct official Communications as well within as without the territory of the State in the name of the Protector under his responsibility and only firm, taking care to have them, each & every one, Countersigned & collated by the Protector in the book belonging to each Ministry

3d. The orders and regulations which the Protector may dictate for the reforms of Administration shall be signed by him & by the Minister to whom it belongs

4th. In Communications with foreign Governments they are to address themselves to the minister whom it concerns, observing the same rule with those which may be returned.

5th. All official communications shall be made directly to the Ministers, observing the classification of affairs on which they turn.

6th. The Title of Ministers shall be that of "*Most illustrious Lordship*" with the address of "*Most Illustrious Sir*".

FOURTH SECTION

ARTICLE 1st. There shall be a Council of State composed of twelve Individuals—to wit —the three Ministers of State, the President of the high Chamber of Justice, the General in Chief of the united army, the Chief of the General Staff of Peru, Lieut[t] General, Count of Valle Ovelle, the Dean of this Holy Church, the Marechal de Camp Marquis of Torre Tagle, the Count of Vega & the Count of Torre Volade—the vacancy which remains shall be filled hereafter.

2d. Its functions shall be the following.—to give its opinion to the Government in cases of difficult deliberation, to examine the great plans of reform which the Protector

faithful report according to the best materials in my possession. San Martin, whom we have long seen as the Conqueror under the name of *Deliverer* of

may take into Contemplation, to make on them such observations as may best suit the public good & to propose such as shall be most advantageous to the prosperity of the country

3d. The Council of State shall hold its Sessions in the Palace—the Protector shall assist at them when he finds it convenient, to resolve after consulting & discussing on the arduous deliberations.

4th. The Council of State shall name a Secretary who shall have no vote, who shall record the acts which shall pass and shall charge himself with drawing up the projects which may be formed according to the Second Article.

5th. The Council shall be assembled whenever necessity may require it, & urgency shall be the rule which it shall follow for augmenting or diminishing its Sessions.

6th. The Council of State shall have the title of "*Excellency*"

FIFTH SECTION

ARTICLE 1st. The presidents of the Departments are the immediate executors of the orders of the Government in each of them

2d. Their special attributes are, to direct the economical administration of the Department, & to increase the Militia if it should be necessary as much as they think it convenient, with the consent of the General Inspector of Military Citizens; to promote the prosperity of the Finances of the State, by zealously watching the conduct of the officers who keep so important a branch, & proposing to the Governt. the reforms or advantages of which it may be susceptible, according to the local circumstances of each Departmt. To take care of the impartial administration of Justice, that all the inferior functionaries may fill the duties of which they have taken charge, correcting infractors & giving an account of them to the Government

3d. Presidents are the police judges in the Departent & therefore they shall be careful on the observance of public morals, on the establishments of early education & its progress & above all, on that regarding the improvement & health of the people.

4th. Articles 5, 6, & 9 of the provisional regulation of Huaura of 12th. Febry. of this year, relating to the powers of the presidents of the Departmts are henceforth sanctioned.

SIXTH SECTION

ARTICLE 1st. Municipal corporations shall retain the same form which they formerly had & shall be headed by the president of the Departments.

2d. The elections of members of this corporation from the next year shall be made by the people according to the regulation which shall be separately formed.

3d. The title of the municipal corporation of the Capital shall be that of your "*Illustrious Lordship*", & that of the others of the state shall be that of "*Your Lordship*".

SEVENTH SECTION

ARTICLE 1st. Judicial power shall be held by the high Chamber of Justice & the other inferior tribunals which now exist, or which shall hereafter be established.

2d. The same attributes which the so called *audiences* formerly had, belong to the high chamber of Justice & besides, it shall for the present take cognizance of the civil & criminal causes of foreign Consuls & Envoys, & of the public functionaries who may fail in their authority. In like manner its jurisdiction is extended for the present to the trial of prizes acquired by the ships of war of the state or by those who may obtain privateering Commissions according to the law of nations. The functions of the Mine-tribunal are likewise reassumed by the high Chamber.

3d. the Chamber shall nominate a comission composed of Individuals of their own members & of other Jurisconsults who may distinguish themselves by their probity & knowledge, to form immediately a plan for the administration of Justice which may simplify all the inferior tribunals, which may have for basis that equality before the law which every Citizen enjoys, the abolition of those duties which judges have before collected, and which henceforth are entirely prohibited. The same commission shall present a regulation for the establishment of a judge of prizes.

ART. 4th. The members of the high Chamber shall remain permanently in their offices during their good conduct. The title of the Chamber shall be that of "*Your Illustrious Lordships*"

EIGHTH SECTION

ARTICLE 1st. Every Citizen has an equal right to preserve & defend his honour, liberty, security, property & existence, & cannot be deprived of any of these rights unless it may

Peru, has *given* a Constitution to this conquered Nation. Translation of this Constitution is herewith enclosed and I shall not presume to offer a single

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be by the sentence of the competent authority, given in conformity to the Laws. He, who may be unjustly defrauded of them, can reclaim before the Governm^{t}. against such an infraction, & freely publish by the press the proceding which may occasion his complaint.

2^{d}. The house of a Citizen is a Sacred asylum which nobody can enter without an express order of the Governm^{t}. given on due cognizance of a cause. This condition being wanting, resistance is a right which legalizes the acts which it may produce. The presidents of the other Departments shall be forbidden to give the orders for such entry; & Governors & Lieutenant-Governors can only give them in case of treason or Subversion of the public order,

3rd. By treason is to be understood every machination in favor of the Enemies of the Independence of Peru. The Crime of Sedition consists alone in assembling armed forces in any number for the purpose of resisting the orders of the Government, in exciting the people or any part of them to the same end and in forming secret associations against the legitimate authorities. no one shall be judged seditious for opinions which he may hold in political matters if he does not unite some one of the circumstances referred to.

4th. The Liberty of the Press shall be sanctioned under rules which shall be separately prescribed.

Ninth Section

Article 1st. Those are Citizens of Peru who have been or may be born in any part of the states of America who have sworn the Independence on Spain.

2nd. Other Foreigners may be naturalized in the Country but cannot obtain a card of Citizenship, unless in the cases which are prescribed in the Regulation published on the 4th. of the present month and which is henceforth approved.

Last Section

Article 1st. All those Laws of the former Government which are not in opposition to the Independence of the Country, to the forms established by this Statute and to the Decrees and the Declarations which may be issued by the present Government, shall remain in full force & vigour.

2nd. The present statute shall operate until Independence shall be declared throughout the whole territory of Peru, in what case there shall be immediately convoked a general Congress which shall establish the permanent constitution and form of Government which is to rule in the State.

Additional Articles

Article 1st. The Government being animated by a sentiment of Justice and equity will recognize all Debts of the Spanish Government which have not tended to continue the Slavery of Peru and its hostility to the other independent people of America.

2nd. The present statute will be sworn to by the Protector as the fundamental basis of his Authority, and as a guarantee given to the free people of Peru of the disinterestedness of his views and for which all the constitutional authorities and citizens of the State shall swear on their part to obey the Government and fulfil the orders of the Provincial Statute of Peru. In all other Departments the Presidents and all others employed by them shall swear to it before all citizens. The form of their Oaths will be as follows.

The Protector's Oath

"I swear by God & my Country and give my Honor to faithfully fulfill the provisional statute pointed out by me for the best government and direction of the free departments of Peru, untill there shall be established a permanent constitution of the state which will defend its Independence and Liberty and promote its felicity by every possible means within my reach."

Oath of the Ministers of State

"We swear to fulfill and see fulfilled the Provisional Statute of Peru and take upon ourselves with all zeal and rectitude that which tends to the public service which we as Ministers will see fulfilled."

Oath of the Public Functionaries & all Citizens

"I swear by God and my Country to acknowledge and obey in everything the protectoral Government to obey and see fulfilled in that part that concerns the constitutional

comment on it to one so perfectly competent as you are, to appreciate it, in all its principles and operative bearings.

By recent arrivals from Lima and Chili it appears that a complete rupture has taken place between San Martin and Lord Cochrane. Some of the circumstances of this affair were reported in my Dispatch (N°. 24) It is now said to be ascertained that the design of San Martin was nothing short of taking possession of the whole Naval Force of Chili and placing it under the Peruvian Flag and under the command of officers devoted to him, in which case he would have dictated the Law to Chili or declared himself independent of her authority. Letters from Chili state that the Government there has approved the conduct of Lord Cochrane, which may produce a breach between O'Higgins & San Martin. For Short, the general impression seems to be, notwithstanding his hypocritical Cant of a wish to retire to look for happiness in the recess of private life and passing the rest of his existence in contemplating the goodness of the Almighty &c that San Martin's mind is filled with projects of the most gigantic ambition. On this side the mountains affairs wear a daily improving aspect for this Province & for the establishment of regular, representative governm^{ts}. Some time since, as reported in dispatch (N°. 24) under 16th. November, The Government of Tucuman asked assistance in Arms & warlike Stores of this Government, but it was refused on the ground that, as long as the Governments of the Provinces were in the hands of Single Individuals, standing on the sole basis of Military power and influence that tenure was so uncertain that, in furnishing aid to it, the application of the means furnished depended entirely on the success of those to whom they were given and, as this Province had in more than one instance experienced, it might again happen that the arms furnished by her might be turned against herself. The declaration has also been made to all the Provinces that as long as military and factious Government prevailed in the different Provinces, Buenos Ayres would not consent to cooperate in any Congress formed of such elements, but that, if the people in the several Provinces would set to work, in good faith, to form sound public opinion by a well regulated liberty of the press, to form representative Governments and establish perfect security of persons and property, then the Province of B^{s}. Ay^{s}. would cordially unite in promoting a General Governm^{t}. and every other measure which can conduce to general happiness and prosperity. This declaration has already had a happy influence and great hopes are entertain'd that the course prescribed by this Government will be generally

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statute and the free departments of Peru, to defend its Independence and zealously promote its prosperity."

Dictated in the Protectoral Office of Lima the Eighth day of October One Thousand eight hundred and twenty one.

José de San Martín.

Juan Garcia del Rio.

Bernardo Monteagudo.

Hipolito Unanue.

adopted by all the Provinces. In S^ta^. Fé and Entre Rios. the former under Lopez the last under Mansilla, all goes in conformity with the wishes and views of this Government. In Cordova also, where Bustos has laboured most earnestly to excite hostile feelings and Measures, his influence is at least lost, *and it is said* (though not officially known) that he has been deposed.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Relations of the United Provinces of South America [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *May 23, 1822.*

SIR: It is with inexpressible satisfaction that I transmit to you the inclosed very important Documents.

The Message of the President and a Report of the Secretary of State to the Congress of the United States of America, recommending the immediate recognition of the Independence of those Spanish American Provinces who have thrown off their allegiance to the King of Spain, by the United States. As it is well known that the wishes of Congress on this interesting subject have hitherto only been restrained by motives of high political discretion on the part of the Executive Government, it may be with certainty anticipated that the measure now presented will be adopted immediately and probably with unanimity by Congress. I cannot do justice to my personal feelings on being the humble organ of this important communication.

I pray you, M^r^. Minister, to receive [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [2]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *June 5, 1822.*

My time will only permit me briefly to state that The President's Message and your Report to Congress recommending the acknowledgement of the Independence of the great Divisions of Spanish America, arrived here on the

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II. This was an enclosure to Forbes to the Secretary of State, July 10, 1822, for which see below, pt. II, doc. 281.

[2] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

22nd. of May most opportunely to shed additional lustre on the festivities of their greatest National Anniversary (the 25th of May).

Inclosed I transmit the Argos of 25th and 29th of May & of the date in which are translations of the two important documents with a Decree of the Government ordering the same to be published in an extra sheet of the *Registro Oficial* and distributed gratis to the people.

On the faith of what was supposed rather than known, I received a much greater share of Credit than was due to my feeble offices in that great measure.

I have the honour [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *July 10, 1822.*

SIR: My last respects were under 5th June, since when we have had no direct opportunity to the U. S. This goes by the Brig Oswego, Capt. Hamilton, to Baltimore. The most important event which I have now to report is the arrival of the President's Message and subsequent public Acts of our Government touching the recognition of these late Provinces, as independent Nations, and the manner in which they have been received by the Government and people here—the news of this important event reached here on the evening of the 22nd. of May. I sought the Minister in vain that evening, but the next morning I went to the Fort and had previously prepared a short communication in writing of which I enclose a Copy. This gave the business an official character and the Government immediately decreed that the documents should be published in a supplementary sheet of the "Registro Official" and distributed *gratis* to the people. The Government and all those who can appreciate moral influence were much delighted with the news. The factionists and the English set their brains and their tongues to work to discredit, if possible, the news by confounding it with idle and baseless rumours on same subject which had previously prevailed at different periods; finding it difficult to *discredit* the report, they then made every possible suggestion to depreciate its importance, particularly the English who asked, in the spirit of their own selfish policy, what the United States were to receive in *payment* of this Act of nugatory protection? how many thousand men the U. S. were to furnish to the Armies of Spanish America to maintain their Independence? To all these suggestions, my friend Dn. Manuel Moreno made an informal, but triumphant reply in the Cotemporaneous numbers of the Argos. The English further tried to damp the public feeling

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

by reporting that the Spanish Cortes, had also decreed the Recognition of these Governments but this was put to silence by the more correct information which this Government possessed on the subject. The failure in every effort of these poor mortified people to enfeeble the effect of this magnanimous measure on our part, only increased their humiliation and confusion. They were even so much annoyed as to avoid me in the Streets and not a solitary Englishman had the generosity to offer me his felicitations on the occasion.

Their jealousy of my supposed influence had long existed and they could not support the idea that these events would for the moment at least place me on higher ground than ever, and this at the time when they had not even the semblance of an informal representation here. It is well known Sir to you that the 25th of May is the greatest Anniversary of the Revolution in this Province. How opportunely then did this great event reach us! Arrangements were already in train of execution under the genius and activity of a distinguished french Engineer for the most splendid public festival. The largest Square of the City was most tastefully decorated; Carousels and various public games were ordered and stimulated by rewards, to be followed by brilliant illuminations and fire works. Several public dinners were agreed on, to the most respectable of which that of the University and Medical College I had been invited. On the morning of the 25th May, the weather was remarkably fine and the day was ushered in by a grand Salute from the Fort repeated by all the Armed Vessels in the two Roads.

I displayed from my window the Flags of the U. S. and of this Province. In the evening my house was illuminated and two shields blended in a transparency representing the Arms of both Governments were exhibited at one of my windows. At 12 oclock the Governor accompanied by his Ministers, the Diplomatic Corps, all the public functionaries, Military and Naval officers, passed in grand procession, through a most brilliant display of well dressed troops, from the Fort to the Cathredal (*sic*), to a *Te Deum* and grand Mass. Thence the most distinguished officers accompanied his Excellency the Governor, to his house and partook of some refreshments. Here the Governor paid me the compliment of inviting me only to accompany him to the Theatre, and added that he would send his Carriage for me. At the dinner of the University, where Mr Rivadavia assisted as Guest, many toasts complimentary to the Government and people of the United States, were given, and Mr. Rivadavia in an animated Speech of half an hour, spoke in terms of enthusiastic eulogy of the great moral influence of the Government of the United States, which he declared to be greater than that of any other Government in the World. He also eulogised the President of the United States and the Secretary of State, by their names, as not to be surpassed in magnanimity, wisdom, or political experience by any Statesman in the World. He said among many other things, that Europe was now in a much

more revolutionary state than America. I regret, to say, that the speech being extemporaneously expressed, no Copy could be had, and only a very short notice of it appeared in the Argos. Agreeable to previous arrangement the Governor sent his Chief *Aid du Camp* at 8 oclock in his Carriage to conduct me to his house, whence I accompanied him to the gallery of the *Cabildo* the largest Public building here on the great square. From a central position of this gallery I saw the most splendid spectacle I think I ever beheld. The illuminations were most brilliant, the Square and all the surrounding houses were filled with ladies, and gentlemen, the former of great beauty and most elegantly dressed, and the fire works were equal to any I ever witnessed in Europe. After remaining here about half an hour I accompanied the Governor to the Theatre where we were received by the singing of a Patriotic hymn composed for the occasion by Doctor Lopez, and sung on the Stage by a number of well dressed, Boys and girls. At about 10 oclock I took leave of the Governor and retired to my own house and thus terminated the 25th. of May. The public Games during the day and the illuminations during the evening, were continued the two following days. All agree that there was never any thing seen in this Country to be compared to the splendour of this great National festival. In making this long and I fear tedious report I should think I had sinned unpardonably against all the laws of decorum, in speaking so often of myself, if I did not consider, as I hope you will, that all the attentions shewn to me on the late occasion were paid to and received by me in my Public character and in that View, go for as much as they are worth, to shew the feeling of these People for my Government and Country. By this opportunity I send you a regular file of the *Argos* for the months of May, June, and July, to this date (13th). Also three numbers of the "*Registro-Estadistico*" of which the previous numbers have already been transmitted.

I have the honour [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *July 18, 1822.*

P.S., August 1, 1822. The Ship Eagle, Capt Davis, by which this goes having been detained to this time I have it in my power to report some important occurrences since the commencing date of this despatch. In the natural progress of salutary reform, the burthensome institutions of the Church

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

did not fail to occupy the attention of the Minister the Government decided on taking possession of and devoting to general objects the very considerable properties of the several religious orders, the principal of which are the Dominican, Franciscan, and Recoleta, leaving the Friars, to exist under the discipline of their orders with reasonable pensions for life. This measure excited a violent agitation in the community and most determined resistance on the part of the Friars. In the *Junta*, there are several Ecclesiastics, of talents and influence, the most distinguished of which are *Provisor*, *Gomez*, who was in France, and the agent of the Prince of Lucca negociation—Aguerro—and Doct^{r}. Planes. there are also many Puyrredonists. Gaillardo, a young lawyer of popular talents, Doct^{r}. Pazos, an indefatigable revolutionist, having been one of the instruments of various changes here of which his only reward has been a monentary participation, in the prevailing power. On the present question, all the fragments of parties discontented by the civil and military reforms and other measures of the Government, rallied with the Ecclesiastics to make a last effort against the influence of the Minister. The incursions of the Indians and every fibre of alarm and discontent were set in agitation—the skirmishing of these parties commenced in the *Junta* on some questions relating to *Padre Casteñada*, of flagitious notoriety, this man had been banished to the Indian frontier some eight or ten months ago—after the law of oblivion or Amnesty had gone into effect, it first became a question, whether it embraced the case of this Friar; it was decided by the Junta that, he might return under that law, but a condition was annexed by the ministerial party, that he should not be permitted to renew his incendiary writings—after a lapse of two or three weeks, a relation of Padre Casteñada petitioned the *Junta* that this injunction might be removed and that he might be permitted to enjoy the full liberty of the press. This question discussed with some warmth, was carried against the Minister. This triumph gave great courage to the opposition. Many strong papers were published for and against the rights of the Friars. The discontented vehemently represented that this measure was only the fore runner of a total abolition of all religion—the fermentation became very general throughout the community, and the most reflecting friends of the Minister began to express serious apprehensions, and to regret that these measures were so much precipitated. In truth, I really believe, if a competent leader could have been found to take command, some popular movement would have taken place in which case a most sanguinary conflict and of uncertain issue would have been the consequence. When, however, the great discussion came on, the moderate party proposed the further investigation by a committee already charged with the subject, and this was adopted as a motive for postponing the final question thus the affair now stands. But it is still believed that after a lapse of a few weeks, the measure will return to the Junta, strengthened in its enactments and extended in its operation. Instead of merely administering on the estates

of the religious orders, leaving the Friars a decent existence, it is even thought that the business will terminate in their total suppression. We are here most anxiously waiting the definitive measures of the Executive of the United States as to the organization of a diplomatic intercourse with the South American States. In examining the legislative proceedings one circumstance has excited much observation; it appears that the house of Representatives voted two bills one for the recognition, the other appropriating for Salaries of Ministers. The Senate concurred in the last, taking no notice of the former. This circumstance I have explained; presuming that the senate considered the principle of the former contained in the provisions of the latter measure. Until very recently the *droit d'aubaine* existed in full force here, and the property of several strangers, particularly English, has been taken by the Government. I have, as a first example, obtained authority to administer on the estate of George Charlton a citizen of the U. S. lately deceased here. The effects of this man are very inconsiderable probably not sufficient to pay his debts, but I gladly availed myself of the first case which occurred in order to establish the principle, and to shew *my friends* the English, that I could accomplish things, not always easy to them. You will undoubtedly have received direct from Rio de Janeiro, a full report of the recent events, which have passed there. The strides making towards Independence under a *Prince Regent* and, *Perpetual Protector*. My last advices from that place mention that a considerable expedition in Troops, Arms, and ammunition was about sailing for Bahia, to support the Brazilian, and put down the European party at that place. The opinion given me is, that the prospects of Brazilian Supremacy in that quarter are not so great as at Rio, and that the success of the Brazilian cause, generally speaking, depends chiefly on the disordered state of Portugal and her probable inability to enforce her sovereignty on this Continent. The officers of the Army at Monte-Video, with General Le Cor at their head, have declared their adhesion to the *King*, and Cortes of Portugal. During these events, Don Antonio, Manuel Correa de Camara, arrived here three days since and I have this day received an official notification from the Government that he has been duly recognized as Consul and Commercial Agent of the *Kingdom of Brazils*. I have also seen his Commission which is under the authority of the Prince Regent. Yesterday reached this city, Don Antonio Gutierrez de la Fuente, Chief of Squadron of Cavalry as Envoy from Lima. His mission is temporary, and circular to all the Provinces, for the special purpose of asking the formation of a short expedition to attack the rear of the Spanish Army, as it quits its present positions at Cuzco, and at other points. I have not yet seen either of the gentlemen, but shall visit them tomorrow, and if I can learn any thing worth communicating I shall add it before closing this dispatch. This Government now boasts of a numerous *Corps diplomatique*, reckoning the agents of their various provinces. They take precedence as follows, Don Miguel Zañiartu, Minister, of Chili—

The Agent of the U. S. of America—Gen[l]. Godoy y Cruz, late governor now Agent or Envoy of Mendoza— Don Pedro Jose Agrelo, Agent of Entre Rios—no friend of the present government. Don Francisco Ignacio Bustos, Agent of Cordova,—Cousin to the Governor, of that Province—the above named Envoy of Lima and the Consul of Brazils—seven in number—among whom the most and perhaps the only *sincere* friend of the present Government is the Agent of the U. S.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *August 21, 1822.*

SIR: Accompanying this is duplicate of my last despatch, N° 35, which went to Philadelphia by the Brig Ann, Cap[t] Miercken. Since that date the Junta have decided on the course to be pursued in relation to the demand of military co-operation made by San Martin, through his envoy M[r] de la Fuentes. In announcing very briefly in my last despatch that Gentleman's arrival and the object of his mission, I omitted to state that San Martin, coming to these Provinces, *in forma pauperis*, to supplicate their military aid, had the modesty to name the General to whose command the solicited army should be committed, and this General was no other than *Bustos*, the present Governor of Cordova, the declared enemy of the present Administration here. This circumstance would have had its weight, had not higher motives guided the public counsels on this occasion. The magnanimous policy of M[r]. Rivadavia, the vital principle of which is a desire to substitute moral influence for military force, dictated totally different means from those proposed by San Martin, and, instead of raising an army, the Junta voted to put at the disposition of Government, thirty thousand dollars, to defray the expences of various pacificating missions. this course is the more wise inasmuch as the armies in upper Peru, nominally Spanish, are composed almost entirely of misguided sons of the Country, who, when reclaimed, may prove excellent members of a regenerated society. The Minister, in a recent conference, gave me his opinion that there are not more than three hundred Spaniards in those armies. These pacificating measures will embrace the unfortunate provinces of S[t] Iago de l'Estero, Tucuman and Salta who have long been and to this hour are involved in a most sanguinary civil war. Ministers are immediately to be dispatched to Spain, to Generals San Martin and La Serna and to the Provinces abovenamed. I have only heard one of the Gentlemen named who are to fill these missions. M[r]. Provisor Gomez,

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

it is said, is to go to Spain. This is the negociator in Prince Lucca's affair, a man of learning, address and talents. Another important measure has been adopted by the Junta. They have authorized the Government to raise a loan to the extent of four Millions of Dollars and I learn from the Minister that it is to be effected in England. The avowed objects of this loan are, the construction of a Port here, the establishment of several towns on the Southern Frontier and the procuring water for this City by aqueduct. Of these the second object, I have reason to believe, is nearest the Minister's heart, as he has conversed often with me, and recently much at length, on the means of encouraging emigration; I, of course, put forward as the most efficient of those means, the establishment of perfect liberty of religious faith and worship. On this subject the most confident hopes are entertained of compleat success within twelve months; in fact, the measures tending to that end will rapidly succeed the now agitated reform of the ecclesiastical establishments, and it may be said that toleration even now exists *in fact*. The Protestants have their public cemetery and are unmolested in their private worship; there exists no public Church or Chapel, because it has never been asked for.

From the new Consul of Brazils I learn that an order has already been issued by the Prince Regent for embarking all the Portuguese troops now at Monte Video and Transports are on the way from Rio to take them to Europe. The destiny of the Banda Oriental is still enveloped in mystery and uncertainty. The people of Monte Video enjoy great commercial protection from their present Masters and perhaps may apprehend some change in that respect, should they come under the Government or influence of this Province, which would naturally promote, in preference, the trade and prosperity of this City. As far as I can learn from the Brazilian Consul, M^r^ da Camara, The Prince Regent would willingly manifest a spirit of moderation and justice, by renouncing all claim to the dominion of that Province, but there exist several parties there and, conformably to the general system of this Government no military intervention on its part is to be expected. The operation of moral influence, during the occupation by foreign troops, must be slow; when that foreign force is withdrawn, an emulation of the wise course pursuing here may unite all parties in the Banda Oriental, especially if old Artigas could be liberated from the grasp of the despotic Francia and brought forward to a people with whom his influence might be easily revived. It is, however, much to be apprehended that the evacuation by the Portuguese troops, may prove the signal of some violent commotions at Monte Video. The accompanying file of newspapers to which are added the four first numbers of "*The Centinel*" will supply the defects of this communication by giving you many circumstances of interest necessarily omitted here. I also forward five first numbers of the "*Abeja Argentina*" a monthly magazine published here containing much statistical matter. in the last number is a

good translation of the Report of our Committee of foreign relations on subject of the proposed acknowledgement of the Independence of Spanish America.

I have the honour [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *August 23, 1822, 11 p. m.*

SIR: I had closed my despatches by this Vessel and given them to M[r]. Bayley a Gentleman who goes passenger, when, at this hour of the night, an intelligent friend comes to me from the Junta and reports the following very important circumstances, which I write under his dictation and much in haste.

The three Ministers appeared this evening at an early hour in the Junta and asked a suspension of proceedings to give place to an important communication then to be made to that body; the suspension of other business was agreed to and the clerk read a communication from the Government, which in substance was, that Government had pledged itself not to disclose the name of the person (who was afterwards declared to be the chief of the principal military Corps in this Capital) who had been called on by the *Ex-Secretary of State* M[r]. Gregorio Tagle (just imprisoned) to lend his aid to a conspiracy having for object the overthrow of that representative body and the present Executive Government, assuring him (Col°. V.) that every arrangement was made to render success certain if his support could be relied on. the communication terminated by signifying that the three Ministers were charged to sustain the discussion on it which might arise. Immediately after the reading this message, the Minister of State rose and with extraordinary energy, opened the subject and proceeded to give an ample and compleat detail of the plan of the conspirators, which in substance was to overthrow the present system, to reestablish the abolished Cabildo, to form a new Executive (of whose Ministers two were known but names not communicated) the motives of this change put forward were, an assurance that the present Government was applying all the resources of their power to bring the Country back to the dominion of Spain—that the Government had recently refused the aid asked by San Martin from personal motives, that the general tendency of the Administration was in opposition to the interests of the Country and in these views the projected ecclesiastical reform was made to play a distinguished part.

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

The allusions of the Minister were very pointed to the mode in which previous revolutions had been effected—he stated, with vehemence that the present *aspirants* were "*tan ineptos que depravados*", added that if the present Government was not supported by public opinion, they were ready to retire, but that it would only be done with dignity.

In conclusion he proposed that a Commission in form of a jury should be appointed to try the Conspirators or a Committee of public safety should be elected from that body. The affair was referred to a special Committee composed of Aguerro, S^{t} Iago Rivadavia (the brother of the Minister) Gomez, D^{n} Castex and Somerera. This measure was carried by a large majority, only two dissenting.

It is supposed that the Committee will be ready to report and that the affair will be again discussed at a special meeting of the Junta tomorrow evening. There is no doubt that the Conspirators are numerous and powerful—led by the Puyerredonnists and supported by the Friars. I just learn that besides *Tagle*, ten others are arrested. I rely much on the vigilance and firmness of the Government, and presume that the conspiracy was defeated before it was disclosed.

I have the honour [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *August 24, 1822.*

Thursday, August 29, 1822. This day some of the best friends of the Government began to look gloomy; the majority in the Junta which had before been counted on, now was doubted. *Padre Casteñada*, pushed his momentary success to the daring extremity of posting up all over the City the most inflammatory placards, calling on the sleeping people to awaken and defend their Religion and declaring that the Government was in the hands of heretics. The enemies of Government boldly contended that the project of law for a Jury to judge a crime already committed operated retrospectively and of course was unconstitutional. Besides, they formed the most confident expectations of the acquittal and impunity of the arrested conspirators by the operation of this new experiment of trial by Jury, if it should even be carried into effect. The Junta met at an early hour and the house was so much crowded that when I went I found the box assigned to the *diplomatic Corps*, filled to overflowing, and the doors beset by an impenetrable crowd.

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

Of course I was compelled to retire. I afterwards had faithful reports from different friends of the subjects and course of the debate.

The projected trial by Jury was fully and ably discussed; the result was that a general opinion was expressed that the trial by Jury was inexpedient and the conviction of the accused on the existing evidence highly improbable —in the same debate almost every member expressed his entire conviction that an extensive Conspiracy existed and that D^r^ Tagle was at the head of it; a firm determination to support the Government was manifested and a Decree was passed [thirty in the affirmative and only three members dissenting] authorizing the Government to transport D^r^. D^n^ Gregorio Tagle to any point within this Province which might be deemed proper, and there to hold him in strict surveillance. Col. Vidal is ordered to be tried by Court Martial, in the most public manner. This firmness on the part of the Junta has entirely reanimated the friends of the Administration. This evening a proposal was made to authorize the Government to suspend, under its discretion and responsibility, the inviolability of persons or in other words, to suspend the *habeas Corpus*, it was refused; but on this debate—the friend of our Country, D^n^ Manuel Moreno, noticing an observation of D^r^ Aguerro, that England was the freest Country in *Europe*, admitted the fact as to Europe, but said there was another Country in the World, and on our own Continent, much more free than England and then made an elegant panegyric on our Constitution and laws and on the moral character of our people. I have had frequent occasions to notice in my past communications the friendly efforts of this Gentleman to vindicate the U. S. against the predjudices of his Countrymen and the calumnies of the British. he was, until within six weeks past, principal Editor of the Argos, whose columns were much devoted to our cause; but, as he is a Professor of the Medical University, Public Librarian, and member of the Junta, it became necessary for him to relinquish the Editorship of that paper, and I regret to say that his place has been filled by M^r^. Wilde an Englishman, who is also a writer for the *Centinel*. of course the English are much panegyrized on every occasion.

In reporting the circumstances of the present crisis, I must not omit to state that the Minister of Government in an animated Speech to the Junta on the conduct of Col. Vidal, most keenly alluded to M^r^. Zañiartú, the Chilian Minister, as having counselled and directed *Vidal*, in a manner highly abusive of his diplomatic inviolability. I have heard it said that he will be ordered away from this place. *Ainsi soit il:* M^r^. Zañiartü has boasted to me of his confident expectation of being named Chilian Minister to the U. S. as soon as the recognition shall be consummated, but I have awakened Judge Prevost [who is not one of M^r^. Z^s^. admirers] on the subject and I hope that the Government of Chili will choose a better representative in its intercourse with our Cabinet. This evening [29^th^ August] while I was absent at the Junta I had a visit from M^r^. da Camara, Brazilian Consul, who left for my perusal two

important state papers, under the Signature and authority of the Prince Regent of Brazil, the one, a Decree prohibiting the landing of any troops from Portugal or any other Country, directing that they shall remain on board until all the necessary provisions for their return shall be furnished them and, in case of their attempting to land, directing the Brazilian troops and subjects to resist by force, to burn their Ships and boats. The other paper is a long and animated proclamation of the Regent to the Inhabitants of Brazils, in which, among other things, he says, that the time has arrived when they ought to have but one rallying word and that, *Union!* and when only one Cry should be heard from the River Amazon, to the La Plata and that Cry, *Independence!*

Friday, August 30, 1822. This is a great holiday [Santa Rosa de Lima, Patroness of this America] and the morning was ushered in by a grand Salute from the Fort. The City wears a cheerful aspect and the minds of the people seem tranquilized in the belief that the political tornado has passed over without doing much injury. The Government is strengthened for the moment, but I expect that the project of Clerical reform will be postponed, although not definitively abandoned. This and every thing else, like concession to party clamour, will be ascribed to a consciousness of weakness on the part of Government and will in a few weeks or months encourage some further attempts on the part of the opposition. I called on the Minister to renew my felicitations on the favorable spirit manifested by the Junta, and the general aspect of affairs, but I did not see him.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 2, 1822.*

SIR: I have just had a confidential Conversation with the Chief Clerk in the Department of Government, and, as his Communication was made in strict reserve, except as to my Government, I write it in this way that it may not pass under the eye even of my own Secretary. M[r]. Tagle will be sent to Patagonia—Col[o] Vidal will be tried immediately and with all possible publicity, and will be punished in the utmost rigour of the laws according to his sentence. This Government has already written to that of Chili, requesting

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II. The number 38 with which this was enclosed is his dispatch dated August 24, 1822, which see above, pt. II, doc. 285.

the immediate recall of Mr Zaniartu, not wishing to order him away; in the mean time the vigilance of the police is directed to follow his movements and, if he is found tripping, he will be sent off immediately. Active preparations are making to open all those negociations with Generals San Martin & La Serna, The Provinces &c &c, which were authorized by Decree of the Junta and reported in my despatch N°. 36.[1] The most frank exposure of all the Circumstances of the late Conspiracy will be made to the several Governments and Chiefs, by the negociators employed.

I was misinformed as to the mission of Mr Gomez to Spain as announced in N°. 36. No one will be sent to Spain, until a conciliation of the Provinces shall have been effected. The Government has taken such measures as to prevent the possibility of it's being overthrown by force, but the members of it are determined on retiring from office whenever it shall be ascertained that their administration is not supported by public opinion. A very full and minute regulation of the Press will immediately pass into a law of the Junta—the general bases will be, perfect liberty, subject to legal responsibility to prove the truth of all printed allegations. The ostensible motive of this measure is found in the recent remonstrances of Mr Bustos, Envoy from Cordova, against an Article in the Argos, the *real object* of it is to restrain and punish the daring and incendiary libels of Castenada.

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John M. Forbes, Special Agent of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[2]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *October 16, 1822.*

P. S., November 14, 1822. I have just had an unprepared and unexpected conversation with the Minister of Government and found him firm to his principles, professing his sole and entire reliance on the growth of moral influence in this Country. The long delay in the expected opening, on our part, of a diplomatic intercourse has occasioned much observation here. I took the opportunity to day to explain to the Minister those impediments to a nomination, during the recess of the Senate, which arose from the construction given by many to the words of the Constitution on that subject, and I thought myself warranted in speaking of another view of the case which results from my own reflections aided by intimations from purely individual sources. I frankly stated my opinions to be compleatly personal and pro-

[1] See above, pt. II, doc. 283, Forbes to Secretary of State, August 21, 1822.
[2] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

ceeded to say, that it was possible, that the act of recognition of the Independence of these Countries, was considered as a perfect and solemn act of our Government in the face of the World, and, under that view, it might be, that the first overtures of diplomatic intercourse were expected by the Government of the U. S. from these Governments, as the younger Sisters of the family of Nations. On this, as on every similar occasion, I found that I was not to surpass the Minister in frankness. He replied to my intimation by saying, that, under all circumstances, he did not deem it necessary to hasten the forms of a diplomatic intercourse, repeating the opinion formerly expressed and already made public, that he looked steadily for the best foundations of political character and security to the progress of internal civilization and illustration and to the wise institutions which would result—that he hoped that the gradual operation of these causes, exemplified in the progress of Buenos Ayres, would shed their influence over the other Provinces, promote a perfect harmony of political views and at no distant period induce a Confederation much more permanent than that which had been formerly established under the odious influence of intrigue and force. In short this Statesman builds his political faith and hope on the immoveable rock of sound enlightened moral influence and considers the mere pageantry of foreign diplomatic courtesy as a delusive and dangerous quicksand.

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John M. Forbes, Secretary of the United States Legation at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 2, 1823.*

I have just been informed of a new attempt to establish Monarchy on a large Scale on the Coast of the Pacific. It appears that, when San Martin sent his two Ministers Paroisien and Garcia del Rio to Europe, one of the principal objects of their Mission was to seek a Master for the Peruvians and that those Ministers were authorized to offer the Peruvian Crown to His Highness Prince Leopold of Saxe Cobourg. a Copy of the proposal is said to be in this City and the Argos of yesterday contains a formal revocation, by the Congress of Peru, of the powers of those Ministers. I lose daily somewhat of my faith (which was never very great) in the Susceptibility of these people of perfect republican liberty. I see to my great mortification so much idolatry

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

for every thing European and such an indifference, bordering on hatred, towards the North Americans (whose model of Government is the only one which they ought to emulate) that I am quite disgusted and sigh for the Occasion to separate myself from a Corrupt people wholly unworthy that enthusiasm manifested by many of our best Citizens, who have been the dupes of sounds and names without meaning on this side the Equator.

My last announced the overthrow of O'Higgins and the establishment of a temporary Government in Chili, without bloodshed. the most recent accounts from that Country state that the Executive commission had appointed O'Higgins, as an honourable retreat, to the chief command of the Chilian Army in Peru. to assume this command O'Higgins repaired to Valparaiso, accompanied by his late Minister of War, Rodriguez, who is very odious to Freyre and generally unpopular. Before O'Higgins could embark, Freyre, with five hundred men arrived at Valparaiso and arrested O'Higgins, Rodriguez and Zenteno, Governor of Valparaiso, and up to the latest dates these individuals were in close confinement. What effect this difference of sentiment between the Government Commission and General Freyre may have, remains to be seen. The Columbian Minister is still here and without any reply to his Note. He has given notice of his determination to quit this City, on his return to Chili on the 15th of this month. He has as little reason to be gratified with his personal as his official reception and treatment here. I believe that he has experienced no hospitality from any one except a formal, diplomatic dinner from the Minister of State. The liberal party and cause have experienced within a few days a serious loss by the death of M^{r}. Santiago Rivadavia, the brother of the Minister of State. he was a sincere patriot, an excellent scholar, an honest man, and a very good public speaker. Fame says that when they both left the University, he was deemed more learned than his brother, the Minister, but the great advantage of the Minister has been derived from personal knowledge and observation of Europe.

March 11, 1823.

Being informed that M^{r} Mosquera, the Colombian Minister had yesterday signed a Treaty with this Government, I called on him to ascertain the fact and found him at home. He told me that he had yesterday signed a preliminary Treaty only, as the state of this Province in relation to the other Provinces, permitted no other arrangement, that the Treaty he had signed contained only mutual pledges of the identity of principles and views and of a reciprocal and perpetual friendship between the Republic of Colombia and the Government of Buenos Ayres, and a stipulation that they should cooperate by all possible means to the two grand objects of common interest to all America, Independence and a cessation of war, that as soon as circumstances should permit, these general principles together with all the detailed provisions necessary to secure the reciprocal rights and duties of the contract-

ing parties shall be confirmed and settled by a definitive Treaty. I found M^r^ Mosquera much occupied in preparations for his departure, which he had always fixed for 15^th^. of this month but he now intends to leave this on the 14^th^. on his way to Chili, thence by the way of Peru, home.

This Government has promised as soon as the Junta (which meets on 1^st^ May) shall have ratified the present preliminary Treaty, to send a Minister to the Capital of Colombia.

Having been previously invited by the Minister of Government and Foreign Relations M^r^ Rivadavia, to a conference I repaired on leaving M^r^. Mosquera to the Fort or Government house and was immediately received in the most friendly manner. Our conversation for at least half an hour, was general, turning chiefly on the events which affect this and the neighbouring Countries in which the preliminary Treaty just signed between this Government and the Colombian Minister was noticed, I congratulated the Minister and expressed my ardent wish that these preliminary arrangements might lead to a firm system of American policy wholly independent of European interests or influence. He assured me that such were his wishes and should be the object of his most constant efforts.

M^r^. Rivadavia took occasion to bring to my attention the intimation he had made more than twelve months ago to the English Captain OBrien and to the French Commodore M^r^. Gaw [sic], and which he has repeated within the last fortnight to Captain Bourchier of the British Brig Beaver, and to the Captain of a French Government Schooner which was, that this Government could not enter into any discussions or explanations with armed agents, and that political questions must be discussed by regularly appointed diplomatic Agents. After a general and protracted conversation I prepared to retire on which the Minister opened the subject on which he had particularly invited a conference. He observed that he wished to express the very particular respect and esteem of this Government for that of the United States and the high sense he felt of that wise measure the Recognition of the Independence of the ci-devant Spanish American Provinces, that soon after this event had been made known here I had informed him of the intention of the Government of the U.S. to send a Minister here. I here begged leave to remind him that I had told him at the time that all my information was derived from ("*les on dits des Gazettes*") Newspaper paragraphs, that all the knowledge I had, even of the Acknowledgement of Independence was derived through the same channel— The public Newspapers. That to this hour I was without a single line of written official information from Government on the subject.

The Minister manifested some surprise at this circumstance and I replied by representing to him the general reserve of my Government, except in cases where it is deemed necessary to give precise specific instructions to their Agents abroad, and the necessity of peculiar circumspection in a case of such important and delicate bearing as that of the Acknowledgement of the Independence of these vast Countries. I referred to the explanations and opin-

ions I had previously given as entirely personal, of the probable motives of delay in the sending of a Minister here. First in order was, the Constitutional difficulty of the President's naming to new offices in the recess of the Senate, this I explained at full length, and entirely to his satisfaction.

The second was, the idea before expressed to him, that the solemn act as proclaimed to the world by our Government was probably deemed competent to the perfect Recognition of these Nations as Nations, and that perhaps the first step to a diplomatic intercourse might be expected by the United States from these Provinces, that I considered the appointment of M^r. Todd to Colombia as a mere reciprocation of the appointment of the late M^r Torres &c. To this the Minister replied by a long exposition of the extreme difficulty arising from the situation of this Province isolated from the others and acting entirely by itself, that for a Mission of Representation or parade, they neither had the means to cover its expence, nor did he conceive it consistent with the *Modesty* of their position, to initiate such an intercourse. He constantly repeated his assurances of the great regard he felt for the Government of the United States and the sincere pleasure he should feel in availing himself of the first occasion to cherish and promote the closest and most friendly ties of mutual intercourse. he requested that I would communicate these sentiments to my Government which I promised to do with the utmost possible accuracy, but I intimated that his ideas would be more perfectly transmitted, if he deemed it proper to address me a Note of which I would transmit an exact copy to my Government; but this he declined, saying that, under existing circumstances he beleived that my report of the conference would be sufficient. I assured him of my constant good wishes for the success of his measures and after an interchange of many agreeable and friendly assurances, I retired to my house and immediately collected as far as my memory could be relied on, all the particulars of my conference with the Minister and committed them to writing of which you have now a faithful transcript.

March 13.

We are still without any news from Chili since beginning of February and I apprehend that the difference between the governing commission and General Freyre, manifested in the arrestation by the latter of OHiggins and others, may lead to some reaction of party which if it induce a resort to arms, will open a very bloody Arena. General San Martin has been for nearly two months in Cuyo and Mendoza a letter from my particular friend & Countryman Doctor Colesberry, who is his attending Physician, assures me that, from the moment of his entering Cuyo, he recovered his health. He is now perfectly well and is hourly expected here. His political and administrative fame is entirely lost. He has only now to rely on the strength of his arm and the length of his sword and to wait for circumstances in which these powers can be sucessfully exhibited. I hope and trust that his visit to this place will be without any political influence.

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John M. Forbes, Secretary of the United States Legation at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *April 30, 1823.*

It now appears that the intrigues of *Legui* to effect a disunion between the Provinces of the quadrilateral alliance are compleatly defeated. in short the political clouds in which we were so recently benighted seem to be wholly dispersed. One difficult subject still lays in the path of the Minister. The Emancipation of the Banda Oriental. On this subject there prevails a great difference of opinion as to the most fit means to attain the same end. Many here and almost all in the Provinces of Entre Rios and Santa Fé are in favour of an immediate and unqualified resort to force, whilst the Ministry here is disposed to temper the threat of Military coercion by simultaneous diplomatic efforts and with this view D[r]. Don Valentine Gomez (of diplomatic celebrity in affair of Prince of Lucca) has been named three weeks since as special Minister to the Court of Rio Janeiro, but has not yet departed on his Mission. The long talked of Spanish Commissioners are daily expected from Rio, but no important result is anticipated from their negociations.

The last accounts from Rio Janeiro are to 10[th] Instant. Lord Cochrane with his fleet sailed for Bahia about last of March or beginning of this month, in the public opinion every thing is believed to depend on the life, courage and skill of the commander, the fleet having been badly manned in a very hasty manner. Intimations are made of a very despotic disposition manifested on the part of the Emperor Don Pedro who is said to have abandoned the idea of holding a Cortez. From Lima it is written that on the one hand a new expedition is about to be undertaken against the Indermedios, on the other hand, that the Royalists are marching against that Capital with too much hope of success. It appears that at Lima a kind of revolution has been operated under military influence. On the 27[th] February the Congress elected José Tagle for President, but on the peremptory demand of Santa Cruz backed by the Army, this election was set aside and on the 28[th]. February Rivaguera was unanimously elected President of the Republic. It is said that an invitation has been sent to Bolivar to go and mediate between the different parties, but his leaving his country is forbidden by the Constitution of Colombia. Arenales has resigned and Santa Cruz is General in Chief. Colonel Miller, left in command at Entre Medios, writes most despondingly that all he can hope is to save his sick.

From Chili they write under 3[rd] of this month that *Don Ramon de Freire* has been elected to the Directorial dignity and under 8[th]. instant it is stated that he has been duly installed in the Supreme Executive power. It is

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

further stated that the Peruvian Deputy Larrea having arrived and most humbly solicited men and money, four thousand troops were to be immediately embarked and that the Director himself would take the Command. The loan from England has been accepted and a million of Dollars is to be set apart for expences of the new expedition under the guarantee of Larrea, in the name of the Peruvian Government, for its reimbursement.

I cannot finish this communication without noticing an evidence of that partiality for the English on the part of this Government which I have frequently stated to exist. On the 4th of July very soon after our recognition of the Independence of this Country was made known to this Government our national anniversary was kept by our Countrymen here. Salutes were fired from an American Merchantman, Morning, Noon and Evening, our flag was publickly exhibited joined with that of this Country. On that occasion all that was done by the Government here was to run up their Flag for an instant at noon, fire a single gun and lower their flag. On the 23rd Instant (St George's) the English celebrated their King's birth day and the flag of the Government was kept flying all day and at Sun set a regular Salute of eleven guns was fired from the Fort, and all this, without any british official representation or any salute fired on their part. At this dinner Mr. Rivadavia, Minister of Government, and acting Governor, gave the following toast, which was published in the official Gazette.

"To the most wise Government, the English. to the most moral and enlightened Nation,—England". Such circumstances do not merit any formal notice on our part but as "Straws show which way the wind blows", I deem it a duty to state the facts to you in corroboration of opinions formerly and frequently given on the subject.

May 1, 1823.

We have this moment received New York papers but only to 21st January. The most important fact which meets my eye in relation to this Country is, the nomination of Mr Rodney as Minister Plenipotentiary, but this fact still rests only on paragraphic authority. If it be true I wish that our Minister may reach this City before the 25th of this month the grand anniversary of Independence here.

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John M. Forbes, Secretary of the United States Legation at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *June 2, 1823.*

The affairs of the Banda Oriental remain suspended to wait the result of Lord Cochrane's efforts against Bahia, of which nothing is yet known. The Portuguese in Monte Video cannot be forced but by a united Sea and land blockade and that is impracticable pending the more important operations of the Imperialists at the North. About ten days since, the Monte Videan garrison being much reduced, by a well conducted Sortie, captured and brought in one thousand head of Cattle, which, with supplies to be obtained hence, will protract their defence for a long time. The Spanish commissioners Don Antonio Luis Pereira and Don Luis de la Robla landed here on the 23rd May, presented their personal visit (but not their credentials) on 24th same. I presume that they delayed their formal recognition on account of the public festivities then going on and to avoid any official participation in them. They are now fully acknowledged, some notes have been exchanged between them and the Government and a communication is to be made this Evening to the Junta. I understand that their proposals only go to some commercial arrangements and to a temporary armistice. Neither of these are of any importance to this country—which has long since been relieved from Spanish hostility and abounding in foreign commerce. It has reached this city from Colombia that the instructions of these commissioners are, in case they should be pressed to the recognition of the Independence of these countries, to yield to it, but if possible, to obtain without it, the minor expedients of a temporizing policy. I am very anxious for the arrival of Mr. Rodney to put the seal to our recognition of this Government, and am not without apprehensions that these commissioners may precede us in this consummation.

The World, however, will render us the justice to believe that our magnanimous policy has accelerated the subsequent measures of Spain and those who may follow her example.

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John M. Forbes, Secretary of the United States Legation at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *June 22, 1823.*

SIR: I had last this honour on 2nd Instant (N° 49.) by the Ship Nimrod, Capt Sterling, to New York—duplicate of which accompanies this. Since

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

that date, the most important measure here has been, the suspension of the negociation with the Spanish Commissioners, on account of the proceedings of the Junta on the communication of the Government. This communication will be found in N°. 50. of the Argos. It was referred to a special committee composed of Doctors Gomez, Somellera, Manuel Moreno, Rojas, and Diaz Velez.

After nearly two weeks discussion that Committee unanimously agreed to and subscribed a Report which immediately follows the project as inserted in the Argos. D^r^ Moreno, was instructed by the Committee to sustain this report by an explanatory speech in the Junta, but when the subject came into discussion he was surprized to find himself precluded by D^r^. Gomez who had commenced the discussion in a speech criticising very severely the report he had signed and approved and proposing the insertion of a second article tending to paralyze the operation of the first, by leaving Spain and each South American Government mutually at liberty to negociate on such terms as might be convenient. After two nights' debate, M^r^ Gomez prevailed in obtaining the adoption of his second article and, with this insertion, the decree of the Government was adopted, by which the Sum of Twenty thousand dollars is voted to the Government to enable them to press the measures necessary to accelerate the cessation of hostilities and the acknowledgment of Independence.

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John M. Forbes, Secretary of the United States Legation at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *July 5, 1823.*

SIR: Yesterday being the Anniversary of our Independence I was engaged with a numerous party of my fellow citizens in the accustomed festivities of

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II. The draft of a preliminary convention with Spain follows:

Preliminary Convention agreed upon between the Government of Buenos Ayres and the Commissioners of his Catholic Majesty

The Government of Buenos Ayres having recognised and caused to be recognised by virtue of credentials presented and legalised in due form, as commissioners of His Catholic Majesty the Messieurs Antonio Luis Perreira and Luis de la Robla and the Minister of Foreign relations of the State of Buenos Ayres having proposed to those Gentlemen the formation of a Convention preliminary to a definitive treaty of peace between His Catholic Majesty and the United Provinces, on the fundamental principles established by the Law of the 19th. of June of the present Year, after mutual conferences and explanations of what they considered conducive to the best arrangement of the relations between the States before mentioned, making use of the faculties with which they are invested and of the powers by which they are authorised, they have adjusted the said preliminary Convention in the terms expressed in the following Articles.

that occasion and while at table I received from the Minister of State the important intimation that a Preliminary Convention had on that glorious day been signed between the Commissioners of Spain and the State of Buenos Ayres. A very fast Vessel, The Brig Dick, is just sailing and I am only allowed time to transmit, without commentary on its stipulations, a Copy of the said preliminary treaty. The Enemies of the Minister will find something to Carp at, but if this preparatory step only serves to conciliate the Sanguinary conflict going on in the Upper Provinces of Tucuman, Salta and

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ARTICLE 1. After Sixty days to be counted from the ratification of this Convention by the Governments to whom it appertains, all hostilities by Land and Sea between them and the Spanish Nation shall cease.

ARTICLE 2. Consequently the General commanding the forces of His Catholic Majesty in Peru will keep the positions he may occupy at the time, he shall be informed of this convention, saving the particular stipulations that by mutual convenience the adjoining Governments may propose or accept for the improvement of the respective lines of occupation during the suspension of hostilities.

ARTICLE 3. The Relations of Commerce, with the only exception of Contraband articles of War, shall be fully re-established during the term of this suspension, between these Provinces and the Spanish Monarchy, the provinces occupied in Peru by the Arms of His Catholic Majesty and the State that ratify this Treaty.

ARTICLE 5.* The relations of maritime Commerce with the Spanish natives and the States that ratify this Convention shall be adjusted by a special convention to be entered into immediately after the present.

ARTICLE 6. Neither the authorities that Govern the Provinces of Peru in the name of His Catholic Majesty, nor the adjoining States, shall impose on the Commerce of either greater contributions than those existing at the time of the ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 7. The suspension of hostilities shall continue for the term of Eighteen months.

ARTICLE 8. Within the said term the Government of the State of Buenos Ayres shall negociate by means of a Plenipotentiary of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata and conformable to the Law of the 19th of June, the celebration of a definitive treaty of peace and friendship between His Catholic Majesty and the States of the American Continent to which said Law refers.

ARTICLE 9. In the event of a renewal of hostilities these shall not take place, nor shall the relations of Commerce cease, until four months after such intimation.

ARTICLE 10. The Law existing in the Spanish monarchy as well as in the State of Buenos Ayres relative to inviolability of property, altho that of enemies, shall have full effect, in the event mentioned in *the* preceding Article, in the territories of the Governments that ratify this Treaty and reciprocally

ARTICLE 11. As soon as the Government of Buenos Ayres may be authorised by the Representatives of the State to ratify this Convention, it shall negociate with the Governments of Chili, Peru and the other Provinces of the Rio de la Plata for their joining in the same, and the Commissioners of His Catholic Majesty shall take at the same time all the means conducive to its having the promptest and fullest effect on the part of the authorities of His Catholic Majesty.

ARTICLE 12. For the due effect and validity of this Convention the necessary number shall be sealed by the Commissioners of His Catholic Majesty with their Seal, and by the Government of Buenos Ayres with the Seal of Foreign relations. Buenos Ayres 4th. July 1823.

[SEAL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS.] BERNARDINO RIVADAVIA.
[SEAL OF THE COMMISSIONER OF HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY.] ANTONIO LUIS PERREIRA.
LUIS DE LA ROBLA.

PROJECT OF LAW

The Government is authorised to ratify the preliminary Convention of the 4th of the present month between the Governments of Buenos Ayres, and Commissioners of His Catholic Majesty near it, and also to negociate the accession to it of the States and Governments mentioned in the 11th article of said Convention.

(Signed) RIVADAVIA.

*[Article 4 does not appear in the original manuscript]

Saint Iago del'Estero, it will be a most happy measure and will strengthen in a very great degree this part of America for any future struggle which may become necessary.

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John M. Forbes, Secretary of the United States Legation at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 12, 1823.*

The progress and success of the preliminary Convention with the Spanish Deputies now submitted to the different provinces is variously reported. The Enemies of the measure say that it will not be generally acceded to and that the only result of all the pending negociations with the Provinces will be the formation of a new Union but, as they say, this must be preceded by a change of Government in this Province. I have this moment received a Gazette of Mendoza entitled "*El Verdadero Amigo del Pais*". of 31st August containing the following important news. "From Chili by a gentleman arrived from that country we learn that a Vessel had just arrived from Callao, bringing the interesting news that the *Deliverer* (*Libertador*) Bolivar had arrived at Callao with 3000 Men. He alone landed and presented his respects to the Congress, he was named *Generalisimo*, he marched immediately with his forces upon the Intermedios, at the same date General Alvarado had already gone forward with 3000, which, with the force raised by Santa Cruz 5300 Men, made 11,000 and some soldiers. The Enemy as soon as this event was known dislodged himself from Lima and thus left again in liberty the Capital of Peru.

We can announce with security that the mountains and Valleys of the Incas at this moment celebrate the triumph of liberty and that the flag of Independence waves on all the points of America".

The affairs of the Banda Oriental are still covered in mystery. It is very difficult for this Government to keep in check the patriotic ardour of several other Provinces in favour of an immediate emancipation of that country by force, from the Brazilian Lake. Nor is it an easy task for this Ministry to justify its extraordinary delay and that deceptive reliance on diplomatic efforts, by which the adverse party gains much in the success of its arms in other quarters and a consequent augmentation of means of resistance in this Vicinity. Mr Gomez has been well enough received by the Emperor of Brazil, who, however, in his reply to a long presentation address of Mr Gomez, said that he could give no opinion on the subjects of his Mission until he had

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

consulted his Ministers. In the mean time it is said that the Provinces of Santa Fe and Cordova have united with Entre Rios and Corrientes and that a strong force is about to attack immediately General Le Cor in the Banda Oriental. Now, as M^r^ Gomez is the Minister of Entre Rios and Corrientes as well as of Buenos Ayres, such a resort to Arms pending the negociation, may place him in a very critical situation.

September 14, 1823.

SIR: I have this moment learned that the greatest solicitude is now entertained about a league which is said to have taken place between the Provinces of Cordova, Mendoza and San Luis, the object of which is to raise a considerable army which is to be put under the command of *General San Martin*, a Lion who has been sleeping for more than six months at Mendoza, under pretext of bodily indisposition. Another Army is forming at Tucuman under the orders of *Urdinea* a devoted friend and instrument of *San Martin* the ostensible object of these Military efforts is to attack the Brazilians and emancipate the *Banda Oriental*, but the real object, is to effect a new Confederation under the protection of Military force and to invest the Supreme Directorship in *San Martin*. The forces of the before named Provinces will cooperate with those of Santa-Fé, Entre Rios, and Corrientes raised with the same ostensible and same real motive. The Enemies of the Preliminary Convention with Spain ascribe all this hostile excitement to that measure; but I think the spirit of this new Coalition is to be found in the restless ambition of a few Military Chiefs. It is said that some demur has taken place on the part of *Bustos* the absolute Governor of *Cordova* but as his reluctance is personal it will be overcome by the promise of a fair reward to his ambition. The discontent here is very considerable and it remains to be seen, if the city can present a competent opposition to the forces which will be presented in this new Montenero War. I shall infinitely regret the revival of Military power, but contemplate with much more horror the reaction of a desperate and relentless Ecclesiastical influence. The present circumstances call for all the talents, firmness and activity of the prime Minister to dissolve if possible the Conspiracy and, failing in that, to offer a determined resistance to its efforts.

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John M. Forbes, Secretary of the United States Legation at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *November 5, 1823.*

. . . The Preliminary Convention with the Spanish Deputies, meets with an increasing opposition in some of the distant Provinces and in the ultra Montane States of Chili & Peru, where the recent brilliant atchievements of the patriot Arms animate to an energetic prosecution of the Contest and expose in striking colours the inexpediency of a suspension of hostilities founded on distant, contingent and quite uncertain benefits to the patriot cause, while the advantages secured by it to the exhausted Armies of Spain are certain and great.

The Minister of Peru near the Congress of Chili, has protested in a most formal and spirited manner against the adoption by that Congress of the aforesaid Preliminary Convention. Those Provinces which have in any manner acceded to it, have annexed to their adherence, such various modifications as have totally changed the Convention. This Preliminary Convention has been a powerful engine in the hands of the Minister's Enemies, and, joined to the unpunished incursions and extensive robberies of the Indians on the one hand, and his too slow and cautious policy in relation to the Banda Oriental, on the other, have very much diminished and shaken his popularity. The many financial ameliorations, however, the great improvements in the city his great love of order and his sincere desire to substitute for the oppressions of military despotism the mild and equal empire of reason, justice and law, have secured to him a strong party among the men of property and of settled principle in the city.

I am therefore of the opinion, that if a change should take place, it will be by an insidious, indirect attack on the Government, in the change of Governor, with the understanding that the present Ministers will be continued in power. The two most ambitious and restless leaders are Colonel Major Don Manuel Dorrego,—the Governor who immediately preceeded Rodriguez in 1820.—he is now a popular member of the Junta and a man of daring character.—The chief Idol of the Country people is Colonel Don Manuel Rosas. also a brave and daring man, of extensive property and influence.

In the tardy operations against the Indians, his arm was only put forth at the last extremity and his efforts are now held up by his party as the sole cause of the recent success against those Enemies, who, according to the last official accounts, have been dispersed, with the recovery of 80,000 head of Cattle, of their previous plunder. It was said three days since that a subscription was on foot to support Rosas as Governor, on condition of his con-

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

tinuing in power the present Minister. it is very probable that he would make this promise in the beginning but it is believed that he would soon after disregard it and place M^r^ Aguerro, a leading ecclesiastic, at the head of a new Ministry. The reaction which might result from such a change is too horrid to contemplate.

In the affairs of the Banda Oriental, it appears that while the Ministry of Brazil protract at their pleasure the Diplomatic negociation with D^r^ Gomez, General Le Cor, does not sleep on his arms. A blockade by sea and land has been established and among the Portugueze troops in Monte Video, the discontent has been carried so far as to produce a formal protest on the part of a number of the Officers and a considerable portion of the troops, declaring the pending contest not authorized by the King, their determination no longer to continue it and requiring of Don Alvaro, the sending of flags to General Le Cor and to the squadron to negociate a capitulation on condition of being sent to Protugal.

A flag was accordingly despatched by Don Alvaro da Costa to Baron de Laguna on 24^th^ October stating that having learned that the will of the King John the Sixth was that his troops should no longer make war with those of Brazils and that they should retire to Portugal and being ignorant if the Baron had sufficient authority to make precise engagements concerning the means of effecting their embarkation for Portugal, he was about to send to the court of Brazil an Officer, with the character of a flag of truce, in order to obtain from the Emperor the necessary guarantees and means; and thus proposed an armistice and free Commerce between the town and Country until the answer of His Imperial Majesty should arrive. On the 27^th^ The Baron answered, that he was vested with full powers to resolve concerning the embarkation of that part of the Division which of its own spontaneous will, desired to return to Europe and for the remaining in the Country of those who preferred so doing. Thus he deemed it unnecessary and should not permit the flag of truce to proceed to Rio Janeiro, it being only a pretext to gain time in order to favour a revolution projected by Don Alvaro, and being further well informed that under this mask an armament was now preparing in the City, he would only consent to an Armistice for some days (which must be very few) during which time two or more confidential Officers of the Division should be charged to treat and should treat with him about the Embarkation. On the night of the 30^th^ October the Company of Talavero of the second Regiment passed over to the General and on 31^st^ at 12 oclock His Excellency was to meet at the Piedras with Colonel Gorgas and Major Acuña to enter into negociation. In this state of things the Cabildo of Monte Video has made a last, an agonizing call on this Government for aid and protection and with a view to obtain the sanction of the Junta to the pacific policy pursued by the Government, the Minister asked the advice of that body. The communication was submitted to a committee of which Dorrego was one. On this com-

mittee asking some further information, the Minister in a long and rather dictatorial speech of an hour and a half, virtually withdrew the subject from further consideration by, declaring that there was no other alternative but open War which the Government disapproved or entire peace which was the line of conduct pursued by the Government and intimating further that he sought only the approval by the Junta of the Executive policy and not any Criticism or opposition.

From Peru the news continues to be extremely favourable to the Patriot cause. The appearance of Bolivar has excited great enthusiasm and general confidence appears to be placed in his patriotism and the sincerity and pureness of his Views. He has been named *Liberator* and vested with full powers civil and Military with the co-operation, to a certain extent, of the present President Don José Bernardo Tagle. General Santa Cruz has obtained great advantages at La Paz, General Arenales in Potosi and General Lucre and Colonel Miller on the coast. In short La Serna and Canterac appear to be reduced to narrow limits, and must soon be compelled to abandon the whole country. The preliminary Treaty with Spain, now become the great subject of party controversy here, gives rise to daily varying rumours; it is now reported on the authority of a letter from a respectable British Merchant at Lima that *Bolivar* has accepted that convention availing himself of the present occupancy by the Patriots of great and advantageous positions. The oppositionists contend that this is impossible and that *Bolivar* will only accept a convention which shall stipulate for the entire evacuation of the Peruvian territory by the Royalists. and it is said that the powers of the Deputies who made this Convention extend to such stipulations and even to a recognition of Independence under circumstances of urgent necessity.

November 10, 1823.

Since writing the foregoing the affairs of Banda Oriental have had one very animated discussion in the Junta, they excite great interest among the citizens, and will again be warmly discussed this Evening. The Minister and his friends contend that means of all kinds are wanting. The Treasury is empty, Foreign Commerce, from whence comes all the Revenue is, for the moment, almost suspended, and the more alarming call for resistance is the Indian Invasion.

On the other hand, it is contended that resistance against the occupation of Monte Video by the Imperialists is a matter of vital importance to the tranquility and to the commerce of the Province and city, inasmuch as such an occupation will necessarily be followed by a great augmentation of the Brazilian forces to secure them against future dispossession and this aggregation of forces, Military and Naval, will enable the Imperialists not only to attack the limitroph provinces but with an inconsiderable naval force to cut off the trade of this city altogether. Yesterday it was said that the Indians had re-

tired, to day it is reported that they are again advancing. The melancholy fact is, that the Indians are daily increasing in boldness and confidence, while the troops of this Province are daily losing their courage and giving themselves almost up to panic. This war is also an instrument very actively employed by the Enemies of the Administration to discredit it with the great Landholders and with the country people generally.

November 11, 1823.

A great concourse of citizens assembled last evening at the Hall of the Junta in the expectation of an animated discussion of the Banda Oriental affairs, but to their great disappointment, after waiting more than an hour, the Sergeant at arms announced that there would be no Session, the truth is, that the Committee was not prepared to report on that affair and as Dorrego and Doctor Diaz Velez, both oppositionists, are on the committee there is great reason to believe that they will protest against the report, should it not propose a hostile opposition to the Imperialists. I omitted before to say, that the Minister had some days ago sent for Colonel Dorrego and offered him the Mission to Columbia, by way of purchasing his friendship. This he refused and now publickly boasts of this condescension on the part of the Government. The prevailing opinion is, that his friendship was never worth the price offered.

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John M. Forbes, Secretary of the United States Legation at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *January 3, 1824.*

SIR: The Minister of the U.S. being in a debilitated State of body, his Physicians have interdicted him the use of his pen and I feel it my duty under such circumstances to endeavour to state to you such facts within my knowledge in relation to this Government and its public concerns as it may be interesting to you or the Government to know.—I have had frequent occasion to notice the great opposition to the present Administration as well in this Province as in others of La Plata formerly United, which, under various motives, has been for some time growing.

General San Martin was supposed by some to be secretly hostile to the present Administration here and the factions were constantly during several months threatening his visit to this Capital as the signal of some great change of men and measures.—At length on 4th Dec^{r} last in the afternoon General

[1] MS. Despatches from Argentina, II.

San Martin arrived in this City and proceeded immediately to the former dwelling house of his late Father in law, M^r^ Escalada, but finding that that family was at a Quinta in the Country, he repaired to that place and remained several days there.—The next day after his arrival the discontented were peculiarly active in circulating projects of an immediate change; this same day General San Martin made very respectful and friendly visits to the Governor and his Ministers which were promptly returned.—In a very few days it was understood that the greatest friendship existed between him and the Government and that, far from entering into the intrigues of the discontented, he had even denounced to the Government some of those who had tampered with him on those subjects.—In the meantime the law regulating the election of the new Governor has shut the door against his competition, if he contemplated it, for no one but a native of the Province is eligible, and San Martin as well as D^n^ Carlos Alvear, another leader of party, are from the territory of the Missiones. . . . According to the law of election recently passed, The Governor is to be chosen by the Junta, who are to meet expressly for that purpose on 1^st^. April between which day and the third, the commencing period of service, the election is to be effected.—Any member of the Junta is eligible, but no person not a native of the Province of Buenos Ayres.—

The Oath prescribed to the Governor is, to support national Independence, individual liberty and a *republican*, *representative* system of Government.—

On the 27^th^ December The Minister Plenipotentiary and Secretary of Legation of the United States were publickly presented to and received by the Governor of the Province, surrounded by his Ministers and all the great departments of public service, Law, Police &c, but the external, popular demonstrations were excessively cold and there is no doubt they were prepared by the Government in concert with the two great parties which now influence their Councils, The old Spaniards and the English.—On this subject it is not necessary to enlarge, as the great individual feeling among the North Americans excited by these circumstances will find a copious flow in their private correspondence, some extracts of which, as usual, will meet the public eye.—The comments on our recognition which appeared in the subsequent Argos and were evidently written in the Government house, confirm the apathy felt on this great occasion and most studiously inculcated by the Government, in further confirmation of which stands the fact, that Mr Garcia, Secretary of the Treasury in a long speech at the close of the Session of the Junta, giving the political history of the Government during the past year, never even indirectly alluded to the recognition by the United States or the arrival of our Minister here.—Don Carlos Alvear, a man of extensive family influence and who has twice been at the head of affairs during the revolution, once as Supreme Director and once as Commander in Chief, is appointed Minister Plenipotentiary of this Government to that of the United States.—D^n^. Tomas de Iriarte, formerly a L^t^. Col°. in the Artillery and more recently Second

Clerk of the Department of Government, is appointed Secretary of Legation and they will both proceed shortly to England on their way to the United States.—It is presumed that M^r. Alvear has some explanations of the late affair of the *Brazen* and perhaps on some other points to make with the British Government, probably to throw some influence into the scale in favour of the loan now in train of negociation.—From Peru we learn that that Country is involved in serious dissentions bordering on Civil War.—The influence of Bolivar has entirely failed in a negociation to reconcile Riva Aguerro, a jealous patriot chief, and by last accounts Bolivar was about to march against him with an original force of 3500 men which it was expected would be greatly augmented on its march.—Riva Aguerro once subdued, or won over to a cooperation (or if only subdued) Bolivar will then attack the Royalists with an Army of 7 or 8000 Men.—But according to recent reports the affairs of that Country are rendered more complicated and difficult by an Act of the Royalist Chiefs; they having declared Peru independent of Spain! Such a measure would only tend to confirm and increase the distinct influence of men long in hostility with the patriots and it is presumed that Bolivar will by no means consent to such a recognition, but will persevere in his military efforts to the compleat expulsion of the Royalist Chiefs and their Army.—

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John M. Forbes, Secretary of the United States Legation at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

Private BUENOS AIRES, *January 24, 1824.*

The present state of this Country gives me the greatest uneasiness and adds to my previous desire to return and sit down under the "vine and fig tree" of real, well established liberty, "having no one to molest or to make me afraid". I fear that the sun of freedom, which has only shone on this Country for a short Winter's day, is fast declining to that horizon whence it will sink into the night of despotism. A most profound plot is going on between Despotism in Europe and La Serna, the Royalist Commander in Chief and Vice Roy in Peru. Instructions from the absolute King Ferdinand 7^th., forwarded under the auspices of the Duke of Angouleme to the Commander of the French Frigate now at Maldonado, for La Serna, are now on the way, by a Confidential messanger, over the Mountains, to announce the prompt expedition of a joint naval & military force from Cadiz to his assistance to

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

advise him to hold out or to cajole the patriots in any way he can, until the promised aid shall reach him. In the full anticipation of the spirit of these instructions La Serna had already amused General *Las Heras*, the Minister from this place, with the idea of the adoption of the Preliminary Convention and has rumoured an *intention* to proclaim Peru independent. But what gives a colour to the most unfavourable suspicions against the men in power here, on the part of their Enemies, is, that they still keep up a ludicrous negociation about a Convention entered into with the Constitutional King and Cortes, a party which has ceased to exist by the reestablishment of despotism. Why, say the oppositionists, talk of a contract of which one of the parties is politically dead? Because, say they, the present Government wishes to lull the nation into a false security that it may be found unprepared and fall an easy victim to despotism when it shall pounce upon the Country. Another Circumstance fortifies these suspicions, which is, that in the recent double struggle of Bolivar in Peru, not only the Chilian Auxiliaries but those of Buenos Ayres, retired from the field, leaving Bolivar entirely to his Peruvian & Colombian resources. What means of access to these Countries have not the Despots of the holy alliance? Brazil, where the mock Emperor has been playing an occult game with his dear father and associates, extends her territory to this River. all her Ports will be immediately thrown open with welcoming hallelujahs to the arms of European Despotism. In Co-operation with the King of Portugal, the absolute King of Spain Ferdinand 7th may make an uninterrupted landing at Monte Video whence he may attack this Province, under present circumstances, with great hope of success. The real patriots are quite disheartened and openly declare that the old Spaniards have already the ascendancy here. The election of one half the Junta approaches and great efforts are making on both sides. I am confident, however, that the Ministerial ticket will prevail, although it is composed of known enemies to the revolution, except three, Doctor Pasos, Gen^{l}. Soler and Col^{o} Dorrego, who are merely put forward to blind the people and induce them to swallow the whole list. In this state of things a paper has been published in the new Argos N^{o} 3, purporting to be the secret treaty entered into at Verona, November 22^{d} 1822, the first article of which stipulates that Russia, Austria, Prussia and France are to unite their efforts to prevent the establishing representative Governments where they do not exist and to destroy them where they do. Doubts are entertained of the authenticity of this document; you will be better able to judge of it from its examination. Its publication, joined to the news of an expedition fitting out at Cadiz, increases much the public anxiety at the present moment. The plans for the new organization of this Government are as various as the individuals from whom you derive them. It was, until lately and still by many, said, that M^{r} Rivadavia wished to go to Spain as Minister, partly to repose from the turmoils of a thorny and difficult administration, and partly with a view to augment his

importance by a temporary absence and to secure his election to the Supreme Directorship, when things shall be matured for a new union of the Provinces. It is now said that he will, *if forced*, take the Gubernatorial Chair of this Province. In either case it is generally believed, that Doctor Don Julian Aguerro, a Priest of great talents, but with a full share of hyprocrisy and duplicity will take the helm of state as *Premier*.

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John M. Forbes, Secretary of the United States Legation at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

Private. BUENOS AIRES, *February 12, 1824.*

. . . Of my sincere wishes for the cause of liberty he could have no doubt; that although he knew less of the Minister, I could assure him that no man could be more ardently devoted to the cause of the Independence and liberty of South America, than M[r] Rodney; that I should immediately communicate to him the substance of our conference, but that I could assure him (the Minister) in advance, that if he could embody his charges and the competent proofs, M[r] Rodney and myself, would both, give our most sincere efforts to bring them to the knowledge of the President. I saw M[r]. Rodney last evening in his bed and reported to him all that had passed between M[r]. Rivadavia and myself. That excellent man was much distressed at the affairs stated and said he should give the subject his fullest reflection. I left him and have just now met Don Ignacio Nunes, the Chief Clerk of the Department of State, who told me, that he was charged to address a note to the Minister M[r]. Rodney, which would be immediately prepared and sent. I write thus much in the present state of the business, to avail myself of the occasion which this moment presents by M[r] Coxe of Philadelphia. The public mind here, is much agitated by the menacing power of the Holy Alliance, and the Junta is specially convoked for the 18[th] Instant, to consider all these matters, among which the proposed Union of The Provinces.

I am [etc.].

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

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Bernardo Rivadavia, Minister of Government and Foreign Relations of the United Provinces of South America, to Caesar A. Rodney, [1] *United States Minister at Buenos Aires*

[TRANSLATION]

BUENOS AIRES, *February 12, 1824.*

The Minister, Secretary of Foreign Relations and of Government has the honour to address himself to M^r^. The Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States, with a view to bring to his Notice an event which has an intimate connection with the interests of the American Continent and inasmuch as the Commander of the Naval forces of the United States in the Pacific is implicated in it, it is proper to bring it to the knowledge of his Government for that which in consequence of it may take place.

It is now some time since the Ministry of B.^s^ Ayres had received from respectable public men, as well in Chili as in Peru, the most particular information against the conduct which the beforementioned Officer has observed, that is, an open protection of the Royalist Army in Upper and Lower Peru and consequently a direct hostility to the American System.

The Ministry of Buenos Ayres presuming that the Governments of the Republics of Peru and Chili would have taken care, as it is believed they have done, to inform the Government of the U.S. of an event of such importance to the American interests, and in the understanding also that the reprehensible conduct of the said Officer can rest on no other principle than a mere private speculation, whose accomplishment has caused this deviation of conduct, has not taken care to avail itself of documents to prove in every case the conduct of which the said Officer was generally accused. Notwithstanding the News received to this time go to assure it, that the said Officer has continued, without interruption, to render services to the only Royalist Army which now resists, in one point, the independence of South America, already conquered in every other point; which has brought this affair to such a degree as to elicit an expression of public opinion in the most alarming terms. But at present The Ministry of Buenos Ayres has obtained the most legal document which it can, for the moment, hope for, to place the above named Officer in the point of view which he merits, and availing itself of the opportunity presented by the residence in this Country of the Minister Plenipotentiary of the U.S. whose attachment to the interests of all America is well known, it is by one and the other that the Undersigned Minister has deemed it his duty to give already to this Affair the Official Character which belongs to it. This document is a Note from the public Commissioner of Buenos Ayres near the Authorities of

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II. The conference referred to in this dispatch is apparently that between Mr. Forbes and the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs, the substance of which is embodied in the accompanying note of this same date from Mr. Rivadavia to Mr. Rodney.

his Catholic Majesty in Peru, in which from the limitroph territory which those occupy and under date of 17th January of this year, referring to Communications from the General of the Royalist Army to respectable persons of his Command, says, "General La Serna announces that he has sent a diplomatic Commission composed of two Individuals, of which one is a Secretary of his, to North America, and although he does not tell me for what object, it has been signified to me that he believed it was to purchase Ships of War, about which he had before spoken with the Commandant of the Ship Franklin, when he was in the Intermedios, and that this last had facilitated every thing and had even offered his person". The opinion which this document commands with respect to the conduct of the said Officer will be easily felt by Mr. The Minister Plenipotentiary to whom the Minister addresses himself, this renders it unnecessary to make any observation on the subject and limits him to the request that the said Gentleman would have the condescension to transmit it also to the knowledge of the Government of the United States as an affair whose nature and importance deserves certainly to occupy the attention of the Government the most interested for the security of the Independence of these Countries. It only remains for the Undersigned Minister to recommend to Mr. The Plenipotentiary the importance of the view of the above cited Note, with that reserve which he himself and the position of the Commissioner of the Government of Buenos Ayres in Peru, render absolutely necessary. Mr. The Secretary of Legation, whom the Minister invited yesterday to his Department to avoid causing any inconvenience to Mr. The Plenipotentiary, can give the verbal explanations which were made, as well on the point of the reserve as upon the subject matter of this Note.

The Undersigned Minister desiring a better health to Mr Plenipotentiary, has the honour [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Secretary of the United States Legation at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

Private. BUENOS AIRES, *February 22, 1824.*

. . . To my last Communication, I have only to add, that a special meeting of the Junta has been convened to take into consideration the project of a new union of the Provinces, which has been progressing through the Agency of Mr. Zavaleta, who has been for some time past the circulating Minister of this Government among those Provinces. The written Communications of this Government have been delivered over to a Committee of

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

five, composed of Doctors Gascogne, Fernandez Aguero, San Martin and Ramirez and Colonel Dorrego. This Committee has reported to the Junta and, among other things, have proposed to withdraw from the European Spaniards the right of suffrage at the approaching elections. It will be recollected that by the Constitution of the United Provinces this right was denied to European Spaniards until the Independence of the Country should be acknowledged by Spain. Immediately after M^r^. Rivadavia came into power, by an effort of magnanimity and on the ground that the restriction operated on so many of their fathers, relations and friends, the right of suffrage was granted to the European Spaniards. It is now proposed that it should be again withdrawn and the report of the Committee is to be discussed tomorrow. The debate will be quite animated. Three of the Committee, Doctors Gascogne & Ramirez and Col° Dorrego are in favour of the report and two, Doctors San Martin and Fernandez Aguerro, are opposed to it. The Cousin of the latter, Julian Aguerro, a man of great talents, now bought over and enchained to the Administration by the hope of eminent employments, is also opposed to that article of the report, as will be also all the influence of the Government and thus I expect that the report will be rejected. In a postscript to the duplicate of my last despatch, I mentioned the departure of General San Martin for France, via Monte Video, in a French Vessel. I have since been informed that, under an ostensible coolness was concealed the most intimate and confidential intercourse between him and M^r^. Rivadavia, that they met at the house of the latter almost every evening, and it is now said, that San Martin has gone to Europe, with a most confidential mission from this Government, of a similar character with Puyerredon & Co's farce of the Prince of Lucca and of the more recent attempt of San Martin, Paroisien & Garcia del Rio, to import the Prince of Saxe Coburg, as King of Peru.

Some months ago San Martin, while in Mendoza, received from his Emissaries, Paroisien and Garcia, in England, an intimation of the practicability of obtaining a British Prince for these Provinces. This was, at the time, communicated to this Ministry, who then had too strong hopes of the success of their preliminary Convention with the Spanish Commissioners and paid no attention to this new project. Subsequently, when the Peruvian Admiral, Blanco, returned hence to Chili, he was instructed by this Ministry to urge General San Martin, on his way through Mendoza, to visit this City, which Blanco did, and, among other objects, held out the almost certainty of his being elected Governor here. Soon after his arrival, however, San Martin saw that there was no chance of success in that project and Rivadavia, probably conceiving that he might prove a formidable rival for the Supreme Directorship, offered a large sum (it is said 30,000 Dollars) as a national reward for his eminent services and engaged him to undertake this mission to Europe. His first plan is, to beat the bush for an English Prince; failing in this, he is to engage the influence of the French Cabinet to procure a Prince of the Spanish

Family. It is further said that this was to have formed one of the objects of Alvear's mission to England and that the Government, fearing the evil tendency of personal dislike between these two great men, have given M^r A. to understand that his Mission to England is no longer necessary, but that he is to proceed directly to the U.S. It is supposed that M^r Alvear, considering that visit as the pleasantest part of his various Agencies, will perhaps give up his appointment to Washington, where, in any event, *his mission will be merely itinerant* and of a short duration (say 4 or 5 months)—I give these reports as I hear them, but believe them to be highly probable.

March 1, 1824.

I am happy to say that my anticipation of the result of the discussion on a project of a new Congress of the Provinces, as far as related to the continuance of the right of Suffrage to the European Spaniards has not been realized.

After an animated discussion of several days, on the night of 27^th Feb^y, all the articles of a Decree for convoking a new Congress were agreed on, and by the 5^th Article, "those *Strangers* only can be permitted to vote who have Certificates of Citizenship". Since writing the foregoing I learn also that M^r. Alvear still goes to England, but, as 'tis said, only on family business, to meet his father there.

I am [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Acting Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *July 5, 1824.*

. . . One of the most prominent in relation to this province, has been the relinquishment of all public employment by Mr. Rivadavia who, after resisting all kinds of entreaty to resume his important Official functions, actually embarked in the British packet, Walsingham, for England on the 26^th June last. The departure of Mr. Rivadavia at this moment is much to be regretted, as it may be apprehended that his absence may again throw open the field of Competition to many ambitious men and be the signal of some new Commotions. We must, however, hope that his voyage to Europe may effect some great national good, which may be equivalent to the hazards incurred here. My own opinion is, that he has gone to bargain with England and Spain, jointly or separately, for an early recognition of South American Independence, on what conditions this negociation will be made, the event only will shew. . . .

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

We are without any recent news from Peru or Chili; probably owing to the usual Winter difficulties in the passage of the Cordilleras which are presumed to be quite filled with snow, from an unexampled coldness of our Winter here. Our last news from Chili gave the particulars of Mr. Allen's public reception and those from Peru mentioned the resignation of La Serna, the Spanish Vice Roy, the chief Ostensible motive of which is, the decree of the Absolute King, annulling all the appointments and other acts of the Constitutional Government. Mr La Serna's resignation will be found at length in one of the numbers of the "Argos" now forwarded. The Congress of these provinces still continues to be spoken of, but the period of its formation seems still clouded in uncertainty. It is said that some of the provinces have required, as a previous Condition to their assembling in Congress, that Buenos Ayres should pay or assume all their debts, on the ground of her having received all the revenue; but I believe this has only been particularly urged on the part of Cordova— By all that I can collect from the best political sources, I am induced to believe that it will not be among the first objects of the Congress to form any written Constitution for which the mass of the people is not yet prepared, but, in the first instance, Congress will be occupied with a system of Common defence, and further by the means of disseminating throughout the Provinces those practical notions of administration inculcated here by Mr Rivadavia; of exciting a general interest in public affairs, to which the great body of the people have hitherto been Strangers, and, when the elements of a sound, public feeling and opinion shall have been created by a three or four years' practical pupilage, then the attempt will be made to adapt a Constitution to those elements.

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John M. Forbes, Acting Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *August 13, 1824.*

. . . The British Packet, Camden, arrived yesterday and brings no very encouraging news for these people. There has been a mysterious delay in bringing ashore the Newspapers and it is said that the confidence of the London Capitalists in South American funds has been so far impaired, that the pending loan to this Government would not be effected. It is also said and believed that the King of Spain has most peremptorily refused to listen

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II.

to any proposals of England on the subject of the recognition of South American Independence and has sent an autograph letter to the King of England, declaring his determination to attempt the subjugation of his revolted Colonies and boasting of the certainty of effective support from the Sovereigns of the Holy Alliance. It appears to me that the hopes of Spanish Sovereignty here are at an end, but that a race for influence and power here has commenced between England and France. It seems that the latter has enlisted in her cause, at least one very powerful emissary, in *Iturbide*, Ex Emperor of Mexico, who, it appears, left London, under pretext of going to Bath and went to Southampton, whence he secretly embarked for Mexico.

In the supposed struggle for influence between the two named powers, the weight of Commercial wealth and of maritime power is in one Scale, and that of religious sympathy and the most subtle intrigue is in the other. I am of opinion that, to avail themselves to the utmost possible extent of ecclesiastical influence, the French will seek to re-establish fanaticism in this section of the Country, where it has been shaken and to animate it in all those Countries where it has had its uninterrupted empire. In the neighbouring Empire of Brazil, it is said that French influence predominates in the Councils of the Emperor, while his popularity is chiefly supported by the Naval reputation of Lord Cochrane. With respect to the religious feelings of this Country, I am induced, by the testimony of the most competent and respectable witnesses, to believe, that the spirit of tolerance is literally confined to this City. Some time since a Decree was issued, offering to educate, at this University and at the expence of this Government, two youths from each of the Provinces, of which one was to be destined to the Church; to this proposal, I understand, that the unvarying reply has been—No! Sooner than send our Sons to Buenos Ayres, that focus of heresy, let them go without education, provided they remain "*buenos Christianos*" which means, "*good Catholics*". In such utter darkness what are the hopes of religious liberty and tolerance? Under the prevalence of ecclesiastical despotism, where are the boasted promises of civil liberty, free institutions and representative Government? Would to God I could form, from such chaotic materials, anything like a sound opinion of future probabilities. I feel conscious of the most sincere and ardent wishes for the welfare and happiness of this people. My previous Communications have proved these feelings on my part but I hope that I shall never be so far misled by my predilections as to run madly after the pretenders and false prophets of republicanism. The new War in Peru between the *absolutes* and *constitutionalists* renders all political speculations and conjectures still more complicated and difficult than they were before. Thus far the greatest object for which those armies have been contending appears to have been the Mines and Mint of Potosi, the last news from that quarter are, that on 25th June General Olañeta evacuated *Potosi*, having previously conveyed to *Tarija* every thing most valuable and even the utensils of the Mint.

On 27th same General Valdes occupied Potosi, which, according to private letters, was reduced to a compleat skeleton, Olañeta having occupied himself for some time before hand in transporting to Tarija every thing which could be of service to his enemies, and having obliged all the rich families and all the religious Communities to retire also to that place; with the aid of these last, and his great knowledge of, and relations with the surrounding Country, Olañeta may make a long and perhaps a triumphant War against the Constitutionalists in that quarter. What is most extraordinary, however, in these last Military operations is, that the *patriot Colonel*, Lanza, was aiding Olañeta to cut off the Communications with Oruro and Cochabamba. As long as the Victory between the *absolutes* and *constitutionalists* shall remain undecided, the lukewarm and wavering patriots of that region will divide their weight between the two scales; it is therefore much to be wished that one or the other party might be beaten; in which case, the ruins of the vanquished party might take refuge under the patriot standard. At *Mendoza* there has been lately a revolution in favor of the *liberal* party, so called, but how was it effected? by the free workings of public feeling and opinion? No. by the arm of military force, the former Governor having been wounded in his attempt to escape; The leader in this revolution was a young Colº. Lavalle, Son of our Collector General here, who remained a few days a Governor, when he was replaced by a man of that Province. While revolutions continue to be effected by such means, they are only ephemeral mutations of power, without any solid amelioration of public opinion. We are here, perhaps, only sleeping at the crater of a political volcano. The Amnesty accorded, at the suggestion of Rivadavia, to all the expatriated associates of Tagle and Rolon, in the insurrection of March 1823, has brought them all back, with undiminished Confidence in the revolutionary projects. Unless the present Administration soon gets an accession of moral strength, I should not be surprized to see some bold effort made to dislodge it from power. My belief is, that Mr. Puyerredon, ripe in age and reposing on the lap of great wealth, would decline any personal participation in public affairs, but he still gives his name to a numerous and powerful party, of which the efficient and active political leader would be Tagle. Among the military officers, disgusted by Rivadavia's reform, it would be no difficult task to find a daring military Chief. Should a revolution take place in favour of that party, it would of course lean towards France and the re-establishment of fanaticism. There is another party now in opposition, called the patriot or popular party, of which Dorrego is the military head. Among his political Advisers may be counted some very good men, they profess a great admiration for our institutions; but I am sorry to say, that though Dorrego has great personal courage, yet I believe him too violent to gain many thinking followers. The Government has, however, on two occasions, manifested its apprehensions from the hostility of Dorrego; before Mr. Rivadavia left the Administration he offered

him the mission to Colombia, which he refused; the same mission, joined to one to Peru has been again offered by the present Administration and again refused.

August 23, 1824.

SIR: The Vessel by which this goes having been detained I have only to add that we have reports here of a partial change in the *personale* of the Chilian Government, that is of the Senate. Also of a conspiracy discovered at Callao to deliver that place into the hands of the patriots. This discovery caused the military execution of eighty individuals. It is also said from Lima that Bolivar's Army has been augmented to fourteen thousand, that he was in motion towards the enemy and in greatest confidence of a successful result to his operations. From Upper Peru it has been reported that Olañeta had gone over to the Patriots, but I cannot trace this news to any authentic source.

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John M. Forbes, Acting Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Manuel José Garcia, Minister of Foreign Relations of Buenos Aires [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *December 6, 1824.*

At a moment when important events are expected one of which appears to be the recognition of the Independence of the Provinces of La Plata by a great European Power, and the other, the negociation of a treaty of Amity and commerce with that Power, The Undersigned, Chargé des Affaires of the United States of America feels it to be a general duty of vigilance over the interests of his country, further stimulated by the instructions of his Government, to submit to The Honorable M^r^. Manuel José Garcia, Minister of Government and of Foreign Relations, certain facts and observations connected with the commercial views and just expectations of the United States.—

It is not unknown to M^r^. Garcia that the liberal system of commercial reciprocity, now extending its benign influence to most of the Nations of Europe, had its origin in the legislation of the United States of America.—As long ago as in 1815, the Congress of the United States made, through the President, a general offer of reciprocal duties on navigation to all such Governments as should choose to accede to such a system; and most of the commercial Nations of Europe have already acceded to it.—

Under such circumstances, no Government has a fairer claim to reciprocal rights and advantages of Commerce than that of the United States.—

On this important subject the language and conduct of the United States

[1] MS. Consular Letters, Buenos Aires, II. A copy of this was enclosed with Forbes to the Secretary of State, December 17, 1824, which see below, pt. II, doc. 303.

towards the former Provinces of Spanish America, have ever been most frank and fraternal.—

The basis of all their intercourse with foreign powers is *reciprocity.—They* have not demanded nor would they have accepted special privileges of any kind in return for an acknowledgement of Independence, but that which they have not desired and would not have accepted for themselves, they have a right to insist, ought not to be granted to others.—Recognition is in its nature not a subject of equivalent; it is claimable of right, or not at all.—

Any extraordinary concessions as the price of such a right is the surrender of the *thing* for the acquisition of the *name.*— an exchange of the *substance* for the *shadow.*—

With such principles and feelings, the Government of the United States will ever strenuously maintain its right to be treated, in every respect on the footing of the most favoured, or as it is more properly expressed, the most *friendly* Nation.—

The Undersigned further takes leave to state to Mr. Garcia, that, on the 17th. September 1821, in a formal, official conference with the Honorable Mr Bernardino Rivadavia, then Minister of Government and of Foreign Relations, these principles and views of the United States were frankly and fully explained, and, in reply, Mr Rivadavia was pleased to give to the Undersigned the following precise and explicit declaration—"that it was the firm determination of this Government to grant no exclusive privileges of Commerce to any nation whatever, and that the Undersigned might communicate this decision to his Government with an assurance that the most compleat reliance might be placed on it."—In compliance with his duty the Undersigned did, at the time, communicate this formal assurance to the Government of the United States, it received the full and entire faith of Congress and was published by their order, with other documents relating to the provinces of formerly Spanish America.—

In communicating these observations to the Honorable Mr. Garcia, The Undersigned prays him to be assured, that they are dictated wholly by a sense of circumspect duty and in no manner arise from any want of confidence in that perfect justice and good faith which has ever marked the political course of the Government of Buenos Ayres.—The Undersigned respectfully requests, in case any new organization of the department of Foreign Relations should take place under the approaching General Congress, that this Note may be passed to such competent authority as may be instituted.—

The Undersigned prays The Honorable Mr. Garcia, Minister of Foreign Relations, to accept [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Acting Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *December 17, 1824.*[1]

. . . The Government of this Province transmitted a Complimentary message, containing some general political views and an imperfect sketch of the negociations of this Government with those of foreign nations as well as with the Sister Republics of the American Continent.—I send herewith one of the Copies of this Message, furnished me by the Minister, Mr. Garcia, at the moment of its transmission to Congress.—On the opening of the Sessions of Congress, at 11 oClock, A.M. the National Standard was hoisted at the Fort under a grand Salute, repeated from the Place de la Victoire and from the armed Vessels in the Roads, which were elegantly decorated with the flags of all nations, among which that of the United States held the second place, that of the Country of course holding the first.—I displayed the flags of both Nations from the top of my house, where they continued to wave until a closing Salute from the Fort at Sun Set.—Mr. Parish having adopted the plan of displaying the British flag from the top of his house, I followed the example, improving on it, by displaying the flag of the Country on another Staff near to that of the U.S.; this I felt to be an act of Courtesy and thought it might also shew the people the difference of feeling and relations between us and those of the British.—The long talked of acknowledgement of Independence by the British Government, is alluded to in the Message of this Government to Congress.—it is said that an important Communication will be made on Monday next by Mr. Parish.—The mystery which seems to hang over this great measure will then be dispelled; there continue, however, to be various opinions as to the nature of this recognition.—The English merchants have inculcated the belief that it will be simultaneous with a treaty of Commerce and so much was said on this point that I felt myself called upon to enter something like a *Caveat*, which I did by a Note to the Minister of Foreign Relations under date of 6th Instant, of which I transmit herewith a Copy,[2] and hope that this step on my part will be found justified in the view of our Government by motives of necessary circumspection.—Preparations are making for general illumination and public rejoicing, which will no doubt be very extravagant, should the Communication of Mr. Parish amount to an unqualified recognition.—As to the U.S. we are used in their State papers as rhetorical ornament, a mere figure of speech, and our recognition has been most impudently assimilated, in importance, to a similar measure on the part of one of their smallest Provinces; but, among a people as much benighted in ignorance and sensuality as are these people, it cannot be hoped that moral influence can be understood or appreciated.

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, II.
[2] See above, pt. II, doc. 302, Forbes to Minister of Foreign Relations, December 6, 1824.

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John M. Forbes, Acting Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *January 23, 1825.*

SIR: On the evening of the 21st Instant this city was excited to a degree of madness of joy at the most important news from Peru, which has ever gladdened the hearts of any people.—Nothing less than the *total destruction* of the Royalist Army under the Vice Roy La Serna, Generals Canterac & Valdez by the liberating army under the command of General Lucre, the action was fought on 9th December on the field of Huamnanga.—All the General Officers, Prisoners, La Serna dangerously wounded, the whole Army either killed or prisoners.—

The materials of the Army also in possession of the patriots and an order given to General Rodill to surrender the Fortress of Callao.—Bolivar was, at the time of the Battle, at or near Lima making arrangements for the siege of Callao.—This is a hasty summary of the leading facts.—

I have seen no account which gives the numbers of either Army.—The publication of this important news was immediately followed by a grand salute from the Fort, fire works in every direction and the most splendid music, from a reunion of all the Military bands, accompanied by hundreds of citizens, shouting and singing patriotic songs throughout the city.—I received a most flattering attention on the part of a most respectable party of more than two hundred, composed of distinguished Military Officers, and literary men, Lawyers, authors, Editors of papers &c. who came with a band of Music and coming into my lodgings, they entirely filled them.—They offered me the felicitations of the city with the unmerited assurance that the country owed more to me than to any other Individual, inasmuch as my favourable and correct Reports of the state of the country had induced the first recognition of their Independence.—These assurances were accompanied by apparently cordial *accolades* or embraces.—I could not fail to be duly moved by such manifestations of feeling towards me, but, conscious of the errors of judgment to which great excitement and enthusiasm naturally lead, I disclaimed the unmerited tribute of applause, declaring that I had in no instance, done more than a sense of duty and love of truth had dictated.—In my hall was a Portrait in oil of the immortal Washington, which gave rise to a very animated speech by a promising young lawyer, named *Varela*, highly eulogizing the character of this great man and of our country, and inculcating very eloquently the most fraternal feelings towards the United States.—This speech was followed by various most patriotic toasts and the whole offered such a scene as to induce in me, for a moment, the opinion, that, although the sordid race of stock jobbers, speculators and Merchants may bend to another influ-

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, II.

ence, the higher order of minds glow with a warm patriotic feeling of fraternity towards us.—There are certain men of high rank here who receive this glorious news with a very equivocal feeling, as the real patriots already promise confidently an early visit from the great *Regenerator*, who alone can recast public opinion here.—

Inclosed as a despatch from M^r^. Hogan, our consul at Valparaiso, which, containing all the particulars of this news I do not deem it necessary to enlarge on it.—M^r^. Slacum consul of the U.S. arrived here on Sunday 16^th^. Instant, he was presented to Mr. Garcia, on Thursday 20^th^. Instant, and duly acknowledged, and yesterday I had the honour to present him to His Excellency, The Governor, by whom he was very politely received.—Mr. Slacum's appointment to this Consulate promises much advantage, inasmuch as, besides elevated sentiments of honor and of public duty, he possesses many personal qualities calculated to make him acceptable to the society and best feeling men of our Country coming here.—For the present he will take up his personal residence and establish his office in my house and I shall most cheerfully aid him with my best advice on all occasions, not only from a sense of duty but from a long friendship to him.—

The Congress has, until yesterday, been "hoerens in cortice"—or, nibbling at the bark.—While Mr. Parish, the British Consul General, and the public have been agonizing for weeks in a state of the most impatient expectations, it having been understood that he only waited the formation of a National Executive to present his credentials as Minister and an acknowledgement of the Independence of the Provinces of Rio la Plata on the part of Great Britain.—Urged by such weighty considerations congress yesterday took up the great question of forming an Executive Power.—The project of Doctor Acosta, before announced, has been virtually withdrawn, and the project now under consideration is to vest in the present Government of Buenos Ayres, a temporary Executive power to conduct all foreign relations, subject, in case of treaties, to the ratification of Congress.—This project was ably debated yesterday and, the session being adjourned to this day, the debate is now going on, and I hope that the vessel by which this goes, may be long enough delayed to enable me to transmit the whole project with the final decision on it.—

In this communication I have continued that unrestrained style which a sense of duty and a love of truth have always dictated.—I just now recollect that the principles stated have taken a more free flow from my long personal accquaintance with M^r^ Adams, whereas it is now quite uncertain to what Gentleman this may be delivered, as Secretary of State; my wavering confidence, however, gets new strength in the conviction that, in our country, no man reaches the highest offices of our virtuous Government who does not duly appreciate the principles which on this occasion I have ventured to profess.—

January 24, 1825.

I have only a moment to add that Congress yesterday sanctioned and approved the law vesting provisionally in the present Government of Buenos Ayres the Supreme Executive Power to conduct the foreign Relations of the United Provinces.—Inclosed I send you the Argos of Saturday and an Extraordinary number of same paper published this day, as also the Gaceta Mercantil of this day, containing the principal facts of the late Affairs in Peru and the additional fact of the murder of Mr. Rowcroft, British Consul General in Peru.—

I have the honour [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *May 2, 1825.*

P. S., May 8, 1825. Great events are flowing in so rapidly upon me from all quarters, that I have much difficulty in giving order to the narration.—This Government has received most tranquillizing and satisfactory communications from the victorious General Sucre.—They will all be found in the different numbers of the "Argos" now transmitted, but to bring some of the most important more promptly to your knowledge, I send translations of several.[2]—In the official communication of Sucre, he professes his own deter-

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, II.

[2] The more important of the pertinent enclosures are the following:

[TRANSLATION]

SALTA & BUENOS AYRES

The Government of the Province of Buenos Ayres, as charged with the National Executive Power by the general Constituent Congress of the Provinces of the River La Plata.

It being convenient for the General interest of the United Provinces to accelerate by all possible means the termination of the misfortunes of the present war, and to cause that the four Provinces of Upper Peru, even to the *Desaguadero* should immediately regain their liberty— With these views, the Government of Buenos Ayres charged with the National Executive Power, has resolved to authorize fully, as by the present it does authorize the Colonel (major) In° Anth^y Alvarez de Arenales, Governor & Captain General of the Province of Salta, to adjust the Convention that he may think necessary with the Chief or Chiefs who command the Spanish forces which occupy the said four Provinces, even to the *Desaguadero*, or with the persons that be in like manner authorized by them, upon the basis that these are to remain in the most compleat liberty to agree on what shall be most convenient for their interests and Government— The National Executive being obliged as it does oblige itself to ratify immediately—or with the previous authorization of the General Constituent Congress, according to the fundamental law of 23^d January—all which, in virtue of the present, the said Governor & Captain General of the Province of Salta shall adjust and agree to in its name.—

Given, at Buenos Ayres, this 8^th of Febr^y 1825.

(Sign^d) HERA—MANUEL JOSE GARCIA.

mination not to participate in any political agency, but to return to the main army. Allusion, however, is made to the expected arrival of Bolivar, and

Instructions to which the Governor & Captain General of the Province of Salta, Don Juan Anthoy Alvarez de Arenales, should conform himself in the commission which is conferred upon him by the National Executive Power.

Considering that the triumph which the Liberating army of Peru, obtained on the 9th Decemer will put an end to the war of Independence in the whole Continent, without the necessity of again having recourse to a single battle—that the efforts which the General of the Spanish forces occupying the four Provinces of Upper Peru, as far as to the Desaguadero, is now pretending to make, can have no other object since that important event than that of placing himself in a position to be able to derive all possible advantages from a Capitulation which he will find himself obliged to make—that it is always a point of great interest, lessens as far as may be, the calamities of war, especially in a country that has suffered so much under its dreadful scourge—and that even for the better organizing the before named four Provinces, it would be more convenient they should embrace the cause of Independence by means the least violent—the Government of the Province of Buenos Ayres, charged with the National Executive power, is persuaded that it will be convenient that a person of the character, and possessing the qualities which distinguish His Honor, the Governor of Salta, being vested with the necessary powers, should be able to profit of the critical circumstances to which the remnant of the Spanish army in Upper Peru has become reduced, in order to obtain in favour of that territory a dissolution of said army in virtue of a convention that be entered into with its chief or chiefs—and that thus the four Provinces mentioned remain in perfect liberty to arrange their interests & form their Government.—Consequently, the said Governor being fully authorized, by this & by the credentials which are annexed, the Government limits itself to the declaring

1st That the basis of whatever convention should be the dissolution of the Spanish army and the entire liberty of the Provinces to dispose of their lot as best may suit them.—

2d That he may guarrantee in the name of the National Government to the chiefs, officers and Civilians, the permission of leaving the country with their property & families, or that of remaining with them in the place of their residence.—

3d That it is left to the discretion of his Honor, the Governor, to grant other personal advantages to such other individuals as he may consider convenient, in order to secure the object of the liberty of the Provinces and the immediate cessation of the war.—Buenos Ayres, 6th Feby 1825.

(Sign'd) Manuel Jose Garcia.

[translation]

Liberating Army, Head Quarters in La Paz, February 20, 1825.

Most Excellent Sir: I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the Liberating army after having acquired the Independence and the peace of Lower Peru in the battles of Iunin & Ayacucho, has passed the Desaguadero with the view of ransoming these Provinces from the Spanish power.—

His Excellency, the *Liberator*, at the time of prescribing me this movement, believed that on the approaching of the army, Independence in these Provinces would be proclaimed by General Olañeta, who had offered us his friendship, and thus His Excellency considered as unnecessary, the giving me other instructions than those of requiring of the Spanish General this measure, which, in itself, terminated the war General Olaneta, opposing his reunion with us, has persisted in sustaining the royal cause, and we have found ourselves obliged to pass the Desaguadero, and to employ force to destroy him and to wrest from him the Country.—

The greater part of this territory being liberated and without a government of its own which should charge itself with the public direction, under circumstances in which the Argentine Provinces have not yet organized their central Government, and Peru does nothing regarding these Provinces, I had thought it my duty as an American and as a Soldier to convoke an assembly of these Provinces, that forming a government purely provisional may put an end to factions, to parties & to anarchy, and preserve the territory in the best order.—With this view I have issued the subjoined Decree which is a generous testimony of our principles—to which I add the solemn protest of the neutrality of the Liberating army, in the domestic affairs of these Provinces. I consider it my duty to inform the different governments of the United Provinces of this step—to which I have been compelled by the circumstances—meanwhile the General Argentine Gov-

his probable *Umpirage* between the other Provinces and those newly conquered.—Among the translations I hope to be able to include the commission of this Government to General Arenales to treat with the Provinces of Upper Peru, in the contemplated representative assemblies, and the instructions to that officer to guide him in these affairs.—From the Banda Oriental we have the most cheering news for the friends of the daring and patriotic efforts making in that quarter for the recovery of independence.—In addition to the various printed bulletins which I transmit, I also send an extract of a letter from my respected and intelligent friend, Doct. Joshua Bond, giving some of the

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ernment, being installed, it may be submitted to its consideration as I now do to the Government of Peru.—

Your Excellency will please to accept [etc.].

LIBERATING ARMY, HEAD QUARTERS IN POTOSI, April 6, 1825.

May it please Your Excellency.

It is highly satisfactory to me to be the organ of the Liberating army to the Argentine People through the installing of its General Government— This event is of an immense importance to the cause of America—and the army feels in it all the pleasure that the welfare of its brothers inspires.—On the 29" ult. I entered this city, and to the satisfaction of reaching (treading) the last Capital that was oppressed by the Spaniards I add the pleasure of knowing the reunion of the United Provinces.—

General Olañeta, who had evacuated this town on the 28th fell in with a column of our army on the 1st inst. and, being completely defeated and wounded, died on the 2d.—A wretched corps of 300 men, wandering and fugitive, is all that disturbs the country and will be destroyed in a fortnight by the forces I have sent out, in every direction to pursue them.—As a consequence of these fortunate events, our communication with Your Provinces has become free, and I discharge a pleasing duty in congratulating Your Excellency and the Illustrious People over whom you preside, on the termination of the war of Independence.—I have the pleasure of including herewith the duplicate of a communication that I directed to the different Governments of the River La Plate, on the 20th February, accompanied by a Decree issued on the 9th relative to these provinces of Upper Peru.—The General Assembly, of which it treats, will not be united until the 5th May, because the occupation of these settlements by the enemy prevented the election of deputies from taking place.

It has been pleasing to me that a just cause should have retarded this meeting so that the Argentine Government may establish its relations with this assembly and with the Government of Peru—to the end that an affair of so much importance be terminated in a manner the most agreeable and fraternal, as in conformity with the sincere desires of the Liberating army.—I have manifested in the communication already noticed, the motives that induced me to this Decree, and I hope the Argentine Government, that of Peru, and these Provinces will find in my principles a most sincere desire for the good of these settlements.—My sole object has been the saving them from the dislocation with which they were threatened, the avoiding anarchy and the forming a mass that should obviate the disorders of the Provinces in a state of dissolution, at the same time it should free them from the weight of a military Government, that would make the Liberators themselves detestable, constituting a government of their own although purely provisional.—The Liberator, Bolivar will be in these countries the beginning of May and will afford a fine opportunity for the Argentine Government to open her relations with the Peruvian regarding these Provinces—I also think that the timely concurrence of her representatives in an arrangement that so much interests her, would prove to both an important service.—Having, on my part, with the Liberating army, extinguished the last remnants of the Peninsular tyranny, and, not appertaining to me, as an auxilliary soldier, intervention in domestic questions, I have concluded my commission and consequently my military duties calling me where is the greater part of the army, I return at the close of this month, to the other side of the Desaguadero, leaving these Provinces well garrisoned, thus to obviate the evils that the spirit of party and aspiring views might cause them during the interval of the arrival of the Liberator to take cognisance of their affairs.—I have the honor to offer to your Excellency, the sentiments of the distinguished consideration and respect, with which I am [etc.].

events which have so unexpectedly hastened the advances of this Thermophylitan band, resembling in miniature the triumphal return of Napoleon from Elba.—God grant that no second battle of *Waterloo* may lower in the distant horizon of this patriotic effort.—It seems that General Le Cor, distinguished for his subtlety and the greatest craftiness, has been compleatly overreached by Frutos Rivera, one of his leading officers, a native of Banda Oriental.—This last having received written offers of a large bribe for his detection (some say 80,000 dollars) from the secret committee here, went immediately to General Le Cor and shewed him the letter, which so entirely confirmed Le Cor's confidence in Frutos that he gave him five hundred men with full powers, as military governor of all the Country part of the Banda Oriental. Thus authorized, he went forth and by virtue of his military powers dispersed in different directions the most important body of troops, who fell easily into the hands of La Valleja's party, and soon afterwards Frutos Rivera, himself, joined them.—He, soon after joining the patriots, proved the sincerity of his conversion by publickly burning his imperial uniform.—

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 18, 1825.*

In a day or two after receipt of my commission, I presented it to Mr. Garcia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who kept it for enregistering, and returned it, accompanied by that formality, on 20th August, whence dates my official rank and precedence. On this point I have to regret that, although I had knowledge of my appointment at least one month sooner than Mr. Parish's credentials reached him, his came to hand nearly a month sooner than mine, by which means I lost that precedence which is due to my Country, from the priority of her efforts in the cause of the independence of these people, and to myself, from my much longer residence than that of any foreign agent here.—I was publickly presented to His Excellency, the Governor, on Sunday, 28th August in the Audience Hall of the Palace.—The speeches made were published by the Government in the next succeeding number of the "Argos", and will be found among the papers forwarded.—I inclose them both (mine, and the Governor's in reply) in English for your examination, and hope that they will meet your approbation. . . .

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, II.

I come, now, to touch on the present State of these Provinces, and, would to God! I could present a more consoling picture to the friends of rational liberty and the solid independence of South America.—Bustos, the military Bashaw of Cordova, has added another to his previous political enormities already reported. He has, in his accustomed style of military despotism, dissolved the Junta of that Province. The Junta has transmitted to the national Congress here, an able and spirited remonstrance against this high handed measure. I forward, herewith, a copy of this document. The Congress, to postpone the discussion, has decreed that a report (or *informe*) should be asked of Bustos. The fact is, that the good and the wise are revolted at Bustos' conduct, but the storm of fanaticism, gathering thick in various quarters, has burst forth in the Province of San Juan, where the fanatics have compleatly overthrown the liberal party and obliged them to seek an asylum in Mendoza, and this alarming occurrence brings every other measure to a more serious aspect and induces the necessity of the greatest prudence and circumspection on the part of a Congress having power only to deliberate, but not to act. . . .

The "Argos" of this date, forwarded herewith, gives an account of some incipient success against the fanatics of San Juan. It also contains a declaration of independence on the part of the provinces of Upper Peru.—

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *November 29, 1825.*

The elections for doubling the present number of representatives in Congress are now taking place in the other Provinces, that for this is ordered for the 18th instant.

The Executive Government and the partizans of a central and consolidated power are active in their efforts to induce the other Provinces to vote for that form, but they are not in all cases successful.

At Mendoza the Provincial Junta, the most enlightened and independent, has voted unanimously for the federal system like that of the United States, and so expressed. But I apprehend that the numbers of the Buenos Ayrean delegation, joined to their direct influence over a majority of the others, will prevail to plant the unity of power, which like the Consulate of Napoleon, will gradually strengthen into an absolute Executive.

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, II.

The Commissioners sent to Bolivar (Messrs. Dias Velez and Alvear) are now on their return. It is understood that Bolivar is disposed to aid these Provinces against Brazil, but the jealousy of the great men here is such, of the influence which such a co-operation would give to the Liberator that they are striving to avoid it by persuading him, at one time, that their own means are amply sufficient to the end in view, at another, that Sir Charles Stuart may be daily expected here, with full powers of the Emperor, Don Pedro, to settle the whole affair. This is the last dream with which they are lulling the solicitude of Bolivar.

In the mean time, we have the certainty that the Emperor has superintended, in person, the embarkation of 2 to 3000 troops with many warlike stores, which have actually sailed for Rio Grande, from whence they are to co-operate with Le Cor at Monte Video. It is confidently believed, however, that these efforts will prove the dying agony of the Brazilian Power in this quarter, since Le Cor is wholly without cavalry, that is to say, without horses, whilst the army of *La Valleja*, upwards of *3000 strong*, and that of Rodriguez, of an equal number, are all perfectly well mounted, and, having the whole Country, can reinforce their Cavalry at pleasure. The God of battles must decide. The parties to the cause are Despotism and Freedom. Should the former have an incipient success, it would, I fear, shake the whole fabric of independence on this side the Equator, which may Heaven avert! . . .

On the 26th Nov. Don Javier Lopez, acting with the most perfect good faith, went out of the city to assemble and review some recruits which he had made for the great national army, when, at 2 o'clock, La Madrid suddenly entered the city and forcibly declared himself Governor of the Province. He immediately proceeded to arrest and imprison all the members of the Junta and the Secretary, Paz, who was, for the moment, charged with the government.—Letters from Tucuman, only to 28th November, deplore with much feeling this dreadful event, as of a nature to bring back all the horrors of anarchy and the most bloody re-action of party.

It would seem as if La Madrid was influenced by motives of the strongest resentment, and is necessarily identified with the violent party of his deceased Uncle. Congress has held two secret sessions in consequence of this news, and the "*Mensagero*" of this date, the organ of the Executive, says, "we know that such an event has called seriously the attention of the National Executive, and we have a right to hope that their measures will be such as are demanded by the honor of the Government itself and the tranquility of the Provinces, threatened by an act so irregular and tumultous."

I know La Madrid well.—He is only distinguished by the most extravagant animal Courage and much of the craftiness and wiliness of Indian warfare. He has very little sound judgment and no education or knowledge. He is the son-in-law of Don Dias Velez, one of the Commissioners sent to Bol-

ivar. In this affair he will lose his life, either in a desperate resistance or by the sword of Justice. Such events are much to be deprecated, as they keep alive the hopes of the enemies of freedom and independence.

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

BUENOS AIRES, *February 9, 1826.*

SIR: This communication, precipitated by the immediate departure of several vessels, will have for sole object to announce the establishment of a permanent National Executive in the person of *His Excellency* Don Bernardino Rivadavia—whose title, as established by law, is, "His Excellency Bernardino Rivadavia, President of the United Provinces of the River Plate."

This new organization renders it necessary that I should be furnished with new credentials, and, to obviate all questions of precedence, I wish that they may reach this before those of Mr. Parish, the British Chargé d'Affaires.

I was yesterday presented in a private audience, by the Minister of State, to the new President, who addressed me in a short speech, expressive of the highest respect for the President of the United States, and some very flattering things towards my humble self. To this speech, I made a short reply, but must reserve the more ample report of these circumstances to my next despatch, this having no object but to urge the early transmission of my new Credentials, which, in present circumstances, it may be well to send in *duplicate*, one to Rio Janeiro and the other to Monte Video.—

I have the honor [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *June 17, 1826.*

Having no very safe mode of transmitting my despatches, I have not before reported my doings on the communication ordered, in your instruction

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, II.
[2] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, III. For the instruction of January 9, 1826, referred to, see above, pt. 1, doc. 153.

No. 2, dated 9th January last, to be made to this Government. That instruction only reached me on 5th April. On the 6th I asked an audience of H.E. The President, which was appointed for the 7th when I accordingly communicated to him, in extenso, your said instruction. He expressed the most grateful sense of the friendly offices of the President through our Minister near the Court of St. Petersburg, to obtain from that of Madrid the final acknowledgement of South American independence, and, also, to move and promote a friendly feeling in other European Cabinets towards these countries. He also manifested his confidence in the merited success of those powerful and kind efforts. On the intimation made to the Governments of Mexico and Columbia by that of the U.S. with a view to obtain a suspension of the projected attack on Cuba and Porto Rico, the President observed that he had long since most anxiously contemplated the very delicate nature of that subject, and was much gratified by the wisdom and prudence of the motives and measures adopted by the Cabinet of Washington. He observed that he considered the question of the future lot of those two islands, as being one of the most important which could be brought before the proposed Congress of Panama, and that on this, and every topic he had the most unbounded confidence in the wisdom and prudence of the President of the U.S. and his Cabinet, and was extremely pleased in the prospect of their participation, by their Ministers, in the deliberations of that most important and interesting occasion. . . .

June 21, 1826.

Already the public is much occupied by the basis of the expected English mediation, which has been suffered (by design, probably, with a view to feel the pulse of opinion) to pierce through the mantle of diplomatic mystery. It is said to be what I have often predicted it would be; nothing short of the erection of a neutral and independent Government in the Banda Oriental, *under the guarantee of England.* This arrangement would probably lead to the making a free port of Montevideo; and, without this last wholly inadmissible idea, it would only create a *Colony in disguise.* I am of opinion that a mediation on such basis, if not refused in the outset, will produce no acceptable arrangement. As far as I have heard the expression of feeling on the subject, it is that of decided opposition to such a project. In the meantime, Don Ignacio Nuñez, an active and warm *American*, long first officer of the Department of Foreign Affairs, more recently in the same character in the office of the Prime Minister, has been sent over to the Banda Oriental, where the first meeting of the new Provincial Junta is about to take place. Mr. Nuñez has very extensive powers from the National Executive, and his objects are, to reconcile some existing jealousies and differences between rival chiefs there, and to ascertain the real feeling of the people, as to the terms of the proposed mediation, preparatory to Lord Ponsonby's arrival,

now daily expected. I have long had a considerable intimacy with Mr. Nuñez, who has, since my arrival here, ever been the effective man of the Foreign Department; excepting, only, during the Ministry of Mr. Rivadavia, with whom he afterwards went to England, as Secretary of Legation. He returned, as did Mr. Rivadavia, quite cured of his previous strong predilection in favor of Great Britain. Mr. Nuñez has repeatedly declared to me his perfect convinction that the South American States had nothing to expect from the European Powers but duplicity and contempt: that their only means of safety were a perfect and most cordial union of American feelings and American resources—the closest and most perfectly fraternal alliance. I have reason to hope, should his mission be successful or satisfactory to Government, that Mr. Nuñez will return to higher functions than those he has hitherto performed.

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *July 15, 1826.*

The Committee on Constitutional affairs have reported a project of law, establishing unity as the general characteristic basis of the Constitution, whose details will hereafter soon be presented. The discussion on this report began last evening. Congress will, no doubt, maintain it, and the Constitution which will follow will, with equal certainty, be voted by that body and recommended to the several Provinces. But the final adoption of such a Constitution cannot be predicted with the same confidence. I have learned from Doctor Gomez, the leading friend of the Executive in Congress, and one of the Constitutional Committee, that the project of Constitution will embrace most of the principles, and even the form of ours. It is intended to have two branches of the Legislature, but, as there will exist no State or Provincial Legislatures, the Senate will be chosen by Electoral Colleges. The House of Representatives will be elected by the people. The Executive appointments to office will only be partially submitted to Senatorial Sanction, and the merging of the present provincial Governments in the new National one, will multiply offices and strengthen Executive influence. These ideas I only collected in a general conversation, but as the great question is of urgent importance, it will very soon be brought before the people.

The affair of peace or the continuance of war is still suspended on the

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, III.

mediation of Lord Ponsonby, not yet arrived here. The Executive does not appear to indulge very confident hopes of the success of that mediation, inasmuch as the most active and persevering efforts for war are going on. Several new regiments of cavalry are ordered, and a new regiment of flying, or horse, artillery, which will be commanded by Dn. Tomas de Iriarte, who was Secretary of Legation with General Alvear in the United States. This last is Minister of War and Marine.

July 17, 1826.

I have learned that the Cabinet here is divided in opinion as to the probable success of Lord Ponsonby's mediation. The President and his Prime Minister, Mr. Aguero, believing in its success, and General Alvear believing that the bases which will be proposed will be such as will be wholly inadmissible. It is thus to be apprehended that this mediation may prove another apple of discord here, and that it will end in a War party and Peace party. Poverty, I fear, will throw humiliation into the scales.

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *August 3, 1826.*

. . . Lord Ponsonby's mediation (of which so much has been expected) has entirely failed, as it is believed; and the refusal to treat, on the part of the Emperor, is supposed to have been sent to the British Government from Rio on 15th June. Many believe that his Lordship will remain at Rio for new instructions, but Mr. Parish thinks otherwise, and that he may be expected here in a few weeks. My opinion is still unaltered, that the British have an occult wish to see this Government so reduced and desponding, and the Province of the Banda Oriental so disgusted by inglorious suffering, as to consent to the cherished project of an independence, guaranteed by Great Britain, or, in other words, a *Colony in disguise.* I am sorry to say that the financial difficulties of this Government, and the inflexible opposition of some of the Provinces, and particularly of Cordova, to the National Executive, still continue without abatement. The dissentions which existed between Rodriguez and Lavalleja, as I have before stated, have been arranged. It is still believed that General Alvear will soon take command of the national army.

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, III.

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 5, 1826.*

The most interesting events which have occurred here since my last, have been the birth of the Constitution, that is, its passage from the hands of the Constitutional Committee into discussion before Congress; and the taking command of the National army by General Alvear. I have not yet seen the Constitution itself, but only the report of the Committee, from which I augur a very close imitation of our system. I shall endeavour to obtain a copy to accompany this. General Alvear passed this River almost in sight of the enemy on 24th day of August, and if he should have the good fortune to get the confidence of the Orientalists, and to put to silence all the heartburnings which have before existed in the army, all will go well; and I anticipate some important successes on the opening of the campaign, which will be in another month.

From a Conference I had with the President on the 17th last month, of which I send a minute made at the time, you will see the objects of primary interest in the political relations between this Country and the United States which at present occupy the mind of the President. In conformity to the intimation made to me at the Conference, I received from the Minister of Foreign Relations an important communication under date of 24th of August, made by order of Government. I send original and my own translation of this communication, and wish that the correctness of the translation may be *tested* in a revision made by a skillful translator in your confidence. I also send copy of my answer, in which I pledge myself to nothing more than its transmission and the prompt and serious attention of the President of the United States, which its importance may fairly be presumed to deserve. As to the naming of a Minister, every thing is settled, and I know the person intended, but shall give you his name and qualities by another opportunity, to avoid the casualities to which this communication may be exposed. Suffice it to say that I have no doubt that he will prove very acceptable. I have, as yet, made no intimation to any of our naval Commanders respecting a passage for the Gentleman and his suite, but reserve it to an expected personal interview with Captain Biddle. By return of some of our vessels from this station or from the Pacific (which squadron I understand will touch at Montevideo) I have no doubt that the Minister will find a safe and agreable mode of transit. I feel it a duty and a pleasure to do every thing in my power to facilitate a friendly diplomatic intercourse between the two

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, III.

Governments. I had yesterday a long and agreable Conference with the President, rendered interesting to him by the communication, on my part, of some important news from Rio. I consider this struggle between Brazil and this Republic as of the highest general interest in its consequences to the liberty and happiness of *all America*, and I cannot dissemble a lively sympathy in the fortunes of the Republican party to the question. This sentiment gains for me the friendship (perhaps momentary) of this Government, and I hope will not be disapproved by my own.

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States[1]

[EXTRACTS]

BUENOS AIRES, *October 25, 1826.*

Cordova has, by a formal decree, separated itself from this Republic, and has determined to send a Minister to solicit a coalition with Bolivia, which Republic is menacing this with war or non intercourse. Under these complicated and daily accumulating embarassments, Lord Ponsonby has made several proposals to this Government tending to a pacification with Brazil. The first was, that the Banda Oriental should be declared independent. This was refused. His next proposal was that Brazil and this Republic should both evacuate that Territory, and leave the Orientalists free to declare their will on the question of independence. This proposal I believe is still unanswered, but I learn, from no common source, that the great difficulty which renders its acceptance impossible, is, that it would admit the right of a Province to secede from the Confederacy, a right which is most vigorously resisted in the case of Cordova and other discontented Provinces. The town has been filled, for the last fortnight, with rumors of many details in Lord Ponsonby's proposals, which, as yet, have no existence: such as, that this Government is to pay 15 millions of dollars in 15 years; that England is to guarantee the payment, and, during the prescribed term, is to have possession of, and a garrison at, Colonia—some say Montevideo. But I am convinced that my above statement is correct as to the real posture of the affair.

In making this proposal, to leave to the free declaration of the Orientalists, the question of their independence, the English count much on their influence in that Province, derived from large acquisitions of real estates there and continued extension of their purchases. British Agents have gone over

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, III.

within a few days to move this subject, and, should fair negotiation not succeed in shaking the policy of this Government, I have reason to believe that intrigue will be employed to attain a decided influence with the inhabitants of that Country, and to frustrate the operations of the war by a deadly opposition. Although the views of the English have not yet been developed to the extent of the rumoured stipulations of military occupancy of Colonia &c. yet I am fully penetrated with the belief that such views are cherished and will discover themselves in the progress of the business. The Brazilians, themselves, do not more compleatly indulge in hopes of advantage from the penury and desperate state of things in this Republic than the *mediating English*. . . .

Another great and serious affair, alluded to in various public papers, has been confidentially communicated to me as having a real existence. I mean a project formed in Europe for dividing the several states of formerly Spanish America, into three Monarchies. I am fully convinced that you must be possessed of much more important and exact data on this subject than I can give you. Yet it is not less my duty to communicate the little I know. On this subject, the Government here has "*Cartas reservadas*" or confidential letters from Europe. According to these letters, this project has been pressed by Mr. Hurtado, the Colombian Minister, but was not known to Mr. Sarratea, the Minister of this Republic (who is now on his return, leaving Mr. Gil Chargé d'Affaires) that the plan had been vigorously resisted by Mr. Canning. It is said that Don Pedro is one of the Monarchs indicated, and it is pretended that *Bolivar* is to be another. As I before stated, you will doubtless get from the more zealous and vigilant agents of the Government in Europe, very ample details on this interesting topic. The only hopes of rescuing American liberty from these atrocious attempts of absolute Power, are placed in the United States and England. An idea generally prevails, as to the identity of views of those two cabinets, in relation to Spanish America. The message of the President on the opening of the approaching sessions of Congress, cannot fail to be replete with the most important matter, and I look towards that moment with the most lively solicitude. I hope that some prompt mode will be found of communicating the views of the cabinet of Washington to this vast section of America, by some of our smaller vessels of War, as the channels of Commercial intercourse are too few and uncertain in the present state of things here.

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States [1,2]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 8, 1827.*

It is presumed that the accounts of these two great reverses will reach the Emperor simultaneously and, it is hoped, will incline his heart to peace. It certainly will tend to fortify this Government in its previous determination to resist all his pretensions either to the conquest or the independence of the Banda Oriental; the last of which having been, as it still is, the favorite project of the English, the greatest activity is now observed among their agents sooner to protract the war than abandon their system. So that, the happiest immediate effect to be hoped from this success, may be the tempering and, may God send final conciliation of Provincial resistance.

March 9, 1827.

I regret to say that the news which continues to come in from the Provinces is of a very unfavourable nature. Doct. Castro, from whose mission to Mendoza hopes were entertained, has returned with a negative answer to all his proposals. In short, the Congress is threatened with further extreme measures on the part of the discontented provinces.

While I am writing, an intelligent English Gentleman has called and informs me that the basis of a peace is already settled, chiefly through the negotiation of Sir William Gordon with the Brazilian Government at Rio de Janeiro. The basis of this peace, as far as relates to territorial limits, is said to be that pointed out in the treaty of 1777 between the Spanish and Portuguese.

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States [1,2]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *April 12, 1827.*

P.S., April 20, 1827. The humiliating necessity which has dictated the mission of Mr. Garcia, the active but secret enemy of the present Ministry and the devoted Agent of the British and Brazilian factions, augurs but poor

[1] This letter, though dictated by Mr. Forbes, was at his request signed by J. D. Mendenhall.

[2] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, III.

hopes of the basis which he may be empowered to propose. I believe that basis to be such as will open a wide field to future difficulties and the most violent parties: The mutual evacuation of the disputed territory, leaving its inhabitants to the election of their future lot and character. The question of their independence or their continuance in their association with the other provinces, will be the first signal of parties. If the friends of nominal independence prevail, it will be impossible to attempt such an independence without the aid of some European Government, and, under all circumstances, the only Government which will offer or accept such intervention will be England. Such an intervention will at once excite the lively jealousy of other European Powers, and will not be seen with any pleasure by the Sister Republics of this hemisphere: so that, Mr. Garcia's mission is beset with many and most complicated casualties, among which must not be overlooked the great instability of the existing Government here.

The projected Congress at San Juan is fast organizing. The opposition party is encouraged by the embarrassments of the Government and quite unbending in its views and purposes, and I fear that the pride of the Executive will induce some more important National sacrifices to the foreign foe, rather than such concessions as may be necessary to conciliate their domestic rivals and enemies and to unite the whole resources of the several Provinces in a vigorous prosecution of the War. How much is to be regretted such a horrid preversion of every patriotic sentiment in such an interesting crisis in the fortunes of the South American Republics!!!

I have the honor [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States [1,2]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *July 18, 1827.*

It was decided that the Provincial Government of Buenos Ayres should be re-established with all convenient speed; and that, during the necessary measures to that object, a provisionary President should be elected and a new ministry formed to watch over the general interests and to prosecute the war: this provisional authority only to exist until the provinces shall have decided on the mode of establishing a new and permanent national Government. Mr. Rivadavia's resignation was accepted, and Doct. Don Vincente

[1] This letter, though dictated by Mr. Forbes, was at his request signed by J. D. Mendenhall.

[2] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, III.

Lopez was elected by a large majority to be President provisionally. On the first offer of this high dignity, although under the most flattering circumstances, he declined it: but on its being urged to his acceptance by an appeal to the highest motives of patriotism, he was induced to accept; qualifying such acceptance by the assurance that he relied entirely on the cordial support of all parties; and that if he failed in this just hope, he should immediately resign his power. His ministers, as far as he has named them are, Doct. Don Tomas Anchorena, Minister of the Treasury, and General Marcos Balcarce, Minister of Foreign Relations and of War and Marine.

In the meantime an order has been given for the election of forty seven members to form the Provincial Junta of this town and Province, which is to take place on Sunday next.

General Alvear has been removed from the command of the National army, and General Lavalleja, the leader of the gallant band who first raised the standard of Independence in the Oriental Province, is named to succeed him. This nomination is extremely popular, and the happiest results are expected from it. He leaves this city this evening, and it is presumed his presence will electrify the whole Province of Banda Oriental and reunite many corps who have left the National Army, under command of Alvear, in disgust.

All these events have passed in the utmost tranquility and good order; and the present feelings of the nation are full of hope and enthusiasm.

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *May 2, 1828.*

On my first interview with the Governor his communication to me was frank and confidential and he did not hesitate to declare his distrust in the eventual success of this pending negociation; and told me his orders to Gen[l] Lavalleja were in some measure dictated by this distrust, as he had ordered him to continue all his belligerent measures without the least relaxation; since that time the opinion has been daily gaining strength that this proposed independence of the Banda Oriental was only to serve as a veil to cover new intrigues of the Brazilian Government who availing itself of the state of anarchy in which that unhappy country has been so long, are most industri-

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, III.

ously working to get the Inhabitants to consent to a princely or ducal Government under the protection of the Emperor of Brazils, even the person intended to hold the ducal power has been mentioned, and all these circumstances have much enfeebled the hopes of a peace at one moment entertained—connected with the project of peace a congress of ministers at Monte Video has been spoken of to complete all the details of such a compact—on the part of this Government the gentlemen designated are Gen[l] Don Ramon Balcarce, Gen[l] Don Tomas Guido, and Don Pedro Feliciana Cavia.

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Henry Clay, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *September 13, 1828.*

P.S., September 17, 1828. Since writing the foregoing we are overwhelmed with a multiplicity of great events from Europe and Rio brought by the arrival of two British Packets nearly at the same time; the most important and interesting event for this country is the conclusion of an honorable and advantageous peace with the Emperor of Brazils; the general conditions of this peace are complete independence of the Banda Oriental together with the evacuation of the two fortified places of Montevideo and Colonia, to take effect four months after the formation of a provincial constitution for that Province; the Blockade to be raised immediately after the ratification of the Treaty by this Government; this treaty is to be sent immediately by special commissioners and submitted to the national convention now sitting at Santa Fé; all question of indemnity on one side or the other is completely merged, and as the conditions of this Treaty are considered to embrace every thing which this Government asked or could ask, no doubt is entertained of its prompt ratification.

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, III.

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

[EXTRACT]

BUENOS AIRES, *February 13, 1830.*

The situation of the affairs of this Country still continues to be complicated and the subject of the greatest uneasiness: for, although the late struggle has eventuated in the establishment of a decided numerical superiority in favor of the Federals, yet, the great strength of talent, wealth and respectability of the Unitarian party, joined to the military successes of General Paz, in Cordova, keep alive their hopes and protract the agony of their ambition: while, on the other hand, the total absence of that great sinew of war, *money;* the dilapidated state of the public treasury and the necessarily declining public credit, render it extremely difficult for the dominant party to sustain their power, without resort to measures of violence, which might revolt public opinion. To these difficulties may be added the existing differences among the ministers to which I have alluded in my previous dispatches.

Much hope rests on the pending negotiations of the mediating commissioners. Of their positive success nothing is published; although several of their circular communications to the Provinces will be found among the accompanying gazettes. This absence of authentic information, opens a wide field to conjecture and invention among both parties. In the mean time, the active preparations for defence on the part of the Government, both by voluntary and forced recruiting, raise doubts of the supremacy of the Federal arms in the interior provinces. I have recently had frequent occasions to see the Governor and his ministers. A few days since, I had a visit from H. Excellency, and saw him to day at his own house. His countenance, as well as those of his ministers, indicates the constant effort of thought and anxious reflection. I have ascertained to day the truth of a rumour that the Governor contemplates a journey to Santa Fé, where he has been invited to a conference with the Governors of the neighboring provinces of Santa Fé, Corrientes and Entre Rios; and there can be no doubt that the object of that conference is to combine the means of resistance, should the mediation fail which is now going on. During these passing events, projects of European intervention, some time since circulated, are now brought again into notice; and it is now asserted, on what is stated to be respectable authority, that these provinces, going under the assumed name of the "*Argentine Republic*", are to be annexed to the Empire of Brazils, on the previous condition that the little Queen, D[a]. *María da Gloria*, shall renounce all her pretensions to the throne of Portugal. It is added that the project is sus-

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, IV.

tained by England and Austria, and that a prince of the Imperial House of Austria is hereafter to marry the little Queen. Time, alone, will develope these mysteries, which may prove to be only political dreams thrown out to influence these people to a cordial union among themselves. If, in the extensive correspondence of our Government with Europe, any facts, important to the interests of this Country, should cast up, it would be a friendly and ingratiating office to make them known to this Government; and it would be particularly grateful to me to be the organ of such friendly communications.

I have the honor [etc.].

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John M. Forbes, Chargé d'Affaires of the United States at Buenos Aires, to Martin Van Buren, Secretary of State of the United States [1]

BUENOS AIRES, *December 25, 1830.*

SIR: Herwith I transmit duplicate of my last No 107, the original of which went by the Brig Soto, Cap[t] Ricketson for New York.

Since then a very important event has occurred here; nothing less than the acknowledgment of the independence of this Republic, by the new King of France. This great event is officially announced by a note of the 20[th] of this month from Mr Mendeville, the Consul General of France, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs here.

Mr Juan Larrea, the Consul General of this Republic at Paris, arrived by the last British packet, and brought a confirmation of this important news.

It is presumed that a minister will be appointed to go to France, as soon as the consent of all the provinces can be obtained, which must be done by circular communications as in the case of the late mission to Brazils. I am inclined to believe that the person who will be proposed for that mission, will be, my friend Gen[l] Don Thomas Guido.

I am [etc.].

[1] MS. Dispatches from Argentina, IV.

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